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January/February 1977

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International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs


The non-aligned movement

Slowness of disarmament

East-West strategic parity

Is SALT worth its salt?

Co-operating with the dictators



Contents

January/February 1977

the non-aligned movement/ <i>C. V. Svoboda</i>	3
non-aligned chronology	6
armament	
Lack of progress/ <i>R. Harry Jay</i>	10
Achievement of strategic parity/ <i>C. R. Jacobsen</i>	12
Two years after Vladivostok/ <i>Lloyd Jensen</i>	17
Planning for the generations/ <i>Thomas Land</i>	21
atorships and economic development/ <i>Renaud Bernardin</i>	25
ter to the Editor	29
ference section	29

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The "creative alternative" of the non-aligned movement

by C. V. Svoboda

In an earlier article in this journal concluded with the observation that the non-aligned grouping was, and probably would remain, "a large unwieldy body that will take few practical or economic decisions" but that it would also, since it had with the passage of time developed a "curious life of its own . . . , probably . . . continue to exist". The latter forecast has, during 1974 and 1975, proved its fundamental soundness; whether the earlier conclusion will bear the scrutiny of time remains, essentially, open as before.

The conception of a non-aligned group arose in the 1950s as a reaction by certain states to the bipolar world that emerged out of the Second World War. The basic common factor shared by the states that met at the first conference at Bandung was a desire to remain separate from "European quarrels". This desire to free themselves of European influences extended beyond a mere urge to rest aloof from European antagonisms; it included a desire to further the development of the "Third World" and the exploration of solutions to problems shared by non-European countries. During the 1960s, as polarization became less important, the members of the movement became increasingly preoccupied with economic and social concerns.

The reorientation of the non-aligned movement to full flower at the Algiers summit meeting in August 1973. Under Algerian guidance, the conference demonstrated a greater degree of non-aligned cohesiveness than ever before. There was little debate over the identification of problem areas such as racism, development, imperialism, and peace and security. Rather, the emphasis was on the preparation and elaboration of common positions.

The Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, called at the request of the then evident leader of the non-aligned movement, Algeria, saw the first solid manifestation of the "Spirit of Algiers" in the UN context. In practical terms, this reflected, in a political

dimension, many of the economic aspirations of the Third World earlier seen in the contexts of the UNCTAD forum, the Second Development Decade Preparatory Commission and the energetic and continuing debates of the General Assembly's Second Economic Committee, where the Group of 77, the economic incarnation of the Third World, focused its collective energies for many years.

Until relatively recently, the non-aligned lacked any formal cohesiveness either in terms of bureaucratic structure or ideology. As a result, the movement tended to suffer an absence of focus and had to endure serious internal communication problems that perhaps only now are being faced squarely. This has meant that there are few sources from which the interested outsider can gather material on the movement; indeed, the tendency of many writers on international development and the policies of developed/developing country relations has been to limit their analyses to the regional level except as regards specific common economic problems.

There is a natural tendency to associate the non-aligned nations with the underdeveloped nations, or so-called Third World. Indeed, it is often assumed that the two coincide. In fact, they do not,

*Cohesiveness
only recently
attained*

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because the non-aligned grouping still reflects much of its Cold War origin in such matters as the criteria for membership. The non-aligned, furthermore, as is suggested by its name, has a particular political role and orientation which sets it apart from both the Third World and the Group of 77.

Pakistan and certain other Third World countries have never been members of the non-aligned grouping, and their membership in the West's military pacts or the presence of foreign military bases on their soil continue to be obstacles to admission. Even if the political requirements were altered (and the non-aligned seem more indulgent towards Eastward leanings than Westward ones), it would still be difficult to provide satisfactory Third World criteria. In economic terms, as much as in politics or ideology, there are wide disparities between members. Yugoslavia, for example, is by the standards of most other members of the grouping a rich industrialized country, and oil-rich Kuwait can scarcely be equated with potentially bankrupt Chad.

First use

The actual term "non-alignment" was first used in a communique resulting from a meeting between Tito and Nasser that followed immediately after the 1956 Brioni meeting of Tito, Nasser and Nehru. Non-alignment became known as an expression of a state's desire to remain outside of any formal military alliance with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Consequently, it was decided that countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Pakistan, on the one hand, and China, on the other, were to be excluded. After Bandung, because non-alignment was defined in broad political terms and included states from almost every continent, it was thought that the possibility of a series of well-designed political platforms permitted by division of the world into regional organization would be cast aside in favour of an unwieldy but more inclusive world movement.

The members of the movement became deeply involved in economic and social concerns in the early 1960s. In fact, it was at this time that five influential leaders of the non-aligned states (Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and Tito) met to discuss joint action that might be taken in the United Nations. A year later, the first formal conference of the non-aligned was held in Belgrade and produced specific proposals.

During the first 15 years of its existence, the movement had, by and large, of

perceived necessity, to concern itself with immediate and pressing political issues: issues of freedom, equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is evident even the casual observer that these endeavours in the political sphere, just like the problems they are intended to combat, will continue into the foreseeable future. However, with the third "summit" at Lusaka in 1970 and, more emphatically since the fourth "summit" at Algiers, 1973, economic issues have also attracted the increasing attention of the movement.

It was readily apparent that, although there were often similarities of approach amongst Third World states on economic and political questions, nations would tend naturally to group in different ways according to specific issues, depending on their specific national interests. On certain questions individual interests in the realms either of international politics or economics would need to be sacrificed or to the other or to the cause of movement solidarity. The internecine difficulties in this regard were no more exacerbated by the political/economic "mix" than they were by the simple growth factor in the non-aligned movement. At the outset there were 25 members; at the conclusion of Colombo, the movement numbered 83, representing nearly two-thirds the membership of the United Nations, a body that owes much of its recent evolution to the "Spirit of Algiers" emanating from the 1973 summit meeting.

New dynamism

The shape and direction of the movement derived a new dynamism and emphasis at the Algiers meeting, the result of which were embodied in a political declaration of a general character, a "declaration on the struggle for national liberation", an economic declaration and an "action program for economic co-operation", together with a number of supplementary resolutions on specific subjects. These documents presented for the first time comprehensive and interrelated political and economic objectives, which have since inspired the policies of the non-aligned and developing countries. They foreshadowed the proposals on economic development advanced at the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly, the regular sessions in 1974 and 1975, and, in part, those advanced at UNCTAD IV and the CIEC this year. The documents also formed the basis upon which solidarity was forged on political issues, particularly on the Middle East and southern Africa. The proposition that emerged from the Algiers conference



S. R. D. Bandaranaike addresses the Thirty-First General Assembly of the United Nations in her dual capacity as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka and as leader of the non-aligned movement. She described the non-aligned movement as "a creative alternative to mutual suspicion, recrimination and hate...".

crit exegesis, and might be summarized as follows:

— While progress towards East-West détente was welcome, it could not amount to "a mere shifting of confrontation from one area to another". Peace is indivisible; détente will remain precarious if it does not take into consideration the interests of other countries.

— Henceforth, the relevant differences in the world would be increasingly economic, rather than ideological or political; they would be between the rich and the poor, the industrialized and the developing, the North and the South.

— International security could not be maintained unless it included "an economic dimension which guarantees to all countries the right to implement their development programs free from economic aggression and any other form of pressure". Non-aligned countries "should take prompt action at the UN with a view to strengthening the organization's security system to include economic security".

— Except in southern Africa, where the problem remained especially acute, the additional institutional expressions of colonialism and imperialism had, for most practical purposes, been liquidated; however, neo-colonialism, in the form of "polit-

ical subjection and economic domination", was as aggressive as ever.

— "Zionism" was to be associated with colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Non-aligned countries should sever, suspend or freeze "all relations with (Portugal), South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel" and denounce these regimes in "all international political, economic, cultural and social forums". From 1975, Zionism has been linked by the non-aligned with racism, and Israel has increasingly come under attack for its putative military and other close relations with the Republic of South Africa.

— More specifically, non-aligned countries should lend every assistance to the African liberation movements; the PLO was the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of their just struggle"; member countries should take steps to boycott Israel and South Africa in all ways, including methods outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter.

The outcome of the Algiers conference proved to be of greater significance to the United Nations than had at first been generally expected. The conference had identified a set of beliefs, aspirations and interests designed to distinguish non-alignment anew from both the West and the

*Unexpected
significance
of Algiers
conference
to United Nations*

East, and to confer upon the Third World a degree of cohesion at the UN that it had never known before. It was based essentially on the determination of the newly-independent developing countries to secure a more equitable share of the wealth of the world, on the support that the Arab countries, as financial leaders of the non-aligned group, would be able to muster in favour of the Palestinians, and on the strong commitment of African states to ending the denial of human rights in southern Africa.

Assembly dominated

As had been foreseen following Algiers, non-aligned group initiatives began to predominate at the UN General Assembly. The enhanced cohesion and organizational efficiency of the non-aligned, which had been a significant feature of previous UN General Assembly sessions, came to be reflected in the confident management by Third World delegations of most major issues that interested them. The dramatically-increased economic power of the Arab oil-producing states assured the Arab element of a much-strengthened leader-

ship capacity among the non-aligned forces and of a respectful, or at least wary, attention from the delegates of industrialized countries. The Arabs have been able to proceed methodically with the advancement of Palestinian claims on Middle East issues. Virtually universal Third World support on this front was assured by enabling the Africans to achieve their long-sought goal of excluding South Africa from participation in UN Assembly proceedings. The non-aligned split as usual on political issues like Cambodia and Korea, where the acute national sensitivities of particular members far outweighed considerations of group solidarity. However, such fissures in non-aligned unanimity were eclipsed by the unqualified community of purpose with which the group pursued its overriding universal object of bringing about a "new world economic order" dramatically favouring the interests of developing countries.

There was a measure of validity in the argument of several non-aligned spokesmen that Third World delegates were not merely using to their advantage the majority position long enjoyed and used again

*Increase
in oil prices
assured
Arab leadership*

A non-aligned chronology

1955 *April*. Bandung Afro-Asian Conference.

1956 President Nasser of Egypt, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Mr. Nehru of India reaffirm Bandung principles.

1961 *September*. First conference of heads of state or government of non-aligned countries, Belgrade. Attended by 25 countries (mainly African and Asian, but including Cyprus and Yugoslavia) and three Latin American observers.

1962 *July*. Conference on problems of economic development, Cairo. Attended by 31 non-aligned and other developing countries and five observers.

1964 *October*. Second conference of heads of state or government, Cairo. Attended by 47 countries, including Cuba, and ten observers (nine Latin American and Caribbean states and Finland).

1970 *April*. Foreign ministers' meeting, Dar-es-Salaam.

September. Third conference of heads of state or government, Lusaka. Attended by 51 countries (including Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago) and nine observers from Latin America and South Vietnam.

1971 *September*. Ministerial meeting of non-aligned countries, New York. Attended by 54 states and six observers for consultations before the Twenty-Sixth UN General Assembly.

1972 *August*. Foreign ministers' conference, Georgetown, Guyana. Issues the "Georgetown Declaration", an action program for economic co-operation, a statement on international security and disarmament, and seven political resolutions.

1973 *September*. Fourth conference of heads of state or government, Algiers. Attended by 75 full members (56 represented by heads of state or government), nine countries and 14 liberation movements.

tem by developed countries in a United Nations whose rules of procedure were drawn up long before most non-aligned states achieved independence. Developing countries saw progressive and collective action in the General Assembly as one of the few ways open to them to press the industrialized world towards reform of the international economic system. In their view, the developed countries that were in a position to take effective action, both in the realm of international peace and security and on economic issues, had often failed to act to solve global problems through the UN in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Charter. Instead, they had resorted to more specifically-oriented institutions and arrangements that suited them better (CCD, IMF, IBRD, GATT) on major current issues. Even the Security Council was viewed with misgiving because of the veto power retained by its permanent members. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. appeared to Third World delegates to act broadly in concert to determine the fate of the Middle East in the light of considerations of strategic advantages, oil and domestic

politics. It is thus predictable that Third World countries will tend to band together at the UN General Assembly, where their collective force may be felt at least to a greater extent than in other multilateral contexts.

As an aside, it cannot be said that up to 1976 the Soviet bloc enjoyed many concrete and identifiable successes. Voting scrupulously as always with the non-aligned on all political issues with anti-colonial connotations but clearly situated in the "industrialized" camp on many economic questions, the Soviet bloc tended largely to be taken for granted as totally predictable, if not positively ignored, by the very Third World representatives whose favour they vigorously sought.

In the face of Third World solidarity on UN General Assembly proceedings and decisions, Canadian and other Western delegations began to find themselves for the most part in a defensive stance. With few exceptions, they were reacting to non-aligned initiatives, seeking, at best, to modify draft resolutions so as to render the consequences of their inevitable adoption less unpalatable, and, at worst, to

as observers, together with three countries and four international organizations as "guests". Issued economic and political declarations, a declaration on national liberation, an action program for economic co-operation, 16 political and six economic resolutions.

1974 *March*. Second ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau, Algiers (first Bureau meeting followed Algiers summit meeting, 1973). Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and 23 observers.

1975 *February*. Conference of developing countries on raw materials, Dakar, Senegal. Stemmed from the 1973 Algiers summit meeting, but nominally open to all developing countries; of the 110 invited, 57 non-aligned and ten other developing countries attended (only 15 represented at ministerial level), together with observers.

Issued the "Dakar Declaration", an action program and 19 resolutions, none on political issues.

March. Third ministerial meeting of Co-ordinating Bureau, Havana. Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and 24 observers.

August. Fifth meeting of foreign ministers, Lima. Attended by 82 full members — North Vietnam, North Korea, Panama and the Palestine Liberation Organization joined; Mozambique and South Vietnam were elevated to full membership; South Korea's application was rejected.

1976 *May*. Fourth meeting of Co-ordinating Bureau, Algiers. Attended by foreign ministers of the 17 Bureau countries and observers for 29 countries and organizations. Angola, Comores and Seychelles accepted as full members.

July. Information ministers' meeting, New Delhi.

August. Foreign ministers' meeting, Colombo, followed by fifth conference of heads of state or government, Colombo. Membership raised to 86.

organize protest votes as respectably as possible by way of opposition or abstention. Against the pressure of the non-aligned majority, these efforts achieved only mixed results.

The fifth summit conference of non-aligned countries, held in Colombo (Sri Lanka) from August 16 to 19, 1976, focused on the contentious issue of defining non-alignment in the light of the major changes in world political and economic relations since the last summit meeting in Algiers three years earlier. Its 15-point draft agenda embraced a wide range of political and economic issues — some of them highly divisive. They covered southern Africa, the Middle East and the Palestinian question, Cyprus, Korea, Latin America, the Indian Ocean “peace-zone” idea, disarmament and the implications of *détente*. Economic issues centred largely on the demand for a new international economic order; the Colombo participants urged greater economic solidarity and co-operation among non-aligned countries, especially with “countries subjected to foreign economic pressures”.

Reservations

Several states circulated specific reservations on elements of the final communiqué, e.g. on Korea and other political questions. Despite some moderate voices, extreme anti-Western resolutions emerged with nominal consensus support. While they may be prepared to express reservations, many members appear to adopt a passive attitude, allowing one-sided resolutions to be passed by consensus as long as these do not conflict with their own particular interests. Such a nominal consensus suits the extremists, allowing them to present a united front in favour of their resolutions. Majority voting, introduced at the Georgetown foreign ministers’ conference in 1972, was short-lived, having exposed serious differences, notably on the seating of Indochinese liberation movements and the decision to hold the subsequent summit meeting in Algiers.

The diversity of membership aroused some fears that the movement was being “diluted” or “adulterated”. Concern was expressed over the observers and guests invited to Lima in August 1975 and over applications for observer status from Portugal, Romania and the Philippines — respectively members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact and SEATO (the Philippines also has a bilateral defence pact with the United States). Although some countries argued for admission of any state with an independent foreign policy and sympathetic to the non-aligned movement, the

foreign ministers’ meeting that preceded the summit meeting decided to restrict these countries to “guest” status. Pakistan’s membership of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) has been consistently held to debar it from membership.

(In response to this, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Ali Bhutto, following the Colombo conference, called for a full Third World “summit” to signal “the turning away from the threat of a simmering and potentially disastrous confrontation to the promise of global partnership . . . to reconcile the position of Third World countries . . . and enable [them] to take [their] rightful place in the world’s economic community . . . whether aligned or non-aligned Communist or non-Communist . . .”.)

The impact of the Colombo summit meeting has already been seen at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. It is readily apparent from the conference documents circulated at the request of the Sri Lanka permanent representative (UN Document A/31/197) that Third World solidarity and direction shaped at Colombo will be critical factors in several areas — e.g., on Middle East and South African issues. Naturally, the summit meeting is, as was its predecessor, also an important guide to probable trends in the economic realm in general and, of special interest to Canada, in the context of the CIEC.

Basic line

Essentially, in review, the summit conference seems to have maintained the basic line of the non-aligned movement. It began to evolve after 1973 at Algiers. Aimed ostensibly at dialogue and co-operation, the confrontation and rhetorical aspects of the movement, particularly directed at Western and industrialized states, have been further institutionalized, but in a relatively moderate fashion, that, while direction is given (e.g., on the collective attitude towards Israel), the specifics remain somewhat vague. It seems, however, that the “purist” neutralism (espoused especially by Yugoslavia) is losing even more force and that the movement may well be reshaped in more radical terms. One indication of this is, perhaps, the choice of Cuba as the host for the 1977 summit meeting. Also noteworthy in this connection is the fact that, in contrast to its experience at earlier non-aligned summit meetings, the Soviet Union emerged virtually unscathed, tarred only indirectly with the brush of big-power hegemony and military presence in the Indian Ocean, etc., whereas the major Western nations, in particular the U.S. and France, faced

*Redefinition
of non-alignment
to match changes
in world relations*

ally, the latter in the context of Mayotte and arms sales to South Africa.

Of interest at Colombo was the fact that whatever Algerian-Yugoslav struggle for paramountcy in the movement had earlier been perceived seemed to have been set aside, at least temporarily. To judge by what appears total unanimity on southern African matters, a degree of leadership may have passed, at least at Colombo, to one of the more assertive African members. Cuba and India also further established leadership credentials. Division amongst Arab participants appears to have frustrated most attempts to achieve a united Arab position, although a degree of unity was preserved in references to Israel and Palestinian questions. These, while disturbing enough to most Western states, were nevertheless couched in general terms and do not go substantially beyond earlier non-aligned declarations.

Less than satisfactory

On the economic front, it became clear at Colombo that, collectively, non-aligned states reflected disappointment that the results thus far of UNCTAD and the CIEC were less than satisfactory from the developing-country perspective. The important feature to record, however, is that confrontation as a strategy to be employed with the developed West does not seem to have given undue emphasis, nor is it expressed in specific terms. Although certain of the more "forward" proposals for Third World self-development are in evidence, e.g. for a Third World marketing system, most of the proposals are those encountered earlier. This general "thrust" no doubt reflects the activity of Third World moderates such as Dr. Perez Guerrero, the co-chairman with Canada of the CIEC, and the Sri Lanka hosts. Thus, by and large, the Colombo economic program of action reinforces, but does not add significantly to, the stances already taken by developing countries in the CIEC or UNCTAD forums. Proposals for separate non-aligned action as alternatives to progress in other bodies emerge as "fall-back" positions. The economic attitude of the movement now appears to be one of "wait and see" as regards the CIEC and UNCTAD negotiations, rather than one of taking decisions upon which (as the past has shown) the non-aligned cannot follow through. Nevertheless, there remains an element of

warning to the developed countries that Third World patience is wearing thin.

Institutionally, perhaps the main points of interest emerging from Colombo are the establishment of a news agency pool, the enlargement of the co-ordinating bureau (to include, among others, the PLO) and the development of a permanent, though not formalized, secretariat. Though the general effects of these measures cannot yet be analyzed, in the longer term they cannot but be forces acting for a better-defined, if not a more radical, direction.

Perspective

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Madame Bandaranaike, addressed the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 30 in her dual capacity as leader of her country and current chairman of the non-aligned nations. In her statement, she tried to place the decisions of the Colombo summit meeting and the non-aligned movement in perspective by explaining their motivations, methods and objectives. Clearly, the last word on the direction and impact of the group she represented that day will not be written in the immediately foreseeable future. In her remarks, however, there are grounds for optimism both for the non-aligned movement itself and for its relations with other countries.

She described the underlying philosophy of the group as "... the deliberate choice, by a large number of nations, not to be drawn into the policies of confrontation implicit in the system of hostile military alliances... a refusal to contribute to a division of the world into camps... the world should not... fear and distrust a movement which came into being as a creative alternative to mutual suspicion, recrimination and hate... [our] unity will continue undiminished in the years to come". Finally, another of Madame Bandaranaike's phrases might serve not only as her own testament to the movement but as a positive note upon which to conclude: "We have faith in our potential and our eventual success in establishing a world order of genuine peace, equity and justice, not so much because of the material power we wield but more because of the reasonableness of our proposals." So be it.

*Perspective
on decisions
of Colombo
summit*

Frustration and disappointment over slowness of disarmament

By R. Harry Jay

Canadian spokesmen have repeatedly pointed to the growing frustration and disappointment felt by most countries — and certainly by Canada — at the failure of the international community to face up more concretely and rapidly to the awesome problems that confront it in the field of disarmament. Despite some modest steps, the record of achievement provides no comfort.

Shall we be forced to admit in five years that the declaration of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade was a half-hearted gesture? International security will be in even greater peril if, in these next five years, we do not come to grips with the tasks set out for the Decade. Early agreement must be reached on the most pressing arms-control problems and vigorous action taken to resolve them.

All states of military significance share this task, but the primary responsibility to ensure that the Disarmament Decade is not a failure rests with the nuclear-weapon states. Of all the problems we face in the arms-control and disarmament field, none is greater or deserves higher priority than the need for limitations and reductions in nuclear arms, for an effective ban on all nuclear-weapon testing and for further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation system.

As valuable as they have been, the strategic-arms limitation talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union have not yet slowed the nuclear-arms race — much less led to any reduction in nuclear arms. Canada welcomed the SALT I agreement and the establishment

at Vladivostok in 1974 of the principle of numerical equality in central strategic systems. Four years have passed since the SALT I agreement and the Vladivostok principles still remain to be confirmed by a definitive SALT II agreement. During those years, new developments in strategic weaponry have further complicated the task of curtailing competition in nuclear weapons. The problems facing the United States and the Soviet Union in undertaking even gradual and partial measures of nuclear disarmament are very complex. Nonetheless, the two super-powers must make a more determined effort to overcome these problems. They must move with greater speed towards the conclusion of SALT II and then move on to SALT III — that is, from limitations to effective reductions.

Nuclear-weapon testing

Despite the appeals made year after year for almost three decades in resolutions of the United Nations, progress towards a ban on all nuclear-weapon testing has been almost imperceptible. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has not yet been signed by two nuclear-weapon states, one of which is still engaging in atmospheric testing.

It is difficult to accept the fact that more resolute efforts have not been made by the nuclear-weapon states themselves to overcome the obstacles to a nuclear test ban. It is even more difficult to understand why, as the Soviet Union has argued, movement towards a CTBT is impossible unless all five nuclear-weapon states participate from the outset. Ultimately — and sooner rather than later — all nuclear-weapon states must stop their weapon-testing in all environments. We cannot at least the two super-powers, and as many other nuclear-weapon states as possible, enter into a formal interim agreement to end their nuclear-weapon testing for a specific trial period? The nuclear arsenals of the super-powers are so huge and their capacity for destruct-

*Tasks shared
by all states
of military
significance*

Mr. Jay is Canadian Ambassador to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva and to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The views expressed in this article represent the views of the Government of Canada. A fuller version of the Canadian views was given in Mr. Jay's statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on November 5, 1976.

far exceeds that of any other nuclear-weapon state, that it is difficult to give credence to the argument that an interim testing halt by the two of them would threaten their security unless all the remaining nuclear-weapon states immediately followed suit. Someone must take the first step, and the two super-powers are in the best position to do so.

Even if such an agreement were for a fixed trial period, at the end of that time it could be reviewed to determine whether it might be further extended or be transformed into a permanent agreement including all nuclear-weapon states. Such an interim agreement should be open to all states, and should contain measures to ensure that its terms are fully honoured and that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes do not confer weapons-related benefits.

Although existing nuclear arsenals pose the most immediate threat, the world continues to be haunted by the danger that nuclear weapons will spread to other states. If more resolute efforts are not made to avert this danger, we shall have frittered away completely whatever chance there still may be of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its associated system of IAEA safeguards continue to be the basic instruments of the non-proliferation system and the most appropriate framework for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some positive steps have been taken since the NPT Review Conference of May 1975, but much that should have been done in support of the non-proliferation objective has not been done. The treaty's obligations apply to all its parties — to nuclear-weapon states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states. While non-nuclear-weapon parties undertook not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, the nuclear-weapon parties undertook, in return, to pursue early negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. It is to be regretted that the nuclear-weapon states have not done more to fulfil their part of the NPT bargain. An effective non-proliferation system is in the interest of all states, but to be fully effective and to serve the interest of all states the non-proliferation system must entail restraints on vertical as well as horizontal nuclear proliferation.

An important achievement has been the growth in the number of the treaty's adherents from just over 80 at the time of the Review Conference to about 100 now. Parties to the treaty now include almost all the most highly-industrialized

countries and the great majority of developing countries. By forswearing the acquisition of nuclear-explosive devices and by placing all their nuclear activities under IAEA-administered safeguards to verify this commitment, this impressive group of states from all parts of the world has clearly rejected the notion that either the possession of nuclear weapons or the retention of an option to acquire them is a guarantee of security in some way essential to national sovereignty and the reinforcement of national prestige. This encouraging perspective, however, is not yet shared by certain other states advanced in nuclear technology or in the process of acquiring that technology. These states should reassess their reasons for not making a firm commitment to the non-proliferation objective, either by adhering to the NPT or in some other equally binding and verifiable way.

NPT review

In its Final Declaration, the NPT Review Conference urged that "in all achievable ways" steps be taken to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards as the reasonable and necessary condition for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada has taken this appeal seriously and has made it clear, in the negotiation of new bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements and in the renegotiation of others, that Canadian nuclear assistance is solely for peaceful non-explosive purposes.

Measures taken in the IAEA and among suppliers to reinforce and broaden the application of nuclear safeguards, the safeguards agreements concluded by a number of countries with the IAEA in the past year (especially their explicit exclusion of any explosive use and strengthened provisions for the application of safeguards to technology transfers), the detailed study being given to the need for greater care and more stringent controls in the use of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear-fuel cycle — all these have been Canadian objectives. But there is still a need for further strengthening and broadening the scope of nuclear safeguards. Safeguards will not be fully effective until they cover all peaceful nuclear activities of all states. Canada itself has willingly accepted the application of safeguards to all of its own nuclear industry; universal acceptance of such safeguards would provide the soundest basis for international nuclear co-operation.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could help curb the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen the security

*Nuclear
assistance
for peaceful
non-explosive
purposes*

of states that become fully bound by their provisions. The possibility of establishing such zones in various parts of the world has been the subject of numerous United Nations resolutions in recent years. Yet, apart from the Antarctic, Latin America is the only area of the world that has been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone by treaty — and that treaty is still not in force for some important countries of the region. Moreover, its protocols have yet to be adopted by all the states to which they were designed to apply.

Necessary support

The value of any specific nuclear-weapon-free-zone proposal or arrangement depends, however, on whether it has, or is likely to have, the support of most countries of the area concerned, including the major military powers of the region. It also depends on a nuclear definition of the geographic area covered, and assurance that no additional military advantage is conferred on any state or group of states. There must also be provision for ensuring full compliance with the commitments involved and forswearing the independent acquisition of nuclear-explosive capability. Supplementary arrangements applicable to states outside the region must be

realistic and consistent with general recognized principles of international law.

These are only some of the most pressing problems of arms control. There are others. The mammoth proportions of the international arms trade continues to devour vast resources urgently needed for productive economic and social purposes throughout the world. Concerted international action is urgently required among both suppliers and recipients to check the growth in the arms trade. Progress has been slow in the MBFR negotiations which are now about to enter their fourth year with little measurable achievement yet in sight. There is a glimmer of hope for a treaty to prohibit chemical weapons, but difficult verification problems remain to be overcome. No more time must be lost in seeking solutions to these problems. As the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs said in the UN General Assembly on September 29, 1976, "states must re-examine their traditional assumptions, take adequate account of the security concerns of others and seize all opportunities for concrete action. This is the spirit that must guide states in the special session of the UN on disarmament that is expected to take place in 1978."

Disarmament

The achievement of parity in the strategic balance

By C. R. Jacobsen

In today's strategic environment, the U.S.S.R. has reached something akin to parity with the U.S.A. Through the early 1960s, Moscow had concentrated on securing the survival of its as yet limited strategic potential: it built reinforced silos, experimented with mobile missiles and with ballistic-missile defence (BMD), began to move a portion of its missile force to sea, and, finally, succeeded in greatly improving its command and control systems. By the mid 1960s, the Soviet Union might be said for the first time to have acquired a secure "second-strike" force deterrent. It then proceeded through the

late Sixties and early Seventies with a quantitative building priority aimed at matching the larger panoply of the U.S. strategic arsenal, with its resulting flexibility of options.

The program initiated in 1961 to build a strategic navy with a global reach proceeded apace. By 1970, emerging capabilities were demonstrated in the first coordinated world-wide exercise "Okean". By the mid-1970s, one saw the initial deployment of the 4,000 to 5,000-mile De Aguiar SLBMs, submarine-launched missiles that could be fired from coastal waters secure from the (in any case marginal) air-

submarine potential of NATO, as well as the testing of the first Soviet "mini-carrier", or "through-deck cruiser", a small but potent carrier designed for vertical-launch and short-takeoff planes.

Reduced emphasis

Soviet emphasis on missile-defence planning was reduced about 1967, when the single-warhead missile was overtaken by the U.S. development of multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). A small missile-defence capacity was left in place around Moscow, as "worst-case protection" against potential third-power enemies, and research continued with reduced funding (indicating at least a limited degree of expectation), but the main effort shifted to MIRV development, to match the U.S. advantage in this field. With the development of Soviet MIRVs by the mid-1970s, there was some evidence of renewed emphasis in Moscow's favoured pursuit of defence and reports that Soviet strategic-defence spending was accelerating. But, while there were observers who thought that basic immunity against third-power (China) attack might be perpetuated, there were few who could conceive of defence technologies that would drastically affect the super-power balance.

The same years saw an expansion of the air-lift capabilities of the Soviet Union, and a notable strengthening of its non-strategic forces' capacity to fight in both nuclear and conventional environments. Concomitant with this came, in 1972, a novel treatment of interventional wars. Previously these had been seen as socio-political phenomena attributable to the contradictions inherent in capitalism and its need for captive markets, and thus phenomena from which socialist states were, by definition, excluded. A prominent Soviet author now allowed for the possibility of secular (military) rationales for intervention, thus giving theoretical leeway to potential "socialist" engagements. Two years later, Defence Minister Grechko for the first time spoke of a commitment to resist "imperialistic aggression" in "whatever distant region of our planet it may occur". By 1975, the Soviet Union had proved able and willing, with its allies, to provide extensive, effective assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa.

While the Soviet Union may have attained a degree of parity with U.S. capabilities (a process accelerated, ironically, by U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the relative diversion of resources that it entailed), there is no question of either

existing or foreseeable U.S. inferiority. Two Republican Presidents with impeccable "anti-Communist" credentials, both noted as champions of defence requirements and defenders of "the military-industrial complex", have asserted their continuing confidence in U.S. military might; the most recent example was provided by Gerald Ford's scathing rebuttal of Ronald Reagan's contention that the U.S. might have slipped to a "No. 2" position. "Neutral" support for Mr. Ford's confidence was provided by the quasi-private journal *Military Balance* of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Offset

On the strategic level, Soviet superiority in missile-booster numbers and "throw-weight" is clearly offset by the continuing U.S. lead in MIRV deployment and MARV (manoeuvrable MIRVs) development, and by the American bomber superiority (the advent of "stand-off" missiles that can be fired from beyond the reach of enemy air-defences re-establishes the bomber as a cost-effective, feasible warhead-carrier).

On the conventional level, U.S. global capabilities still exceed those of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt of the continued capacity of the United States to intervene in the Third World, by means of both air and sea action (the carriers might be *Edsels* where *Volkswagens* would suffice, but they are powerful!). And even the European force would appear more potent than it is sometimes depicted if account were taken of all force elements, quantitatively (i.e., if NATO dropped such anomalies as including reserve tanks in its estimate of Warsaw Pact capabilities while excluding them from its own balance-sheet) and qualitatively (i.e., if NATO de-emphasized crude air-number comparisons and looked rather at the degree to which the greater sophistication of its air components might offset the numerical advantage of more Spartanly-designed Soviet planes).

The basic fact of the strategic balance lies in mutually-offsetting second (third, fourth...!) strike capabilities, and as-

*Continued
capacity
to intervene
in Third World*

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tounding "over (-over, over!) — kill capabilities". Each branch of the U.S. strategic "triad" (land, sea and air) can by itself obliterate Soviet civilization (while the obverse cannot be claimed for Soviet air capabilities, the greater land-based throw-weight of the U.S.S.R. might perhaps be said to possess the offsetting capability to re-kill the corpse of civilization with even more redundant thoroughness than the U.S. land forces).

There was much talk through the 1960s of the dangers of "first-strike". Since the emergence by the mid-Sixties, however, on both sides, of essentially non-vulnerable sea-based forces, this has been nonsense. In fact it always *was* nonsense, and not only because of the early SAC decision to keep part of the bomber fleet airborne. Even the land-based forces as such were, and are, less vulnerable than is sometimes hypothesized; one might point to the long-acknowledged practical, if not theoretical, impossibility of fully co-ordinating the arrival on disparately-located targets of missiles fired from equally disparately-located launch-sites, each after completion of uncertain and complicated launch-preparation and control procedures (in a real sense, the arrival of the first hostile warhead would be adequate and sufficient warning, since it would most likely still leave time for the employment of most of the attacked force!); or one might point to the fact that the disruptive effects of the first incoming detonation are likely to preclude the immediate follow-up required to ensure destruction of a targeted-missile silo.

No expert of stature can foresee any imminent technological change that is even remotely likely to negate the situation of off-setting second-strike forces. There appears no foreseeable likelihood of either side negating the other's power to launch a devastating retaliatory strike.

Political exercise

SALT I, then, was at most clearly an exercise in political arms control; it should not be confused with military arms control (even less with arms reduction or disarmament). Neither power cut back or even slowed its research or deployment program on any major weapon system. On the U.S. side, in fact, it might be argued that the political attractiveness of the "bargaining-chip argument" ensured more favourable Congressional attitudes to new strategic programs (B-1, *Trident*, "cruise" missiles) than would otherwise have prevailed. "Bargaining-chip" became an ironic misnomer for the oiling of billion-dollar funding commitments to prestige pro-

grams of dubious worth. Thus one could argue that the B-1 mission could be performed as effectively by cheaper off-the-shelf 747s with stand-off missiles, and that the association of the massively-expensive *Trident* submarine with the truly impressive long-range *Trident* missile was unwarranted and deceptive, since the latter might with profit be deployed rather on smaller, cheaper platforms.

SALT I merely ratified existing strategic dispositions and perceptions. The United States had long curtailed quantitative-expansion efforts in favour of qualitative strategic-force improvement. And the U.S.S.R. had clearly come to a similar decision by 1972. There could then be no doubt that the dramatic Soviet procurement of the late Sixties and early Seventies was tapering off. Moscow had reached "parity", yet recognized that the unremitting pursuit of superiority would have scant if any prospect of success in view of the character of existing second-strike forces, and the limits of present and foreseeable technologies. The latter considerations, as well as appreciation of Congressional scepticism, presumably underlay also the U.S. acceptance of the probable durability of the present balance.

No question

There was no question of either side allowing the other undue advantage. The higher missile-booster number allotted the Soviet Union merely reflected existing realities, realities that had grown out of differing procurement and deployment preferences (viz. the Soviet preference for a "dyad" rather than a "triad" of strategic-force branches). The Soviet missile-booster advantage had no relevance to the need to deploy also against the People's Republic of China, if only because short-medium- and intermediate-range missiles adequate to meet that concern were not encompassed by SALT. Instead, the Soviet advantage was clearly intended to offset the acknowledged U.S. advantage in other strategic areas.

SALT I was a noteworthy watershed in that it could only be signed by Moscow once it was satisfied that it had attained basic parity. (As indicated by its strategic literature over the previous decades, the U.S.S.R. had long realized that it could accept no semblance of inferiority without abdicating both its ideological aspirations and its self-designated role as leader and protector of the non-capitalist world. And it was furthermore noteworthy that it could only be signed by Washington upon acknowledgement of the likely durability of the new state of affairs.)

*No likelihood
of technology
that would avoid
second strike*



In November 1974, U.S. President Gerald Ford met Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev at Vozdvizhenka Military Airport in the U.S.S.R. The two men then took a 64-mile train ride to Vladivostok, where they concluded negotiations for SALT II.

brought about by the Soviet attainment of parity.

In arms-control terms, SALT I could, at most, be seen as a "confidence-building measure" and possibly a prerequisite for more substantial future agreements. And therein lay its main worth, as a symbol of equality and *détente*, of a new era of mutually-accommodating negotiations and agreements.

Hence also the follow-up accord that limited SALT-sanctioned BMD deployments to one site rather than two. The one existing Moscow complex was vital to the U.S.S.R., as securing the heart of the nation against potential third-power enemies; continued BMD research was similarly vital to the prospect of perpetuating this "ultimate protection" — as well as to lingering aspirations for more ambitious security concepts. But the second site was by itself of little value, since it could at most direct attack away from one area to any one of a number of other similar but still unprotected targets. It therefore became a prime candidate for the moment when *détente* again needed political "boost", when the willingness to negotiate to mutual advantage had to be "proved" anew.

So also with Vladivostok. The equality there designated answered political

criticisms that rested on the mistaken impression of imbalance caused by SALT I's focus on missile-delivery vehicles. It also fleshed out SALT I's implicit acknowledgement of overall balance. Thus it underlined the equitability of SALT and made it more politically presentable. But it did nothing to alter the military irrelevance of SALT, nothing to alter existing dispositions or retard procurement of new weapon systems, nothing for hopes of arms reduction.

Lack of will

Today's SALT, foundering on the issues of the *Backfire* bomber and the "cruise" missile, merely reflect the lack of political will, the disrepair of *détente*. They are false issues, manipulated into artificially-presentable rationales for not negotiating. The U.S. insistence on including the *Backfire*, of which only a few are as yet deployed, is patently ridiculous — both in view of the fact that the plane could, in any case, only reach the U.S. on suicidal one-way missions at subsonic speeds (the vision of its refuelling in Havana in the midst of nuclear war surely deserves no comment!), and in view of the fact that the U.S. has more than 1,000 (FBS) fighter-bombers with a similar capacity to strike

at the U.S.S.R. (all of which have been excluded from SALT owing to American insistence that to do otherwise would be ludicrous). As for the cruise missile, the stance of both sides similarly indicates a disinclination to negotiate. Yes, it is cheap (though slower, and therefore more vulnerable), it is useful, and the U.S. leads in the development of long-range versions. But it is not going to change the strategic balance. It is at most going to allow for an even more redundant capacity for overkill. And it is not even going to remain a U.S. preserve for long. Soviet mastery of shorter-range versions, and continuing Soviet research, make a mockery of assertions to the contrary. The technology is not so revolutionary after all; rather, it represents a refinement of long-existing, dormant technological possibilities. The cruise missile may be crucial to fears of proliferation because it promises third powers a cheaper method of delivery (it is not the availability of nuclear technology that has deterred proliferation, it is the technologically and financially more daunting task of acquiring effective delivery means).

*Difficulties
in delivery
has deterred
proliferation*

Superiority

If there is a Soviet threat to be guarded against, it emanates not from Soviet military superiority but from a superiority of Soviet will. The U.S. suffers from a lost sense of purpose and a perversion of self-professed ideals. Why is it that Moscow's aspirations on the world scene can be made to appear more consonant with those of the Founding Fathers than can Washington's? Any Vietnamese historian, if listened to, could have forecast that the only thing that could have induced Ho Chi-Minh to rely to the slightest degree on his long-time rival Mao was the degree of U.S. military hostility that was to be unleashed on the peculiar premise of his being a dangerous puppet of the Chinese. Similarly, anyone truly familiar with Angola and Africa, with Neto's friendship for the Portuguese anti-Soviet socialist leader Soares, and with the MPLA's favouring of the anti-white Fanon's teachings over those of Lenin, could have forecast that the only way of maximizing sympathy and support for Moscow would lie in (quasi-) alliance with the "No. 1 Enemy", the Republic of South Africa. Soviet success has been due in no small part to U.S. abnegation of its own principles; to argue otherwise is to put the cart before the horse.

The vacillations of *détente* have been owing to the vacillations of U.S. domestic

political perceptions, not to changing Soviet attitudes. Moscow has throughout been explicit in its view of *détente* as limited, pragmatic accommodation of certain mutual state interests. It has always seen *détente* as an extension of "peace-co-existence", a defusing of the threat of a war that would be mutually suicidal but still a conflict on the economic, ideological and other levels. Moscow never uses the term *détente*, preferring *rasrjadka*, a term that allows for the possibility of sudden termination.

It was always clear to most experts familiar with the Soviet scene that Western hopes of changing Soviet domestic realities as a *quid pro quo* for Western technology credits were quite unrealistic. There is no doubt that Moscow desires Western economic "inputs", viz. its continuing lend-lease repayments even after the demise of the 1972 Trade Agreement. But the U.S.S.R. is not desperate. In spite of prognostications of doom for the Western economy every year since 1972, the Soviet economy continues to advance at a respectable pace notwithstanding acknowledged bottlenecks, continuing inefficiencies, etc. Hence, the phenomenon of increased Jackson-Vanik pressure on Jewish emigration being accompanied by a steady decrease in actual emigration, hence Moscow's refusal to countenance the 1974 Congressionally-imposed trade bill conditions. The U.S.S.R. cannot afford such obvious humiliations. Its chosen image, bolstered by increased confidence, demands "equality".

One might argue a case for not negotiating. One cannot argue a case for prejudiced treatment, inequality; such policy can only be counterproductive and futile. A relaxation of Soviet internal (and emigration) policies might (or might not) result from a longer era of pragmatic interchange. It certainly — if unfortunately — will *not* result from the type of pressure envisaged by the 1974 Congress.

The hopes of 1972 were undoubtedly Utopian. The expectations of 1974 were unrealistic. The pessimism of 1976 may have represented an unnecessarily negative reaction to either or both of the realizations. There remain strongly-persuasive arguments in favour of selective, pragmatically-considered Western trade, technology and credit-barter arrangements with Moscow, arrangements of proportional mutual risk, proportional mutual promise. Unemotional consideration of these arguments, and of possibly pertinent counter-arguments, awaits the next U.S. Administration of Jimmy Carter.

Two years after Vladivostok Is SALT worth its salt?

Lloyd Jensen

Considerable optimism greeted the successful conclusion of SALT I in May 1972. U.S. Administration spokesmen suggested savings in strategic defence spending of \$5 to \$15 billion over the next five years. Despite such optimistic assessments, the strategic-arms budgets in the United States and the Soviet Union have risen considerably above levels established before the opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and nuclear-weapon stockpiles have more than doubled. Moreover, the prospects of a more significant follow-up program have grown dimmer because of the continuing difficulties of obtaining agreement on the Vladivostok Accord of 1974.

In reviewing what has been achieved during seven years of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, there is considerable reason to be pessimistic. Agreements reached to date, both within and outside SALT, have done little, if any, impact on the reduction of armaments. For example, the SALT I agreements contain no provisions for reducing existing weapon systems. Admittedly, the anti-ballistic-missile treaty nipped in the bud what might have become a very costly ABM race, but whether such a race would have occurred, given the increasing scepticism about the effectiveness of such a system, is highly debatable. U.S. scientific opinion was overwhelmingly united on the position that there were many ways of countering any ABM system through such devices as MIRVs, decoy missiles and penetration aids.

The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, signed at the same time as the ABM treaty in May 1972, froze strategic-missile strength at the levels existing as of July 1, 1972. While placing a ceiling on the number of missile-launchers, the agreement allowed for extensive qualitative improvement of existing missiles. Chief among these was the fact that each missile could be "MIRVed", allowing an extensive increment in the number of deliverable warheads emanating from ICBM and

SLBM forces. Given the opportunity to "MIRV" missile forces with from three to more than a dozen independent warheads, both sides were in a position to increase appreciably their strategic warhead capabilities by the time the Interim Agreement expired in October 1977.

Tendency prevailed

The tendency to negotiate agreements that would allow both states to produce all the weapons they had planned seems to have prevailed in the case of the 1974 Vladivostok Accord. Although it is somewhat more difficult to evaluate the implications of the numbers established at Vladivostok because of the uncertainty as to whether weapon systems such as the "cruise missile" and the Soviet *Backfire* bomber are to be included, it is clear that considerable latitude for strategic development has been provided. The accord would still allow the United States to "MIRV" some 402 of its existing missile force as of November 1974 and still remain within the 1,320-MIRV ceiling, and it would permit the Soviet Union to produce even more, since its MIRV program was far behind that of the United States. Should the cruise missile or the Soviet Union's *Backfire* bomber not be included in the Vladivostok limits, as seems quite probable unless the 2,400 ceiling on strategic delivery systems is raised, the strategic arsenals of both sides may become even more awesome.

Not only did the Vladivostok Accord do little to restrict the number of strategic delivery vehicles — in several instances allowing increases —, it made no attempt

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to stop the qualitative race. With the expected limit on quantities of weapons, system performance becomes much more important. This concern is reflected in statements by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the House Armed Services Committee in support of budgetary requests for the fiscal year 1977. Rumsfeld held that the *Minuteman* system was becoming too vulnerable and might have to be replaced. Despite SALT I and possible agreement on the Vladivostok Accord, Rumsfeld left open the possibility of a replacement for *Minuteman* capable of more than tripling the payload. Such a system, along with the *Trident* and B-1 bomber systems proposed earlier, could mean a total ten-year cost for the three programs of some \$65 billion.

Costs of agreement

In order to evaluate the utility of partial measures such as those reached at SALT, one needs to examine the cost of reaching such agreements. These costs have included the concessions that have been necessary to placate domestic interests, the price paid for "bargaining chips" that have not been cashed, and the suspicion and distrust that have arisen owing to concern over treaty evasions.

Because it has sometimes been more difficult to work out a compromise with various interests within the United States and the Soviet Union than between the two governments, certain agreements have, in fact, accelerated the arms race, with the agreement itself providing minimal compensation. This was true in the case of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Threshold Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty signed in 1974 by the United States and the Soviet Union. In both instances, military interests asked for and received an accelerated nuclear-testing program compatible with the respective treaties.

Similar trade-offs to domestic forces have been apparent at several stages during the SALT talks. According to former *New York Times* reporter Tad Szulc, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reticent about even supporting the negotiations as such unless the Nixon Administration would support the deployment of MIRV. John Newhouse, in his comprehensive chronicle of the SALT I negotiations entitled "Cold Dawn", has indicated that the acceleration of the *Trident* program was Kissinger's *quid pro quo* to the Joint Chiefs for supporting the Soviet edge in missile capability provided in SALT I. One might assume that similar processes were at work

in the Soviet Union, in view of its extensive arms buildup since 1972.

The political costs to future agreements inherent in efforts to sell the SALT agreements to the U.S. Congress should also not be overlooked. Given the concern of Senator Henry Jackson and others, the Administration acquiesced in the so-called Jackson Amendment, which called for equality of arms levels in any future agreements. On the surface, such expectation would appear to be well taken; but in the case of negotiations for strategic arms limitation, the amendment makes negotiation difficult because of the minimum consensus on what constitutes essential equivalence.

It would seem that the SALT agreements have actually worked to the advantage of certain interests involved in weapons-procurement. SALT I especially may have benefited military interests since it gave the appearance of inequality, allowing those in favour of increased spending to exploit the issue. Since the public is not sophisticated enough to ascertain the advantages that a state has in a number of other areas to offset such inequalities, it tends to be susceptible to arguments for increasing armaments in areas not limited by treaty.

Certain groups may also have an interest in obtaining agreements limiting favourite weapon systems of other groups. In this manner, the probability of increasing the funding for their own pet projects can be enhanced. Such procedures of the way for more costly weapon systems which require extensive outlays for search and development. As Detroit found it can be financially advantageous to change models frequently.

Bargaining chips

If these arguments for supporting arms control negotiations are not sufficiently persuasive to influence the military conservative, he need only look at yet another advantage provided by such negotiations — they can be, and have been used to justify the production of "bargaining chips", which have usually meant new weapon systems. The production of such chips, however, only creates pressure for the other side to develop its own bargaining chips, and arms races rather than arms reduction are the inevitable outcome.

Despite the futility of the exercise, the history of the SALT talks has been one of continual search for just such a "chip" to enable one side or the other to prevail. The ABM became the first of many such chips, with the Johnson Administration, in its waning days, proposing

Sometimes internal compromise more difficult to achieve

the *Sentinel* system as a bargaining chip for the upcoming SALT negotiations. Earlier arguments for the system as a protection against a possible nuclear strike from China, as a device for countering an accidental missile launching, and as a protection against a first strike, had all been found wanting. The Nixon Administration also used the bargaining-chip argument in trying to sell its *Safeguard* ABM system. The U.S. SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, went so far as to send an urgent telegram to members of the Senate in August 1970 suggesting that a vote in favour of limiting the *Safeguard* system to two sites would be detrimental to the outcome of SALT. Without such an intervention, the limit vote likely would have passed. As it was, the proposal failed by five votes.

Hedge

As if the threat of an ABM race were not enough to get the Soviet Union to agree to a ban on the ABM, the Nixon Administration also sought to justify the MIRV system as a hedge against the Soviet ABM. MIRV was to have made it clear to the Soviet Union that it would never be able to provide an effective defence against a United States retaliatory strike. It is interesting to note, however, that there was no discussion of stopping MIRV developments once agreement on the ABM was reached and, as indicated earlier, MIRVing continues at a rapid pace.

Perhaps the best illustration of how a military bargaining chip can force the development of unneeded weapons and, in turn, impede the prospects of arms control, is found in the development of a cruise missile. According to John W. Finney in an article published in the *New York Times* on January 21, 1976, it was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who proposed that the Pentagon undertake development of long-range cruise missiles as a bargaining chip for the SALT II negotiations. According to Finney, Mr. Kissinger now laments in private conversations that he "didn't realize the Pentagon would fall in love with cruise missiles". Similar second thoughts have been expressed by Secretary Kissinger about the MIRV system, which had earlier been sold as a bargaining chip but after production became a serious obstacle to reaching agreement because of the inspection problems it created. Kissinger is reported to have said that he wished he "had thought through the implications of the MIRVed world more fully in 1968-70". The best time to stop an arms race involving any weapon system is before work begins on the weapon — at a time before vested in-

terests become committed and before deployment complicates inspection.

Despite recurring problems with bargaining chips, which have really never been cashed, a substantial number of weapon systems have in recent years been supported on the ground that they would provide effective bargaining counters in negotiations with the Soviets. Such arguments have been made by Pentagon and Administration officials with respect to proposals for *Trident*, the B-1 bomber, NCA defence, the development of an advanced airborne command post, site defence, the Manoeuvring Re-entry Vehicle, and higher-yield and more accurate missiles. On August 19, 1975, President Ford also attempted to pressure the Soviets into an agreement on SALT when he suggested that the strategic-arms budget would have to be increased by \$2.8 billion if agreement were not reached.

According to some authorities, the SS-9 represented an effort by the U.S.S.R. to create its own bargaining chip. Also the rapidity with which the Soviet Union rushed into development of the SS-16-through-SS-20 series is suggestive of a desire to increase its bargaining position during SALT II. The same can be said of the scheduling of a series of ICBM tests at the end of May 1972, just as SALT I was signed, and further tests conducted on the eve of the resumption of the SALT talks on February 20, 1974, following a long delay in negotiations.

Increase of fear

Bargaining chips tend to increase fear on the part of the adversary, and the traditional reaction is one of responding in kind. To have either side emphasize bargaining chips makes it more difficult for the moderates in the other country to plead for realistic arms restraint. Ammunition is merely provided for the hawks to press for higher defence budgets and to sabotage any effort towards arms reduction.

On the whole, bargaining chips have been costly, but if it could be shown that partial agreements such as those reached in SALT had stimulated more extensive reductions of armaments, they would be worth the price. Unfortunately, this does not seem to have been the case. Instead, the agreements to date have tended to generate increased suspicion and have actually slowed down the momentum towards more significant agreements.

Suspicion about possible evasions of an arms-control agreement is likely to be pervasive in a world that is high in threat-perception and heavily armed. Indeed, a state may be trapped by public pressures

Difficulties increased for moderates advocating arms restraint

into retaliating against an adversary's violation (or assumed violation) even if it is not in that state's interest to do so. There is something more compelling about the need to react to perceived increments of weapons controlled by a treaty than to buildups not so regulated. Such suspicion is likely to set back the cause of disarmament further, and even to accelerate the arms race. We have already encountered a number of accusations of alleged Soviet violations of the SALT I agreements, including assertions that the Soviet Union has tested a type of radar system that could be utilized in an ABM system, that it has replaced smaller ICBMs with missiles above the size-limitations agreed on, and that it has used decoys and camouflage to interfere with United States national technical means of verification. The Soviet Union in turn has accused the United States of camouflaging some of its missiles. Ambiguities of this sort, as well as those arising over the unilateral interpretations that were publicized by the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of signing the agreements, are likely to pose further difficulties in the future. The problem, of course, is what this does to the prospects of negotiating more meaningful disarmament agreements, for distrust is already very high.

No permanency

Although the temporary nature of the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons was recognized in its title, efforts to negotiate a more long-lived treaty have failed thus far, as the strategic arms race continues. Despite the fact that the Vladivostok Accord was signed in November 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be some distance from negotiating a final treaty. But even after an agreement is negotiated it would serve to delay negotiations for more meaningful reductions, since the proposed treaty is to be in effect until 1985.

Mr. Kissinger has argued that it is more feasible to negotiate the actual reduction of strategic weapons once a ceiling has been placed on the arms race. But it should be noted that an interim ceiling placed on the arms race in 1972 did not result in an agreement to reduce weapons at Vladivostok. Instead, a new and higher ceiling was established. It appears only too obvious that what has happened in recent years is merely the codification of the strategic arms race.

If a significant reduction of strategic capability is to be negotiated, several changes must be made in terms of the positions

taken by the two sides. Most important perhaps, is a need to rethink the notion of "essential equivalence". Although this notion presumably enables one to develop a systemic "overview" of the power balance in which one can recognize some of the less-obvious power factors such as geographical proximity, potential help from other states, differing threat situations, etc., in practice "essential equivalence" has been interpreted as meaning more an equivalence in each weapon system. It is particularly difficult to persuade the mass public and domestic political opponents otherwise, as they look strictly at the comparative numbers. Overlooked calculations for the strategic balance are some 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe alone; additional nuclear capabilities contributed by France and Britain to the military strength of the Western alliance system; the fact that the Soviet Union has to be more concerned than the United States with the threat from Communist China; and the fact that the United States is able to keep a higher percentage of SLBMs on station owing to foreign bases and access to the seas.

Improbable

It is improbable that agreement will ever be reached on just how to measure essential equivalence. Suggestions that measures of "throw-weight" be used are the point, since the United States has purposely chosen to emphasize smaller nuclear warheads, believing them to be more efficient. Correspondingly, it is unlikely that the United States would agree to measuring equivalence in terms of the number of warheads on each side. Other complications enter into the calculation because of the varying accuracy of missiles and the relative vulnerability. The concept of a breakthrough in terms of permitting each side to determine the specific "mix" of strategic-force capabilities within a certain range was a useful one. But a substantial strategic-arms reduction will probably require a fundamental rethinking of just how much capability is necessary for sufficient deterrence. Substantial reductions of strategic weapons will probably require acceptance of the notion of minimal deterrence, with each side having a sufficient protected retaliatory capability in which it feels secure. Only in that way can the compulsion to react to each and every increase in power on the part of the adversary be reduced.

Whatever is done in the SALT negotiations should be directed primarily at making the nuclear-deterrent system more stable. The proper response to the incre-

*Ambiguities
continue
to be source
of difficulties*

vulnerability of the ICBM might be to emphasize it as part of the deterrent and to make certain that SLBMs remain invulnerable. Agreement on limiting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) either by restricting weapons or by defining certain areas as sanctuaries for SLBMs would seem to be particularly useful in facilitating credible deterrence.

Above all, the success of strategic disarmament will be dependent on the making of careful decisions regarding the development of new weapon systems. The history of the SALT negotiations demonstrates the futility of using such weapons as bargaining chips; for, once produced, such weapons have not been easily eliminated, as is suggested by MIRV. Efforts

by the U.S. Congress to inquire into the arms-control implications of proposed defence spending is a most positive move for those interested in strategic disarmament.

As we contemplate the future of SALT, I find it particularly remarkable how little risk the United States is willing to take regarding the reduction of strategic weapons compared to the risks that it is taking with nuclear deterrence. If nuclear deterrence is a workable system, it can certainly function at lower levels of destructive capacity. SALT will never be worth its salt until it demonstrates an ability to move in the direction of the reduction of armaments rather than merely provide a cosmetic for a dangerously armed world.

*Deterrence
can function
at lower levels
of capacity*

disarmament

Challenge of arms control to plan for generations

power, peace and the public

Thomas Land

The emergence of a new generation of unmanned, precision-guided weapon systems has overtaken the military bargaining at the deadlocked European conference for the reduction of forces facing each other across the Iron Curtain. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction conference, concerned with bartering tanks against war planes stationed in the region, has gone on for two years in the ancient and beautiful Central European capital of Vienna. The development of remote-controlled aircraft and high-energy laser weapons means that a surprise assault by the numerically-superior Warsaw Pact forces could well be repelled by a small army of technicians. This would enable the NATO high command to take the political decisions required to fulfil its military commitment to deploy the nuclear warheads already in the area, and thereby completely to devastate the continent.

No Western government seriously considers that the Soviet Union and its

European allies are likely to attack in the foreseeable future. Nor is the Kremlin endangered by a politically divided as well as morally weakened Western Europe. The vast forces of land armour and fighter bombers, backed by nuclear weapons, on either side match not an actual military threat from the other but a technical capability that is likely to intensify at an accelerating rate with technological advance. The apparent need of states to maintain a high degree of military capability is therefore a reflection of their internal rather than external insecurity in the modern world.

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The hitherto completely fruitless Vienna talks following three decades of feverish war preparations can thus fulfil only two functions. One is to enable the rulers of the participating countries to assure each other that they are not as yet ready for mass suicide. The other is to convince their own peoples that the blame for the prevailing prewar tension should be cast on the "wrong" side of the Curtain.

Bad faith

But it should be clear that the conference, ostensibly intended to reduce arms and tension, has been held in bad faith. Both sides have known for some years that the armaments at present at a high state of readiness would soon become obsolete and be withdrawn even without an agreement — hence the promise of Leonid Brezhnev at a recent Communist Party conference in Moscow to make new initiatives at the Vienna bargaining table, which apparently means that Russia will soon be ready to re-equip the Western frontier.

For the new weapons have outdated generations of military thinking as well as such traditional and reliable instruments of slaughter as the tank (in which both sides have invested huge amounts of their public wealth). In the 16 days of the 1973 Middle East War, Israel lost more tanks to mobile, Soviet-made, precision-guided weapons than the entire United States land armour stationed in West Germany. A new generation of remotely-piloted air vehicles — armed by precision-guided munitions and operated from a safe distance by computer technicians watching television screens — have already demonstrated their capacity both in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia.

Even if the new weapons are never employed in another European war, they are certain to shatter the public calculations of Western generals intended to frighten tax-payers into tolerating constantly-increasing military expenditure. These calculations are likely to reflect accurately the contingency planning of the Soviet generals; but they tend to distort the violent fantasies of professional killers by transforming them into the realm of universal probability.

Thus in a discussion of the military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries, General Sir Walter Walker, former Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe, recently assured readers of *The Times* of London that, "with their 'meat-grinder' tactics, they will crunch their way forward, regardless of casualties, at a speed of 70 miles a day, supported in depth by airborne troops, armed helicopters, air

attack, amphibious attack on the flanks and chemical attack. Their doctrine regards the tactical use of chemical weapons as a normal form of conventional warfare and in this field they are better equipped and psychologically prepared than any other country in the world". The General goes on to predict that the speed, devastating power and velocity of the Soviet onslaught "will" be such that NATO "will" not be able to resort to the use of its nuclear weapons because the missiles "will" already have been overrun by the time the political decisions are taken. The grave implication is not that Europe must rid itself of paranoia but that it might, in the event, depend on American intercontinental missiles for destruction.

But the General will be wrong if the catastrophe is postponed for just a little while. Studies emerging from the military establishments of the Western allies suggest that the new generation of precision-guided weapons necessitates a radical departure from traditional strategic planning. The high accuracy of the new missiles has rendered both the tank and the aircraft vulnerable to small and mobile teams of technicians and tilted the European military balance in favour of defence.

It would be comforting to conclude from this that the advance of military technology has thus solved mankind's dilemma of survival in the shadow of nuclear capability, and that more than twenty years after the end of the war there may now be peace. The Vienna talks on force reductions in Europe will in all probability produce spectacular results within the next two years as the obsolete weapons are in fact removed. But, judging from previous experience, it is equally likely that the new weapons about to replace them are soon to lose their advantages and further military innovations without any one save the military planners on both sides of the Curtain deliberately preparing for corporate destruction.

Europe alone is armed by about 7,000 American and 3,500 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons with a combined destructive capacity 50,000 times as great as that of the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima. For added "security", the continent is also the target of thousands of strategic nuclear missiles. The United States is capable of delivering about 8,000 of these and the Soviet Union about 2,500. A recent strategic arms "limitation" agreement reached in principle at Vladivostok permits each of them to deploy 1,320 intercontinental missiles armed with multiple warheads, enabling them to strive

*New weapons
have outdated
generations
of military
thinking*

wards a capacity far greater than they have.

Their competition is simply not related to military superiority in the modern world. This is partly because each side has an invulnerable submarine arm that can deliver a retaliatory second strike in the event of destructive nuclear aggression and partly because each side already holds a huge "overkill" capacity and, even at this technological age, you cannot kill a person twice.

Manifesto

Early a quarter-century ago, when the world was still unaccustomed to nuclear weapons, a manifesto signed by many eminent philosophers and scientists, including Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, put the problem in simple terms:

"We have to learn to think in a new way. . . . Here, then, is the problem which is presented to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable. Shall we put an end to the human race, or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war.

"The abolition of war will demand far-reaching and far-reaching implications of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term 'mankind' is vague and abstract. People scarcely realize in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly comprehended humanity. They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love are in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly. . . . We have to learn to ask ourselves what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, and there no longer are such steps; the question we have to ask ourselves is: what steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all parties?"

The issue is so huge and the dominance of militarist thinking so thorough that people have forgotten to ask that question. Since the Johnson Administration in the United States, not a single civil servant in Washington has been employed in thinking about the feasibility of general and complete disarmament. President Gerald Ford recently promised: "If we get a good agreement (with the Russians), it will keep the lid on strategic arms for the next seven to ten years." He thereby condemned, by implication, another generation to the threat of universal man-made catastrophe, which, in modern terms,

means catastrophe even while an outbreak of nuclear war is avoided.

For the intensifying war preparations absorb specialist manpower and scarce material resources urgently and desperately needed elsewhere. World expenditure on military research and development alone is \$25 billion annually, according to one authoritative recent survey, about four times the amount spent on medical research. More than 400,000 scientists and engineers, about half the world's total technological manpower, are now engaged in improving existing weapons and developing new ones. World expenditure on armaments is \$210 billion a year, roughly equal to the entire combined income of the poorer half of mankind. The rate of increase of military expenditure coincides with the rapidly-growing technical complexity of weaponry. World investment in armaments has doubled since 1950.

Underestimate cost

These figures probably underestimate the actual cost of weapons if one considers the initial outlay required for the establishment of modern armament industries. At the close of the Second World War, only five countries — the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain, Sweden and Canada — were major arms-producers. Many developing countries have since joined them, at a huge cost to their economies. The latest to acquire virtual self-sufficiency in arms manufacture is India, which has also developed a nuclear-weapons capacity through its "peaceful" nuclear-energy program aided by Canada, and built up the third-largest army in the world, with more than a million men in uniform.

Representatives of the governments responsible for wasting such colossal public wealth and for endangering your life and mine have been meeting at world conferences concerned with such universal problems as environmental pollution, food shortages, mass unemployment and squalor in the cancerously-growing cities. By common consent, these meetings in search of a global solution to specific problems refrain from paying serious attention to the parasitic military establishment; and they end with resolutions calling for concerted action and regretting the lack of available funds for the purpose. They do achieve marginal results, such as the recently-increased flow of fertilizers to the developing countries after the World Food Conference in Rome and despite the rise of petroleum prices. But these are hardly achievements in terms either of the size of the problems they are intended to solve

Arms production proves costly to developing economies

or of the actual production capacity of mankind.

This summer, the World Employment Conference in Geneva was told that there had never been as many destitute people as today — a period following rapid and universal economic growth. At the beginning of this decade, about 700 million people lived in severe poverty, and 500 million were chronically hungry. An estimated 300 million people are unemployed or working for starvation wages. Another 800 million, the equivalent of the present population of China, will be added to the potential world labour force during the next 25 years without a hope, under present conditions, of finding adequate employment. Unless we are prepared to see our obsolete tanks turned against the wrath of these unemployed civilians — our own children —, we had better change the conditions.

Question postponed

The “stark, dreadful and inescapable” question of the Einstein-Russell manifesto of 1954 has thus been postponed at an immense and rapidly-multiplying cost. Mankind has neither committed suicide nor renounced war. It has instead channelled its aggression into local military conflicts and universal war preparations, misdirecting the constructive energy and material resources needed for common-sense environmental management. The longer the question is postponed, the greater the likelihood of thermonuclear suicide, whether through technical error or political miscalculation. But the longer the holocaust is postponed, the greater the hope that men may yet learn to live with their recently-acquired nuclear capability without needing to engage in homicidal fantasies regarding its use. And men are adaptable.

This makes the corporate decisions of our generation the most crucial, and our time the most exciting and potentially the most creative, since the emergence of man. The decisions are made not only by diplomats and journalists and politicians but also by the citizens at large. For the paradox of our generation is that governmental decisions obviously contrary to our interests in fact reflect our corporate decisions. Political leaders in all countries, including the most ruthless dictatorships, calculate in terms of grass-roots support or at least tolerance. They would not survive in power without the co-operation of silent private citizens concerned only with the short-term welfare of their families and averting their eyes from the probable long-term effects of their limited functions.

Holding each other responsible for the common catastrophe, both the politicians and the public take a sneaking pride in their national “deterrents”.

This duality of conflicting communal desires for peace and power, constantly reinforced by potential external threats, has thus emerged as perhaps the essential universal obstacle to survival. This is the major issue of all political affairs, whether at the hostile Vienna bargaining over tanks and aircraft or at pious world conferences concerned with the ills of our abused global habitat. To possess power as it is commonly conceived in the modern world is to embrace the freedom to discharge our terrible weapons and thereby to relinquish life. To possess peace is to have the freedom to plan for generations and thereby to end our present flirtation with suicide. Planning for “overkill” while talking of *détente* is relinquishing both peace and power. Yet we can have both, if peace does offer power — only of a different sort, the power of creative man.

Thus an American President could in theory tell his public that, since the destructive power required for the liquidation of every enemy and friend as well as citizen had already been amassed, the United States would in the future endeavour to beat the Soviet Union at world development rather than at surplus nuclear capacity until the day Communism progressed from coexistence to co-operation. To be fair to Mr. Ford, no American President could expect to be re-elected on such a platform, despite its military, technological and economic consistency. The politicians have tried, at hundreds of peace conferences, to work out mutual compromises of national sovereignty intended to limit voluntarily the freedom of states to discharge their weapons. They have failed, probably because politicians want to keep their jobs as much as clerks employed in armaments manufacture.

Test ban

But there has been one important exception — the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 when the professed will of the politicians coincided with the vehement demands of the public on both sides of the Iron Curtain for an end to atmospheric nuclear testing. The issue of environmental contamination was then grave, but it was minor compared to the ever-present possibility of ultimate destruction. But the widely-publicized radiation sickness of the boat-load of Japanese fishermen affected by fallout from an American nuclear test and the explosion of a giant Soviet device with the power of 58 million tons of TNT

*Postponement
of holocaust
provides hope
of adaptation*

d appalled the public. The treaty did not
ect the nuclear-arms race significantly;
wever, it demonstrated the power of
blic opinion to guide the collective
ision of states. This, then, is the only
pe.

The age of technology has given con-
centrated influence over the future of
nts to three specific groups of people,
ly one of which is yet aware of its power.
is is the military establishment, which
prospering as a result of universal in-
urity and is committed to the arms
e and to seizing the power of even
mal government in many countries.
ver before has this group possessed so
uch destructive capacity or wasted such
eat public resources. Its time is limited,
it will either destroy itself together with
e rest of us or become redundant.

The second is the scientific and tech-
nological establishment, which has hith-
o seen itself as the servant of human

progress — and found itself manipulated
into the role of public executioner. If
human beings were to learn to take indi-
vidual responsibility for the long-term
effects of their actions, these men alone
could defuse the apparatus of destruction.
The third group is composed of the mass-
communications media, which recently
surprised themselves by bringing down the
Nixon Administration in Washington. The
personal triumph of the novelist Alexander
Solzhenitsyn over the will of the Kremlin
demonstrates that the power of the pen
is not limited to Western democracies.

Governments are vulnerable to polit-
ical pressure; and the influence of the
military establishment could well be
outweighed by the other two estates
privileged in our era, given a public de-
manding a right to the future. The suicide
of civilization begins with the illusion that
individuals cannot prevent it. But only
individuals *can*.

*Vulnerability
of governments
to political
pressure*

Co-operating with dictators for economic development

Renaud Bernardin

few years ago, the possibility of “co-
operating” with a dictatorial regime would
even have been questioned. Provided
at staff was available and means clearly
ntified, a venture in co-operation would
ve been undertaken without much hesi-
ion. In recent years, however, there has
en a gradual trend towards examination
the objectives pursued, the means used
attain them and the agents involved in
implementation process. As a result,
y person rationally considering the pos-
sibility of venturing into the realm of co-
operation now asks about various aspects
co-operation, and particularly how ef-
tive his contribution would be in those
untries improperly referred to as being
derdeveloped and to what extent his
orts would be suited to their culture,
long the subject of scorn and dis-
agement.

Nonetheless, the basic situation has
not changed. The approach to problems
and their solution is still marked by an in-
dividualistic and humanitarian philosophy.
The tendency to emphasize charity, phi-
lanthropy and paternalism in co-operation
at the expense of justice and of the accep-
tance of the differences inherent in men
from different cultures and of the rights
stemming from these differences, seems,
at least to judge from statements on the
subject, to have diminished. But recogni-

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Third World. The views expressed here
are those of the author.*

tion and acceptance of equal rights and obligations for oneself and for men from other cultures have yet to be achieved.

Changes in this situation have not been pushed to their logical conclusion because of the relatively recent development of Canadian awareness of international co-operation and the lack of individual participants from the Third World in this trend — and for a host of other reasons. Yet these reasons may themselves be explained by the fact that the limitations implicit in any reasoning on these matters are a reflection of liberalism, even if the thinker is trying to differentiate himself from the liberals.

Examination of such questions as those concerning non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the context of dictatorial regimes shows how much ground has been covered (since these questions are finally being asked) and how much remains to be covered (since such questions are still being asked). Moreover, it is not a coincidence that these political questions are being asked today, for they are part of the initial reaction to the consequences of the takeover of co-operation by governments.

Government takeover

Now that governments have divested co-operation of the trappings of humanist philosophy and have bound it in a bureaucratic strait-jacket, it has become an instrument of political power. All governments, either directly through government agencies or indirectly through non-governmental organizations, have set up so-called international co-operation programs for the purpose of reaping short- or long-term benefits. A study of the material, political and ideological interests that are brought into play by or that motivate these programs helps to identify certain aspects of co-operation as it really is. Co-operation appears as a means of legitimizing government actions (since the recipient government uses the friendly attitude of the donor government to justify its repressive policies towards its own citizens) or as a means of persuasion (since the donor induces the recipient to carry out the policies that the donor wishes) or as a means of dissuasion (since the donor encourages the recipient to abandon policies the latter has already worked out).

Governments are eager to turn to their own advantage the desire for justice and the feelings of generosity and brotherhood by which advisers and workers concerned with co-operation are often too naively motivated. Under coercion, the latter may be manipulated and may un-

willingly become agents of their country's power abroad, helping to establish in recipient countries not only service or change structures but also power structures.

This is why it is important to give careful consideration to the place of advisers in the general donor-recipient strategy, and to establish the aims of co-operation very clearly. But first we should remember that real co-operation, begun on equal terms and never diverted from the pursuit of its objective (the liberation of historically, socially and culturally situated people), is not an end in itself but simply one of a number of means of liberation.

Aims of co-operation

It is important to distinguish the *aim* of establishing new bonds of brotherhood from the *possibility* of temporarily improving often subhuman material conditions in just one area and from the *probable* outcome of co-operation — namely the perpetuation, perhaps not intended, definitely contributed to by foreign investment, of existing societies in assisted countries.

These goals are carried by agents who are achieved through action. Agents' actions are not unbiased; their presence in dependent social structures is in itself significant. Every individual or collective agent brings a history, a culture, a value system and a view of the world. Every action implies a preference for a particular civilization and involves specific goals. As a result, after aiming for the ideal and then making every effort to achieve what is possible, the end-product is generally a form of social reproduction. The question is, therefore, one of determining the place of co-operation in terms of agent action, irrespective of what the agent would like his action to be. In other words, intentions must yield to facts, and facts clearly show that, in general, on the bonds of dependence between the ruling classes of the centre and the ruled classes of the periphery have so far been tightened. This is no accident.

Third World dictators try to maintain the structures of exploitation by force, and an even more reprehensible trend is now developing, particularly in Latin America, towards stronger repressive measures because power is being contested not only by those elements of the ruling class that are isolated from the decision-making and wealth-producing centres but also by peasants, farmers, the workers and the progressive elements of the lower middle class who find the current situation untenable. Unless, therefore, internal power relations

*International
co-operation
for the purpose
of reaping
benefits*

versed, the only outcome will be a lengthening of the social structures that enable one or other of the ruling factions to maintain power. Societies under dictatorial rule are at an impasse. In such conditions, no options are open to them, because, in order to release the capacity to absorb foreign aid through a popular consensus or to promote even the idea of self-development, these societies must first be released from within.

It is felt in some quarters that the downfall of a dictatorial regime should not have to precede any attempt to improve the lot of poor farmers. It should be pointed out that such attempts have already been made and have failed. There is no lack of good will, funds or expertise, but every attempt came up against the existing socio-economic structures and the interests of the social classes that had no interest in social change. It should also be remembered that each failure bears its psychological toll in dashed hopes. The expert or the adviser can return home, but the disappointed farmer will stay where he is and will require more convincing before joining in another venture of which he quite rightly does not want to bear the burden. It should also be remembered that farmers are not the first to benefit from whatever decision is taken, since corrupt leaders and bureaucracies redirect funds away from the objectives for which they were originally committed.

These repeated failures, therefore, have a single cause:

The action is within existing social structures and is carried out with the support of that section of the ruling class currently in power.

Even in this light, it is not the power of the man that is in question, or that of his family or his ministers, but rather the power of a whole social class that is living in good, not to say excellent, conditions and does not wish those conditions to change.

Manoeuvre

What then is the responsibility of recipient countries and foreign advisers? The main problem here is to determine how much room for manoeuvre is left by dictatorial regimes to those trying to promote social change.

The answer depends on whether the decision is undertaken by citizens of the recipient countries or foreign advisers. It is clear that the former have no choice but to fight these negative dictatorships. A dictatorial regime is strong because it resorts to repression and torture and because many of its citizens have not done,

are not doing or do not intend to do what is needed to topple the regime and change the social structures so as to prevent another dictatorship. Those who have made an attempt at some point are now weary from the long and hard struggle, during which, at certain critical moments, their lives have been at stake. The risk here is that they will give up, if they are not assimilated by the regime in power.

Only choice

And yet, for an increasing number of citizens, the only choice is involvement in the social and political struggles being waged in their country. They cannot wait for the regime in power to define areas of action or room for manoeuvre. It is they who must take the initiative and choose the time for and the forms of organized action. They have prime responsibility for the future of their country.

*Citizens
must choose
the forms
of action*

The foreigner, on the other hand, has only those responsibilities that have been assigned to him or that he assumes personally in order to offset the effects of the mechanisms producing the recipient country's dependence upon his own country. The second type of responsibility is not relevant at this stage of the discussion. Delegated responsibilities have a political significance that every foreign adviser must identify clearly and act upon. The simple fact that they are working in a country ruled by a dictatorship legitimizes that regime and its actions. Their presence implies that the regime is accepted as an interlocutor and negotiator, that the rights accorded to it because of its contribution to the financing of projects are accepted and that foreign advisers agree to act as witnesses to the "positive approach" of the regime to those who wish to work for "national reconstruction". Once the foreign advisers are in the country concerned, it is too late; their involvement will be used by the regime to legitimize itself. They may disregard such treatment of their work, but they cannot be unaware of it. In any case, the decision to act or not to act in a country ruled by a dictatorship, whether or not the legitimization of such a regime by one's presence or actions is taken into account, is a political choice and a political action with political consequences. Yet, in spite of all this, some choose to go, hoping to do what it is "possible" to achieve.

Any understanding of the strategy surrounding the notion of what is "possible" presupposes an awareness of the aversion that some people have for political and ideological questions. Such a feeling of distaste may be attributable to the way

in which these questions are framed, to a pragmatic approach that emphasizes the number and dimensions of the means available for involvement and expects social change to result from the application of those means, and especially to a belief in gradual progress that lays the emphasis on small-scale achievements. If such an approach is adopted, all comprehensive solutions and programs of national importance are rejected and activities are limited to a specific area of the country concerned and to the establishment of so-called functional mechanisms.

Action taken within the framework of what is "possible" is an attempt to create a certain number of "powers" at the grass-roots level. It would entail not only developing the latent potential of farmers to the point where they became autonomous but also enabling them to acquire the capacity to become involved at a higher level. They would move up from one level to another, and each successful completion of a task would be the starting-point for the pursuit of a new objective. The attainment of an objective would indicate that a new "power" had been acquired and that their capacity to become involved had been increased.

This view of development has the advantage of, on the one hand, removing a dimension of false humanism and providing a political dimension, inasmuch as it is designed to create powers, and, on the other hand, of forcing the debate to concentrate on the internal problems of potentially recipient countries. This view should be considered further in order to determine whether the power structures developed as a result of the situation created by involvement could counterbalance the power structures generated by social structures.

It would be particularly useful to find how such objectives might be attained. The prerequisite of social upheaval leads to a change in internal power relations, not met.

Even a rapid breakdown of the rest of development shows that such power structures have not yet been created, mainly because any action that might challenge the power of the ruling classes is not accepted. An experiment is tolerated as long as it does not become a vehicle for social change but, once the new power becomes a threat to the established power, the latter reacts and smashes its potential challenger. It should be remembered that social change is conflict, which can be shifted or controlled but not avoided.

Conclusion

The dilemma of co-operation boils down to a few simple questions: *who* does *what* for *whom*, with *whom*, on *whose* behalf? *Who* asks for *what* to be done? And *who* has to do *what*?

These questions in their very simplicity cast doubts on misleading appearances and on many presuppositions. They lead back to a fundamental consideration of the conditions that should be present for technical involvement to be possible and effective. In other words, there is a threshold below which any action *within* the system is bound to fail. Once action *upon* the system has made it possible for the energies of the majority to be released and channelled towards social change, the support of all men of good will and progress who wish to become involved in a specific development project will be accepted partly as reparation and partly as a gesture of brotherhood.

Errors in *Intrepid*...

I read Mr. Glazebrooke's review of *A Man Called Intrepid* in the July/August issue of *International Perspectives* with great interest.

By and large I find myself in agreement with his comments, but I am a little surprised at the uncritical approach to both the subject and the book. I find it intriguing to "guestimate" the reason for the timing of this publication so close to *Bodyguard of Lies*, *The Ultra Secret* and the like, and I was not sure when I finished reading the book whether the author's aim was to suggest that Sir William Stephenson was a puppeteer of Churchill and Roosevelt on his strings.

More serious perhaps is the reviewer's omission of any comment as to blatant errors in the text, which cast some doubt on the veracity of the whole work, particularly as there are no footnotes or citations to indicate where the innumerable quotations come from. Many surely are not all from Stephenson's private papers. One's suspicions are intensified by reading at p. 191 that Lester Pearson was not only "a future Prime Minister of Canada", but also "Secretary-General of the United Nations". Also, at page 32 there is reference to a letter from Roosevelt in 1933 to "Britain's socialist Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald". The Labour Government ended in 1931 and in 1933 Macdonald was leader of the National Labourites was heading a National Government.

When one finds such glaring errors on simple issues, one cannot help but have doubts as to the author's regard to matters of which one does not have direct knowledge.

L. C. Green,
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No. 116 (November 2, 1976) Extension of Canadian fisheries zones.

No. 117 (November 3, 1976) Visit to Ottawa of Commonwealth Secretary-General S. Ramphal, November 3-6, 1976.

- 19 (November 5, 1976) Appointment of Allan B. Roger as Canadian High Commissioner to Guyana.
- 20 (November 5, 1976) Visit of Commissioner Garba of Republic of Nigeria, November 8-10, 1976.
- 21 (November 5, 1976) Canadian position on UNESCO media draft declaration.
- 22 (November 10, 1976) Canada-Australia Literary Prize awarded.
- 23 (November 12, 1976) Visit of Sir John Rennie, Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
- 24 (November 12, 1976) Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Mr. Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, November 22 and 23, 1976.
- 25 (November 15, 1976) Garrison Diversion project — Canadian note delivered to U.S. State Department.
- 26 (November 24, 1976) Agreement for continued use by U.S. armed forces of facilities at Goose Bay, Newfoundland.
- 27 (November 26, 1976) Appointment of Derek Burney as Senior Departmental Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- 28 (November 29, 1976) Appointment of Edward L. Bobinski as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
- 29 (November 30, 1976) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Britain, December 4 to 8, 1976.
- 30 (December 1, 1976) Visits of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Brazil, Peru and Colombia, January 10 to 26, 1977.
- 32 (December 10, 1976) First meeting of Joint Co-operation Committee set up under the Framework Agreement on Commercial and Economic Co-operation between Canada and the European Communities.
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Ottawa, November 24, 1976
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Done at Geneva, June 27, 1973

Canada became a Participating State
June 18, 1974

Terminated June 30, 1975

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Done at Geneva, December 28, 1973

Canada became a Participating State
June 18, 1974

Terminated June 30, 1975

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Done at Lima, March 18, 1976

Signed by Canada, March 18, 1976

In force October 1, 1976

Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain

Done at Lima, March 18, 1976

Signed by Canada, March 18, 1976

In force October 1, 1976

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Done at Lima, March 18, 1976

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Regulations of the Transfer Office

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Done at Lima, March 18, 1976

Signed by Canada, March 18, 1976

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
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
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Quebec's international competence

New dimensions of federalism

Europe's internal pressures

Canada's European image

Reconciling foreign and defence policy

International Perspectives

Contents

March/April 1977

Provinces and foreign affairs	
Quebec's international competence/ <i>Louis Sabourin</i>	3
Federalism's new dimension/ <i>J. Peter Meekison</i>	8
<hr/>	
European Community	
EEC's internal pressures/ <i>Philip Windsor</i>	12
European image of Canada/ <i>André P. Donneur</i>	16
Canada looks at Europe	20
<hr/>	
Reconciling foreign and defence policies/ <i>Alasdair MacLaren</i>	22
<hr/>	
Book reviews:	
Neatby's Mackenzie King/ <i>John A. Munro</i>	26
Stursberg on Diefenbaker/ <i>Nora S. Lever</i>	28
<hr/>	
Reference section	30

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Quebec's international activity rests on idea of competence

Louis Sabourin

The Parti québécois victory in the November 15, 1976, elections, and the widespread reaction to this historic event both in Canada and abroad, have once again brought to light the special character of Quebec and the growing importance of its international activity. In addition to analysing the nature and the manifestations of this international activity, it is important to assess its basic significance and define the underlying strategies that motivate it.

Quebec's international activity is essentially a seeking and exercising of broader competence in order to assert Quebec's identity and to encourage its development and that of others through reciprocal and mutually-advantageous relations with other peoples, states and public and private institutions with which Quebec is attempting to establish exchanges of all kinds.

Beyond the events and the facts that, particularly since the beginning of the "Quiet Revolution" in 1960, have led to a distinctive Quebec presence and behaviour on the world scene, two strategies have gradually become established, often more as a result of spontaneous behaviour and reaction than through predetermined, long-standing plans. These two theories of development of *human competence* through a broader, but co-ordinated, effort of Quebec and federal institutions and resources, as opposed to a strictly Quebec *state competence* in international relations — have grown to the point of becoming both the basis and the objective of the two schools of thought. These will inevitably continue to clash as long as Quebec remains a part of the Canadian Confederation. In a word, Ottawa will continue to argue in favour of the exercising of competence by Quebec in international life with deference to Canada's international personality, while René Lévesque's government will seek in its international activities to confirm its own competence.

After reviewing Quebec's international activities, one can only conclude that they have been, and still are, a normal, legitimate and desirable phenomenon. The errors of procedure and the excesses of language should not obscure the fact that the basic, long-term interests of all the parties involved have been promoted to advantage. Any democratic society that wishes to make progress in today's world — particularly if it feels its culture threatened — cannot, as in the past, turn in on itself. In the era of closed societies, withdrawal could be considered a "positive defence". In the era of the post-industrial society and declining birth-rates, however, withdrawal would amount to a veritable withering away, which no *Franco-phone*, whatever his political or ideological allegiance, could seriously consider. Under such circumstances, a proliferation of international exchanges becomes not only desirable but necessary in all sectors, from economic affairs to exchanges of technology and culture, from sports and television to development co-operation. We cannot claim excellence in physical fitness, industrial management, food production or music without knowing what is happening abroad. This is the case for almost all areas of activity. It is important at this stage to develop an increasing degree of competence, not only at the political and administrative summit but in all fields and at all levels.

At the same time that Quebec, for its part, wishes to open its doors onto international perspectives, in order to obtain the many benefits to be had, it appears that more and more nations are becoming interested in Quebec, and value the skills

*Withdrawal
no longer
a positive
defence*

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and the expertise of the "French-speaking North Americans" in areas such as health, forestry, agriculture, hydroelectric power, fisheries, co-operatives, education, administration, communications, management, arts, culture, sports and many others.

Moreover, several industrialized countries are following, with much more interest than is generally imagined, the efforts made by Canada and Quebec to build a dynamic society in which the idea of the "quality of life" holds an ever-larger place. It would be a mistake to think that the problems of language duality, American economic domination or union struggles are the only issues that attract attention abroad. The three million immigrants who have settled in Canada since the end of the Second World War are the proof to the contrary.

Ties proliferated

Such a mutual interest, with all the new means of communication and transportation, and the growing number of exchanges, have already brought about a proliferation of international ties such as the Lesage team could hardly have imagined at the beginning of the Sixties. Premier Bourassa's visit to Tehran and the agreements signed with the Government of Iran in 1975 are a striking example. The people of Quebec have truly rounded a corner and acquired a taste for things international.

Until very recently, missionaries were the largest group of French Canadians living abroad. The only others were Québécois who had emigrated to the United States, servicemen and a limited number of diplomats, intellectuals and students. Now, in addition, there are advisers, technical experts, businessmen, artists and professional people of all sorts almost everywhere in the world, especially in the United States, the West Indies, Mexico and French-speaking countries. Québécois from various backgrounds are participating directly in international life and discovering it to be a source of cultural stimulation and professional, material and psychological satisfaction. Contacts abroad are now an established fact. Moreover, these contacts are seen by the vast majority of Québécois as an indispensable element in their individual and collective progress.

Aside from exchanges with the United States, and to some extent with France, international exchanges are a relatively recent phenomenon for Quebec. Very few societies, however, have succeeded in so short a time in participating directly in so many areas of international life, beginning with tourism, which for a great many

people is the starting-point, after education and television, in gaining an awareness and a better knowledge of the outside world.

It is in this propensity to take advantage of foreign sources while contributing to them that we should seek the meaning or the "content" of Quebec's international activity.

Not detrimental

Of course, this activity, while it serves the Quebec cause, has not, for all that, been detrimental to Canadian foreign policy. That policy was in real need of an injection of "Frenchness". Quebec's international activity in the Sixties disturbed, worried and even traumatized many of those in charge of Canada's foreign policy. In fact, it produced a salutary effect, as the events of the following years demonstrated both on relations with *francophone* Africa and institutions in the French-speaking community, and — need I emphasize — with France and Belgium.

It is remarkable, though not altogether surprising, that Quebec nationalism has exerted so little influence on Canada's relations with the United States and with other areas of the world, particularly Latin America. Where the United States is concerned, Ontario and British Columbia have often shown a more open nationalism than have Quebec and the Maritime Provinces which wish to obtain American loans and investments in order to create jobs and reduce unemployment. It is more in relations with France and the French-speaking community that Quebec's feeling of nationalism has given rise to much debate.

The efforts by the Liberal team of Premier Jean Lesage following the latter's election in 1960 to put Quebec on the international map were accompanied by a great deal of fanfare, especially the creation of the Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs in 1961 (which became the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs in 1967), the opening of the General Delegation in Paris in 1961, and the conclusion of cultural agreements with France in February and November of 1965. Under the governments of Johnson (1963-68), Bertrand (1968-70) and Bourassa (1970-76), these official activities were extended to new sectors and to other countries, as well as to international institutions and conferences. They now influence and affect many social classes in Quebec. With the proliferation of exchanges at all levels, we are witnessing the institutionalization of Quebec's international activities.

There is no doubt that the Parti québécois government of René Lévesque will

International interest in attempt to improve quality of life

Large number of Québécois everywhere in the world

tempt to step up these activities, though it would be surprising if this were to be done ostentatiously. International relations are far from a priority in the Parti québécois program, especially since the action dealing with this matter is quite incomplete and subject to reservations introduced by the party leadership; this action will certainly be re-examined in the next few years in the light of experience and as a result of a more practical view of contemporary strategic and international realities by party activists. Also, until a referendum is held, the Quebec Department of Intergovernmental Affairs will probably devote more of its energies to general-provincial relations than to international relations.

Changes

Without taking up in detail the sequence of events, it should be recalled that Quebec has strengthened its position in the French-speaking community since 1960, and in 1970 even created a precedent in becoming a "participating government" in the Commission de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT), which had a Québécois, Jean-Marc Léger, as its first secretary-general. Quebec is no longer isolated psychologically from the French-speaking community. The contrast with the 1950s is striking. In addition to participating in the ACCT, Quebec contributes to many multilateral institutions, such as the Conference of Ministers of Education (Africa and Madagascar) and the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports, not to mention the dozens of non-governmental organizations such as the International Association of French-speaking Parliamentarians, the Association des universités partiellement entièrement de langue française (AU-ELF), the headquarters of which are in Montreal, the Association des éditeurs de langue française, the Communauté radio-phonique et télévisuelle de langue française, and numerous professional associations of journalists, doctors, economists, historians, geographers, sociologists, writers, and so on, from the French-speaking world.

On the bilateral level, Quebec has set up a network of general delegations and trade missions in a number of other countries. It now has official representatives in Europe (Paris, London, Brussels, Milan, Rome, Dusseldorf), the United States (New York, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Lafayette), Asia (Tokyo, Beirut), Africa (Abidjan) and the West Indies (Port-au-Prince). Special mention should also be made of the role of the Office franco-québécois de la Jeunesse, which

since 1968 has been opening international horizons to thousands of young people of all backgrounds. In addition, Quebec contributes directly, or indirectly through private institutions, universities and business, to the implementation of numerous co-operation projects in Asia, Latin America, the West Indies and Africa (especially in French-speaking states) undertaken by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) and numerous voluntary associations.

These are the established facts, undeniable and irreversible, which, following Expo 67, the visit of French President Charles de Gaulle the same year, the events of October 1970, the Olympic Games and the Parti québécois victory in 1976, have put an international stamp on the special character of contemporary Quebec.

Despite some hesitations and many disappointments, Quebec's international activities have continued to grow to the point where they have been cited as a precedent in several recent textbooks on international law.

After a number of "noisy" years, Québécois have now realized that it is first and foremost through their *competence* that they will gain acceptance and respect on the international scene.

Individual or state?

Competence is thus the key idea, but the question is, what sort of competence? The human or professional competence of the individual or the institution in a given field, or the legal jurisdictional competence of Quebec as a state in embryo? Or both at the same time? Below the swells (1964-71) and the froth (1971-76) that have stirred and capped Quebec's international waters, two undercurrents — the two strategies on the subject of competence — have met and pulled against each other, sometimes churning the water to produce no mere semantic foam but a true political tide-race, with constitutional and diplomatic whirlpools. A given set of words may, according to the place, the individual and the circumstances, describe different behaviours, objectives or realities, and, of course, may be used deliberately with this intent. The debate on Quebec's international competence is a case in point.

The experience of recent years has shown that, when seen as a stage in development and in the sharing of "human and professional competence", Quebec's international relations have not given rise to much opposition in Ottawa. As a lever and an instrument for broadening juris-

International activities now cited as precedent



Canada Wide p. 3

At the Paul Sauvé Arena in Montreal on November 15, 1976, surrounded by supporters and members of the press, Quebec's newly-elected Premier, René Lévesque, delivers his victory speech. Mr. Lévesque has stated his intention of adding a new dimension to Quebec's role in foreign policy.

dictional competence, however, they have elicited many objections and led to the creation of numerous working groups in the federal capital.

The basic reason for these difficulties is that a great deal of emphasis has been placed, in speeches and official statements at any rate, on the notion of "constitutional competence". The working paper on external relations submitted by the Quebec government to the constitutional conference in 1969 is significant in this regard. The notion of "competence" is gradually beginning to replace the traditional one of "sovereignty" in international law. "Absolute sovereignty" is a term used less and less by contemporary jurists, since most states have agreed by treaty or otherwise to circumscribe its exercise. Thus we have the current use of the term "competence of the state".

To be sure, while it was indispensable at the beginning of the Sixties to resort to all plausible arguments, such as certain historical precedents, some court decisions, existing practices in other federal systems — including the U.S.S.R. with the well-known examples of the Ukraine and Byelorussia — and various interpretations of an archaic constitution, in order to give more legal authority and a certain "consistency and legal weight" to Quebec's international activity, it is clear that such a strategy could be successful over the short term. Why? Because it put into a legal context

a "state of mind" or a "psychological desire" that it did not need then, and certainly does not need now, to be maintained and protected in this way. But there is more to it.

Two approaches

In contrast to those who see these activities as a legitimate trend and an asset in bringing about a gradual change in Canadian federalism, as well as a declaration of Quebec's uniqueness in Canada, at home and abroad, there are others who have preferred to give priority to matters of fact and to act in such a way as to confirm the view of Quebec's jurisdictional competence and establish through precedents a permanent status. Such an attitude has quickly turned Ottawa's "specialists in the pragmatic" into experts in Cartesian logic, determined to set down in written documents scrupulously-defined limits to Quebec's international activity. To be convinced of this, one only has to consult the two White Papers published by the Federal Government in 1968, *Federalism and International Relations* and *Federalism and International Conferences on Education*. When the true history of the Victoria constitutional conference in 1971 is written, the importance of the Federal Government's concern in this area will be more clearly understood.

In wishing Quebec to act alone at the international level in fields in which it

Constitutional competence replacing sovereignty

sisdiction, and so to demonstrate competence (or sovereignty), many Québécois, without publicly admitting it, were attempting at the same time to take a step towards state competence (or sovereignty).

This formalistic legal behaviour quickened Ottawa to view such a project as a malicious plot and a dangerous undertaking that had first of all to be contained and then quickly frozen into the framework of "provincial powers". This was quickly done.

Naturally, the "course of events" is not necessarily the whole story, but it must be acknowledged that the "jurisdictional competence" approach was bound sooner or later to cause direct confrontations and to trap Quebec and Ottawa in a web of federal and international "conventionalism" at the time of constitutional conferences and international conferences of the French-speaking community.

Federal response

Federal leaders retorted, using the same formalistic methods, resorting to constitutional law and international law, alerting other federal governments, and "making it clear" to many young African nations (themselves very sensitive to questions of jurisdiction and competence, in particular those that had benefited or wished to benefit from Canadian assistance) that there could never be two official spokesmen on the international scene — in short, that Canada's external sovereignty was indivisible. This also was quickly put into effect. The series of events surrounding Quebec's presence at, and Canada's absence from, the Libreville conference in 1968 was subsequently cleared up, on one hand by a "new normalization" of cooperative relations with *francophone* states and institutions and on the other hand by the establishment of new understandings and procedures at Kinshasa, Niamey and Quebec City between 1968 and 1971.

Then there was France. The visit of Pierre Elliott Trudeau to Paris in October 1974 clearly demonstrated that theiscard d'Estaing Government also accepted the principle of the indivisibility of Canada's international personality. This does not prevent the French Government from continuing to co-operate directly with Quebec; the warm welcome the Prime Minister of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, received two months later was proof of that. Mr. Bourassa became the first foreigner to be asked to participate in a meeting of the French Cabinet. In Paris's view, co-operation between France and Quebec — institutionalized since 1964 by a joint commis-

sion — is not incompatible with France-Canada co-operation, even within the federal framework. What counts above all is the positive results of this complementary co-operation. The same is true of Canadian and Quebec activity in French-speaking institutions, provided that neither side adopts cat-and-mouse habits or attitudes.

Indeed, it is wholly natural that Quebec should be better suited and more inclined than, say, Alberta to develop cultural ties with Senegal, though this is not necessarily true technically and economically speaking. On the other hand, Quebec cannot and should not confine itself to the French-speaking community, to which some would like to see its influence and its activity limited.

However, while Quebec's unique character is now recognized and accepted in the French-speaking world, this is not always the case elsewhere, even in countries where Quebec has appointed attachés for trade or immigration, or *ad hoc* representatives to conferences of international institutions. Since the beginning of the Seventies, a much larger presence has been sought for Quebec in areas that until then had been overlooked — economics, technology, trade (the GATT negotiations, for example) —, without seeking to provoke any constitutional battles.

More positive effects

Quebec began in 1960 to make its presence felt officially in the world at large. Considered objectively, this activity has had many more positive than negative effects on Canada's international practices. Too often, however, there has been a tendency to concentrate on the few deplorable "flag quarrels", rather than dealing with Quebec's positive contributions to the French-speaking community on the one hand and to Canada's international activity on the other. Again, Quebec has undeniably been much enriched by its participation in international life. This movement of opening up to — and participating in — the world is only beginning. Now that the bases have been established, it remains to be planned and oriented in more meaningful ways. The outlook for international exchanges by Quebec is virtually limitless.

While a page of history has been turned with the coming to power of Prime Minister Lévesque's Parti québécois government in November 1976, the book remains wide open. The history of Quebec's international relations is richer in future prospects than in past events, and this is certainly to the advantage of all parties involved.

*Relations
not confined to
French-speaking
community*

Provincial activity adds new dimension to federalism

A Western view

By J. Peter Meekison

Traditional discussions and explanations of the role of provincial governments in the area of international relations usually begin with an assessment of the constitution. Most authors have analysed the wording of Section 132 of the British North America Act and its subsequent interpretations by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by examining the important judicial decisions on this question such as the *aeronautics*, *radio* and *labour conventions* cases. Some compare Canadian practices with the constitutional provisions governing international affairs found in other federations such as the United States, Germany, the Soviet Union and Switzerland. Depending upon the perspective of the author, the practices of other federations are approved or rejected.

While much of this analysis has been useful, the tendency of most arguments has been either to prove conclusively that under the Canadian constitution provinces do and should have a voice in international affairs or that they do not and should not have such a voice. Here one gets to the crux of the debate, what the constitution legally permits *versus* what politically is best for the country.

Because of interpretations of the British North America Act and practices that have evolved within the federal system, the provinces have developed and/or acquired a role, albeit a modest one, in international affairs. The purpose of this

essay is to discuss this role and try to assess whether or not it has been detrimental to the maintenance of a coherent Canadian foreign policy. At the outset, it should be stated that the primary responsibility for the development of foreign policy and for the conduct of international affairs rests with the Federal Government. This reality is generally accepted by provincial governments, although occasionally, as in the late Sixties, the Federal Government's role has been challenged.

It is worth while to consider briefly why challenges to the Federal Government's position have been raised. The answer seems to be related more to domestic issues than to international ones. If one assumes that foreign policy, to a significant degree, reflects or is determined by domestic considerations, then provincial governments will undoubtedly be concerned with those aspects of international affairs that may affect their jurisdiction. As is natural in any federation, domestic policy is a combination of decisions established by both levels of government. The existence of strong provincial governments has been recognized, often grudgingly, as an important consideration in decision-making in the area of domestic policy. Most significant issues in Canada have a federal-provincial dimension, as in the areas of health, immigration, energy, taxation, social services and transportation. Federal-provincial interaction in these and other areas is not only accepted, it is expected. For some reason this type of interaction has not carried over into the area of foreign policy, though there are indications that even this is changing.

Variety of interests

It may be argued that, since the conduct of international affairs is a federal responsibility, there is no need for federal-provincial interaction. As will be seen later, however, provincial governments have a wide variety of interests and concerns in this area. It does not seem unreasonable for provincial governments to

Arguments on provinces having a voice in world affairs

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criticize or to seek to influence domestic policies on transportation, banking and communications. For some reason, however, recognition by the Federal Government of legitimate provincial concerns in the area of foreign policy was slow to develop. Presumably the distinction can be explained by the fact that foreign policy is somehow different, that other nations expect Canada's position in the councils of the world to be firm. Reaching these decisions in the crucible of federal-provincial conferences is somehow unthinkable because other nations might get the impression that the Canadian government is not completely in command of the ship of state. To a certain extent, the myths surrounding the conduct of foreign policy as they relate to the federal system should be dispelled. In this respect, the creation of the Federal-Provincial Co-ordination Division in the Department of External Affairs is a welcome sign because it gives recognition to the fact that there is a federal-provincial perspective on external affairs.

What do provinces do in the area of international affairs? What are some of the areas of provincial concern? What are some of the problem areas? An inventory of provincial activities in the realm of international affairs leaves one with a better understanding of the scope of provincial interests. While the activities described below are restricted to those of the Province of Alberta, those of other provinces do not differ markedly in either kind or degree.

Offices abroad

Alberta maintains offices in London, Tokyo and Los Angeles. The largest overseas operation is Alberta House in London. Several provincial departments have representatives stationed there, to deal with federal and intergovernmental affairs, business development and tourism, and advanced education and manpower. Alberta House, far from competing with the Canadian High Commission, complements its activities. From the perspective of the provincial government, Alberta House is the province's main link with Europe. It handles numerous inquiries about employment, travel, trade and business opportunities in Alberta. Specific and detailed information can be given by individuals thoroughly familiar with the province, its laws, economy and climate. At the same time, assessment of European trade opportunities can be made by staff totally familiar with the province's economic goals and aspirations. The type of information given or sought is useful to the provincial

government in developing its policies and priorities. The offices in Tokyo and Los Angeles have smaller staffs and their activities are concerned primarily with developing and improving trade relations. Numerous routine inquiries about the province are also dealt with. In summary, the overseas operations provide an important vehicle whereby information can be given or acquired on trade, tourism or other matters of interest to the province.

In the past three years, Premier Lougheed has made three official visits to different parts of the world — Japan in 1973, Europe in 1975 and the United States in 1976. It is worth while noting that these missions were planned in conjunction with the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian embassies in the countries visited. There was a high degree of co-operation between the federal and provincial governments. While each mission had a different purpose, two factors were common to all of them — observing and explaining. The Alberta government could observe for itself, at first hand, policies developed in other countries. Topics of discussion ranged from North Sea oil development to labour relations in Germany; from trade opportunities in Japan to energy concerns of the Northwest United States, from the development of social policies in France to the industrial development of coal gas in Germany. In each case the information obtained related to provincial policy concerns.

Other purpose

The other purpose of these missions was to explain Alberta's policies, plans and aspirations to a number of audiences on a wide range of issues, from trade to foreign ownership of land. The Premier could also explain the realities of decision-making within the federation, with respect to energy pricing for example. While in Europe, Mr. Lougheed gave his support to Prime Minister Trudeau's desire to forge a "contractual link" with the European Economic Community. Seen in this light, the various missions that have been undertaken by the province enrich Canadian foreign policy. The net effect has been not to undermine Canada's position in world affairs but to enhance it. Improved trade relations, scientific exchanges and capital investment have often been a direct result of these missions.

Through Culture Alberta, the province has developed a modest program of foreign assistance. Culture Alberta provides grants that supplement funds raised by non-governmental organizations involved in international aid work. These

*Co-operation
between federal
and provincial
governments*

*Foreign policy
enriched
by provincial
undertakings*

grants have been used to support the construction and maintenance of schools, hospitals and other projects in less developed nations. The Departments of Advanced Education and Manpower and Agriculture supply expertise for projects of the Canadian International Development Agency in Third World nations. The Department of Agriculture has also been an active participant in preliminary discussions on agricultural development in less-developed countries.

There is also a provincial interest in Canada/United States relations. A common border with Montana means that Alberta has frequent communication with that state. The Premier of Alberta and the Governor of Montana have met to discuss problems of mutual interest. Alberta's common interests with the United States transcend, however, the limited matter of province-state interests, as evidenced by the maintenance of the office in Los Angeles and the undertaking of a mission by the Premier in 1976. Trade relations between the two countries are extremely important, and modifications in either Canadian or U.S. government policy can have important consequences for Alberta producers. For example, a change in beef quotas has an impact on the entire agriculture industry in the province. Reductions in the export of oil and natural gas also have a direct effect on the Alberta economy. The development of new markets for petrochemicals is an immediate concern of the provincial government. The negotiation of the Canada/United States pipeline treaty has involved discussions with the provinces, including Alberta.

The list is a long one, but what should be recognized is that Canada/United States relations with respect to trade and other matters are of more than passing interest. The need for a more prominent role for the provinces in Canada-U.S. relations was recognized by the Canadian Senate in its recent report on this matter. During the development of Canadian Government policy, it is essential that the interests and concerns of all parts of the country be taken into consideration. To this end, a useful information flow has been established between the Canadian Embassy in Washington, the Department of External Affairs, and interested provincial governments. So far this two-way exchange has been most beneficial.

Alberta has not actively pursued the establishment of formal arrangements with other countries or with states of other federations. The need for this type of arrangement has been obviated by the treaties on cultural and scientific activities

that Canada has entered into with a number of countries. For example, when the periodic review of activities sponsored under the Canada-France and Canada-U.S.S.R. cultural treaties has taken place, provincial representatives have been involved not only in the discussions in Canada but also at the bilateral conferences where forthcoming activities under the treaty were assessed.

Trade

Alberta, with other provinces, has a major interest in the question of foreign trade in general and the current negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in particular. This is quite apart from concerns arising from Canadian United States trade relations, and special developments emerging from overseas offices and missions. Any modification of Canada's tariff policy may or may not be detrimental to the province. Certain policies may be developed that reflect the interests of the industrial heartland at the expense of those provinces dependent primarily on the sale of raw materials and resources. This concern was expressed by the Western premiers at their conference in April 1976. Discussions have taken place between Alberta officials and the officials representing Canada at the GATT negotiations. A greater say and role have been claimed for the provinces, because any agreement arrived at in Geneva will have significant long-term consequences for the development of provincial economies.

A few years ago, the question of provincial participation in international conferences was a *cause célèbre*. As an issue has died down and, because they have something to contribute, provincial governments have participated, for example, members of the Canadian delegation in the World Population Conference in Budapest, the World Food Congress in Rome and *Habitat* in Vancouver. (In this context it seems strange that a more active role in GATT negotiations has not been realized.) Comments emerging from these conferences strongly suggest that the provincial role was positive and strengthened the total Canadian contribution. Alberta, for example, was also invited to participate in the Law of the Sea Conference, but for obvious reasons declined. Coastal provinces, however, like Newfoundland and British Columbia, would have a vital interest in such deliberations.

Over the past few years, Alberta has been host to a number of foreign trade missions visiting Canada, as well as to countless ambassadors accredited to Canada. For example, the first major trip outside

*Vital interest
of provinces
in relations
with United States*



Wide World photo

Alberta's Peter Lougheed with former French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac during Mr. Lougheed's 1975 visit to Paris.

Ottawa by the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China was to Alberta. Hardly a week goes by without some group or individual representing a foreign government paying an official visit to the province. These visits often involve meetings with the Premier, various members of the cabinet, and/or senior provincial officials. Time is spent explaining provincial decisions covering a wide range of issues such as agriculture, trade, energy and technology. Often tours of various parts of the province are undertaken, including visits to ranches, dairy farms, housing developments, coal mines, power-stations and the oil-sands. Just as members of the province's overseas missions have attempted to observe and to explain, the many visits to Alberta make this a reciprocal process. A visit is often a direct result of one of the province's overseas missions.

Associations

Of all the provincial international activities, this is the most extensive dimension. Alberta government officials, through participating in international professional associations, either as private individuals or as government representatives, interact with officials of many other governments, but particularly with those of the U.S. states. The result of this interaction is a significant amount of intergovernmental activity conducted throughout the entire government (in virtually all of the functional subdivisions of government).

The above inventory leaves one with the impression that Alberta is far more active in the area of international relations than one might ordinarily expect. Of equal importance is the fact that this burgeoning provincial activity is a recent phenomenon. The areas in which the provinces

have tended to concentrate their activities, if Alberta may serve as an example, have been confined to those matters in which the provinces have direct constitutional interest. In contrast to federal involvement in external affairs, the provincial role up to this point has been relatively modest. The experience of the past few years suggests that the provincial role in international affairs will probably continue to increase as provinces recognize the significance of their participation in their own policy development.

The gradual transformation in this area of the federal system, leading to a greater provincial presence in international affairs, is similar to many other developments in Canadian federalism. There has been no grand federal-provincial conference convened to discuss the provincial role in international affairs, though such an event would not be too surprising. In this area, provincial interests and concerns vary considerably, just as they do on purely domestic matters. Given this heterogeneity, one would have difficulty in identifying anything approaching commonly-defined provincial goals. There are a few isolated instances of interprovincial co-operation, however, that should not be ignored when assessing the total impact of provincial governments. Recent co-operative endeavours by the four Western provinces with respect to trade matters is a case in point. Another example is the meeting between the premiers of five Eastern Canadian provinces and the governors of the New England states. As provinces gain experience in the international arena and as they identify their common interests, more co-operation amongst them may be expected.

Wide variation in concerns of different provinces

New dimension

What does all of this mean for the federal system? In essence, it suggests that a new dimension has been added to Canadian federalism. This statement does not mean that there will not be periodic conflict between the Federal Government and individual provinces over various components of Canadian foreign policy or over representation at international conferences. What it does mean, however, is that, through co-operative efforts, Canadian foreign policy can be strengthened and enriched. Recent recognition by the Federal Government of a legitimate provincial role in international affairs has done much to overcome the conflict that characterized this debate in the 1960s. The evolution of a definite provincial role shows the remarkable capacity of the Canadian federal system to adapt to changing conditions.

European Economic Community beset by internal pressures

By Philip Windsor

When Britain finally became a member of the European Economic Community at the beginning of 1973, it appeared that many of the problems of creating "Europe" were now well on their way to solution. Britain, after all, had been a test case for the will and intention of Europe ever since the veto imposed upon its application by General de Gaulle some ten years earlier. The fact that Britain and France had now agreed on the terms of enlargement, that the other members had acceded, that all were prepared to accept the new complications of arriving at agreements and decisions in an enlarged Community, seemed to testify to an abundant political will.

At the same time, the enlargement meant that Europe had finally arrived as an economic super-power. The Community now accounted for 23 per cent of the world's gross national product (GNP). It was also responsible for more than half the foreign trade of the globe. But this measure of responsibility was not confined to the economic sphere. Europe already exercised very considerable political influence throughout the Mediterranean basin and over much of Africa. The pattern of association agreements that were being negotiated or signed between the members of the Community and other states seemed to testify to the growing vitality and the growing "thrust" of Europe in the affairs of the world. Indeed, Dr. Kissinger, at that time still an enthusiast for his own vision of a future world organized and run from five centres of power, was still inclined to see Western Europe as one of these. But not only did this reflect Dr. Kissinger's

personal view of the future "pentangle" it also reflected an objective reality.

At that time European currencies were strong and the American dollar was weak. It was not unusual to see officials from the American Treasury arriving in Brussels, cap in hand, to plead for greater European understanding of the financial commercial and economic difficulties caused by the war in Vietnam (in general the French answer was negative and the German answer positive). In other words, Europe appeared to have acquired a decisive voice in West-West relations.

But Europe's purpose appeared also to extend to relations between East and West. The Davignon Committee — in effect, the foreign ministers meeting in regular congress — was expected to provide the framework for new initiatives in relations with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. This, after all, was an area that concerned Europe very closely. And, also at the beginning of 1973, a new regulation had come into force whereby commercial agreements between member states of The Nine and other foreign governments were now subjected to the scrutiny of the Commission. Commercial policy was, in fact, to become an instrument of foreign policy.

Frustration

In all these respects, Europe appeared to be on the verge of "takeoff". And yet the record since that time has been one of frustration. This is not to suggest that everything that The Nine have attempted has ended in failure. In some respects their achievements have been significant. But the entity "Europe" can still hardly be said to exist.

Does anyone now remember the talk of only two or three years ago of a "European identity"? Did it disappear entirely with Pompidou? "Il faut faire l'Euro" was once the common slogan. Does anyone remember it now — does anyone care today how or whether "Europe" is made? The frustrations of the intervening years

Enlargement meant Europe had arrived as economic super-power

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lected in contemporary pressures among the nine members of the EEC; the nature of these pressures will be examined a little later. But first, in order to understand them, some clarification — even of a cursory nature — of the frustration suffered between 1973 and 1976 is worth while attempting. Obviously, these frustrations have both an internal and an external character.

To take the external first. Europe had begun its takeoff, joining Dr. Kissinger's entangle, at a time when the configurations of power in the world were already changing. The changes affected both East-West relations and North-South relations.

Effects of détente

In terms of East-West relations, the emerging entity of Western Europe was soon to find that its room for manoeuvre had been decreased rather than increased by the progress of *détente* and the success of *Ostpolitik*. The latter had been conceived of by the German Government as the beginning of a process — what Willy Brandt called a "dynamic status". In other words, it was expected to humanize and generalize the relations between the two Germanies and the two halves of Europe. But it was conceived of by the Russians as the end of a process: that is, it would merely normalize relations. And the limits of normalization were rapidly shown by the widespread application of the doctrine of *Abgrenzung*.

This East German formulation of a technique whereby economic relations do not spill over into political relations, which in turn do not spill over into cultural relations, which themselves leave human relations to be organized as part of a political bargaining process — this technique and its doctrine soon became characteristic not only of the East German approach to relations with the West but of the attitude of most other East European states as well. The dynamic status quo was reduced to a static status quo. And this in turn was made possible by the fact that *détente* (so far as it was ever a reality) consisted much more in a special super-power understanding than in a general East-West understanding.

Nothing showed this more clearly than the preparations for the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. West Germany had hoped at one stage to create a connection (*sachlicher Zusammenhang*) though not necessarily a direct linkage (*Verknüpfung*) between the three "baskets" of negotiation. In such a view, economic concessions by the West to the East would have been seen to be clearly related to — though not necessarily conditional upon —

security agreements, in which, of course, some of the major concessions would have been made by the East to the West. Similarly, any long-term commercial or economic agreement would have been tied to the observance of the humanitarian and intellectual provisions of "Basket Three".

Such a strategy appeared for a time to unite The Nine. Indeed, it was perhaps the first united foray of the nine members into the field of foreign-policy making. It is hard to say whether, in any event, it would have succeeded. No matter — it made the Soviet Union uncomfortable in Geneva and brought the United States into a position where, for the sake of further progress at SALT and in the MBFR talks, it helped to rescue the Soviet Union from its discomfort and to wind up the Helsinki Conference as quickly as possible. And since that time *détente* itself has, in any case, come increasingly into question. Western Europe was disappointed with the results of *détente* while it was still flourishing; when, instead, it began to show the fissiparous tendencies of super-power competition, Europeans also competed. The expectations that commercial policy would provide the basis for a foreign policy gave way instead to separate accommodations by the various European governments with Moscow.

The British, the French and the Germans have all competed to supply Moscow with credits to buy from them, and so provide employment at home. In one sense, at least, Solzhenitsyn seems to be right: instead of using their economic strength as a bargaining counter to reach security agreements, the West Europeans continued to subsidize a Soviet peace economy, which in turn enabled the Soviet Government to maintain a war economy. The fruits of *détente* are, therefore, at best uncertain and divisive. But this pattern also reflects something of the economic weakness of Western Europe — and this weakness derives from North-South relations rather than East-West relations.

Threefold changes

Within a year of the enlargement of the Community, the rise in oil prices, already evident at the beginning of 1973, was about to undergo its dramatic quadruple leap. The changes of 1974 were threefold. First, they bitterly divided Europeans and Americans. The disputes between the United States and the EEC countries arose out of the question of rendering assistance to Israel during the war of October 1973, but they also extended to the question of whether one should confront or accommodate the oil-producing nations. To the extent

*Europeans
make separate
accommodations
with Moscow*

that the EEC countries have since been able to help bring about new discussions on the North-South economic relation, they have a historic achievement to their credit. But, at the same time, this very process has revealed deep divisions among themselves.

These divisions will be considered shortly; but, in the meantime, they are also reflected in the second effect of the transformations of 1974. This lies in a reversal of power. The European countries, depending so heavily upon energy imports from the Middle East, were much more closely affected by the rise in oil prices than the United States, which, while by no means self-sufficient in energy, was far less reliant on Middle Eastern sources. Even today many Americans are unaware of how far they were beneficiaries of the oil crisis of 1973-4. It greatly weakened the European currencies; it greatly strengthened the American dollar. In turn, this change was linked to a third: a high degree of inflation in the domestic economies of most European countries and an endemic economic crisis in some of them.

Internal frustrations

These frustrations in external matters might in themselves seem sufficient to account for the disappointment of those high hopes that had been conceived in Europe at the beginning of 1973. But they were accompanied by a series of internal frustrations too. Indeed, it would appear in retrospect that the negotiations on the enlargement of the Community had really served, by their success, to cover the failure of The Nine (or The Six) to agree on other matters. For it must be remembered that the original intention of the signatories to the Treaty of Rome had been to create a political community. All hopes of progress in that direction were stopped dead when General de Gaulle vetoed the first British application for membership in 1963. Ever since, the inveterate question had remained unanswered: what was to be the vehicle for "Europe"? And all that The Six had come up with was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Yet they had agreed on an ambitious program for economic and monetary union by 1980. Even if this had been realistic in the first place (a doubtful proposition), there was no chance at all of its realization once the inflation of 1974 began to be felt, and to be felt so unevenly.

Before the program was forgotten, the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, announced a new vehicle. This was the Common Energy Policy. Indeed, Brandt went

further. He argued that, without such policy, Europe would be finished. Unfortunately, a common energy policy is difficult enough to achieve even in countries that are already united. The United States still lacks one. And, in the case of Europe, questions of energy merely accentuate the divisions among the members. Britain, for example, was attempting in 1974 and 1975 to deal with its domestic economic problems by borrowing heavily abroad, with the promise of North Sea oil as collateral.

While this reflected Britain's economic weakness, it also indicated a certain expectation of political strength — or at least the *hutzpah* of Mr. Wilson's Government. This was evident in the British attempt to insist on a separate seat at the conference of energy-producing and -consuming nations at which it had already been agreed that The Nine should have a single common representative. For France, on the other hand, energy questions provided a splendid opportunity to establish itself as the capital of the Euro-Arab dialogue, thereby fulfilling the twin French dream of assuming a leading role in Europe and snubbing the United States. Germany, in calling for a common energy policy was, therefore, an indication less of European unity than of that country's special position in the field of competing interests. In other words, Europe had, and still has, no vehicle beyond the CAP.

This would not have mattered much if the member states had been able to consolidate their position, continue to reach *ad hoc* agreements on a variety of issues, and share the profits of their economic growth in such schemes as those of the Regional Development Fund. But it was here that the differences in economic performance made such agreements impossible. In 1975, for instance, the British GNP actually fell, and this fall was accompanied by a large increase in Britain's balance-of-payments deficit. In 1976 it appears that the GNP has grown slightly, but this growth is accompanied by an even larger balance-of-payments deficit.

Germany, on the other hand, continues to accumulate vast surplus reserves of foreign currency. The downward "float" of the pound (and the *lira*) goes hand in hand with pressures for the revaluation of the *Mark*. Differences in domestic performance were, in fact, accentuated by the system of floating exchange-rates that came into being as the old international monetary system had broken down. In turn, this has meant that tensions on economic matters have increased.

Oil crisis
weakened
European
currencies

What, then, have been the principal pressures and tensions among The Nine over the past couple of years? The first concerns the question of regional aid. Here, Italy, Britain and Ireland have been competitors for the limited regional development funds available. All of them have depressed or poverty-stricken regions, and both Italy and Britain have failed to recycle their own domestic product in a manner that would permit an equitable distribution of internal wealth or generate the capacity for growth in their poorer areas. Britain, too, has tended to behave as if the losses it suffered by joining the EEC so late (approximately an extra £500-million deficit on its balance of payments in 1973 prices) represented some sort of British concession that should be compensated by a large flow of regional development funds. Italy's domestic political problems have, however, been more pressing. But, in general, what has become clear is that the regional-aid program is not big enough in scope to make a significant difference to any of the countries concerned over the next few years.

Second, there is the working of the CAP. A certain paradox is evident here. The CAP was originally the outcome of a Franco-German understanding by which both countries sought to maintain a degree of prosperity for their surplus rural populations. But, in general, it was Germany that put up most of the money and France that received most of the benefits — a situation that reflected the dominance of de Gaulle over Erhard. Moreover, it reflected a deliberate French attempt to maintain a high proportion of people on the land. As such, it amounted to a tax levied on France on other members of the Community for the sake of French political and social stability. But this contradicted one of the overt aims of the CAP, which was to ease uneconomic smallholders into a peasant retirement and thereby increase the overall efficiency of European agriculture. In other words, hidden tensions were at work inside the CAP itself, and its economic and social functioning varied from country to country.

Price of entry

Britain, which has an extremely efficient agricultural system, accepted the CAP with a heavy heart as part of its price of entry. It was expected that it would substantially increase the burden on the British economy. It is now argued, however, that the effect has been exactly the reverse; and the British, who once, with German backing, made it a primary aim of their European policies to revise the agri-

cultural agreements, have now, with German acquiescence, declared that these are non-negotiable.

The reason is clear. The workings of the "green money" system, whereby a notional unit of account for the EEC agricultural prices as a whole are then translated into the different national currencies, are highly advantageous to those countries whose own currencies are floating downward. It is, therefore, Britain and Italy that are now being subsidized through the CAP. The Germans, of course, are still paying. But the real paradox is that the CAP *does* represent a great burden on Britain and on other countries — since subsidization simply means the acceptance of the ludicrously high prices that have been fixed for agricultural produce in Europe anyway. And in turn, these prices lead to overproduction and underconsumption — to lakes of wine and milk, and to mountains of butter and beef, even though a large number of the people who make up the EEC can barely afford to eat meat once a week. At the same time, the CAP has led to tensions in Europe's foreign relations, for it was designed simultaneously to allow some imports from the Third World — and thereby to support, or at least buy off, developing countries — while restricting imports from the United States and Canada — and thereby to encourage European farmers.

These tensions are felt less now than they were three or four years ago, and have partly been absorbed by the framework of the North-South dialogue. But they cannot be expected to remain relaxed forever. In the meantime, Europe has, in one signal respect, extended the scope of its operations in the Third World. The Lomé Convention, which superseded the Yaoundé agreements, has created a framework for relations between the EEC and 46 other countries, not only in Africa but in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The exclusive club has given way to a much more open association. This could certainly hold great promise for the future. At the same time, one should note that it has also been accompanied by a degree of disappointment in the developing world, since The Nine, like other advanced nations afflicted by the twin evils of inflation and recession, have had to cut their spending; and, inevitably, the cuts have included development aid. This was at German insistence; and, while it reflected economic necessity, it also indicated political tensions. The majority of the associated states are still French-speaking — and the German Government saw no reason why France should

*Reduced
tensions
not expected
to remain*

go on buying political influence at German expense.

There are other tensions — as, for example, over the question of fishing limits — where Britain and Ireland have been half-hearted allies against the rest but whole-hearted enemies of each other. But the real matters at stake are more important than any of these individual instances, even the CAP. The fact is that the assumptions of ideological community on which the EEC was founded — a shared belief in the structures and values of liberal democracy — have now given way to a profound political uncertainty. The political instability and tendency towards polarization between neo-Fascist and neo-Communist is notorious in Italy; in France there are strong prospects of a socialist-Communist victory in the next elections; in Britain there is deep apprehension that the country's economic difficulties could lead to acute social and political conflicts.

The politics of the EEC are not overtly determined by such questions; but each country frames its approach to Europe primarily by reference to its own expectations of domestic stability. This

goes beyond the question of whether "Euro-Communism" can change its spot. Whether it can or not, it would bitterly divide The Nine. The only major European country that has preserved economic prosperity, social cohesion and political authority is Germany. Germany is subsidizing the rest. Since this itself has already produced a backlash in Italian politics, the present German Government is anxious not to do so too overtly in the case of Britain. But the fact remains that the continued strength, and even perhaps the survival, of the European Community now depends on Germany. One might perhaps be thankful that the power struggle between Bonn and Paris that was implicit in much of what has been said here has been won by Germany. At present Herr Schmidt and his colleagues are leaning over backwards to show understanding to recalcitrant and desperate cases. But it must remain open to question whether their country can afford to do this forever, and, if not, whether the Community can find a new vehicle for a more sensible co-operation than it has found in the past.

*Assumptions
have given way
to political
uncertainty*

Canada's image in Europe still needs improvement

By André P. Donneur

One of the major elements in the "Third Option" policy — Canada's long-term strategy for becoming more independent of the United States — has been to consolidate and develop relations with Western Europe. This policy has not only consisted of negotiating and concluding an agreement with the European Economic Community — bilateral ties have also been strengthened. Several trips by the Prime Minister to member countries of the Community have drawn much attention. His visit to Paris two years ago was a particularly striking example of this policy; relations with France, which had undergone a period of serious crisis between 1967 and 1969 and a subsequent period of normalization, entered at that time upon a new era of co-operation.

What effects have these undoubted efforts on Canada's part, over the past four years in any case, had on European governments? Has what we imagine has to be Canada's image abroad — the image of a country riding on the coat-tails of the United States — been dispelled in Europe? In the first place, this has never been the unanimous view of foreign observers, Europeans in particular. Before Canada ever stated its desire to reduce American influence through the Third Option policy, it was thought of by a considerable number of European political leaders as a distinct country, a country with its own diplomacy, made famous by the efforts of Lester B. Pearson during the Fifties.

It must be admitted, however, that some European leaders — particularly the French — gave credence to the myth and had serious doubts as to the origin of Canada's foreign policy. One of the deep-seated causes — never openly stated — of the crisis in relations between France and Canada from 1967 to 1969 undoubtedly lay in this assessment.

Position altered

The Third Option policy has, without question, altered this position. The change did not come about immediately after it was officially announced in the fall of 1972. In the now-famous article by Mitchell Sharp in a special issue of this magazine, it was only after many long explanations by officials at different levels of government that the most reserved of European leaders understood the innovative character of this option. I personally recall being struck by the surprise manifested by the staunch Gaullist members of French leadership circles when they were first made aware, in 1973, of the content of the Third Option policy. The reaction was: "Basically, what Canada wants is the same thing France wants — greater freedom of movement, but within the Atlantic alliance". The same persons decided that it would be greatly to Canada's advantage to make this policy better known in France. Today, this has been achieved.

The example of France is significant, for it was in that country that the image of a Canada unconditionally tied to the United States was most widespread. However, the views of Western European leaders should be considered systematically, in which case different types of officials, at different levels, may be regarded in turn. Let us consider first the position of the leadership circles in the European Economic Community; then the position of the larger countries (all of them members of the Community in any case); next the position of the smaller member countries of the Community; and, finally, the position of other non-European countries.

Canada signed an agreement this year with the Community — though not without some difficulty. It is well-known that, since 1972, officials of the Community (the EC Commission, the Council of Ministers and senior government officials) had had reservations about ties of any sort with Canada. They wished particularly to avoid setting a precedent that would allow any other industrialized state to claim similar advantages. Clearly, it was feared that Canada would be the Trojan

horse by means of which the United States would gain entry to the Community.

At the same time, the fact that Canada had, a short time previously, reviewed its defence policy and relegated its NATO participation to third place among its priorities (after the defence of its own territory and the defence of North America) left Europeans with the impression that Canada was losing interest in Europe and withdrawing into itself. In concrete terms, members of the Council of Ministers of the Community could observe the withdrawal of half the Canadian military forces stationed in Europe. However, the Prime Minister's trips to Brussels and the capitals of the other member countries cleared the way for an agreement. The groundwork for these visits was laid by the discreet but untiring efforts of the Mission of Canada to the European Communities and the contacts between senior officials of the Canadian Government and the European Economic Community. It was also stressed in Ottawa that Western European defence was of decisive importance for Canada, and the reinforcement of Canadian military "hardware" in Germany by German *Leopard* tanks was a concrete expression of this change in defence policy.

Resource attraction

Now that there exists an agreement between Canada and the European Economic Community, it might be asked what the leaders of the Community expect of Canada. Raw materials, which Europe lacks, are certainly what most interests the Europeans. The content of the agreement, however, is still quite vague. It is a framework within which all sorts of joint projects could be discussed and initiated. The widespread feeling among "Eurocrats" — the name coined to describe senior officials of the Common Market — is that Canada itself is not quite sure what it expects of the Community. The standard reply in Ottawa is that the Canadian

Ottawa stressed importance of defence of Europe

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position has already been explained patiently and in detail in Brussels.

However, it seems that this feeling cannot be dispelled. Canada continues to be seen as lacking a uniquely Canadian position in GATT negotiations and as aligning itself with the United States without giving sufficient consideration to the Community's position or acting in concert with the Community. Canada's protectionism in agriculture and some industrial goods also conflicts with the Community's interests. Since the agreement was signed only recently, it is expected that these criticisms will end as the agreement is put into effect. In any case, opinions within the Community bureaucracy are not unanimous in their attitude towards Canada, and only a careful scientific survey (which has, unfortunately, not been carried out to this date) could provide, accurately and with all necessary nuances, information on the attitude of the Eurocrats.

*No unanimity
in Community
bureaucracy
on attitude
to Canada*

Closest ties

Canada's closest ties among the major European countries are with Britain, which is still the main source of immigration to Canada. Trade exchanges with Britain are the third highest in all Canada's trade. These facts are well known. The intense co-operation between Canada and Britain at the ministerial and senior government levels is also an unquestionable fact.

Britain, with all of its ties with Canada, is the country most likely to be aware of the latter's needs, and in the best position to know what to expect from Canada. However, there is still too great a tendency to think that Canada and Canadian policy are clearly perceived in Britain. Indeed, one is often surprised to note that in some important British circles Canada is still seen in the outmoded image of a semi-colony.

Those who perceive Canada thus are not, of course, among those who come into direct contact with Canadian ministers and senior officials, but they are often influential in the economic and intellectual community. In this same milieu, I have been told, the road from Canada to Brussels, capital of the Community, passes through Washington. The Third Option policy has been deplored, Canada's hostility towards the United States criticized, and the advantages of free exchange with the U.S. extolled. This free-exchange option was precisely the one rejected by Canada when it adopted its present policy towards the U.S.

Since the time of Mr. Trudeau's visit to Paris in 1974, relations with France have,

as we have seen, taken a new direction. The trip made by Mr. Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the beginning of November 1976 afforded another opportunity for strengthening the terrain of co-operation. Mr. Jamieson showed great openness in regretting that contacts between Paris and Ottawa were not frequent enough at any level, even if they were only telephone contacts. It is a fact that relations between French and Canadian leaders — especially senior government officials — are neither as frequent nor of as routine a nature as relations between Canada and Britain.

Then again, relations between France and Canada cannot be considered without taking into account the special character of direct relations between France and Quebec. These preferential relations have over the past ten years made it possible for 38,000 persons in France and Quebec to make exchange visits. The visits have been extended to all classes of society but have been of particular importance in leadership circles in both countries. It may thus be considered without any doubt that many French citizens in positions of responsibility in the universities, in the economic and trade-union spheres, and in administration and government, have a relatively good knowledge of Quebec.

But the advantage of this knowledge also has its drawback — the view that the French leaders have of Canada is only partial one, since they know Quebec more thoroughly than they do English Canada. The special tie with Quebec thus tends to slant their view of Canada towards the Quebec viewpoint. However, particularly since 1974 and since the desire to co-operate with Canada as a whole was indicated by President Giscard d'Estaing, more direct contacts have been established between France and Canada, enabling French leaders to gain a more comprehensive view. For French leaders, Canada is an economic partner of serious interest. The Third Option policy is not better understood in France than in many other European countries. It should be noted that the lifting of the French veto on a link between Canada and the Common Market has certainly enabled negotiations along this line to be completed.

A final serious question to be raised with respect to French expectations of Canada and Quebec is the question of what might happen in the event of a rise to power of a leftist coalition government in France. An interesting fact, hardly touched upon here, is that the French socialist party has in its ranks one of the

most knowledgeable of all French politicians on the subject of Canada — Mr. Barrère, deputy to the National Assembly and Mayor of Pau, who taught for more than ten years at Laval University. He is an active member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Assembly and could be called on to play an important role in the field of foreign affairs should a leftist government come to power. With such a spokesman, as well as other leftist leaders, mainly socialists, who have had contact with parliamentarians, government officials and academics in Quebec and Canada, there is no chance that the latter will be overlooked or misunderstood in France if the left comes to power.

Germany

The most important state in Western Europe and the Common Market is undoubtedly the Federal Republic of Germany. "What Do We Know About Canada?" was the headline in the July 22 daily newspaper *Neue Ruhr Zeitung*. In an article by Jens Feddersen, the paper's answer was: "In fact, we know very little: it is a large country, has lots of forests and water, not many people, some bears, wheat that is sold to Moscow and Peking, German immigrants, a few Eskimos, a little language barrier between French and English, and a liberal Prime Minister." As a matter of fact, the newspaper emphasized and explained that the reality was quite different. However, it took a humorous tone in summing up its readers' superficial knowledge.

Fortunately, knowledge of Canada among German leaders is more extensive. The visits to Bonn by the Prime Minister in 1975 and by the Minister of External Affairs in 1976, and Chancellor Schmidt's trip to Ottawa in the summer of 1976, enabled terms for closer co-operation between the two countries to be established. Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Trudeau also had an opportunity to meet at the summit conference on economic problems in Puerto Rico. In addition, in January the two countries have been co-operating as members of the United Nations Security Council, to which they were both elected last fall.

In concrete terms, West Germany is much interested in co-operating with Canada in the field of nuclear technology. This is an area in which Canada has developed advanced techniques and can be a strong, well-developed partner. Germany is also interested in Canadian raw materials. Co-operation could, therefore, grow along the lines of the Third Option, especially in the nuclear field, where reduction of the dependence on the United

States should result in the development of advanced-technology industries in Canada.

However, West German businessmen, academics and leaders have difficulty in understanding Canada's concern about American influence. With its alliance with the United States as a mainstay of its policy and with a dynamic economy and cultural life, West Germany cannot see what Canada is so worried about. At any rate, German leaders see the response as part of an internal Canadian solution to the American challenge. It is up to Canada to show its excellence in the technical and cultural fields, and American influence will dwindle by itself. It is hard for West Germany to visualize the effect on the Canadian and Quebec cultures of the difference in scale between the United States and Canada, taken together with their proximity. The Third Option policy is, therefore, regarded sympathetically and with an eye to the economic advantage to be gained by Germany, but without being clearly understood.

This review of attitudes of Western European countries towards Canada is by no means exhaustive. We shall not, for example, discuss Italy, and shall take only a brief glance at the viewpoint of the smaller Common Market countries. The Benelux countries — Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg — have close relations with Canada: they were the first to understand clearly the Canadian position and to encourage ties between Canada and the European Economic Community. Denmark has been much more hesitant, as could be seen by its last-minute opposition on the raw-materials question, which delayed the signing of a framework agreement between the Community and Canada. Even if the opposition was for the purpose of establishing a precedent for future negotiations with Denmark's oil-rich neighbour Norway, it was nonetheless indicative of a degree of ignorance of the stakes involved for Canada in these negotiations.

Non-members

There remain the smaller Western European countries that are not members of the Common Market. Some of them, such as Spain, are of a respectable size. Just as we have not considered Ireland and Italy in the Common Market, we shall concentrate on only two non-members of the European Community — Sweden and Switzerland. Because of their neutrality, these two countries should be in a position to understand more readily Canada's desire for independence.

Third Option gets sympathy but no clear understanding from Germany

Canada needs
closer ties
with countries
of Nordic Council

It is to be regretted that Canada has not developed closer ties with Sweden. This comment applies equally to the member countries of the Nordic Council (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland). These countries are actually closest to Canada in terms of climatic conditions and geography in general. They have succeeded equally in many fields in being in the forefront of social organization. In housing, transportation, education, care for the elderly and the sick, and labour relations, these countries are, generally speaking, the most advanced qualitatively in the world.

The former Social Democrat Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme, had personal ties with Canadian leaders and a solid knowledge of Canadian problems. The new middle-class government does not seem, for the moment at any rate, to have modified the broad outlines of Sweden's

foreign policy. Nor does it seem that Swedish attitude towards Canada will be modified either. Relations established with former government officials are being supplemented by relations with a new team, some members of which have already visited Canada in their capacity as members of parliament. With this further knowledge of Canada by Sweden, the two countries could develop co-operative projects other than those that exist at present — for example, in the field of military equipment.

Swiss investments

Economic relations with Switzerland are of an importance proportionate to the size of the country. Swiss investments in Canada are substantial; one need only mention Nestlé, Hoffman-La Roche, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz or Brown-Boveri, as well as the Swiss insurance companies, real-estate

Canada looks at Europe

The vast majority of Canadians favour closer links between Canada and the European Community ("Common Market"). According to a survey carried out by Le Centre de Sondage de l'Université de Montréal and le Centre d'Études et de Documentation Européennes, 86 per cent of the 1,433 persons questioned in 23 urban centres across Canada approved of a *rapprochement* between Canada and Europe; however, many lacked detailed knowledge of European institutions.

Although there were notable gaps in their knowledge of EC institutions, 83 per cent of those interviewed felt that the European Community had benefited all its members and 62 per cent would deplore its dissolution. Most of the respondents perceived the main goals of the Community to be of an economic rather than of a political nature. Of those polled, 80 per cent realized that, although the EC had established a common agricultural policy, it had not yet realized political union; 65 per cent of those interviewed were aware of the customs agreement among The Nine, but only 51 per cent knew that the Community did not yet have a common economic and monetary policy.

Many answers underlined the importance to Canada of its relations with Europe. For example, 79 per cent of Canadians considered relations with Europe to be "very important" and 71 per cent of them saw those relations as having intensified over the past 10 years; 49 per cent expressed some sentimental attachment to one or more European countries.

Canadian perceptions of the importance of relations with Europe were also indicated by the fact that 87 per cent of respondents approved of Canadian participation in NATO. On the other hand, one-third had doubts about the efficiency of the Alliance and expressed reservations about Canadian military commitments to Europe in case of war.

The survey suggests that Canadians are generally quite realistic and clear-headed in their appreciation of international relations and that they tend to think about them in terms of Canadian economic realities. Opinions were divided about the usefulness of the Prime Minister's visits to Europe in 1974 and 1975; 53 per cent saw such visits as useful in furthering closer economic ties, while the remainder expressed a more critical view. Half of the respondents were fully aware of the

investment, and the active presence of representatives of the Union Bank of Switzerland and the Swiss Credit Bank in particular. Trade with Canada (\$260 million in 1975) is not inconsiderable in view of the smallness of Switzerland.

Canada has been well-known for a long time in Switzerland, and Swiss economic, financial and academic circles are generally aware of the potential of this country. Their understanding of the Third Option policy, however, sometimes comes up against objections similar to those we have noted in the case of England and Germany. An advocate of free trade in the industrial area only, Switzerland sees the solution to the problems of economic growth in multilateral exchanges. In the cultural area, it counts more on personal initiatives by its academics and artists than on agreements — which, in any case, it avoids signing. It is nonetheless true that

its leaders and intellectuals are keenly interested in any industrial assistance projects and any possible academic and cultural exchanges with Quebec, and Canada as a whole.

In the light of these general impressions, it seems clear to us that Canada has very considerable assets in Western Europe. However, subject to long-term scientific research — and this would require a series of systematic interviews with leaders and, to use a word not very popular today, *élites* — the image of Canada on the European subcontinent still needs to be better known if Canada wishes to complete one of the stages of its Third Option policy — diversifying its external relations. This option is in any case still valid for Quebec, as it is for Canada, whatever the structural reorganization that Canada undergoes in the next few years.

relationship between the Prime Minister's trips to Europe and the objectives of concluding an agreement with the EC. Only 6 per cent said they were unaware of the negotiations in progress. Almost two out of three respondents said that they had read about the European Community in the press, 70 per cent had learnt about it from the radio and television, while 55 per cent were aware that the EC had been much in the news over the four weeks preceding the survey. It should be noted that this survey was carried out in May and June 1976, as the final steps towards the signing of the agreement between the EC and Canada were being taken.

As for the attitude of Canadians to the agreement itself, the survey shows that 42 per cent of the respondents thought that both sides would benefit equally, while 30 per cent felt that the agreement would be to the net advantage of Canada. Better access to markets and investment capital was seen as the major advantage to Canada. A minority of 28 per cent considered that there might be distinct disadvantages; they were divided between those who thought that European exports might constitute serious competition on the Canadian market, and those who feared that the relationship could be

unfair, with the EC gaining access to Canadian raw materials without providing markets for Canadian manufactured goods.

The survey concludes that, while the attitudes of Canadians towards closer ties with Europe are positive, there is an almost equal interest in the strengthening of Canadian relations with the rest of the world. There is a very clear desire to open up to various parts of the world; seven out of ten of the respondents wanted to see Canada extend its contacts with the Far East in general, especially with Japan and the People's Republic of China, as well as with socialist countries such as the U.S.S.R., and with Latin America. Among those Canadians interested in and informed about international affairs, therefore, the importance of Canada's links with Europe is seen in the context of its foreign relations in general, and Europe appears to share the limelight with major powers on other continents.

The survey was sponsored by the Department of External Affairs, the Quebec Ministries of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, and Immigration, and the Commission of the European Communities.

Canada needs to reconcile foreign and defence policies

By Alasdair MacLaren

The White Paper *Defence in the Seventies* was the result of the examination and reassessment of Canadian defence policy undertaken during the early years of the Trudeau Government. This document set forth priorities of Canadian defence policy. The first priority was the protection of sovereignty, a not unreasonable first choice; the second was the defence of North America in conjunction with the United States; the third was honouring the NATO commitment: finally, in fourth position, was peacekeeping. From this declaratory policy one might have expected that future procurement decisions would be based largely on the needs of the protection-of-sovereignty role.

In the meantime, however, the development of the so-called "Third Option" in foreign policy pre-empted the shift in defence policy to a more national and less international bearing. This has meant that, rather than implementing the priorities of the 1971 White Paper, defence policy has reverted to what it was in pre-Trudeau days, before the hearing of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, before the partial withdrawal from Europe, and before the development of the principal theme in contemporary Canadian foreign policy.

Properly speaking, defence policy is the servant of foreign policy. It is, nonetheless, unfortunate that the apparent *quid pro quo* for achieving Canadian foreign-policy goals involves the neglect of the first priority of defence policy as laid out in 1971 — the protection of sovereignty. Defence policy has also become the hostage of the notion that any Soviet aggression will come on the central front of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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To fulfil the NATO commitment as thus conceived requires functionally-specialized forces. To fulfil the protection-of-sovereignty role, on the other hand, requires general-purpose, balanced forces. This means that there can be little overlap of the forces and equipment that have to be maintained to fulfil the two roles.

Two aspects

There are two principal aspects, or environments, of Canadian security. First, there is internal or domestic security (currently the question of protecting sovereignty), which means, in a military sense, the deployment of monitoring and enforcement capabilities, particularly in the North and now in the 200-mile economic zone. Conflicts arising in this area are principally of an economic, legal or political nature. The external-security environment (membership in the North Atlantic Alliance) is politico-military in character. Activities in this area are primarily in the form of joint measures designed to deter aggression.

In neither environment, it could be argued, can Canada act unilaterally, rather it has to enlist the support of others to realize its goals. This is obvious in the case of NATO in the external environment. It may be less obvious in the domestic environment, where, for example, in matters relating to jurisdictional disputes in the Arctic, the U.S.S.R. is a possible partner. Not only is the permutation of partners different for each of the environments but the situation is further complicated by the position of the United States and Europe *vis-à-vis* Canada. The United States at one and the same time threatens to dominate the North American continent and defends it from external aggression. The Europe of The Nine, the European Community, is one of the desired counterweights to the United States in the working-out of the Third Option. On the other hand, the European Community is, for the most part, made up of states that are also members of N.

*Third Option
has reversed
defence policy*

d, as such, contributors with the United States to Canadian security.

Thus the source of the economic threat to Canadian sovereignty is its principal military ally and partner in North American defence, while the potential ally in the Arctic, the Soviet Union, is its principal military adversary; and the desired economic counterweight, The Nine, are Canada's military allies, who are demanding a greater military contribution from Europe in return for the "contractual link". Canada's room for manoeuvre is thus restricted to the extent that the success of its attempts to forge a contractual economic link with Europe depends on its upgrading its alliance contribution to Europe, which in turn diverts its military resources from other tasks closer to home. In effect, Canada has had to abandon its declaratory defence policy because of developments in foreign economic policy, something that clearly has important long-term effects on its domestic security. Canada can be seen as the prisoner of its size, its richness in resources, the fact that its neighbours to the north and to the south are the superpowers, its small population and, finally, the weakness of its military establishment.

NATO first

At present, Canada has not been faced with making a choice of where to place the emphasis in its defence policy; the North Atlantic Alliance has traditionally come first. What was significant about the 1971 White Paper was that its nationalism was in marked contrast to its internationalism, particularly during the Pearson years. Now, however, the tasks that must be fulfilled by the armed forces, together with the relative meagreness of the numbers involved, make a choice necessary: what is available is not to be spread so thinly as to constitute merely a symbolic presence both at home and in NATO. A choice may soon be made as to whether the danger to natural resources and the threat to sovereignty posed by the United States Government and some of the multinational companies, as well as the dangers posed by an increasing Soviet maritime capability, do not outweigh the benefits of the economic link with Europe with its present military underpinnings.

This is not to deny that a link to the United States may, in fact, be necessary, but it does raise the question of whether the military component of the link is appropriate for Canada in view of the concern over sovereignty in the North and the capabilities required to enforce the soon-to-be-introduced 200-mile economic zone. When the

principal military ally is perceived as the threat in the domestic environment, and the principal military adversary in the external environment is perceived as an effective counterweight in the question of sovereignty, the principal actors and the various interweaving factors form an intricate calculus that exerts different pulls and makes reconciliation very difficult.

It will be recalled that it was a scant eight years ago that the Prime Minister remarked that Canadian defence policy with respect to NATO had largely determined Canadian foreign policy — the tail wagging the dog, it was said. There should be little doubt in his mind now which comes first and, for that matter, has always come first. It now seems that foreign policy has determined the exact nature and posture of Canadian defence policy with little regard for the implications of this fact on the domestic security environment. The purchase of *Leopard* tanks and a replacement for the CF-104 are expensive bargaining chips, the more so when the benefits of the contractual link are as yet unknown, at least on this side of the fog of official rhetoric that has characterized the diplomatic offensive from the beginning.

That Canada must remain in NATO is by now quite clear. It is equally clear that its contribution to NATO must be greater than the token forces deployed since 1969. One means of at least partly resolving the multifaceted conflict in defence policy, however, is for Canada to reallocate its military effort within NATO in such a way that the task of protecting its sovereignty and the obligation to NATO may, as far as possible, coincide. It is argued here that there must be an alternative to the present plans to qualitatively improve Canadian forces under SACEUR, that there must be a way to reconcile the conflicting demands of domestic security with the need for an economic and political counterweight (thus the NATO commitment in its present form) within Canadian defence policy.

A suitable vehicle for bringing this about is the idea put forward by Professor Nils Orvik for an Arctic Command within NATO. Such a command would consist of Canada, the United States, Britain, Denmark and Norway. It would give some institutional recognition to the increased capabilities of the Soviet Navy, especially the Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula, with the political and military dangers that this poses for the North Atlantic states. It might stimulate a greater interest by these nations in matters relating to northern security than

*NATO
contribution
must be greater
than token force*



Wide World ph

The overlapping of Canada's foreign and defence policies is most visible in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, is shown at last December's opening session of the biannual conference of NATO foreign ministers in Geneva. Seated next to Mr. Jamieson is Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO, Jerry Hardy.

they show at present, accustomed as they are to the principal focus of the Alliance being on Central Europe. It would offer Canada the opportunity to reallocate some of its military tasks and bring into line the capabilities required for what are, at the moment, very different roles. Finally, such a shift of emphasis might make Canadian defence of greater interest to the average Canadian, who is asked at present to view his country's defence policy principally in terms of European security, something that at first sight may make little sense to him. The shift in emphasis would obviate the need for main-battle tanks and aircraft designed for combat over Europe.

No "free ride"

Such a shift could not be said to be an example of taking a "free ride" or of providing a hint of future disengagement from the Alliance; on the contrary, Canada could reallocate its military resources while displaying solid NATO credentials, thus fulfilling the political function of Canadian troops in Europe: that of indicating to the Europeans that Canada is committed to their defence. Another

military function with strong political overtones is the maintenance by North Americans of a reinforcement-supply capability. The fact that they maintain this capability is an expression of support to the Western Europeans, whether this capability accords with Soviet strategic doctrine, and hence one's favorite scenario, is beside the point.

At a time when financial restraint makes the sovereignty role little more than symbolic; when the introduction of a 200-mile economic zone calls for greater surveillance, protection and enforcement capabilities; when the assertion of jurisdiction in the Arctic presents some formidable military problems, the Government has chosen to acquire as a long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA) the P-3 *Aurora*, which has as one of its main capabilities anti-submarine warfare. But the Soviet Union is currently embarked on a program of replacing the *Yankee*-class with the *Delta*-class SSBN (ballistic-missile-carrying nuclear submarine), with its longer range of fire-power. Where the missile of the *Yankee*-class submarines had a range of 1,600 miles, those of the *Delta* class have a range in excess of 4,000 miles.

placement program has had the effect of making the strategic ASW (anti-submarine warfare) function in the Northwest quadrant of the Atlantic less important. As a result, except to meet the fear that the Soviets would deploy the *Yankee* class as part of a first strike, the maintenance of a Canadian strategic ASW function in the Northwest quadrant makes little sense. The relevance of the sophisticated anti-submarine electronic equipment to be carried on the *Aurora* is called in question, as are the reasons for the acquisition of the *Aurora*.

expensive influence

Canada is attempting to buy influence through its purchase of these aircraft, and the influence is inordinately expensive. If the purchase is to ensure the continuing flow of intelligence between Norfolk and Halifax, then this also represents an expensive means of doing so, and is a poor reason for maintaining this capability. A serious Canadian strategic ASW capability was compromised by Canada's understandable refusal to buy counter-killer submarines, the most effective means of countering SSBNs. The *Aurora* represents an expensive second-best solution to a dubious mission. In view of the tasks that will need to be undertaken, a better "mix" of aircraft would have been obtained for not much more than the total cost of the *Aurora* project. This is not to deny a need for the CF-104, but rather to question the reasons for the acquisition of this particular model, whose electronics package has an unnecessary element of "me-too" about it. A simpler version (and cheaper), plus a variant of, say, the *Dash 7*, would have produced a more desirable "mix". The latter would also present the opportunity of keeping the de Havilland production-lines fully occupied for some time.

A replacement for the CF-104 will very soon be required. No doubt the contenders are being lined up as *Starfighter* replacements with the air element in Europe. Similar questions arise. Does Canada really need something as sophisticated as the *Eagle* or the *Tornado*? These provide, along with the *Leopard*, examples of very expensive weapons-systems. Would not the amount of money required to procure these aircraft be better used to obtain something that answered Canada's needs rather than something that represented the current state of the art in fighters? Is it too late to try to match the procurement needs of Canadian security in the domestic environment with the needs of NATO commitment but in a different

form? This, admittedly, would require modification of Canada's role in the Alliance in order, as far as possible, to reconcile the roles and permit the procurement of weapons suitable for both national and international security purposes.

As the Third Option has featured a diplomatic offensive designed to accomplish certain economic goals, could not Canada have injected some military considerations into the negotiations? At the moment, the Third Option has resulted in an unimaginative return of emphasis in Canadian defence policy to the central front of NATO. The re-emphasis is an implicit acceptance of the notion that the principal danger to our security lies in that theatre, and in purely military form. There are ample indications that the dangers posed are not exclusively military and not exclusively confined to the central front in Europe. Instead of trying to find an alternative to improving the quality and increasing the quantity of Canadian forces in Europe, as demanded by the Europeans, the Government has apparently submitted meekly to the idea of acquiring tanks, LRPAs and advanced fighters as the price of being granted a contractual link with the Europe of The Nine, the benefits of which are not yet known. Of greater concern is the fact that these procurement decisions represent quite considerable "sunk" costs, and this alone makes it unlikely that Canadian defence policy will change, or be able to change, its focus for many years to come.

Hence, what in 1971 had the appearance of making Canadian defence policy more relevant to Canada as well as to NATO now has the forlorn and unfortunate look of an aberration, one belonging to (in foreign affairs) the nationalistic interregnum that was the first Trudeau Government. The promise of a change of direction has not been realized. Canadian defence policy is essentially back where it was before 1968. Policy is moulded not so much by the need to protect the country's natural resources and reinforce its jurisdictional claims as by the need to develop an economic relation with a group of states that are in a position to make certain demands, not the least of which is a re-emphasis of the Canadian commitment to come to Europe's aid in the event of war. The manifestation of solidarity required is the physical presence of the Canadian Armed Forces — not armed with their 32 *Centurions* and similar antiquated curiosities but with all sorts of sophisticated weapons reflecting the present state of the art.

*Procurement
decisions
fixes policy
for many years*

Neatby's Mackenzie King a fascinating account

By John A. Munro

*The ultimate
political
pragmatist*

William Lyon Mackenzie King's place among the least attractive of Canadian political leaders seems secure. He was mean. He was petty. He was vain. A sanctimonious man, he could abide ambition in no one save himself. Internationally, he was an isolationist, an appeaser. An anti-Empire champion of Canadian autonomy, he nevertheless retained many of the attributes of "a good old colonial boy". Yet he was the most successful Canadian politician who ever lived. The ultimate political pragmatist, he was the total politician with an absolute faith in the necessary unity of his and his nation's destinies. Mackenzie King was cloaked in contradiction. He remains so.

This is not to belittle Volume III of Professor Neatby's life of King. Although our former Prime Minister must have proved a difficult subject indeed, Neatby has written a fascinating account of the man and his milieu. Undoubtedly, this is the most important book thus far on Canadian politics in the 1930s. Not only does the author provide an intelligent and properly critical account of King in those years, he also provides the best account we have of R. B. Bennett. Furthermore, he does not dwell on the "odd" side of King, whose place in Canadian history does not rest on either his peculiar fascination with the inhabitants of the world beyond or his sexual aberrations; King's private life is dealt with in fewer than 15 pages.

King's method

If Neatby's book does not tell us much about the *madness*, it tells us a great deal about the *method* of Mackenzie King. "Discussions", "concessions", "compro-

mise": these are the words that describe King's method — a method, Neatby tells us, that was "as important as the decision itself". Neatby also tells us that King's guideline was:

"... the simple but fundamental conviction that Canada was a political association of diverse cultural, regional and economic groups. He saw it as a voluntary association, a political partnership. He believed that these groups shared a sense of national community and an underlying commitment to national unity. They were as different as the colours of the spectrum but through his prism he saw them as bound together like a ray of light. His never-ending task as leader was to identify the policies which would maintain and strengthen the partnership, which would be acceptable to all even if no group was fully satisfied. His approach to political leadership was consciously designed to ensure that the Liberal party became the political embodiment of this partnership.

"King's version of national unity was an extension of his earlier views on industrial relations. He knew that the interests of management and labour were not identical and that disputes over working conditions and wages were inevitable. But he rejected the idea of a class struggle, the belief that this was an irreconcilable conflict in which there must be a winner and a loser. He believed that both sides could win. Industry was for him a partnership to which both capital and labour contributed from which both benefited. Disputes could not be resolved by dissolving the partnership. Employers and workers had to become aware of their common interests, of their interdependence, and negotiate within this framework. Strikes or lockouts might sometimes be necessary to remind narrowminded men on either side that they could not succeed alone, and to persuade them to modify the terms of a partnership which

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W. L. Mackenzie King

no longer acceptable. The objective, however, was not victory for one side but the negotiation of a more satisfactory partnership. Industrial harmony depended upon the recognition that employers and workers were partners; both would be better off if they learned to respect each other and to co-operate." Mackenzie King's prism reflected many lights. On the page preceding the above quotation, Neatby is at pains to present this proposition: "Europe's anathema to communism was fascism. Would Canadians face a similar confrontation?" Implicit in the pages that follow is his answer. Mackenzie King would save us from both perils. Yet Neatby does not bring to our attention this portion of King's diary entry for June 29, 1937. This is a part of King's record of his conversation with Hitler:

"... I feel more and more how far reaching in the interest of the working classes are the reforms being worked out in Germany, and how completely they are in the right lines. They are truly establishing an industrial commonwealth, and other nations would be wise to evolve rapidly on similar lines of giving to labour its place in the control of industry; its leisure, its opportunities for education, recreation, sharing, in all particulars, the life which hitherto had been preserved for the privileged classes only. Of all that I have seen on this trip abroad, I have been more impressed and more heartened by what seems to be working itself out in Germany in these particulars than on almost anything else."

No doubt the Rockefellers also approved the methods through which industrial harmony was achieved in Nazi Germany!

One is often led to reflect, when reading these pages, that King's biographer must be possessed not only of hindsight but also of great determination to find acceptable reason and reasonable clarity where all others found obscurity. The author accepts as his guide to understanding the public actions and utterances of Mackenzie King a quite selective employment of King's private account of events as related to his diary. No doubt Neatby's problem was to find a balance between the terribly revealing and the equally self-serving. As indicated above, he occasionally fails. Moreover, at some points the diary (as representative of the private and inner man) and the official papers (as representative of the public and political man) become one and the same. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that there were occasions on which parts of the diary were written at least some days after the events in question. For example, on Page 281, Neatby cites the diary entry for May 13, 1938, on the subject of the British Commonwealth Air-Training Scheme. It is interesting that this same excerpt appears in the files of the Department of External Affairs in a memorandum describing a conversation with the British High Commissioner, Sir Francis Flood, on May 16, 1938. The only difference is that the diary employs the phrase "European war" whereas the memorandum substitutes "European conflict". There is, of course, the more fundamental consideration of whether, indeed, it is sound scholarship to use King to interpret King. The King diary is not a Rosetta Stone.

Magnitude of task

Still, these may be considered as relatively minor points when compared to the magnitude of Professor Neatby's task. He has taken 13 years between Volume II and III, sufficient time for mature and thorough consideration. Certainly, time enough to master things not obvious to those not equally immersed in the period of the 1930s: for example, how to differentiate between the Conservative "depression" of 1935 and the Liberal "recession" of 1937. That said, Neatby's portrait of R. B. Bennett seems fair, in its context. This is an important point, as Professor Neatby knows well. Since his work on King precedes any important biography of Bennett, Bennett's biographer, when he appears, will have in some measure to write his account according to Neatby's (King's) rules. It can be demon-

strated that the first major political interpretation of a period shapes much of the subsequent interpretation of that period. The business of myth-making in Canada is seldom allowed outside the doors of the Whig historical establishment.

If, in reading the above, the reader is led to the conclusion that this reviewer did not enjoy Professor Neatby's book, he is wrong. It is well-written, organized to effect and, as I have noted above, its content is a positive fascination. That this review disagrees with the presentation of King in certain particulars takes nothing away from Neatby's achievement. Indeed, one regrets the decision of Mackenzie King's literary executors to substitute the four-volume *Mackenzie King Record*,

spanning the period from the outbreak of the Second World War to King's death in 1950, for a complete official biography of King's life. The decision of the executors to open the Mackenzie King diaries under the 30-year rule and to make them available on microfiche (a decision to be applauded) will render the *Record* superfluous to scholars; it never had a general reading audience. No doubt the latter period of King's national stewardship will continue to receive the attention of scholars. To date, however, their work has lacked the authority of a Blair Neatby.

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Book review

Stursberg on Diefenbaker shows value of oral history

By Nora S. Lever

With the publication of his second volume of interviews, Peter Stursberg completes what he calls a "living history" of the Diefenbaker era. In accomplishing this task, Stursberg effectively combines the journalistic and academic approaches to oral history.

Researchers in universities, museums and archives question whether oral history embraces a legitimate approach to historical research. But those who belittle the method may be missing vital perceptual material that creates a sympathetic understanding of certain epochs. On the other hand, those who enthusiastically espouse such a procedure must remind themselves that oral history is a supplement to other methodologies, and that the foundation of such an approach relies on extensive use of conventional library and archival sources.

Mrs. Lever is on the staff of the House of Commons as Clerk of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry. The views expressed here are those of the author.

As a journalist in conversation with a newsworthy politician, Stursberg acts as a prompter eliciting the feelings and atmosphere that permeated the Diefenbaker era. Meanwhile, as an academic, he has obviously engaged in preliminary research that guided him in establishing a regular format for his interviews. Moreover, as an archivist in collaboration with Léo LaClare, he has deposited the tapes and transcripts in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, for general release after December 31, 1980. For that the rest of the academic community will be grateful.

Vivid reports of political trials and tribulations appear in conversation with Gordon Churchill, Donald Fleming, David Fulton, Grattan O'Leary, Waldo Montealegre and many others who were active at the centre of Canadian politics during Diefenbaker's leadership. But the story of the decline, which is the particular focus of this volume, is a sad one to read. A Government with the largest majority in the history of Canada's Parliament was reduced to a minority by the 1962 election. The ensuing months held enormous f-



John Diefenbaker

tion for those who participated in the frequent and seemingly endless Cabinet meetings that exhibited a crippling lack of decisiveness on the part of the Prime Minister, with recurring threats of resignation.

The nuclear controversy was the main issue to confound the Diefenbaker Government. As part of the North American Defence Command (NORAD), Canada was committed to obtaining *Bomarc* missiles and the CF-101 *Voodoo* intercept planes; as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canadian Forces were to fly the CF-104 *Starfighters*. To be effective, these weapons required nuclear warheads, but the members of Diefenbaker's Cabinet were divided on the question of bringing such weapons into Canada.

Stursberg's interviews provide an intriguing juxtaposition of the counterbalancing arguments of Douglas Harkness as Minister of National Defence and Howard Green as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Excerpts from the conversations are arranged so that it seems almost as if these two ministers are debating the issue face to face.

Through Harkness's own words, it becomes clear that he regarded the question as settled and urged that Canada's commitments be honoured. Howard Green, on the other hand, points to the divergence of interests in the Defence and External Affairs Departments. In his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs, he had been taking a firm stand in the United Nations against nuclear testing; thus, he felt that Canada would be in an impossible position if it accepted nuclear weapons on its own soil.

Related to the division amongst Diefenbaker's Cabinet ministers, and flowing from it, was the so-called "conspiracy" that Stursberg emphasizes in this volume. R. A. Bell, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1962, and Pierre Sévigny, Associate Minister of National Defence at the time, strongly deny the existence of such a conspiracy. However, their accounts do refer to the Prime Minister's repeated threats of resignation, which, understandably enough, might have provided the occasion for men around him to discuss a possible successor. Léon Balcer tells of a "very antagonistic" group of ten or 12 Cabinet ministers meeting about twice weekly. But it seems to be largely Stursberg's interpretation, rather than that of the participants, that the Government was defeated by a "plot". This volume, like the first, is a collection of interview excerpts only. Since the portions used are not conclusive, we have no way of knowing at this time if Stursberg quotes words carrying inflammatory connotations with validity or not. Nevertheless, in one of his explanatory notes he says:

The first phase had consisted of *clandestine* meetings and discussions in parliamentary offices during the fall and winter; the second phase of *plotting and planning* took only a few days and came to a head during the weekend of 2-3 February. On 5 February, the Government was defeated in the House. (*Emphasis added*)

Happily for the historian, the entire collection of tapes is preserved and will become available within a few years.

The interviews are not offered, of course, as the presentation of a complete story of the Diefenbaker era. Conversations with Prime Minister Diefenbaker himself have not been included because of commitments to the publisher of his own memoirs. As Stursberg points out, no simple explanation is advanced and no single truth emerges. Recall of the participants can be affected by faulty memory; views may be distorted by emotional pressures both at the time and later.

But the phenomenological approach is a valuable addition to the written record upon which traditional historians most often rely. As a technique, oral or living history is "as modern as the latest generation of portable electronic recording devices". It appears that few leaders keep diaries or write letters today. More and more often, decisions are made in conversation or are transmitted by telephone. If that is the case, interviews on tapes will provide increasingly valuable sources of historical information.

*Interviews
not offered
as complete
story on
Diefenbaker*

The interviews offer an excellent contribution to the already rich collection of television documentaries, memoirs, journalistic and scholarly essays that have been devoted to the Tenth Decade. It is to be hoped that Stursberg and others will be encouraged to record the impres-

sions of leading figures in the vitally important politics of the Eleventh Decade.

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No. 134 (December 30, 1976) Canada/France interim fisheries arrangements.

No. 1 (January 17, 1977) Signing of a letter of understanding between Kaiser Foundation Resources Limited of British Columbia and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) of Brazil.

- 2 (January 13, 1977) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to Brazil — joint communiqué.
- 3 (January 21, 1977) Announcement by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of his recent visit to Peru, of several technical co-operation and financial agreements.
- 4 (undated) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to Peru, January 18-21, 1977 — joint communiqué.
- 5 (January 28, 1977) Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning transit pipelines.
- 6 (undated) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to Colombia, January 21-26, 1977 — joint communiqué.
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Vienna, December 9, 1976

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Bridgetown, November 9, 1976
In force November 9, 1976, with effect from April 1, 1976

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Ottawa, November 17, 1971
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In force January 25, 1977

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Athens, January 18, 1974

In force provisionally January 18, 1974

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Guatemala City, February 16, 1976

In force October 26, 1976

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Ottawa, December 10, 1976

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Ottawa, November 30, 1976

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Washington, November 10 and 24, 1976

In force November 24, 1976, with effect from October 1, 1976

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Washington, January 28, 1977

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Done at Rome, October 7, 1952

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Adopted at London November 12, 1975

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-156

United Nations round-up

Time of testing for Fifth Republic

Future of U.S. foreign policy

Syrian objectives in Lebanon

Ramphal at Commonwealth Secretariat

International Perspectives

Contents

May/June 1977

United Nations	
Report on thirty-first Assembly/ <i>Geoffrey Pearson</i>	3
Codifying international law/ <i>Erik Wang and Joseph Stanford</i>	10
UNESCO after Nairobi/ <i>Napoleon LeBlanc</i>	13
Testing of the Fifth Republic/ <i>Donald Baker</i>	19
United States	
Foreign policy under Carter/ <i>Larry Collins</i>	25
Trade-offs of trilateralism/ <i>James P. Sewell</i>	30
Canadian cultural diplomacy/ <i>Paul Painchaud</i>	34
Serbian objectives in Lebanon/ <i>Ibrahim Hayani</i>	39
Emphal at Commonwealth Secretariat/ <i>Derek Ingram</i>	44
Letter to the Editor	49
Reference section	49

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Recap of 31st General Assembly: relative tranquillity at last

by Geoffrey Pearson

Three more members were admitted to the United Nations at the last session of the General Assembly, bringing the total to 117. Of this number, 85 African, Asian and Caribbean countries pay the minimum assessment of .02 per cent. These facts reflect the most important reality about the Assembly today — it is numerically dominated by countries with very low national incomes, most of which are former European colonies. Accordingly, their interests are heavily concentrated on questions of economic and social development, colonialism and racism. Other traditional concerns of the UN, such as disarmament and human rights, remain prominent but tend to be viewed through the powerful lenses of “inequality” rather than as distinct phenomena. In the same way, the Arab-Israeli dispute acquires a peculiar “resonance” in UN committee rooms, attracting all those delegations with recent memories of the struggle to determine their separate destinies, as well as those who see in Arab wealth an escape from bondage to the money-markets of the West. This, as well, the link between racism and tyranny in Southern Africa that colours debate on this subject with “a passionate intensity”, while the abuse of authority in many other parts of the world is passed over in relative silence.

If “inequality” is one key concern at the UN, another and related interest is “accountability”. Most governments recognize that the organization of world politics is and will remain, hierarchical, and that a body of close to 150 sovereign members cannot act effectively as a negotiating forum. It is accepted that smaller groupings — the 18-Member Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, the 27-member Conference on International Economic Co-operation, the Conference on the Middle East, for instance — must do the real work. But the Assembly watches their activities closely. If there is long delay or deadlock, the Assembly is likely to call for a special session of its members, meeting outside the regular fall timetable, or to

demand that plenary bodies, such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, assume full charge of the agenda. Peace and security issues, which are the legitimate business of the Security Council, are given a regular airing by the Assembly, where resolutions can be carried with large majorities despite their lack of mandatory force.

The General Assembly session under review was one of relative tranquillity if viewed against the rather tumultuous sessions of the preceding two years. There was a greater appreciation by member states of the value of consensus, especially in view of U.S. reactions to the “tyranny of the majority”, and there were signs of movement on certain major issues that encouraged moderation. Debate on the Middle East, a source of much controversy in 1975, was generally subdued, owing in part to the U.S. election and to the difficult situation in Lebanon. Western initiatives with respect to Rhodesia, culminating in the convening of the Geneva conference, introduced a degree of restraint in the debate on Southern African matters. Nevertheless, there was also a tone of growing impatience detectable in African speeches. There was tacit agreement by both sides in the “North-South dialogue” to await the results of the CIEC in Paris, of which Canada serves as co-chairman, and the follow-up negotiations to the May 1976 UNCTAD conference held in Nairobi.

Major items of interest to Canada at the session were the elections to the Security Council and the follow-up to the *Habitat* conference in Vancouver. Canada was elected to the Security Council for its fourth term beginning January 1, 1977,

*U.S. election
and Lebanon
quieten
Middle East
debate*

Mr. Pearson is Director-General of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs in the Department of External Affairs. He joined the Department in 1952 and has served in France, Mexico and India. He was formerly Chairman of the External Affairs Policy Analysis Group. The views expressed are those of Mr. Pearson.

Willingness
to consult
results in
fewer votes

along with India, the Federal German Republic, Venezuela and Mauritius. The Assembly approved the report adopted at *Habitat* and agreed that appropriate machinery for dealing with human settlements should be created by the Economic and Social Council at its next meeting. In addition, a resolution was approved establishing in Canada a centre for audio-visual materials on human settlements.

The General Assembly adopted 245 resolutions with respect to 124 items inscribed on the agenda for the thirty-first session. Of these, 148 were adopted without vote, and only 97 required recorded votes. The relatively small number of recorded votes reflects a welcome readiness by member states to consult. In the recorded votes, Canada voted "yes" 56 times, abstained 34 times, and cast negative votes seven times. Thus Canada was able to support 204 of the 245 resolutions adopted at the thirty-first session.

Major objectives

Canada's major aims at the session were as follows:

1. to speak and vote in ways that would not be inconsistent with policies it was likely to follow on the Security Council in 1977;
2. to work in favour of compromise formulas on Middle East questions that preserved the chances for direct negotiations between the parties;
3. to work in favour of resolutions on human rights that were balanced and impartial;
4. to encourage resolutions on North-South matters that were helpful to negotiations at the Paris conference;
5. to strengthen the financial arrangements for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP);
6. to encourage a larger number of contributors to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);
7. to gain as much support as possible for the report of the *Habitat* conference and for workable institutional arrangements to follow it up;
8. to use its influence with Black African delegations to follow moderate policies on Rhodesia and Namibia;
9. to support the German initiative on the taking of hostages.

The following paragraphs refer to most, if not all, of the activities associated with these objects.

Issues relating to Southern Africa were perhaps the major concern of the Assembly, in view of the influence of the 49 African states and developments in Rhodesia,

Namibia and South Africa. The Ki-ger mission to the area, the unrest violence in South Africa and the convening of a conference on Rhodesia in Geneva attracted world-wide attention. As a result there were more resolutions adopted on these issues than ever before and the content of these resolutions was more militant than the first time, countries having close relations with South Africa were criticized by name in these resolutions, armed struggle in Namibia received the endorsement of the Assembly, and the debate on apartheid explicitly treated the situation in South Africa as a colonial situation. Most Western countries, including Canada, found themselves unable to support a number of these resolutions, even though they were sympathetic to the concerns of the African members.

Apartheid

Canadian votes on the various resolutions grouped under the agenda item titled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa" are difficult to compare from year to year because of the number of resolutions and their language vary considerably. Thus at the thirty-first session (1975), there were seven resolutions introduced in the debate, while at the thirty-second session there were nine introduced during the thirty-second session:

	Total	Posi- tive	Absten- tion
UNGA XXX	7	6	—
UNGA XXXI	10	4	4

In 1975, the Africans concentrated on the elements they realized were likely to be unacceptable to Western members in their resolution. In 1976, they prepared a larger number of resolutions and the unacceptable elements were scattered throughout with the result that the number of Canadian negative votes and abstentions correspondingly greater.

Canada opposes apartheid, but has reservations about certain kinds of international action proposed to solve the problem (see Chapter VII on economic boycott and endorsement of armed struggle). Canada abstained on resolutions on economic collaboration with and investment in South Africa because it did not agree that the maintenance of normal trade and commercial relations with the countries implied support for their policies.

On the question of Namibia, there were eight resolutions passed during the thirty-first session, compared to two at the thirtieth session. Canada supported resolutions condemning the illegal South African administration and calling for the independence of Namibia and free ele-

abstained on resolutions supporting armed attempt to free Namibia and granting observer status at the UN to the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The texts of the two resolutions concerning Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) remained essentially the same in both sessions, and Canada supported them. They reaffirmed the goal of majority rule, condemned the white regime, called for assistance to the people of Zimbabwe, and urged the strict enforcement of sanctions.

Middle East

Debates relating to various aspects of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours also occupied a good deal of the Assembly's time, but no new major initiatives, such as the resolution of the previous session linking racism with Zionism, were proposed by Arab members. The status of the Palestine Liberation Organization was again debated, and no attempt was made to challenge the credentials of Israel. Attention was focused on the Palestinians, especially those living in the occupied territories, and on their future as an organized community. Twenty-two resolutions involving one aspect or another of the conflict were adopted, including a moderate Egyptian resolution calling for a re-opening of the Geneva conference before April 1977.

Canada had hoped that the Assembly would take steps to place the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees on a more secure footing. Current voluntary contributions are not sufficient to enable the Agency to function properly. Despite resolutions on the subject, however, the situation of the Agency remains difficult and there is no guarantee that contributions will be any more numerous or larger than in the past.

Canada participated for the first time in the general debate on the Middle East, and its delegation took pains to explain Canadian votes on most of the major issues. Canada's reservations usually related to statements in resolutions running counter to the basis agreed on for further Middle East talks and set out in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, or to resolutions that prejudged the future status of the occupied territories. In addition, Canada objected to one resolution on racial discrimination that recalled with implication a resolution of 1975 purporting to equate Zionism with racism. Two resolutions that singled out Israel for special condemnation without taking into account the actions of others were unac-

ceptable to Canada. In all, Canada voted in favour of ten resolutions, abstained on eight and opposed four.

The debate on Cyprus at the thirty-first session again reflected the frustration felt by many delegations over the lack of real progress on this question. Mr. Jamieson summed up the situation in his speech to the General Assembly on September 29, 1976, in which he said:

In Cyprus, the United Nations Force (UNFICYP) still faces a difficult situation. The parties to the dispute are no closer to agreement now than before. The situation on the ground remains tense and dangerous. It is generally agreed that the UN Force plays a vital role, but the costs of the Force are running \$40 million over the contributions collected. We believe strongly that all member states, in particular the permanent members, should make appropriate contributions to duly-authorized UN peacekeeping operations. The fact that only a dozen or so governments have made payments to the UN Special Account for the first six months of this year is not a record of which we can be proud.

Canada's dissatisfaction was reflected in its delegation's abstention on the main resolution on Cyprus, which did not include an appeal to the parties concerned to co-operate with UNFICYP. On the other hand, the debate did provide the occasion for the Cypriot Government to renounce ENOSIS (union with mainland Greece) as an objective of the Greek-Cypriot community, and Turkey indicated that it wanted no status for Cyprus other than non-alignment.

On December 14, the Security Council renewed the UNFICYP mandate for a further six months and, at the request of the Secretary-General, Canada renewed its commitment to provide forces for this period.

Disarmament

The UN's active involvement in the complex problems of disarmament continued at the thirty-first session. More than 100 statements of national position and the adoption of an unprecedented number of resolutions reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the slow rate of progress, especially by the five nuclear powers, two of which do not even participate in negotiations on the subject. Perhaps Mr. Jamieson captured the mood of many delegations in his statement of September 29 to the General Assembly, in which he said:

*Canadian
abstention
on Cyprus
resolution*

Canadian
voting pattern
indicates
approach

We must not delude ourselves, however, that the principal obstacles to progress on disarmament will be removed by discussion in this Assembly. These obstacles are the differences of view among states as to the best ways of ensuring their security. Our examination of ways of improving the role of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament will have achieved little unless member countries redouble their efforts to overcome these differences. At this mid-point in the Disarmament Decade, the responsibility to address the real obstacles to progress is shared by all members of this organization. But this responsibility falls most heavily on the nuclear-weapon states and other states of military significance. Progress will be meagre unless we re-examine traditional assumptions, take adequate account of the security concerns of others, and seize all opportunities for concrete action.

An article in the January/February issue of *International Perspectives* by R. Harry Jay, Canadian Representative at the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, goes into greater detail on the substance of these questions. For the purposes of this assessment, the statistics of Canada's voting pattern will suffice to indicate the general approach taken by the delegation to the subject.

In the end, the First Committee adopted 21 resolutions on disarmament and arms-control issues. Canada voted for or participated in the consensus adoption of 18 resolutions and abstained on three. Canada also co-sponsored three resolutions. It is relevant to note that Canada's voting record during the thirty-first session is consistent with that of the previous session:

	Total	Posi- tive	Absten- tion	Nega- tive
UNGA XXX	24	19	5	—
UNGA XXXI	21	18	3	—

The three abstentions in this year's session were, in fact, on issues upon which Canada had abstained during the thirtieth session.

Canada co-sponsored three successful resolutions, including: a resolution on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (adopted by consensus); a second, calling for a special Assembly session on disarmament in 1978, which it is hoped will stimulate greater public interest in arms control and put added pressure on the super-powers to work towards the achievement of effective arms-control agreements; and a third, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of Military or

Hostile Use of Environmental-Modification Techniques".

Economic and social development

The general mood of the Assembly tackling economic issues was businesslike but there was an undertone of confrontation that could become significant in 1978. While gains have been made by the developing countries since the demands of a "New International Economic Order" were formulated in 1974, these gains have been largely theoretical rather than practical. Western countries have recognized the need for change in international economic relations, but the pace of change and the price to be paid are still matters of dispute. Nevertheless, serious bargaining is well under way.

In many respects, the session under review was a "holding operation" while delegations awaited the results of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (co-chaired by Canada and Venezuela), the change of Administration in the United States and decisions on pricing by the Oil-Producing and -Exporting Countries. There was agreement, and large, that judgment of the Conference should be suspended until it had completed its work, despite growing disillusion on the part of developing countries in its regard to date.

The Canadian delegation played a role of active leadership on CIEC matters on the one hand co-ordinating the "Group of Eight", representing developed countries at the CIEC, and, on the other, acting as a negotiating spokesman *vis-à-vis* the "Group of 77". Despite a breakdown in these negotiations, which led to refusal by the Western group to support a resolution highly critical of the results of the conference, disenchantment with the CIEC was successfully held below the surface where the conference might have been called off. Instead, it was agreed that the session should be resumed following the final meetings of the CIEC in 1977.

Another question of major concern to the Canadian delegation was the follow-up to *Habitat*. Canada wished to see the report of the Vancouver conference adopted without the intrusion of all the political issues that were in evidence at the conference itself. With the co-operation of delegations from countries that had taken an active interest in Canada of these issues at *Habitat*, the Canadian delegation succeeded in its purpose related, and somewhat more complicated task for the delegation was that of ensuring a satisfactory institutional follow-up to *Habitat*. To this end, Canada

negotiations that eventually produced a decision calling on the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to be the custodian of questions arising from *Habitat* and on the Secretary-General to ensure proper co-ordination of follow-up efforts within the Secretariat. One enduring element of the agreements reached at *Habitat* and in the Assembly will be a permanent audio-visual centre in Vancouver to make use of the vast quantities of informational material gathered on the subject of human settlement. This repository of valuable material will be available not only to Canadians but, more important, to developing countries as they come to grips with the problems considered at *Habitat*.

In general, the political importance of harmonious North-South relations was underlined at the Assembly, though disagreement remained on costs and time-scales. Institutionally, there was interest in reinforcing, or at least defining better, the central role of the General Assembly in giving broad policy guidance to negotiations elsewhere. Not everyone accepts its "compass" function. But there is hope that the direction is now set, whatever the arguments along the way.

Human rights

The debate on social and humanitarian questions, which was the source of much controversy at the thirtieth session, particularly as concerns the "Zionism-is-ism" resolution, was remarkably calm at the thirty-first. Some 21 of 32 resolu-

tions were adopted without a vote, while only two agenda items were postponed to the thirty-second session.

In 1973, the UN declared the period 1973-83 a Decade for Action against Racism. The Program for the Decade called for a world conference on racism and racial discrimination, to be held in 1978. Canada, with the overwhelming majority of member states, welcomed this initiative and extended its full support to the Program.

In 1975, Western support for the Decade was undermined by the adoption of a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. Resolution 3379 distorted the original character of the Decade, in the opinion of Western delegations, most of which then voted against the resolution concerning the Program for the Decade, including the World Conference, as well as Resolution 3379.

Since it was generally felt that Western participation was essential to the success of the Program, efforts were made at the thirty-first session to restore the original character of the Decade. Although these were not entirely successful, sufficient progress was made to allow Western delegations to take a more positive attitude and Canada was able to abstain on the resolution concerning the implementation of the Program.

In 1974, ECOSOC declared that states giving any assistance to regimes in



A tense moment for the leaders of the Canadian delegation to the thirty-first United Nations General Assembly. Left to right, front row: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Basil Robinson, Ambassador to the United Nations William Barton, and Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson.

Southern Africa were accomplices of the regimes and therefore contributed to the denial of human rights. There was no agreement, however, as to what activities constituted assistance and how such activities contributed to the denial of human rights. A special *rapporteur* was appointed to evaluate, as a matter of urgency, the importance and source of political, military, economic and other assistance given by certain states and the direct or indirect effects of such assistance. The Third Committee had before it this year an interim report of the *rapporteur*. While not contesting the facts presented in the report, Canada took issue with it on two fundamental points. First, the report assumed that all links with such regimes, even normal diplomatic and commercial relations, constituted assistance. Secondly, the report limited itself to establishing that such links existed, without attempting to establish whether they contributed to the denial of human rights. Canada therefore abstained on this resolution.

Since the 1973 overthrow of the Allende Government, Chile has been a centre of concern at the United Nations. At the thirty-first session, the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, established in 1975 to investigate human rights in that country, was once again extended, in the hope that an agreement permitting an inspection visit could be reached with the Government of Chile.

Although the Third Committee saw little of the controversy of the previous session, movement on most human rights issues remained minimal. The central problem in dealing with social and humanitarian issues is the absence of a common philosophical ground of agreement on which to base resolutions. Western countries, with long and established traditions of liberalism, promote conceptions of civil and political rights that stress individualism and freedom from extraneous constraints. The non-aligned states, whose solidarity became a political reality in the Third Committee at the thirty-first session, tend to emphasize the economic rights of underdeveloped countries and the social rights of peoples or groups. A Swedish draft resolution on political prisoners, for example, represented a genuine Western attempt to meet the concerns of a majority of states, but it posed obvious embarrassments to many countries in which collective concern for economic development is greater than respect for those civil and political rights that are fundamental to Western societies. Given the preponderant influence of the non-aligned, it will henceforth be necessary to combine West-

ern and Third World views of human rights into a consistent and acceptable basis for future resolutions and action. We are to avoid the situation of near deadlock plaguing the Declaration on Religious Intolerance, which has been in the system since 1962 with no sign that it is nearing completion.

Administrative questions

The scale of assessment was one of the most important and difficult items before the Assembly's Administration and Budget (Fifth) Committee. The scale recommended by the Committee on Contributions, apportions a share of United Nations expenses to each member, according to a complicated formula that incorporates several criteria, including national income. In normal circumstances the scale is revised every three years. The inevitable problem of comparability and timeliness of statistics has rendered the Committee's task a difficult one. The recent international monetary disturbances and economic instability have added to its complexity. At the thirty-first session, for example, a number of states whose national income had recently risen dramatically from increased oil revenues were opposed to the size of the proposed increases in their assessments. Many other countries, including Canada, supported the Committee's proposed revision. In the end, late in the session, the Assembly adopted the new scale by consensus for a one-year period during which a study of criteria of assessment would be made and the minimum level of assessment (for those members with the lowest "capacity to pay") would be reduced to .01 per cent of the UN budget. Canada's interim assessment, pending resolution of the larger questions in 1978-79, dropped from 3.05 per cent to 2.96 per cent, though Canada will remain the ninth-largest contributor to the UN budget.

A second important issue was the need for more office space. In 1975 the Government of Austria offered to provide office accommodation for the United Nations in the Donau-City Centre in Vienna, planned for completion in 1978-79 at a total cost to the Austrian Government of \$700 million. The Centre had first been planned to house the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency, both of which were already located in Vienna in temporary headquarters. The latest Austrian offer was made following the discovery that

*Movement
on human rights
remained
minimal*

IDO and the IAEA could not, in fact, the use of all the facilities they had originally sought in the new Centre, and in line with the official Austrian policy promoting Vienna as an international centre.

The Fifth Committee welcomed this offer and subsequently requested that the Secretary-General prepare a report on the financial, functional and social implications of specific transfers of UN personnel to new accommodation in Vienna. This report, presented to the General Assembly at the thirty-first session, proposed a five-year plan of action for relocating 500 professional staff from New York and Geneva, where a total of 7,800 now serve. After some negotiations behind the scenes, the Fifth Committee and in capitals, a consensus was reached that accepted most of the Secretary-General's recommendations.

Legal questions

The debate on legal questions at the thirty-first session was highlighted by a West German initiative on the problem of hostage-taking and a new Soviet item entitled "Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations".

Speaking to the Assembly on September 28, 1976, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Genscher, requested the General Assembly to include an item entitled "The drafting of an international convention against the taking of hostages" in the agenda of the thirty-first session. Genscher's initiative attracted wide support, including that of Canada, and the question was referred for consideration to the Sixth Committee, which is responsible for legal questions. A resolution establishing an *ad hoc* committee on the drafting of such a convention was adopted by consensus. Nevertheless, this very positive development could be jeopardized by the reactivation of the Special Committee on International Terrorism, which, during its first period of existence, tended to concentrate its attention on the causes of terrorism, on which no agreement could be reached. The Special Committee is expected to meet well in advance of the *ad hoc* drafting committee, and the decision taken by the Special Committee's plenary is bound to affect the chances of the *ad hoc* committee's producing a workable convention.

The Soviet Union's initiative on the non-use of force in international relations took the form of a draft treaty, which, in the view of the sponsors, confirmed those

principles of the Charter that obliged member states to refrain from the threat or the use of force, without, in their view, narrowing or broadening those principles. Other delegations, including that of Canada, argued that the text contained highly-selective and significant variations and departures from the provisions set out with such clarity and authority in the Charter. The draft treaty failed, therefore, to draw a consensus, and the item will be re-examined at the thirty-second session.

Conclusion

The United Nations proper (excluding the Specialized Agencies) has at least four essential functions: to help settle political disputes and prevent war; to regulate or codify standards of international behaviour — e.g., in the field of human rights; to collect information about and to stimulate economic and social co-operation, particularly through technical and other forms of assistance; and to act as a forum for international discussion and debate. Each session of the General Assembly, of course, helps to implement this fourth function, though some sessions have come close to deadlock because of disagreement about the rules of procedure or the meaning of the Charter. The thirty-first session skirted these dangers and reached agreement on most of its agenda.

In regard to the other three functions, the success of the session would have to be judged as only modest. The Assembly is not primarily responsible for dispute-settlement, a job that belongs to the Security Council. But it can sometimes facilitate negotiations or point the way to a solution. For example, by giving the Secretary-General a mandate to explore the basis for a reconvening of the conference on the Middle East, and by renewed pressure on South Africa to relinquish its control of Namibia, it may have helped to move negotiations along. Disarmament will be given greater scrutiny and a new attempt will be made to reach international agreement on ways to stop terrorism. But in other respects standards of state behaviour were not noticeably advanced by the session. The process will be a long one, given the deep divisions that exist. Finally, the issue of better co-operation between rich and poor countries was left in abeyance. At least there was no backsliding. The stakes are enormous and the ideas revolutionary. As in so much that is associated with the UN, it is to the hearts and minds of men one must look for solutions rather than to the machinery of co-operation that is at their disposal if they are ready to use it.

*Essential
functions
of United Nations*

Making progress in codifying body of international law

By Erik Wang and Joseph Stanford

With the increasingly preponderant membership of the Third World countries in the United Nations General Assembly and the Specialized Agencies, these countries have, by force of numbers, been able to concentrate the attention of the UN on issues of concern to them. A degree of disenchantment with these developments has set in amongst Canadians, some of whom question whether the UN can continue to be an effective and useful means for international co-operation in the interests of all member states, developed as well as developing. Under Article 13 of the Charter, one of the basic tasks of the UN General Assembly is to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of "encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification". It is legitimate to ask how well the UN has discharged this responsibility. The following is an attempt to draw up a kind of balance-sheet of successes and failures in UN lawmaking activities, as seen from a Canadian viewpoint.

It is clear from recent General Assembly debates that the climate has been unfavourable to the development of international law in certain areas. Where a majority of members are preoccupied with political disputes it may be difficult to sustain the balanced, long-range approach necessary for the development of rules that are workable and broadly acceptable. The outcome of debate on several lawmaking efforts has reflected political perceptions

inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict and Southern African problems.

The General Assembly reached agreement in 1974 on a definition of aggression after 50 years of intermittent discussion by international lawyers at the League of Nations and later at the UN. This definition was adopted, however, only at the cost of dilutions and ambiguities that pose questions for international law of the future and may impair the usefulness of the accepted definition in influencing and restraining state behaviour. Similarly, discussions in the General Assembly on international terrorism have revealed widely-divergent views among member states about the manner in which the fabric of international law might be strengthened in this field. There is considerable doubt whether any effective international measures against terrorist acts can find general support in the world today in view of the position of many Arab and African states regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization and African liberation movements.

Recent developments at the United Nations may, however, point to a greater willingness of member states to come to grips with the issue of international terrorism, if not in general terms at least in relation to specific categories of international crimes considered to be particularly repugnant.

First, as a result of a West German initiative at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, a UN committee has been established to draft an international convention against the taking of hostages.

A second development is the reactivation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism, which met only once in 1973 and was unable to reach agreement on any effective international measures against terrorist acts. As the terms of reference of the reactivated committee are virtually identical to those of the abortive 1973 committee, there is some doubt whether this body, of which Canada is a member, can achieve progress. The

*Balance-sheet
of lawmaking
activities*

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cts for the hostage-taking committee appear, however, somewhat more hopeful, since (a) its mandate is better focused than that of the Committee on International Terrorism and (b) there are indications that moderate African and Arab states may be prepared to support international measures against this kind of activity.

The results achieved by these two committees will, in the long run, help to indicate the prospects for strengthening international legal measures against terrorism within a UN context.

The debates over several years on various proposals for strengthening the role of the International Court of Justice and other mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes have similarly revealed widespread caution, particularly on the part of developing states, which see the Court and much of the traditional corpus of international law as being too much committed to the status quo. It has sometimes been suggested that the Court tends to view the world "through a rear-view mirror". While an objective assessment of the Court's judgments in past years would not support such a sweeping criticism, it is a fact of international life that states have resisted efforts to broaden acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and have shown great reluctance to refer their disputes to it.

In many areas, nevertheless, the UN has played a dynamic and innovative role contributing to a stable world order through the progressive development of international law. This role has been most evident where states have come to recognize a growing sense of interdependence — for example, on the need for rational management and conservation of the earth's resources and on the development of an international economic system leading to a more equitable distribution of resources.

The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea has been working out a new legal regime for man's use of the oceans, designed to be practical, equitable and responsive to current needs and realities. The range and complexity of the issues at stake are probably unprecedented and a successful outcome is by no means certain, despite general recognition that full account should be taken of the aspirations of the developing countries to benefit from the resources of the oceans.

A significant aspect of the Law of the Sea Conference has been the important role played in the negotiating process by a number of special-interest groups that, reflecting the variety of interests at play, differ from traditional political, geographic

and economic alliances. For example, on issues of the preservation of the marine environment, the "coastal-state group", which includes both developing countries and developed countries such as Canada, has taken positions at odds with positions advanced by the "major maritime powers". On many issues, the developing countries have taken a common stand, while on others there have been differences between those countries that are "coastal states" and those that are "landlocked" or "geographically-disadvantaged".

The extent to which vital national interests are involved and the difficulty of gauging support on the many interrelated issues has led to the realization that, to be effective, a treaty must command not just majority support but broad general support. As a result, the conference rules of procedure provide for voting only as a last resort. The conference is trying to put together a "package" so that a consensus can be reached on the treaty as a whole. Although it is unlikely that any country will be satisfied on all issues, it is hoped that by 1978 solutions will have been reached on the most important issues still confronting the conference.

The conference has already achieved broad agreement on revolutionary new legal conceptions such as the 200-mile "economic zone", in which the coastal state will exercise specific types of jurisdiction, and the "common heritage of mankind", applicable to the international seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. These conceptions, in which duties go hand-in-hand with new rights, are based on principles of equity rather than power, and will form the basis of the new constitution for the seas. Even as the negotiations continue, emerging principles of international law have gained wide acceptance and have been translated into state practice. For example, Canada and a number of other countries have recently taken action to assert exclusive fisheries jurisdictions of 200 miles on the basis of ideas developed at the conference. Whether or not the international community is successful in the near future in completing the negotiations, it is clear that the law of the sea will never return to the unsatisfactory state it was in before 1967, when the United Nations launched the precursor of the third UN Law of the Sea Conference.

Outer space

The progressive development of the law of outer space is another area in which the UN has played a major role, primarily through its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee, of

*Law of the Sea
Conference
in search of
consensus*

Uses of Outer Space will seek to reach a consensus on the main outstanding issue of the extent to which the consent or which Canada is a member, has successfully drafted four international conventions on outer space covering: the legal principles that will govern the use of outer space; the rescue and return of astronauts and the return of space objects; international liability for damage caused by space objects; and the registration of objects launched into outer space. That agreement has been possible on such a wide range of issues is largely due to the growing sense of interdependence among states and a realization of common concerns that the UN has helped to foster. The committee has now turned its attention to three priority subjects: a draft treaty concerning the moon; the legal implications of "remote-sensing" of the earth from space; and the elaboration of principles to govern direct broadcasting by satellites. With respect to the draft moon treaty, there has been little progress, primarily because there has been no agreement as yet on a regime for exploitation of the moon's resources. There continues to be basic differences between those countries that believe the resources of the moon should be treated as the "common heritage of mankind" and those that do not wish to place undue international legal restrictions on research and unforeseen future prospects for exploitation of the moon's resources.

While considerable progress has been made in the elaboration of legal principles to govern remote-sensing of the earth from space, there is still disagreement on the legal rights, if any, a "sensed" state should possess to protect itself from acquisition and release of information acquired by a "sensing" state that might be detrimental to the interests of the sensed state.

There has also been considerable progress in developing principles to govern direct television broadcasting from satellites. This year, the Legal Sub-Committee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will seek to reach a consensus on the main outstanding issue of the extent to which the consent or agreement of a state is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of direct television broadcasting services from satellites. If this issue can be satisfactorily resolved, it should prove possible to draft an agreement containing a full set of principles respecting direct broadcasting from satellites.

The shift in focus at the UN towards North-South development issues has also made itself felt in UN lawmaking activities. Negotiation of the Declaration on

Human Rights of the sixth special general Assembly and, shortly thereafter, of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, disclosed a sharp divergence of views between developed and developing countries on the law relating to sovereignty over natural resources, control of multinational enterprises and compensation of nationalized property — all issues touch directly upon the treatment of foreign investment.

The transfer of capital and technology to developing countries, which is an important UN aim, will require large amounts of foreign investment in developing countries by developed-country investors. The legal regime governing both the treatment and conduct of this investment must therefore, be one of the corner-stones of the future international economic structure.

The fundamental differences that were revealed in the negotiation of the Declaration and the Economic Charter in 1974 called into question the very existence of customary international law applicable to the treatment of foreign investment. In the subsequent two years, however, rather sterile, doctrinaire stand-off has been followed by evidence — at the seventh special session, the CIEC and elsewhere — of a willingness to achieve economic development objectives by seeking practical solutions to problems rather than by debating doctrine (which may, nevertheless, continue to be strongly adhered to).

Foreign investment

The need for foreign investment to make possible the achievement of economic development is obvious. That this investment will not take place without the security offered by an accepted set of basic "ground rules" is equally obvious. The experience of the 1974 Declaration and Charter suggests that, at this stage, the evolution of modern international law of foreign investment for development may have to depend upon bilateral state practice in the form of investment agreements and the methods, both procedural and substantive, by which these agreements provide for resolution of investment disputes. But events move quickly. Increasing awareness by developing countries of the need for access to foreign capital markets, and awareness of the need to conform and contribute to host-government development objectives, may be expected to generate the political will necessary to achieve agreement on the "ground-rules". As the process occurs, the potential for successful multilateral negotiation of a legal regime for foreign investment will increase significantly, and it may then become possible

*No agreement
on exploitation
of the moon's
resources*

ve the difficult issues of international
y that defied solution in 1974.

Canada's demonstrated support for
e objectives of the UN's present efforts
deal with world economic disparity, as
ll as its continuing experience in the
gulation of foreign investment, should
able it to contribute to the development
new international law to meet the de-
nds of the world community for greater
ial justice.

Other areas of international law are
arly ripe for further development. For
e future, it will be increasingly important
be selective in seeking out oppor-
nities to build on past achievement,
d to choose subjects for development or
ification where there is likely to be
nmon ground for all the major interest
ups at the UN. A selective approach
uld, of course, recognize the importance

of the UN forum for dealing with problems
of a global character, as well as alternative
means of international co-operation be-
tween regional or like-minded states. The
increasing attention given to political and
doctrinal disputes within the UN and the
frustration of hopes for the compulsory
adjudicatory process should not be al-
lowed to obscure the widespread recogni-
tion among states of the importance of the
lawmaking process and the expanding
prospects for its further development.
Creation of international law, whether
customary or conventional, is of necessity
complex and laborious, and at times pain-
fully slow, but the United Nations has,
where common interests are identified,
proved remarkably adept at developing
and codifying in a progressive way most of
the known legal standards of our day.

*Importance
of lawmaking
has been widely
recognized*

United Nations

Measuring UNESCO's progress in wake of Nairobi meeting

Napoleon LeBlanc

November 4, 1976, the nineteenth
session of the General Conference of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization suspended its pro-
ceedings in order to celebrate the thirtieth
anniversary of the founding of the Organ-
ization. This anniversary, it was felt,
should be marked by dignified yet colourful
ceremony. The great hall of Kenyatta Cen-
ter was the setting for speeches in which
the activities of the Organization were
examined retrospectively and prospec-
tively for the benefit of members of the
delegations of the 140 member states and
staff of the Secretariat. This solemn
session was followed by a dazzling spec-
tacle that brought to the forefront the
richness of African culture and revealed
the soul of the Kenyan people. The occa-
sion was a moving testimony to the reality
latent in the dream of UNESCO's
founders.

The forerunner of UNESCO was the
International Institute of Intellectual Co-
operation of the League of Nations. The
institute consisted of intellectuals and
artists who believed that the prerequi-

site for lasting peace was continuous intel-
lectual co-operation. It may seem para-
doxical that the founding of UNESCO, the
heir to the ideas of the Institute, was the
result of a political act on the part of some
44 states that met in London in 1945.
These states entrusted to the new agency
the task of promoting, on an international
scale, the formation of functional relations
between the member states. The purpose
was to promote intellectual co-operation in
education, science and culture in order to
guarantee the free exercise of human rights
and to contribute towards laying the
groundwork for a just and lasting peace.

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the past five UNESCO General Confer-
ences and was a member of that
organization's Executive Council from
1970 to 1974. The views expressed here
are those of Mr. LeBlanc.*

As indicated in the preamble to its constitution, the goals of UNESCO were:

- to give fresh impetus to education and the spread of science;
- to contribute to the conservation, advancement and dissemination of knowledge;
- to employ these means to create mutual knowledge and understanding among peoples.

The statistics in the table below and the notes accompanying them illustrate the rate of geographical expansion of UNESCO and the large number of states that have joined it to share its mission of international co-operation based on acceptance of the diversity of political systems, ideologies, cultures, beliefs and so on. These data provide us with reference-points that enable us to go beyond simple chronology and measure how far UNESCO has come in terms of 'temporal' distance. This, of course, is an experimental procedure, and a venturesome one at that, which gives rise to the following questions: can the conception of distance in terms of time be approached in the same manner as distance in space? There are technical means of measuring the latter; how should we measure the former?

In order to measure distance in space, a point in the present is taken, and cover-

ing the distance signifies progression towards the future. There is no movement in the reverse direction. However, in dealing with distance in time, the past may be brought into play, as this allows us to go back and look not only at what is happening in the present but at the events of the past as well, thereby enabling us to find a deeper meaning.

There is danger in attempting to measure UNESCO's progress in terms of 'temporal' distance. UNESCO is too close to us and its activities are too recent to lend themselves to a satisfactory analysis. Nevertheless, there is no reason why we cannot take stock of UNESCO and make an assessment of what it is doing today, keeping in mind the ideals that led to its founding. To do this, we must place the nineteenth session of the General Conference in Nairobi in relation to the preceding ones and briefly examine its characteristics and the results of its endeavours. Finally, we shall look at Canada's participation in UNESCO during this period.

Why Nairobi?

As early as the spring of 1974, in view of the facts that Nairobi was the headquarters of the United Nations Secretariat

Distribution of UNESCO member states by geographical region⁽¹⁾

Regions	Years	1946	1947	1948	1954	1956	1976
Europe (Gr. I)		13	15	18	20	22	28
Eastern Europe (Gr. II)					7	9	11
Latin America (Gr. III)		7	12	14	18	20	26
Asia (Gr. IV)		3	3	5	17	17	22
Africa (Gr. V) ⁽²⁾		4	4	5	8	12	53 ⁽⁴⁾
Total		27	34	42	70	80	140

⁽¹⁾This table was prepared using the grouping of member states established by the General Conference at its fifteenth session for the purpose of elections to the Executive Board, and the list of member states as of November 20, 1976. Group I, therefore, includes Australia and New Zealand, which, for the purposes of the UNESCO program, have been included since 1974 in the Asian and Oceania region. In addition, since that year, Canada and the United States have been part of the European region, which also includes Israel (since 1976) and the countries of Eastern Europe.

⁽²⁾Between 1946 and 1956, the African membership, with the exception of Liberia, consisted entirely of UNESCO's Arab member states.

⁽³⁾When UNESCO has been advised as to Angola's having deposited the instrument of its acceptance of the Convention, the African group will include 54 member countries, or 36.8 per cent of all member states. This will raise the number of member states to 141.

⁽⁴⁾The countries in the Asian group, with those in the African group, represent a total of 75 countries or 53.6 per cent of all member states, and over 64 per cent of the world's population.

Environment Program and that it had a modern, well-equipped conference centre, the Government of Kenya had extended an invitation to UNESCO to hold the nineteenth session of its General Conference in Nairobi.

The election of Mr. A. M. M'Bow, an African, to the important position of Director-General of UNESCO, by the General Conference at the eighteenth session in Paris from October 17 to November 23, 1974, no doubt created among the delegations a climate favourable to the acceptance of the Kenyan Government's invitation.

On the advice of the Executive Board, Kenya's invitation was accepted on November 21. Thus a practice that had not been observed for 20 years was resumed. The rise in the number of member states, the construction of spacious conference rooms in UNESCO's own headquarters and the absence of invitations from member states had for two decades induced UNESCO to hold its ordinary sessions in Paris.

The nineteenth session in Nairobi, held from October 25 to November 30, 1976, was the last lap in the General Conference's "tour" of the continents. By holding its second session in Mexico City in 1947 and its eighth in Montevideo in 1954, it had made contact with the Latin American states. Its third session, in Beirut in 1948, had brought it into contact with the Arab countries, while its ninth session, in New Delhi in 1956, had established its presence in Asia. Moreover, it was in New Delhi that UNESCO's first major project for the promotion of East-West understanding was launched. At Nairobi in 1976, the Organization paid a visit to the African continent, whose emerging states had been urging UNESCO as soon as they gained independence.

Common characteristics

The nineteenth session had a number of characteristics in common with all earlier sessions. It should first be recalled that the General Conference consists of "the representatives of the States members of the Organization". However, it is the duty of the government of each member state to appoint "not more than five delegates, who shall be selected after consultation with the National Commission, established, or with educational, scientific and cultural bodies". These delegates act on behalf of their governments in the General Conference.

The General Conference is an independent organ, which, at its ordinary

biennial sessions, "determine[s] the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization" and "take[s] decision on programs submitted to it by the Executive Board". It also 'approve[s] and give[s] final effect to the budget and to the apportionment of financial responsibility among the States members of the Organization', subject to arrangements with the General Assembly of the United Nations. These are the functions the General Conference performs at each of its sessions, no matter where they are held; most of the items on the agenda revolve round them.

In principle, the UNESCO General Conference provides the ideal time and place for a genuine "dialogue" among the delegations of the member states for the purpose of reconciling national interests, which are quite often divergent, and are sometimes opposed, on the basis of the objectives of mutual understanding, international peace and the common welfare of mankind, as proclaimed in the Organization's charter. This exchange does, in fact, occur despite the rough ground (because of politicization) that must be covered, which detracts from the real work accomplished to the point where credibility is compromised.

It certainly appears that previous conferences — beginning, in fact, with the inception of UNESCO — were not spared these difficulties. Jacques Maritain no doubt had an intuition of this when he made the following statement at the second session of the General Conference in 1947 in Mexico City:

[. . .] because the end purpose of UNESCO is a practical one, *agreement between minds can be reached spontaneously*, not on the basis of a practical idea, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, but *upon the affirmation of a single body of convictions governing action. This is little enough, no doubt, but it is the last remaining fortress where minds can meet.** Hence it justifies the undertaking of a great task, and we shall have achieved much if we can attain awareness of our common practical convictions.

If there was a basis for such observations in 1947, when there were only 34 member states in UNESCO, how much more basis was there in 1976, when UNESCO had 140 member states and when, as a result, the balance of power within the General Conference had changed so radically.

Since 1958, the delegations that have assembled for the sessions of the General

*Reconciliation
of national
interests*

Conference have not necessarily constituted a homogeneous group, owing to the diversity of their views on the world, on mankind, on knowledge, freedom and democracy, and even on peace. This diversity and other factors such as tension and conflict and unequal development of member states give rise to numerous divergences, which can lead to harsh exchanges during debate, causing the majority to arrive at decisions that are unfortunate for member states individually and as a group.

An observer would probably conclude that UNESCO was losing sight of its true calling. On the surface this seems true, but it seems less so if it is admitted that UNESCO not only can but does provide its member states with an opportunity to "invent a concrete set of beliefs", not for the purpose of denying these tensions and conflicts but in order to go beyond them and to identify common aims in the achievement of which all might co-operate.

Ever since the initial sessions of the General Conference, UNESCO has, more or less intentionally, been inviting the member states to formulate such a set of beliefs and to put them into practice in their working methods. The nineteenth session in Nairobi continued along this path. The General Conference had planned to come to a decision on the draft program for the 1977-78 biennium and to give final approval to the corresponding budget, proposed by the Director-General. Also on the agenda was the examination of a number of Executive Board reports and others prepared by the Director-General on questions arising from specific decisions made in previous sessions. In addition, there were decisions to be made concerning draft recommendations to the member states and international conventions to be ratified by the member states in accordance with the procedures for each instrument, as specified in the constitution and regulations of the Organization.

Key functions

Such normative activities are among the key functions of UNESCO and the General Conference, so far as the attainment of their objectives is concerned. For example, the General Conference approved a recommendation to member states on the development of adult education. This recommendation was the result of three non-governmental conferences on adult education — in 1949, 1960 and 1972 —, studies on the technical and legal aspects of the project, consultations with member states, and an intergovernmental

conference of experts to complete the draft submitted for examination by the General Conference. As a further example in the regional context, there was the Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees of Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, signed by Mexico in 1970. This instrument gave concrete form to the hypothesis that had been advanced by some ministers of education in certain countries of the region — that it would one day be possible, with the help of UNESCO, to "promote the joint use of available educational resources by placing their training institutions at the service of the integral development of all the peoples in the region". Work is also under way in other regions with the same goal in mind.

In addition to this statutory work, the nineteenth session of the General Conference in Nairobi contained two new elements: a draft medium-term (1979-1982) plan based on problem areas, and the establishment of a drafting and negotiation group.

The draft medium-term plan provided the General Conference with an instrument devised in accordance with a new method by which it could fully assume its constitutional responsibility to determine "the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization" so far as the preparation of future biennial programs by the Director-General was concerned. Here we need only mention that the General Conference was able to offer an opinion on the ten problems that had been examined because of their importance for the future of mankind, on the 44 objectives accompanying them and on the relative amounts of money to be allocated for the activities of programs proposed with a view to attaining these objectives.

To the drafting and negotiating group fell the task of deadening the overtones of the inevitable "political jockeying" that takes place in the sessions of the General Conference and was referred to by Julian Huxley, UNESCO's first Director-General, in his memoirs. The creation of this group was meant to control the chain reaction set off by the debates rather than to prevent the debates themselves.

This fairly representative group, composed of heads of delegations, was assigned the task of preparing, for the plenary sessions of the conference, draft resolutions on the following points, the political aspects of which generally dominated the proceedings:

*Opportunity
to identify
common aims*

- UNESCO's contribution to peace and its duties so far as the promotion of human rights and the elimination of colonialism and racism were concerned;
- the long-term program concerning UNESCO's peacekeeping contribution;
- UNESCO's contribution to the establishment of a new international economic order;
- the Second Development Decade.

In addition to the task of preparing recommendations for the General Conference, the Conference Bureau gave the group the task of examining:

- a draft statement on the basic principles for a widespread public-information program to promote peace and international understanding and to further the struggle against war-oriented propaganda, racism and *apartheid* (deferred until the twentieth session on the advice of the drafting and negotiation group);
- a report on the measures adopted by the Organization concerning the application of Resolution 11.31 of the eighteenth General Conference (violation of human rights in Chile).

The drafting and negotiation group worked intensively for the entire duration of the session on the preparation of draft resolutions for submission to the plenary sessions of the conference, negotiated on the basis of various proposals introduced by member states for resolutions on the above questions. One cannot ignore the fact that the group succeeded in reconciling divergent viewpoints, arriving at satisfactory compromises, and sometimes at consensus. Its main contribution was in preventing unduly-emotional interventions during proceedings of the plenary sessions. When necessary, the group chairman could propose the suspension of a session to bring about improved co-operation among the parties.

Although it is too early to assess its contribution to the work of the conference, the group has shown that there is always a "last remaining fortress where minds can meet". This is a worthwhile lesson for the future.

Canada and UNESCO

When, on November 19, 1946, the first session of the General Conference opened in the grand amphitheatre of the Sorbonne in Paris, Canada was one of the 4 states that had already deposited their instruments of acceptance of the convention creating the United Nations Educa-

tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which was adopted in London on November 16, 1945. At the close of this session, the head of the Canadian delegation was elected to the Executive Board, in his personal capacity, as stipulated in the convention, for a five-year term. He was subsequently elected chairman of the Board for 1946-47. In November 1976 in Nairobi, the members of the Canadian delegation worked with members of the delegations representing the governments of the other 139 member states.

As an original member, Canada has been able to watch the Organization develop. In the beginning, at least until 1951-52, the participation of the Canadian Government was rather cautious, as it observed with quiet sympathy and interest the actual emergence of this new organization. Would it be a debating society? An assembly of dreamers? Or would it be an agency for realistic planning and the promotion of effective international co-operation among member states? In the view of many member states, including Canada, the activities proposed at the conference by the Directors-General of that period did not always warrant the size of the budgets introduced for them. In this period of its relations with UNESCO, Canada seems to have decided to discourage any unduly abstract abstractions. However, even if it did not approve of the proposed budgets, nevertheless, at the end of debate, Canada complied with the majority decision of the General Conference and promptly paid its annual contribution to the budget.

*Cautious
Canadian
participation*

Massey Commission

In 1949, the Government formed the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences in Canada, adding to its terms of reference the task of examining Canada's relations with UNESCO. In their report, published in 1951, the Commissioners devoted a chapter to a discussion of the relations between Canada and UNESCO and of the advisability of creating a national commission for UNESCO. Of all the matters assigned to them in their terms of reference, the Commissioners found this "the most difficult and complex".

The Massey Commission studied UNESCO's constitution and analysed the opinions, most of which were highly critical, that had been expressed in reviews on international issues written by important people who were familiar with UNESCO's activities. The Commissioners also analysed the statements made by

representatives of member states during sessions of the General Conference. When they were finished, they were unable to present an attractive picture of UNESCO. However, they conceded that:

These criticisms point perhaps too harshly at the weakness of an organization which . . . is striving to revive . . . one of the . . . finest spiritual traditions of Western Europe: that mutual understanding and sympathy is a moral obligation laid on all rational beings and that the fulfilment of this obligation can be an important contribution to international goodwill and harmony.

In addition, the Commissioners believed that "an honest recognition of the causes of weakness in this important organization must bring home to every thoughtful person his obligation to give the greatest possible support to this cause".

The briefs it received and the public hearings it held gave the Commission an indication of the lively interest with which UNESCO was regarded by some groups in Canada — namely educators, scientists in the exact, natural and social sciences, and scholars in the humanities. Without exception, they deplored the lack of adequate information, which prevented Canadians from having access to UNESCO publications or from attending its lectures, conferences or training courses. Basing their comment on the opinion of the Canadian Social Science Research Council that Canada should implement its membership as effectively as it could, the Commissioners concluded:

UNESCO is doing good work,
Canada should co-operate more fully . . .
and it is undignified for our country to continue as a quasi-member of this excellent organization.

Gradual increase

This was the beginning of Canada's active participation, starting with projects in education, mass communications, mutual understanding of cultural values by East and West and, finally and above all, the exact and natural sciences and their application to specific problems such as arid zones, the state of hydrology in the world and man and the biosphere — the latter two of which have attained a high degree of scientific maturity and are the object of world-wide interest. It should be pointed out that these two programs involve functional participation by the member states in the UNESCO Secretariat.

Since the inception of the East-West major project, UNESCO has begun a program of cultural studies and promotion.

Canadian participation in this area was stimulated by the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Venice in 1970.

The Government decisions contributed to this increase in involvement: the creation within the Canada Council in 1958 of the Commission for UNESCO and the opening of a permanent UNESCO delegation in Paris in 1960. These provided the people of Canada and the agencies of the departments involved with an opportunity to become more familiar with UNESCO programs and their goals and to participate in defining or redirecting these goals when a change in circumstances made this necessary.

Because of the Canadian Commission the Government of Canada was able, in June 1973 and the following autumn, to respond substantially to the Director-General's request for proposals from member states for the revision of objectives and methods of preparation of the draft medium-term plans he had to submit for examination by the General Conference at its eighteenth session.

To complete this review, we should point out that members of Canadian delegations have often been called on to serve in other ways at sessions of the General Conference. Heads of delegations have on several occasions been elected vice-president, and one member has been elected president of one of the conference's main commissions. Canada has, been a member of the Conference Bureau, the organ that co-ordinates the work done by the conference, at eight of the 19 sessions. Canadian delegates have been elected to other conference organs at 12 sessions. Finally, Canadians have also been assigned equally important duties in connection with the progress of the work done by the General Conference, with program content or with the direction of future programs as was the case at the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the General Conference. From 1968 to 1974, Canada was twice represented on the Executive Board.

In gradually contributing more to the work of UNESCO, Canada has received definite benefits, though these are sometimes difficult to measure. In his message to the Director-General on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of UNESCO the Prime Minister of Canada expressed the sentiments of many Canadians when he wrote:

Although the demands of postwar economic reconstruction somewhat eclipsed the prestige of UNESCO, the Organization nevertheless succeeded in making

its presence felt, so much so that today its influence has spread to a great many different fields and several of its aims coincide with those to which my country attaches the highest importance. You know how keenly we are interested in UNESCO's co-operative research and operational programs concerning the development of the Third World, cultural expansion and communication satellites. . . . It is obvious that UNESCO's deepest concern is the future of man, the all-round development of his personality and his harmonious integration in the surrounding world.

New vistas

The nineteenth session of the General Conference has opened new vistas. Inasmuch as they are aware of their obvious interdependence, member states will have to devise new methods by which they can work with the greatest possible respect for human rights, minorities and cultures. This will be a difficult but not impossible learning process. In this connection, because of its domestic situation, Canada will be in a privileged position if it demonstrates the ability to see things from

another's viewpoint that is required before mutual understanding can exist.

There is also a need for a second learning process: recognizing the new situations emerging from the dynamics of international life, being prepared to accept the contributions of ancient cultures that are being revived and recognizing the historical indebtedness of the Western tradition to those cultures.

In conclusion, Canada must continue to guarantee the autonomy of UNESCO, and even to strengthen it so that the inter-governmental co-operation aspect of its program may be enriched. We must, therefore, examine UNESCO's programs not only from a Canadian viewpoint but from an impartial and truly international one as well. Only this approach will give effect to the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the members of the Canadian Commission on April 2, 1976:

. . . Since its beginning, Canada has firmly supported UNESCO and continues to do so Of all the UN Specialized Agencies, UNESCO perhaps reaches deepest into Canada's grass roots.

Inside France

Time of testing at hand for the Fifth Republic

by Donald N. Baker

Any nation that has had five republics, two empires, three monarchies, and several interregnums in less than two centuries is likely to inspire regular speculation that a "crisis of regime" is imminent. *Caveat lector*. However, there are some signs that France is currently entering a period of stress that may test the flexibility of the Fifth Republic to the utmost.

Institutionally, the growing strain is taking the form of an increasing tension between the President and the National Assembly. France has an "imperial Presidency". Tailor-made for General de Gaulle, a man of singular credentials called to power in the midst of national crisis, the presidency is rooted in direct universal suffrage and provides for seven-year terms. The President names governments, dissolves the National Assembly, makes

foreign policy, initiates legislation and possesses sweeping emergency powers. In practice, the political conditions of the regime have been such that no President has had to contend with an unsympathetic parliament. Accordingly, the lines of demarcation between parliamentary and Presidential powers have yet to be determined under more adverse conditions.

Developments within the last few months suggest that a time of testing for

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both parliament and President is at hand. Political sentiments and political forces have begun to polarize. On the one side, the Socialist-Communist alliance known as the Common Front has grown steadily and impressively in support, according to opinion polls, to the point where a Common Front victory in the next legislative elections, which must be held by March 1978, is not inconceivable. On the other hand, the Gaullist party has been reinvigorated and reorganized under the charismatic leadership of Jacques Chirac and has begun to mark its distance from the Government of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who can command the sure loyalty of only a small band of Centrist deputies led by his Independent Republican Party. To be sure, the Gaullists have not yet broken formally with the Centre, but there is good reason to think that the present Centre-Right alliance may not survive until the spring of 1978. There is even better reason to conclude that Giscard will not be able to improve the situation of the Centre either before the elections or as a result of them.

In sum, it now appears that Giscard will, in the near future, be the first President to confront an unsympathetic, if not hostile, parliamentary majority. To govern effectively, he will need to enter into serious bargaining with either the Gaullists or the Common Front. However, it also appears that both those groups regard him as vulnerable, and neither is likely to do more than a bare minimum to keep his Government alive. The chances are that the Left and the Right will try to manoeuvre Giscard into calling an early Presidential election (by stalemating him in parliament) or, at the very least, to discredit him as an effective alternative for the Presidential elections scheduled for 1981.

Long history

Giscard's awkward relations with the Gaullists go back a long way. He first rose to prominence in 1962, when he led part of the Independent Republican Party into the Gaullist coalition in the National Assembly, thus providing the Gaullists with what was necessary support at that juncture. In reward, Giscard was given Cabinet posts by both de Gaulle and Pompidou. However, Giscard always kept a formal distance from the Gaullists. He refused to merge his party with theirs, despite repeated urging, and, *inter alia*, he opposed the 1969 plebiscite that led General de Gaulle to abandon power. For the Gaullist *purs et durs*, Giscard's career has been characterized by expediency. If he man-

aged to win the Presidency in 1974, after Pompidou's death, it was only because the Gaullist candidates cancelled each other out in the crucial round, leaving him as the leading "majority" candidate, not because the Gaullists wanted him. That he emerged as winner by the narrowest of margins over the Common Front's François Mitterrand in the second round was due in part to the influence of Jacques Chirac, a dynamic young Gaullist, in rallying the annoyed Gaullists to his side.

His election as President did not end Giscard's ambiguous relations with the Gaullists. Just over a year before the Presidential election, in March 1973, parliamentary elections had produced a "Presidential majority" consisting of over 170 Gaullists, some 70 Independent Republicans, and 40 to 60 more Radicals and Christian Democrats. To govern, Giscard clearly needed to have the support of the Gaullist group in the National Assembly. This he secured by making Chirac Prime Minister and by inviting a number of Gaullists to join his Cabinet.

For a while, Giscard's fresh political style obscured the essential reality, which was that, in relying on the Gaullists, he had to postpone his efforts to create a "vital Centre" dedicated to his own brand of "advanced liberalism". In the past year, however, it has become increasingly evident that his reliance on the Gaullists has given them a powerful restraint on his progressive liberalism. When he proposed a moderate capital-gains tax, for example, his bill ran into such a storm of Gaullist protest that it had to be dropped. The Gaullist backbenchers are also growing increasingly obstreperous in foreign policy, and are threatening to veto some of his initiatives. Thus Giscard's advanced liberalism has come increasingly to seem merely a matter of rhetorical form rather than of political substance. Even those who wish to support him are tending to see him increasingly as well-intentioned but ineffectual.

Chirac served as Prime Minister from May 1974 to August 26, 1976. A capable administrator with no special vision of his program of his own, but possessing a vigorous and authoritarian personal style, he took advantage of his office to bring the Gaullist Party under his personal wing. With Yves Guéna, the General Secretary, he brought forward a younger group of leaders and pushed the "barons" of Gaullism — Michel Debré, Couve de Mulville and Chaban-Delmas — into honorary positions.

By early 1976, Chirac and his colleagues apparently concluded that Giscard was too soft and fuzzy to prevent the

*Likelihood
of unsympathetic
parliamentary
majority*



Jacques Chirac

Common Front from winning the next legislative elections. Moreover, some very contentious issues lay ahead: Government advisers were recommending strong economic medicine to combat inflation; the new International Monetary Fund statutes needed parliamentary approval; and the parliament also needed to approve a mechanism for direct elections to the European Parliament. The Chiracians did not want to take the blame for the bitter fiscal medicine and knew that both the IMF statutes and the European Parliament were red flags to Gaullist backbenchers. Deciding that he could no longer "play both ends against the middle", Chirac decided to force things to a head.

Ultimatum

He presented Giscard with what amounted to an ultimatum. He asked the President to call early parliamentary elections and to let him organize the campaign for the entire "majority", including Giscard's Independent Republicans. His argument was that the Government should take the initiative before the Common Front gained any more ground in the public-opinion polls and before any bitter economic pills had to be swallowed. If Giscard gave his approval, his hopes of creating a "vital Centre" would be doomed and he would remain a hostage of the Gaullists, in all likelihood until the end of his term in 1981. If he refused, Chirac would resign, threatening the President's links to the Gaullists and raising the spectre of savage in-fighting within the "majority" at least until the elections. There was really no choice. Giscard refused. Chirac resigned and immediately began girding his loins for the coming struggle for command of the majority in the near future, of the National Assembly after the next elections, and of the Presidency after that.

Giscard, looking somewhat hesitant by comparison with the apparently audacious Chirac, then appointed Raymond Barre, a colourless technician, to serve as Prime Minister, and launched a "war against inflation". The "Barre Plan," which was introduced in October, proved to be remarkably mild. It provided for a 90-day price freeze on everything but food, promised to crack down on fiscal fraud (i.e., tax evasion), and raised the hope of creating a "social contract" along British lines. The plan produced immediate and loud protests from all sides. Small businessmen simply ignored the price freeze, while the labour movement launched a series of protest strikes in October and November.

It was in this propitious setting that Chirac made a dramatic return to the headlines. Seven by-elections took place in November, just in time to catch the rising tide of anti-Government sentiment created by the "Barre Plan". Two Independent Republicans lost to Socialists and another barely survived a sharp decline in support. The Gaullists held on to their two seats and the Centre parties retained two they had previously held. In percentages, the Socialists and Gaullists were the big winners, the Independent Republicans the notable losers. In his riding, Chirac, whose every word and gesture had been given massive attention by the media during the campaign, triumphed handsomely in the first round, improving both his percentage and total vote over the 1973 general elections. The commentators agreed that Chirac was the big personal winner of this "partial national plebiscite", and Giscard the big personal loser.

Into the streets

The by-elections set the stage for Chirac's next step — overhauling the Gaullist party. He called a special national congress for December 5, drafted a manifesto for it, and appealed for thousands to go into the streets to demonstrate their solidarity. The congress was a great success, and some 60,000 people took to the streets in Paris. Chirac put his personal stamp on the party's name. De Gaulle's Union pour la Défense de la République (UDR) gave way to Chirac's Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). "Today all the certainties seem to be dissolving while the temptations of renunciation and facility are increasing," the manifesto declared. "To the questioning of Frenchmen, the clans and parties are offering only poor reasons and phoney answers. As for us, we have chosen to rally together to defend the essential values in which we believe and to

*By-elections
the setting
for return
of Chirac*

prompt the healthy revival of the nation." The bulk of the document consists of rather vague rhetoric about defending liberty, the need for national solidarity, opposition to privilege, the material and spiritual force of the family, and affirmation of the need for order and authority in the state. It also refers vaguely to the need for "democratizing" economic enterprises. "There is in our people an immense need to act together," the manifesto concludes. With effort and unity, "our people will find once more that strength which has so often saved it from disaster in the past and which will save it again tomorrow: the image of France *rassemblée*".

Giscard
is taking
the political
initiative

Giscard, meantime, has finally begun to take the political initiative. His strategy all along, given his decision not to try to "out-muscle" the Gaullists at the outset in 1974 by calling an election, was to go over their heads to the people, to build up a popular following, a *rassemblement* of his own. In the spring of 1976 he wrote a book, *Démocratie Française*, which was published in October with considerable fanfare. Long on lofty principles and short on specifics (as one would expect from an incumbent President), the book provides the fullest statement of Giscard's "advanced liberalism". It comes down to neo-Keynesian economics, social welfarism, a mixed economy (with the "mix" not far from the status quo), acceptance of the principle of *alternance* in power (Left-Right), an overhaul of the tax system, and greater international co-operation. In November, after the disastrous by-elections, the Independent Republicans launched "French Democracy" clubs to provide people with the means for discussing the President's views in appropriate depth. Various Independent Republican leaders have issued appeals of their own for a *rassemblement* round the President, but so far the idea appears to have had little popular success.

Giscard's problem is that he must not only hold off the Chiracian Right but cut into the Left's constituency in order to create a workable "third force." How is that to be done? For those who want change, Giscard has too long been associated with the conservative Gaullists to be taken seriously as a reformer. Besides, apart from the capital-gains tax (which some think he knew was doomed in advance), he has proposed no serious reforms. For those who want effective government, Giscard has also been a disappointment. He has been in charge of French economic decision-making for nearly a decade, first as Minister of Finance and now as President, but France is currently suffering double-

digit inflation (10-11 per cent) and rising unemployment. For those who merely want honest government, the haste with which the Government hustled the Vathaire and de Broglie affairs off-stage is hardly encouraging, while the resort to protests about "interference in French affairs" over the Daoud incident raises questions about its moral courage. In sum, the Giscardian Centrists are heading into the coming elections with little moral authority, supporting few policies that are not articulated more clearly and forcefully by the rivals on both sides, and reduced to the timeworn claim that a vote for them will at least be a vote against "adventures" by either the Right or the Left.

Presidential leverage

To be sure, no incumbent President can do without some leverage. Giscard can call elections whenever he wishes. He can shape public opinion through his unparalleled access to the public media and through referenda. In an extremity (would a deadlock between President and parliament be that category?), the President can even assume emergency powers. However, at the point it looks as though something will have to happen among his Gaullist allies and Leftist opponents before he will be able to turn matters round. It is not inconceivable, although it now seems most unlikely, that the Socialist-Communist alliance will "come unstuck" over the issue of the European Parliament. If recent public opinion trends hold, perhaps the Gaullists will be whipped back into line by the possibility that the Common Front will win an outright majority in the next parliament. For the moment, however, Giscard's room for manoeuvre is not very great and his advanced liberalism is looking tired and defensive.

Chirac's strategy is worth another comment. His immediate intention is plainly to stampede the Centrist elements by pumping up the menace of the Common Front. That strategy, if it succeeds, will hurt the Common Front far less than it will hurt the Centre. But Chirac almost certainly wants to win a majority for his own party in the next election, and to do that he too needs to cut clear across the Centre into the Left's constituency. That he hopes to do by talk about working "participation" in the direction of enterprises and by defending French sovereignty. It would be a mistake to discount the possibility of at least some success in this strategy. The French working class has long been conditioned by the Communists to regard NATO, the Common Market and the European Parliament as

capitalist conspiracies. A chauvinist appeal pressed up in appropriate rhetoric from the Left's own vocabulary might very well enable Chirac to win back some of the working-class vote that de Gaulle once enjoyed.

It is, of course, too soon to say how the struggle between the Centrists and the Gaullists will turn out, but the signs up to this point do not augur well for the Centre. Apart from the by-elections and polls, one need only look at the Radical Party congress held in late November to see that Chirac's dynamism has great appeal to elements that should have reason to fear it. While Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the party's leading intellectual force, called on the Radicals to dissociate themselves from a "rally whose only common denominator is to deny victory to the opposition," many delegates voiced support for Chirac. The majority will need a locomotive like Chirac," one delegate said. The "Left Gaullists," who have been peeling away like dried onion-skins ever since the death of the General (it was hard to sustain the myth of his reformism even that long), have by contrast broken away to establish links with the Common Front. The Centre is not holding — it is in disarray. While it seems very likely that the several Centre parties will sooner or later form a *rassemblement* of their own, their divisions and personality cults may well prevent them from becoming much of a galvanizing force.

Unity of Left

While the story of the Centre and Right is that of disunity, the story of the Left is that of unity. Every time major elements of the Left have united in this century, they have shown considerable political power. The Socialist-Radical Cartel des Gauches of 1924 and the Socialist-Communist-Radical Popular Front of 1936 are the best-known instances. But they were, of course, exceptions. The norm has been constant and self-defeating struggle, especially between the Socialists and the Communists. Perhaps the absence of unity, so emasculating in its effects, explains the potent mystique that Leftist unity has developed and that galvanizes mass followings whenever "unity" is (temporarily) realized at the electoral level.

Both the Communist and Socialist parties have undergone profound changes in recent years. Owing to an enormous gap between its rhetoric and its practice, the Socialist Party founded in 1905 had slowly disintegrated in the 1950s and 1960s under the burden of supporting various Centre governments (to avoid letting the Com-

munists or the Gaullist Right take over) and of officially sanctioning colonial wars. A new Socialist Party was created in 1971 out of the remnants of the old party and several of the new groups, although the most radical elements, made sceptical by experience, preferred to stay together in their own Unified Socialist Party (PSU) in order to avoid neutralization within the new party framework. François Mitterand, who ran as the Presidential candidate for the entire Left in the 1965, 1969 and 1974 campaigns, became its leader. He was determined to avoid the suicidal struggles of the past and proposed a tactical alliance with the Communists based on a common program. Under his leadership, the Socialist Party has considerably revived at every level — in membership, in public opinion polls, in votes and in intellectual vitality.

The Community Party has also been undergoing profound transformation. Founded in 1920, the party long followed every twist and turn in the Moscow line. The "events" of 1968 were a Calvary for the party. Afraid to launch an appeal for a revolution, hostile to the young *gauchistes* who appeared to be at the head of the popular movement in student circles and among young workers, the Communists in effect came down on the side of order. They directed working-class demands into new collective agreements. They seized on the legislative elections called by de Gaulle to direct discontent into conventional channels. Instead of revolution there was revelation; the Communist party was a "paper tiger". Given the most likely conditions it could reasonably expect for a revolutionary strike for power, the party had shrunk back, in effect conspiring with de Gaulle to maintain the old regime. Just a few weeks later, the Russians occupied Czechoslovakia, bringing the "Dubcek Era" to an end. The very muted criticism from the French Communist Party hierarchy stood out in marked contrast to the enraged denunciations from the Italian Communist Party. Young people began to desert the party in droves, and many of its intellectuals began to call for wholesale rethinking of its positions.

The passing of the guard came in the early 1970s, when Georges Marchais became the party's General Secretary. Marchais represents a new generation of Communist leaders — those formed during the Resistance, those who had in their early years associated revolutionary action and freedom with nationalist action, who had in the Resistance learned to act alone as well as under orders. Under his guidance, the Communist Party has formally scrap-

*Revelation
instead of
revolution*

ped the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", proclaimed its acceptance of the idea of *alternance* in power, and reaffirmed its dedication to the democratic implications of the Common Front program. In 1976, the party incurred Moscow's public displeasure by sending an official representative to a rally to protest political repression in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. To protests from newspapers in Moscow and Prague, Marchais replied pointedly that he did not understand either Russian or Czech.

Marchais also led the Communists into the Common Front alliance with the Socialists. The Common Front program, signed in June 1973, is a long and complex document. It avoids areas of irreconcilable disagreement — for example, NATO membership (the Socialists for, the Communists against), the *force de frappe* (the Socialists arguing that disarmament must be multilateral, the Communists calling for unilateral disarmament); the political union of Western Europe (the Socialists for, the Communists against); and workers' participation in the control of nationalized industries (the Socialists for, Communists against). The program outlines massive structural changes, including large-scale nationalizations in the insurance, financial and heavy industries. Politically, the Common Front proposes a whittling-down of the Presidency. The term would be reduced from seven to five years; the President's plebiscitary powers would be restricted to matters not decided by parliament and to issues suggested by parliament; the emergency-powers article would be amended or thrown out to prevent its abuse by a President confronted by a hostile legislature; and parliamentary controls would be established to regulate the President's powers in foreign policy. The program also includes a pledge to alter the basis of the French legal system by introducing habeas corpus and the presumption of innocence.

Although the Common Front has grown steadily in popular support and commands a strong plurality in recent public-opinion polls, it has its problems. The divergences over foreign policy are deep and can hardly be ignored if the Left wins a parliamentary majority or the Presidency. In the shorter run, electoral patterns are also causing problems for the alliance. The recent by-elections suggest that the Socialists are the main beneficiaries of the new alliance. There is a growing vote for change but for relatively moderate change, within existing institutions.

At the moment, however, the Common Front partners are lying low, letting the

divisions in the majority dominate the headlines so far as possible. Like the Chracians, they will profit from a polarized electorate, but for that they would rather the Right took the initiative. They themselves do not want to frighten the Centre. Instead of talking about nationalization they are talking about their dedication to democratic liberties, individual right *alternance*, and the inadequacies of the Government's economic measures. The themes are certain to sharpen the contrast between their positions and those of the Gaullists, whose *barbooze* bully boys are renowned, who refuse to countenance the idea of *alternance* if that means a Common Front victory, and whose new leader has an authoritarian air.

To be sure, Giscard is not going to let the Common Front off without some severe testing. That is probably the reason he is insisting that the matter of direct election to the European Parliament and the IM statutes be debated before the next legislative elections. The more successful Chirac is on the Right, the more Giscard will have to try to sever the bond between the Communists and the Socialists. At this point, however, it does not look as though either the Socialists or the Communists will let their differences on these matters ruin a relation that is promising to let them transform France in the foreseeable future.

It is, of course, impossible to say how the Common Front will fare in elections that may be over a year away. Even public-opinion polls show that a clear majority of Frenchmen believe that the Common Front will win, and a strong plurality of those with opinions want it to win. In electoral campaigns often alter sentiment or at least force people to think hard about the implications of their sentiments and preferences. In the French context, one should not underestimate the influence of conservative appeals. Frenchmen have often rarely *voted* for change; they usually have it thrust upon them. The Common Front may be further from power than it looks at the moment — but, to repeat, the Left has never looked so near to a parliamentary majority in generations.

The political manoeuvring currently under way in France is more important than anything that has happened there since the events of 1968. The disintegration of Giscard's parliamentary majority may well lead to a deadlock between the legislative and executive branches in the advance of the next legislative elections. If that does not happen, the next election might very well create such a deadlock. France, it seems, will live through some interesting moments in the next year or two.

Common Front
would reduce
Presidential
power base

Prospects of foreign policy under Carter's Administration

by Larry Collins

Discussing the future direction of a government's foreign policy can be a very tricky process. One can never be sure which factors — personality, power, public support, to mention only three — will have the most predictive value. We must, therefore, content ourselves with a broad sketch relating the issues the Carter Administration will encounter to its known properties.

President Carter's experience and temperament will probably lead him towards a concentration on domestic affairs. His campaign statements on foreign policy were projections of his domestic themes. They were expressions of moral protest against a long period of political decline and governmental excess. He artfully combined his criticisms of Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic methods with a generalized call for America to demonstrate "compassion" and "sensitivity" in the international arena.

Carter was not precise, however, about the substantive character of a foreign policy premised on morality. Ironically, it may emerge as an ethical relativism that recognizes the legitimate existence of a plurality of political and economic systems. That kind of tolerance might then justify such tighter control of U.S. arms sales, currently totalling about \$7 billion. The State Department has urged Carter to limit arms sales strictly to unstable areas such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It may be possible, for example, to include an arms-limitation agreement in a future Middle Eastern settlement.

Good mixture

President Carter's foreign affairs appointments represent a good combination of specialties and policy viewpoints. In Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter has a combination of managers and planners. The choices underscore his well-known penchant for demanding total options while delegating specific responsibilities. Carter will not permit the control of foreign policy to become the

compartmentalized fiefdom of a single subordinate or agency. It is unfortunate, in this respect, that Theodore Sorenson did not become director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), because he would have augmented the diversity, and therefore the balance, of the Cabinet.

In Harold Brown, Carter has a Secretary of Defense equal in intellectual stature to Robert McNamara. Like McNamara, he will have the task of controlling expenses through reorganization and weapons-development control. Brown's most important function will be to give policy advice on arms-limitation. It is significant that Carter chose as Secretary of Defense a well-known advocate of arms-control, a former technical adviser on the American delegation to the Arms-Control and Disarmament Conference.

Cyrus Vance brings two principal strengths to the State Department. Like Kissinger, he appears to possess a highly-refined personal competence in diplomacy. He served as President Johnson's Paris Peace negotiator on Vietnam, and was dispatched to Cyprus, South Korea, the Dominican Republic and Panama on various missions requiring pinpoint diplomatic intervention. Unlike Kissinger's, his history has been that of a policy executor rather than an architect. His strength lies in reacting to policy initiatives, mediating practical compromises, and then carrying them out. Both Vance and Brown should be viewed as highly competent, experienced, *team* members.

The man most likely to act as Carter's global planner and least likely, by temperament and experience, to be a team

*Personal
diplomatic
competence*

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member is Zbigniew Brzezinski. As Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brzezinski occupies the office that has dominated long-range planning since 1968. During the campaign, Brzezinski was a close adviser to Carter, providing a framework within which the candidate could translate his populist humanism into a critique of the Kissinger era. Because of Brzezinski's influence and position, an exploration of his latest opinions is important in any examination of the Administration's foreign policy.

Most recently, Brzezinski has argued that the ideological underpinnings that have given American foreign policy its continuity and domestic consensus are at present without credibility. The United States must establish an alternate basic relation with the world, particularly the Third World. Brzezinski believes that international politics are today more a matter of egalitarian redistribution of wealth than an ideological competition for the minds of men. American foreign policy must recognize what he refers to as demands for a more "equitable world order", and learn to live with a world that is increasingly overcentralized, overpopulated and poor.

Not surprisingly, Brzezinski thinks Kissinger did little to recognize the change. Kissinger's "Lone Ranger" style, as Carter referred to it, was aimed primarily at intermediate objectives, premised upon super-power maintenance of international order. According to Brzezinski, Kissinger's view, pragmatic but not purposeful, was also responsible, for the growing sense of drift and fear in the American public, and for the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus in Congress.

Brzezinski approaches the problems of maintaining legislative and public support from an essentially conservative perspective. He has referred to Congressional assertions of authority as the "intrusion of fragmented concerns into the policy debates". He believes Congress and the public ought primarily to support elite initiatives. Brzezinski made a telling reference to the role of the public in the 1976 summer edition of *Foreign Policy*:

"[A] public that is ambivalent but constructively malleable emerged from the [public opinion] surveys and it heightened the need for national leadership that was capable of defining politically and morally compelling directions to which the public might then positively respond."

Therefore, Brzezinski castigates Kissinger's methods not because of their potential for abuse but because they led to the loss of freedom of manoeuvre by the

Executive Branch. That may be the wrong lesson. Both Dr. Kissinger and Watergate left a message that must be accurately understood by the new Administration: that the circle of informed participation in foreign affairs should be widened. Congress has demanded it, and Carter has led the public to expect it. A lack of sensitivity to this fact would make Carter's singular asset, his presumed moral integrity, appear a sham.

Nevertheless, Brzezinski will have to present Carter with a policy program and a public rationale to support it. He is perceptive enough to realize the importance of having an ideological justification, a sense of "mission", behind the Administration's foreign policy. The function of the "mission" has historically been to strengthen Presidential control of foreign policy by insulating the Executive Branch from domestic criticism of specific decisions.

The most realistic advice for Carter to receive would be to convince the public that the U.S., while retaining a critical international role, could no longer preter to be the predominant actor. The task would be to cope with problems that can no longer be solved on strictly American terms. Brzezinski has noted that America's vibrant culture, its social dynamism and its productive capacity are greatly admired around the world. These can be integrated to great advantage with Carter's outspoken call for integrity and tolerance.

But crusades should be avoided. Another aspect of the Kissinger legacy was that his interventions were refreshing free of sanctimonious overtones of moral superiority. The world that confronts Carter is suspicious of crusades, particularly if they are being pushed by a wealthy America seeking compromises on what is perceived to be age-old injustices.

Traditional friends

Carter has declared his intention to reduce the emphasis placed on reaching specific bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China and to re-establish close ties with America's traditional friends. The redirection of policy was emphasized by Vance during his confirmation hearing and is one of Brzezinski's favourite themes. Although Soviet-American relations will certainly not be abandoned, they will share "top billing" with the trilateral links between the three great centres of industrial democracy, the United States, Europe and Japan. Carter hopes that, together, the three industrial giants will pursue coordinated economic and trade policies.

Redistribution of wealth more important than ideological competition



The initial contact between the new Carter Administration and its major European allies was made during a ten-day tour of Europe by Vice-President Walter Mondale. Mondale is shown with Italian President Giovanni Leone in Rome.

th among themselves and with the Third World.

The economic strategy accepted by Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico generally favoured deflationary policies. Carter will pursue the opposite approach by promoting incremental increases in Government spending in concert with West Germany and Japan. Combined stimulation of the three economies should reduce unemployment, boost capital investment and, it is hoped, promote international trade. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has given its approval to this approach by denying that the current gradual recovery policies will produce further inflation.

There are obvious areas of mutual interest within the triad. The Administration may, however, be operating on some false assumptions. It is taken for granted that close relations with Europe and Japan would be amenable to co-ordination by the U.S. One of the undeniable consequences of the "new economic order" is that industrialized nations are becoming increasingly competitive with one another. The ex-

perience of the Law of the Sea Conference and disagreement over nuclear-reactor exports should suffice to make the point. Western nations may find themselves at odds trying to protect sagging economies and scrambling for increasingly expensive Third World resources. Dependence on OPEC oil has already divided the "allies" over Israel and the Middle East. Where OPEC monopolizes oil, the Americans monopolize the alternative fuel source, uranium. In 1975, the U.S. raised the price of uranium in a manner that, in the words of Theo Sommer, editor of *Die Zeit*, "made the Arab oil sheiks look like small-time bazaar merchants".

"Eurocommunism", despite the Administration's willingness to permit pluralism, will still present very hard decisions regarding NATO co-operation and effectiveness, and industrial nationalization. There are also vastly different levels of economic performance within the European Economic Community. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a \$3.9-billion standby loan to Britain, of which \$1.1 billion was provided by the U.S. The

British were not sanguine, however, about the domestic budgetary restraints required to get the money.

Japan is probably in an even more precarious position. Its extreme dependence on outside markets, resources and food may make it the most unco-operative of the trilateral partners. Japan simply cannot afford to take part in any initiatives that may invite retaliation or force it to abandon its studiously low international profile.

A successful pursuit of closer ties with its allies will require the U.S. to yield a great deal more than hitherto. Governments of the left will have to be trusted, trade barriers lowered, export loans made cheaper (certainly below the current rate of 8 to 9 per cent), and food, technology and resource transfers will have to be guaranteed within the triangle.

President Carter may come to appreciate what Kissinger accomplished; in the current international system, it may be easier to make friends with your enemies than to make friends with your friends. Presumably Walter Mondale's trip to Europe has established the "ground-rules" desired by the Europeans as a basis for a more co-operative allied co-existence.

The long-range problem facing the new Administration is the immense economic disparity between the industrialized West and the less-developed countries (LDCs). The Administration has not yet had time to produce a comprehensive policy towards the Third World. Since the United States,

Japan and Europe constitute pivot world economies, they must be prepared direct larger portions of their production capacities towards meeting the development requirements of the LDCs. However, arrangements decreasing the growth potential of the Western economies must be avoided, because expanding development assistance can only be met by increased production.

The Americans, in particular, will have to recognize the political economy of international relations. The United States had customarily compartmentalized aid and trade policies, leaving the determination of too much of the trade pattern in private hands. In the area of food, for example, aid policies and business arrangements have converged, to increase underdevelopment. Food-aid programs create a dependence on high-cost Western technology such as fertilizer and machinery, while Western "agri-businesses" controlling large tracts of land in poor countries, produce food for export rather than domestic consumption. They control international markets as well, thus diminishing the benefits obtained through rationalization. A few tangible remedies would include fairer trade policies in the form of tariff preferences for Third World industry, price guarantees to protect commodity exporters, aid programs designed to promote self-sufficiency, and closer regulation of Western-based multinational corporations.

*Closer ties
will require
yielding more
to allies*

Canadian-American relations?



'NO, NO, I ASKED YOU FIRST — WHAT HAVE YOU TO SMILE ABOUT?'

The risks are, indeed, enormous. A stultant response to the demands of poor countries, such as using food as an instrument of coercion, as Carter suggested during the campaign, will only invite retaliation and expose America's wealth and economic principles to a more concerted attack.

Carter's main concern in the Far East is to develop closer relations with historical allies like Japan and Taiwan, while moving towards the recognition of China. Both the President and Mr. Vance have maintained that U.S. recognition is dependent on Chinese acceptance of continued American association with Chiang Ching-kuo's Nationalist Government. This will undoubtedly include close economic ties similar to the "Japanese formula", and very specific guarantees regarding Taiwanese independence.

In the interim, the message reaching Carter from Congress and the intelligence establishment (an unusual alignment) is that the U.S. should draw China into an ever more entangling relation with multilateral agreements covering economic, cultural, and even military, ties. Former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield stated, after his return from Peking, that, unless some American overtures were forthcoming, Chinese leaders might seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Roger Brown, a senior CIA analyst, has argued that a lack of American initiative might result in China withdrawing into

the unpredictable isolationism it exhibited in the 1950s.

Eventual recognition is regarded as inevitable, but Carter will probably defer it while taking intermediate steps towards co-operation. The recent purchase of Rolls Royce-Spey engines by the Chinese Air Force and the sale, in November of last year, of two sophisticated American computers indicate that the Chinese are moving away from their policy of self-reliance. By authorizing other high-technology transfers, the U.S. could promote a vested interest within the Chinese élite in continued ties with the West. Carter might then buy the necessary time to mend fences with Japan and Taiwan, while strengthening the hand of the pragmatists in China.

American recognition of China would actually be a positive step towards closer ties with Japan as well as Europe, since both these countries have long since recognized Peking. Recognition would, in fact, create two triangles — one, constituted by the United States, Japan and Europe, composed of traditional friends, and the other, constituted by the U.S., China and the Soviet Union, composed of traditional enemies. The U.S. would occupy the apex of both triangles.

The President is firmly committed to a comprehensive arms agreement freezing the number of nuclear weapons (SALT II), and a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTB) banning *all* nuclear testing. Arms control was the only specific policy refer-



"PIERRE? I THINK WE HAVE SOLVED YOUR PROBLEMS."

ence in Mr. Carter's inaugural address — a fact, presumably, whose significance was not lost on the Soviets. Although SALT has become the linchpin of *détente*, it has been most vulnerable to criticism and least subject to accurate assessment. SALT I suffered, in part, from the domestic political context in which it had been developed. As Nixon's support weakened, he promoted SALT (and *détente* generally) in ever more unjustifiable terms to slow his political decline.

Although the political climate may now be settled, Mr. Carter must still deal with the deep disagreement within the arms-control community over the degree to which the U.S. strategic posture has been eroded as a result of SALT I. The Pipes Report, commissioned by the Ford Administration's Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Pentagon's transition "issue" papers, presented to the Carter Administration, both argue that the Soviets are attempting to achieve strategic superiority. Other analysts, however, be-

lieve that to delay further arms agreements will imperil *détente* and lead to expensive and destabilizing arms races. This kind of fundamental disagreement was partly responsible for preventing the Ford Administration from concluding a second SALT agreement.

To produce a policy that satisfies both "hawks" and "doves", Carter and his Secretary of Defense will avoid developing or developing weapon systems that undermine the structure of SALT. Weapons like the "cruise" missile, the MX follow-on to the *Minuteman* ICBM) and land-mobile ICBMs will probably be held in abeyance. The new President is likely to develop weapons that, while satisfying the critics, maintain what Mr. Vance referred to as a position of "rough parity" in the general balance. The development of the B-1 bomber will, therefore, probably continue. New programs will be stretched out over a period to hold the increase in defence spending to within politically acceptable limits.

A Carter design?

Trade-offs of trilateralism

By James P. Sewell

Has the Carter team brought to Washington a design for reorganizing the better part of our planet's international relations? If so, what implications does the design hold for various actors downstage and upstage on the world scene? A fortnight of listening to the new Presidential Administration and watching it in action hardly entitles one to attempt definitive answers to these questions. But even conditional replies may help those concerned to foresee emergent tendencies and anticipate potential dilemmas. International-relations theory serves a variety of functions; in this brief inquiry, we shall test its use for deriving practical considerations from a construct of world politics.

The global construct in question features a trilateral pivot. Community Europe and other Western European countries

make up one corner of this pivot. Japan constitutes a distant corner. At the apex stands North America. Within the triangle, among its three "regions," relations proceed amicably and intensely. Upon this triangular pivot hinge the fortunes — on a good part of the fortunes — of others throughout the international system.

Design

Is there a design? For purposes of argument, our initial question can be addressed through three smaller queries. First, what should we assume that the Carter team brings with it any design at all? After Jimmy Carter's background would it appear to dispose him towards global balance printing. Walter Mondale's experience prepares him better for confronting domestic problems than for contriving

ernational plans — notwithstanding the shly-inaugurated Vice-President's able presentations in Europe and Japan. Vance has earned respect for his e-flung trouble-soothing and problem-tigating; he probably does not want, d certainly does not deserve, a reputa- n as the conceiver of grand schemes. reover, the Administration's early ges- res towards issues near and far (the Mid- e East, Southern Africa, Cyprus, Pana- a, conventional- and unconventional- ns proliferation) suggest a preference reflexive tinkering over preventive dering. "Fix it when it's broken" might em at first glance to summarize this new am's approach to foreign affairs.

Here I shall, of course, assert a con- ary position. Towards the end of the ssinger era, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote at "what is needed today is a major chitectural effort rather than an acro- tic foreign policy". Indeed, Brzezinski's lls for architectural efforts punctuate his tements during the past few years. rter's election campaign safely behind n, the President told his fellow Ameri- ns and citizens of the world that he ped "to shape a world order that is more ponsive to human operations". Re- rded seriously, as they should be, these rds imply rather far-reaching aspira- ns. The framework projected by key nbers of the new Administration be- nes more tangible as we pose and follow econd query.

What is the design?

it is accepted that the Carter team s in mind a particular plan, how can ay that their plan approximates the sign outlined above? Does the construct rilateralism fit the intentions of major S. policy-makers, or does it merely nify the conjectures of a distant demic observer? Again, the tests of e will reveal the new leadership's dilections infinitely more surely than old anyone's theorizing in advance of eable developments. For the moment, eever, we can offer evidence that nar- s the gap between sheer speculation d manifest performance.

Many men and women on the new shington team had previously partici- eed in The Trilateral Commission, an sociation described in the Commission's trature as "A Private American [or rth American']-European-Japanese Ini- iative on Matters of Common Concern". rter and Mondale belonged to the Com- ssion; so did Vance, Harold Brown and Michael Blumenthal, among other mem- es of the Cabinet. Trilateralists slated

for prominent positions in the foreign- policy complement include Warren Chris- topher, Richard Cooper, Fred Bergsten, Richard Holbrooke, Lucy Wilson Benson, Sol Linowitz and (at the time of writing) Paul Warnke. Most important for estab- lishing the immediate point, Zbigniew Brzezinski co-founded and directed The Trilateral Commission, and Brzezinski now operates from a White House position with vast strategic potential. Even this incom- plete list of trilateralists-become-Carter- appointees serves to establish the con- tinuity between the Commission and the U.S. executive branch as successive bases for advancing certain notions about inter- national relations.

Debating forum

Jonathan Steele describes The Trilateral Commission as "a debating forum within a consensus". Commissioners aim together at the economic well-being of some, and ostensibly of all, peoples in a world beset by resource scarcities and maldistribution, economic and political particularism, inter- dependence with many costs but few benefits. The goal of an open, free or liberal world economy seems quite central to the body of assumptions shared by Commis- sion members. Commission task forces have produced reports looking towards new monetary arrangements (several of these have since been put in motion), new directions in trade, new approaches to commodity markets, a new (if already dated) regime for governing use of the oceans, new tactics for joint action on energy problems, a new dawning of rela- tions between affluent trilateralists and low-income nations. Several observers of The Trilateral Commission have remarked on its heavy representation from multina- tional corporations; others note its heavy representation from the centre of the political spectrum.

The words "open", "free" and "liberal" likewise characterize the polities that Commissioners wish to perpetuate among themselves — and quite possibly to perpetrate beyond their triangle. Problems in the governance of democracies served as the point of departure for a thought- and comment-provoking study (*The Crisis of Democracy*, co-authored by Michel J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki). Upon the international plane,

*Liberal
world
economy*

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though still within the trilateral family, a Commission task force undertook in 1976 to spell out norms and procedures for minimizing the unilateralism that had plagued traditional friendships between certain nations. In *consultation*, "regular and ever more formal consultation" (Brzezinski), trilateralists agree on a prescription for treating external factors that pack a domestic wallop without as yet lending themselves to authoritative international management. Here, too, the value of openness stands as an element within the Commission's consensus.

Debatable issues arise when trilateralists weigh the means for realizing their common aims; we consider a few of these issues below. Controversy also stirs around "political" matters that some consider, and others do not, within the proper scope of initiative of the Commission, or within that of the government that some now serve. The exchange of information on how various polities benefit from urban planning, improve health-care and mass transportation, limit unemployment, and overcome alienation will hardly give pause to anyone. But common stances by trilateralists have not emerged towards the following: oil-exporting states, would-be purchasers of nuclear materials and know-how, socialist states (including Cuba), and selected abusers of human rights. Let us predict that the London summit meeting will witness other disagreements. Following a premise that controversy may mark the first step towards effective action, onlookers might hope that the awesome problem of controlling conventional-arms transfers will at last be faced. Debate, including open debate, certainly qualifies as a form of consultation.

Different design?

Is it a different design? The trilateralists' emphasis on openness and consultation distinguishes their professed mode from Kissinger's diplomatic style. At the outset, we inquired whether trilateralism promised to accomplish something more substantial, to re-organize international relations. Hence we ask, as our third query on the nature of the Carter design, whether trilateralism presents basic differences from patterns bequeathed by preceding statemanship. How new is the new design?

In some respects trilateralism does not differ from what Kissinger established. Mondale's journeys sought to convey the "fundamental continuity" of U.S. foreign policy, as an aide reported. While the trilateralists' proposals on oil diplomacy (and, more specifically, the "soft sell" offered in a Commission speech of Decem-

ber 8, 1974, by George Ball) have been contrasted with Kissinger's practice, the difference appears to be minimal. The previous Secretary of State talked more and more as if he desired admission to the trilateralists' club, especially in an interview reported on his final day in public office. Kissinger's patron has been Nelson Rockefeller; Brzezinski's is David Rockefeller. When Stanley Hoffmann wrote the "world order is not a matter of architectural efforts", he might have been commenting on Kissinger, although from timing it appears that he was commenting on Brzezinski.

Structural differences

Yet U.S. trilateralists claim that their architecture will differ in important respects from the Kissinger structure. Summarily stated, the differences imply (1) higher priority and greater constancy of attention to relations with U.S. allies, including Canada and others in the western hemisphere; (2) a new working definition of *détente* as a dynamic process with certain competitive attributes rather than an achieved status of relaxation (if the Soviets can test *détente* in Angola, can the U.S. not test *détente* on the way to E-grade?); (3) economic and political inducements to selected Asian, African and Latin American states to align themselves with the trilateralists for specific, if even broader, purposes; (4) a reduction of military support for outlying states with aspirations to great-power standing, unclear capacity and spheres of influence of their own. Although these differences deserve elaboration beyond the limits of our present argument, perhaps mere assertion suffices to distinguish the Brzezinski model from its predecessor.

We have contended that the Carter team offers a coherent design for international relations, that this design can be described succinctly as trilateralism, and that trilateralism promises significant departures from the Kissinger system. What considerations for others follow from application of the trilateral construct to world politics?

Trilateralism would matter little to others if U.S. foreign and domestic policy mattered little. However, despite the *dénouement* of the Vietnam tragedy and the onset of the energy crunch, the actions of those who wield authority in the United States matter a great deal to the lives of those elsewhere. Too much emphasis has been placed upon American power in writing the world's recent history; too little emphasis should not be placed upon it in anticipating the world's immediate

London 'summit'
will witness
disagreements

future. Jimmy Carter spoke without much exaggeration to citizens of the world: "You will be affected by my decisions".

Besides the promotion of interests that Canadians indubitably share (coincidentally or conjointly) with others throughout the industrial market-economy area, trilateralism promises at least one special benefit. Given their planned regimen of consultation, trilateralists will have instituted an early-warning system to monitor tendencies towards neo-mercantilism among themselves. Economic particularism would produce severe political uneasiness here if Canadians felt constrained to choose between positions in support of the United States or of Community Europe against the other. Similarly, economic and political tension between Japan and the United States, or between Japan and Europe, could hardly comfort Canadians. The coming of trilateralism does not guarantee the ending of trade wars, investment wars and resource wars. However, trilateral procedures offer a ready means for those threatened to muster collective defences.

Trilateralism's promise of moderating and preventing economic strain helps to offset one of the design's notable liabilities. A Europe and a Japan drawn closer to North America may facilitate some objects of Canadian foreign policy, but such a development would erode much of the basis for Option Three. Indeed, some observers may conclude that trilateralism fosters a working assumption of three regions, and thus sanctions actions further from North American continentalism. Those who dislike images of dumbbells and twin (or triple) pillars will not take eagerly to a notion of tricontinentalism. Canadians may insist that countries rather than continents serve in principle and in practice as the building blocks of a trilateral community. But Canada's identity may be blurred — even if the Quebec question does not obtrude — on a Trilateral Political Committee that encourages Community Europe to speak with a single voice and assumes that the spokesman for an Asian region will do the same. Japan can hardly be expected to complain about such an arrangement. The uniting of Europe has relied often upon demands for common standards towards outsiders. But Canadians may find difficulty in accepting any institution that requires "some countries to accept the legitimacy of being represented by others at some stages of consultation and even negotiation" (*The Reform of International Institutions*). Would the United States allow North America to be represented by someone else?

Soviet response

Trilateralism displays no military dimension, although the design implies a continuation of NATO, NORAD and the U.S.-Japanese treaty on mutual security. The Soviet Union's response to developments will hinge on trilateralists' military postures, no doubt, but also on their economic blandishments and political initiatives towards peoples of East Europe. Brzezinski thinks it imperative that Communist states "be engaged". He commends a process of "regional and functional co-operation". But "reintegrating the 'dropouts'" (*The Reform of International Institutions*) can only be a delicate operation and, if it arouses Soviet resistance, may well be an unsuccessful one — or worse.

Much will depend upon the political context of overtures to East Europeans. A *démarche* that forces the Soviets to recall the Cold War does not promise success. Outrage at reported violations of civil and political rights comes easily to those who live within the trilateral area. Wise and effective leadership will found its approach to human rights abroad upon quiet diplomacy and further progress in one's own neighbourhood. Strident diplomacy inspires Congress to make international advances in other matters contingent upon national improvements in certain human rights, even though the new Administration has disavowed the practice of forging such issue-linkages. Leverage on human-rights conditions beyond the trilateral area will increase if economic, cultural, political and civil rights are cultivated throughout the western hemisphere and in other friendly polities. The acid test of the Carter team's commitment to human rights will come with its influence upon Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Jimmy Carter might build a stronger position yet by exercising his good offices towards the U.S. armed forces on behalf of "pardons" for Vietnam deserters who, having in some instances broken the military code as an expression of conscience, remain prisoners of the larger acts of erstwhile principals.

One wonders to what extent the founders of trilateralism wished their project to supplant more-nearly-universal frameworks for international action. Some distaste for the UN's clamouring multitudes appears between the lines of trilateralist statements. The Trilateral Commission originated at about the same time as the draft proposal for a "New International Economic Order". To a critical eye, trilateralists might seem less concerned with changing the lot of unfortunate peoples than with making each other richer

*Brzezinski
commands
regional
and functional
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so that marginal returns can trickle down to the lowly. Yet the day of trilateralism begins with an aura of hope, not least because of the Carter team's auspicious start. "Open trilateralism", an idea advanced by Kinhide Mushakoji, can presage generous acts on the part of those within the golden triangle rather than merely their bid to co-opt and integrate well-endowed newcomers into the club. Even so, the ultimate trade-off may be that between firm management of diminishing resources by the like-minded, on the one hand, and effective (if disjointed) action on global problems whose resolution demands the participation of all, on the other.

Despite the discomforts of their trilateral role and the travails of their pluralist society, and perhaps because of the difficulties, Canadians are well placed to speak out on both the potentialities and the problems of the Carter team's layout. "A major problem is the tendency to think in terms of shapes and symmetrical designs, for one of the threats to the evolution of a more orderly world comes, paradoxically, from the compulsive constitutional mongers and other tidy-minded people in universities and chanceries." Thus writes John Holmes. "The beginning of wisdom is the recognition of complexity, the need to live with paradox."

Canadian cultural diplomacy: its illusions and problems

By Paul Painchaud

Canada is not the only modern state with little experience in cultural relations. Although they were not a wholly new experience, this country's cultural relations had an extremely rapid rise just before and after the Second World War with the development of communications, the accelerated diversification of the international system and the emergence of new inter-governmental organizations. In this connection, there is need for a preliminary effort to define terms in order to avoid a number of misunderstandings reflected in a recent group of articles in *International Perspectives* by officials of the Department of External Affairs.

Semantic problems

To begin with, we feel that the expression "cultural relations" itself must be set aside, because it is too general when applied to the activity of a government, as in the case that concerns us here. Rather, cultural relations should be understood as all the cultural contacts that are made between individuals, groups or states, from one body politic to another. Therefore, they include both relations between states and relations of a private nature. This distinction is more important than it appears at first glance. Private cultural relations have

a growing role in international exchange, particularly in the Western world, in the realm of economics as well as in the realm of ideas. They constitute a phenomenon that is relatively autonomous and should be given separate consideration. It is also an older phenomenon than government action in the same field, and its specific significance is being rediscovered as the theory of international relations is confirmed and developed.

It is, therefore, indispensable for purposes of analysis that cultural relations between states be distinguished and assigned a special term. We suggest that, for the time being, the expression "cultural diplomacy" be used whenever the increasingly-diversified activity of modern governments in cultural affairs on the international scene is being discussed. Such an expression will seem too restrictive to those who would like to see this activity surrounded by a noble, disinterested aura, as opposed to other types of diplomatic activity that are considered more utilitarian. We feel, however, that it is simpler from every point of view to call a spade a spade: whenever culture is put to use by the state, it must be subject to the same criteria as govern analysis of political phenomena. We are neither discrediting nor falsifying

is form of government activity; rather, we are identifying it more accurately and, in particular, finding a better position from which to debunk the language used by politicians themselves. Lastly, we are placing the study of cultural diplomacy in a perspective that permits comparative analysis with the other aspects of the international activity of governments.

We come now to the second semantic problem: the field of cultural diplomacy. More clarification needs to be undertaken on several levels. The primary distinction, however, is that of the cultural as opposed to the scientific sphere. In Canada's case, for example, international cultural programs include a sector called "exchanges of individuals", the immediate purpose of which is, at least in part, development of co-operation between universities. How can it be thought that these exchanges of educators are not also, if not chiefly, aimed at setting up long-term communications networks, and even at promoting joint research projects between specialists in both countries that seek thus to improve their diplomatic relations? The Canadian studies programs abroad are an example of this, and other cases could be mentioned that would point up the indistinctness of the boundaries between the cultural and the scientific spheres. In consequence, for a proper discussion of cultural diplomacy, the more comprehensive problem of scientific co-operation must also be broached. Moreover, it is hard to accept the distinction that is often made between the humanities and natural sciences, the former being more closely linked to the cultural sphere than the scientific. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we shall leave this very complex problem to one side.

Dual duty

Finally, we feel there is a third distinction to be made: cultural diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy *versus* cultural diplomacy as an instrument of internal cultural development. This distinction is not peculiar to cultural matters. Diplomacy can serve economics, for example, for its own ends, or it can seek immediate advantages for the economic progress of the country. Cultural diplomacy cannot escape this double duty, which is never clearly delineated and poses a special problem in federal systems.

As an instrument of foreign policy, cultural diplomacy may be used to increase the country's prestige in certain circles abroad; culture is then one vehicle for the state's propaganda. It is incorrect

to think that only authoritarian regimes follow this practice. Democracies do too, especially in their relations among themselves, in which they cannot use forms of propaganda that are too aggressive or too conspicuous. Again, the Canadian studies programs abroad can be cited as an example, since cultural propaganda is paramount in them. This propaganda has various objectives, such as the creation of a favourable setting for longer-term political activities, and even the promotion of business interests — tourist-industry development, book and film exports, and so on.

Political objectives

Propaganda is not, however, the only possible diplomatic use of cultural exchanges. For example, one state may allow another to make its culture better known in its territory in order to obtain political advantages at another level. Such is often the origin of bilateral cultural agreements. This political dimension is, of course, more visible in the case of co-operation between countries with different socio-economic and ideological systems. But it may also obtain between similar systems; thus the sudden upsurge of cultural co-operation between the Canadian and French Governments a few years ago had mainly political motives.

Finally, cultural diplomacy may pursue direct political ends. Canada is not hiding the fact, for example, that in developing its international cultural programs it is seeking to attain the objectives of the Third Option. This pursuit will have to be judged on its merits — that is, as to its real effectiveness; but, for the moment, we may consider it a perfect illustration of how diplomacy can make use of culture.

We said earlier that, at another level cultural diplomacy could pursue the object of contributing to the cultural development of the country. This is, in general, the stated object of international cultural programs, and the one that serves to justify the increasingly high costs of these programs. Sending a theatre company abroad will enable it to gain broader experience

*Cultural
diplomacy
and political
objectives*

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and to meet a different public and different critics — and such an operation is, of course, also a means of enhancing the government's prestige. Participation in a book fair will enable national writers to become better known and will help publishers sell their products more widely. There is therefore, a continuity in many respects between domestic and international cultural policies, because the notion of "cultural development" is one that modern governments are beginning to use more and more in their social and economic planning projects.

Ambiguities

Back of this notion, however, lie several ambiguities, the most fundamental being in the idea of culture itself. Is the sole purpose to develop, in a given society, the sector of "cultural activities", which in its current definition would include education, the fine arts, literature, music, dance, handicrafts and so on? Or is it rather to develop what could be called, for want of a better term, the "total culture" of a society, the things that distinguish it from other societies? The problem appears simple in homogeneous societies. In multinational societies and in certain federal systems it is more complex. In particular, it involves power relations between cultures. The problem also arises in questions of assistance to developing countries. An important component of this assistance is cultural; for example, the export of educational techniques or institutions may have an effect on the total culture of the countries receiving the assistance. Although it may be granted in all sincerity, and very effectively, under the name of "cultural activities", such assistance may prove disastrous to cultural development, understood here in its most profound sense, which is, in fact, synonymous with national development.

Let us make one final remark on the above topic. Cultural diplomacy is often understood as the sum of the bilateral activities of a state in this field. In our day, this idea corresponds less and less to reality. A substantial part of cultural diplomacy is carried out within the framework of multilateral organizations such as the Commonwealth and the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, but there is not always an awareness that this is an important element of cultural diplomacy. Indeed, if cultural diplomacy is not merely to "sell" national culture but is also to support other cultures and to engage in exchanges with them, an administrative and political conception must



be formulated that will make it possible to integrate the various aspects of government activity in this field. And, in particular, the economic and political motivations underlying this multilateral activity will have to be resolutely assessed, just as can be done for bilateral diplomacy, using the approach we began to outline above.

These very brief definitions having been offered, it is easier to understand the difficulties that arise in formulating the cultural diplomacy of a country like Canada. We wish at this point to make a critical analysis of some of these difficulties, for no other purpose than to stimulate some preliminary reflections in an area of foreign-policy analysis in which research is still limited, in Canada as elsewhere.

Developed countries

In general, Canada's cultural diplomacy has been aimed chiefly at what are commonly called the developed countries — that is, those of the European tradition, whether they be in the East or the West. Cultural policies — often indirect in character — with regard to the developing countries have been formulated chiefly under the heading of international aid. A definite choice, of course, underlies this attitude — the Canadian Government feels that Canadian culture must first of all be "accredited" with those countries that have already "arrived" culturally. It is the choice of a country with a "complex", which seeks approval from a certain international public. There is internationally the same snobbery and conformity as domestically with regard to art and culture; a few middle class regrets that it does not possess the same instruments of cultural prestige as London and New York. It is significant that the largest Canadian cultural centre abroad is in Paris; we have yielded to a fashion that is pleasing to the élites of the country in their desire for cultural respectability.

But other choices would have been possible if the Government had decided, in particular, to direct its already limited resources for cultural purposes towards those countries that could enrich Canadian culture with genuinely new — that is, essentially non-Western — contributions. Such a decision would have been all the more warranted because the transnational cultural exchanges between Canada and the Western nations were already very highly developed. Of course, cultural diplomacy would need to be based on quite another philosophy: instead of seeking, in the spirit of narrow nationalism, to "sell" Canadian culture as though it were a

CANDU reactor, we should be trying to expose this culture to influences that would propel it along new paths.

But such a choice is possible only if the Federal Government has the means to modify internal cultural development. This is questionable, in spite of the attempts by Ottawa to secure a dominant role in this field through organizations like the Canada Council. Basically (because the Federal Government does not, in fact, have the power to act at certain levels, such as in secondary education and in social-development groups, which fall more under the jurisdiction of the provinces), it can, in the final analysis, work only with certain élites. It has no means, therefore, of carrying out a broad, co-ordinated cultural program. In other words, the Canadian Government is incapable of formulating cultural policies as a coherent whole in which international activity would support internal development policies.

Weak diplomacy

Canada's cultural diplomacy is, therefore, somewhat weak and may for a long time be neither truly effective abroad nor useful in satisfactorily planning the country's cultural resources. It will only be what to a great extent it is now — a "prestigious gadget". Further, the situation may become more serious as the provinces draw up valid cultural policies of their own and give these policies an international dimension, as some have begun to do. It will then not be sufficient for the Department of External Affairs to base its cultural diplomacy on the simple assumption that it must do what the other Western governments are doing. The special nature of this diplomacy will have to be thought out more thoroughly.

There is another assumption that makes it difficult to define and implement an international cultural policy in Canada: the idea that there is a "Canadian" culture that it is diplomacy's role to display in the market-place of arts and ideas abroad. This Canadian culture exists only in the imagination of a few government officials and politicians who have no contact with the realities of the country. Anyone in touch with the institutions and the scientists, thinkers and artists who are creating Canada's culture sees very quickly that this country is, in fact, founded on two original cultures, those of English Canada and Quebec, whose differences are growing from year to year in all fields, whatever the proponents of an emasculated multiculturalism may daydream about. Yet all Canada's cultural diplomacy — in spite of

*Situation
may become
more serious*

its protestations of adherence to bilingualism — is based on the tacit denial of this duality. On the contrary, it seeks to project the image of a single large, distinct cultural entity that justifies the “political” existence of Canada. There is nothing more depressing, for example, than the atmosphere of the Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris, where any Quebecer feels immediately that the Quebec artistic activities represented there have somehow been “asepticized” for this “Canadian” exhibition. This is one of the obstacles to an effective and credible cultural diplomacy, and will be a greater one in the future unless the federal designers and planners show more imagination. In particular, they will have to make a distinction between the total culture of Canada and support for cultural activities. As for the total culture of Quebec, it is hard to imagine how any government but that of Quebec could take real charge of it, nationally and internationally.

Canadian studies

These remarks also apply to the programs of Canadian studies abroad. It may be too early to make a definitive evaluation of these programs, but we can already point out some of their deficiencies. Let us start with the focus of these programs, the academic world. The mere fact that it is the Federal Government alone, without the provinces, that originated these programs removes any credibility from the initiative. How can one believe that Ottawa’s political and ideological leanings will not have an influence on the nature of such programs? Is it likely that university authorities abroad, receiving large sums for the purpose of carrying out these activities, will agree to introduce elements that run counter to federal policies? How can one hope that Quebec’s political dimension will be represented therein in any meaningful way? In fact, the entire atmosphere of these programs, in both French-speaking and English-speaking foreign universities, tends to minimize one of the problems of greatest interest in the study of Canada abroad — the problem of Quebec and its various reverberations in Canadian life. The governmental origin of some of these programs, their clearly political purpose, and their inevitably propagandist nature (no matter how subtle and indirect the propaganda) cast doubt on their serious significance.

Lastly, what is to be understood by “Canadian studies”? Politics, literature, life in society? What foreign university can hope to cover all these dimensions of

Canada in a coherent program? Even if these studies are restricted to the field of the social sciences, such a survey of Canada is rarely attempted even in Canadian universities. Is it not somewhat futile to seek to impose it on others? Moreover, in most cases, the universities that accredit these programs do not have the basic documentary resources that would enable them to ensure high-quality teaching. One may wonder what, besides propaganda, is the aim of such programs.

One can also ask how fitting it is to involve foreign students in studies of Canada when these studies are still so little developed at home. For example, on a subject that most often interests students abroad, at least those in the social sciences, is Canadian foreign policy. Research and publications in this field are still so scarce that one wonders whether it would not be preferable to use the resources invested in the Canadian studies program abroad to develop this particular field of study within Canada for Canadian researchers. The same question could probably apply to other fields of Canadian studies.

Before seeking to evangelize the outside world, Canadians should rather attempt to explain themselves more convincingly to themselves. The vanity and pretensions underlying these programs bear no relation to the academic performance of Canadians in the study of their own country. This in itself reveals clearly the purely political nature of the operation, which was not based on a clear assessment of what we wished to, and were able to, export. Other formulas exist, more authentically academic, more useful and also more effective from the scientific point of view, to induce universities abroad to contribute to the development of the field of Canadian studies.

Other aims or other methods of Canadian cultural diplomacy could be studied from the same critical point of view. One could look, for example, at the aim of using cultural policies as one of the instruments for carrying out the Third Option; it seems to us that there is a great deal of naïveté in this area. We could also speak of the diplomatic personnel assigned to these tasks, of the specific training they receive, of their linguistic origins, and so on. For the moment, we feel it is sufficient to point out the importance of entering this new sector of Canadian diplomacy with a concern for reaching beyond governmental conformity, and beyond the nationalistic and ethnocentric complacency of the intellectual circles that often support the initiatives of the state in this field.

Evaluating Syria's objectives in its Lebanese intervention

by Ibrahim Hayani

After 19 months of bloody civil war and more than 50 failed ceasefire agreements, Lebanon finally emerged with hopes that the nightmare might be over.

Human losses since the war started in April 1975 have been estimated at 45,000 dead and 200,000 wounded — representing 1 per cent of the country's population. Physical destruction is equally staggering, though hardly surprising for a war of such violence and complexity, which saw the indiscriminate shelling of residential and commercial sectors of densely-populated cities. Sources close to President Sarkis have estimated total physical damage at \$3,000 million, not including losses from fire and looting in Beirut's port warehouses. Lost income and revenue since April 1975, plus estimated losses of income over the next three years, are put at \$9,000 million.

No less important are the political developments. Although, on the face of it, little seems to have changed, with leftists and rightists still vying for power and neither faction in a position to impose its will on the other, the political reality now is very different from what it was a year ago. To begin with, both left and right are considerably weaker, if only because the military supremacy of a Syrian-dominated peacekeeping force 30,000 strong has cowed the warring factions into respecting its commands.

The regime of ex-President Sulaiman Franjiya (who formally handed over power on September 23, though he had lost effective control long before then) was replaced by that of President Elias Sarkis. Franjiya, criticized for his stubbornness and his open sympathy for the Christian right-wing parties, was never able to win the confidence of the Moslem left. Franjiya repeatedly accused "international Communism" of being responsible for events in Lebanon, and accused the Libyans of intervention in Lebanon. In elections that took place on May 8, 1976, amidst fierce selling and leftist complaints that Syrian pressure had made the outcome a foregone conclusion, Sarkis first emerged as "Syria's

man". But, although he still owes much of his authority to the continued military and political support of the Damascus regime, his impartial and energetic pursuit of national reconstruction has revived much of his credibility as a tough and independent President.

Many Lebanese, disillusioned with their traditional *zaaims* and weary of the insecurity and political stagnation that have plagued Lebanon since the late Sixties, are pleased to see a technocrat (even a Syrian-backed one) in power. Most are equally delighted with the eight-man Cabinet of Salim al-Hoss, formed on December 9, which is dominated by young professionals none of whom have had any part in the politico-sectarian feuding of the past. Even the prospect of some loss of traditional freedoms (including freedom of the press), under a President known as a close adviser to President Fuad Chehab in the days when the Deuxième Bureau kept a careful watch on affairs, seems a small price to pay for the return of security and stability.

The bewildering and often incomprehensible political and military developments that occupied the bulk of 1976 revolved largely round Syria's attempts at political mediation, which were quickly followed by armed intervention. Syrian "shuttle" diplomacy, led by Foreign Minister Abdel-Halim Khaddam at the outset of the year, resulted in a peace formula based on a list of political reforms that embraced many leftist demands while pacifying the rightists by preserving the

Small price for return of security and stability

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confessional distribution of top government posts. This document included a pledge by all parties, guaranteed by Syria, to implement the Cairo agreement of 1969, which regulated the activities of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Short-lived peace

The peace was of short duration. Tension soon reappeared over the problem of the Lebanese army, which seemed on the point of disintegration after splitting into factions. The crises came with the announcement of a military takeover by Brigadier-General Aziz al-Ahdab, who demanded, among other things, the resignation of President Franjiya. Though allegedly aimed at reuniting the army, Ahdab's movement had the opposite effect, since it was opposed by factions loyal to Franjiya, and supported by the leftist Lebanese Arab Army under the command of Colonel Ahmad al-Khatib. Khatib's army shelled the Presidential palace at Baabda, and Franjiya was forced to flee to the Christian stronghold of Jounieh. While this conflict completed the *de facto* partition of the country and all its institutions, it also heralded a new Syrian initiative — this time military.

Until late March, the balance of military power seemed to lie with the leftists and the Palestinians, but when, in April, the Syrians began a series of military pushes into Lebanon, an operation described by the Palestinians as another "Black September", the balance began to shift slowly. Syrian pressure on the leftists enabled right-wing militias to overrun the Palestinian camps of Jisr al-Pasha (on June 30) and Tal al-Zaatar (on August 12, after a 52-day siege). Despite cries of dissent from Cairo, Baghdad and Benghazi, it became clear that the Syrians were happy to see Palestinian power in Lebanon confined by the rightists. Efforts to mediate between the Syrians and Palestinians during June and July had repeatedly failed to achieve any conclusive results.

Yet it would be unfair to say that the Syrians had intervened in Lebanon to crush the Palestinians. It has been suggested that the aim was, rather, to pressure them into a more conciliatory attitude *vis-à-vis* both the Lebanese crisis and the Arab-Israeli dispute. In any event, the battle experiences of the Syrians with the Palestinians (notably in Sidon, where the Syrians lost a tank unit in an early attempt to occupy the city) made them aware that an all-out offensive against the Palestinians would be militarily costly as

well as politically hazardous. For by the stage Egypt, which had been attacked by Syria for signing a second Sinai disengagement agreement with Israel, was mobilizing Arab opinion against the Damascus regime's intervention in Lebanon. It soon became clear to all the Arab governments that, by serving as a battleground for inter-Arab differences, the Lebanese crisis was threatening to destroy any remaining semblance of Arab unity.

Perhaps this fear more than anything else induced Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to set in motion a diplomatic effort for a joint Arab peace effort in Lebanon. The summit meetings in Riyadh (October 17-18) and in Cairo (October 25-26) that resulted from these efforts after considerable procrastination — not least by Syria, which was by then in the middle of a major offensive against leftist forces in the south of Lebanon and in the mountains east of Beirut — were hailed by all parties as very successful. By winning Arab blessing, the Syrian presence in Lebanon was converted into an effective peacekeeping force, acceptable to all parties, and soon put an end to hostilities by spreading itself over all the country's battle-zones. Apart from this immediate effect on Lebanon's security, the summit meetings also succeeded in salvaging, indeed strengthening, Arab unity — mainly through a *rapprochement* between Egypt and Syria.

Policy motivation

While the conflict between the Lebanese right and left is a reflection of many longstanding contradictions within Lebanese society, the conflict between Syria and the Palestine resistance movement calls for other explanations. The question here is what has motivated the Syrian policy in Lebanon during the recent crisis? Without the benefit of hindsight, and exposed to all the pitfalls of speculation, one can merely suggest several factors that may partly account for the present Syrian policy both in Lebanon and towards the resistance. These are political role, security and religious minorities.

The first factor accounting for Syrian policy in Lebanon is Syria's image of its role in inter-Arab politics. Syria was traditionally viewed by the two major Arab power-centres — Cairo and Baghdad — as a political prize to be won. Each tried to entice Damascus to join one form of alliance or another. However, Syria currently perceives itself as a major Arab power centre, to be reckoned with. It has always viewed Lebanon as within its sphere of influence. Syria is determined to prevent the establishment in Lebanon of

radical political system composed of Palestinians and leftist Lebanese supported by Libya and Iraq. Furthermore, it is equally determined to see that a stable, friendly and viable political system is established in Lebanon.

In this context, Lebanon becomes a test of Syria's ability to play a major role in inter-Arab politics. As was noted by the prominent French journalist Eric Rouleau: "A close analysis of the various forms of Syria's intervention reveals a striking perseverance on the part of the Ba'athist leaders in pursuit of their objectives: establishing a balance of forces between the two opposing camps, which would confer on the Syrians the role of arbiter, and thus, also, a decisive influence in Lebanon; or at least preventing the rise to power in Beirut of a Lebanese leftist organization more radical than the Syrian Ba'athists;"

So complex were the difficulties faced by Syria in Lebanon that at times it seemed impossible, even probable, that intervention would end disastrously. From the first commitment of ground forces — in the form of the Palestine Liberation Army — in January to the Riyadh summit meeting in October, the position of President Asad was dangerously isolated. Relations with Egypt were broken off, Iraq moved five divisions to the Syrian border, there was heavy fighting in June between the Palestinians and Syrian units, and the Soviet Union, in the past Syria's main backer, gambled at the new direction taken by Assad's policies.

There was, in addition, the expense of the war in Lebanon. This was estimated at \$12-15 million (\$3.3-4.1 million) a day, on top of which there were the strain and cost of supporting up to a million Lebanese who had fled to Syria. The intervention in Lebanon was also the reason for the timing of the closure of the old Iraq Petroleum Company oil pipeline, from which Syria had received substantial transit fees and supplies of cheap oil. Instead, Syria was forced to take Saudi Arabian oil at the market price. Nevertheless, by the end of last year, President Asad's manoeuvres had been brought to a successful conclusion. A minimum of 27,000 Syrian troops were operating in Lebanon, under the fiat of the Arab League, their presence legitimized by the Riyadh and Cairo meetings. The rift with Egypt was closed and Iraqi troops pulled back from the border.

The second factor influencing Syria's policy in Lebanon is the altered perception of its security *vis-à-vis* the Israelis since the signing of the Sinai agreement. Henry

Kissinger's Sinai diplomatic initiatives, as viewed by Damascus, aimed at further fragmenting the already divided Arab world by removing Egypt from the conflict and consequently leaving Syria to face the Israelis alone.

Syrian refusal to negotiate an agreement with Israel put it in a position whereby it would have to counter Kissinger's moves on both the local and regional fronts. On the local front, Syria has tried to avoid giving Israel any pretext to intervene in Lebanon. It was feared in Damascus that Palestinian and leftist military successes would inevitably lead to both a partition of the country and unrestricted PLO activities against Israel through southern Lebanon. Either one of these two developments would give Israel an invitation to invade Lebanon on the pretext of destroying commando bases or protecting a "mini-Christian" state. This possibility was underscored by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin:

The central military factor in Lebanon today is the Syrian army, and they are interested in preserving calm with Israel to avoid giving her an excuse to intervene. But we must be alert to the situation.

Such an Israeli move northward would expose the Syrian western flanks and open the way to Damascus and the encirclement of the Syrian army on the Golan.

On the regional front, Syria had to counter Kissinger's attempt to isolate it. The more Kissinger persisted in his efforts to force Syria to follow in Egypt's footsteps or else face Israeli military might alone, the more determined Syria became to frustrate his plans. Thus it was no accident that, just as Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy in March 1975, Asad proposed a joint Syrian-Palestinian command. Furthermore, Kissinger's resumption of shuttle diplomacy in August 1975 coincided with the formation of the Syrian-Jordanian Supreme Political Command.

However, be that as it may, it would be fair to assume that the Syrians would not have invaded Lebanon without indications that the U.S. (and, by implication, Israel) would put up no opposition. Former U.S. President Ford said Syria's intervention had improved Middle East peace prospects; his press secretary, Ron Nessen, also praised Syria's actions: "If you look at the nature and intent of what Syria is doing in Lebanon, overall they've played a constructive role". The U.S. was instrumental in persuading the Israelis that the Syrian intervention was in the best interests of both Israel and the U.S. Dr. Kissinger himself described the role of the

Syrian attempts to counter isolation by Kissinger

U.S. as that of an "honest broker" passing on "our impressions" on Israeli policy to the Syrians and Syrian policy to the Israelis.

Minorities

The third factor influencing Syria's policy in Lebanon concerns religious minorities. President Asad, in justifying his support for the conservative Christians, noted:

There is no risk of alienating the Lebanese Moslems, who by nature, conviction and interest are committed to the Arab cause. With respect to the Maronites, who are traditionally oriented towards and await their salvation from the West, our duty is to fully integrate them into the Arab nation. To reach this objective it is useful that an Arab, Moslem country, such as Syria, undertake to protect them.

President Asad might have also been thinking of the one million Christians living in Syria, who might be apprehensive about developments in Lebanon, owing to their experiences at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many Christian Arabs view the conflict as a confrontation between Moslem forces striving for dominance and Christian forces struggling for survival. Mindful of these apprehensions, Syria wants to avoid the appearance that it is supporting Moslem forces against Christian communities in Lebanon. Such an appearance would be unsettling to the Syrian Christians.

Though these factors — political role, security and religious minorities — are important and shed some light on the conflict, they fail fully to explain the causes for the confrontation between Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Beyond these factors lies a major dispute between the two that centres round Syria's insistence on maintaining as many options as possible in dealing with Israel, while the PLO insists on the existence of only one option. It is felt in Damascus that, if Syria's options are to be preserved, the power of the PLO will have to be curbed. A strong and independent PLO in control of all or part of Lebanon would have precipitated a PLO-Israeli confrontation, probably escalating into a Syrian-Israeli confrontation at a time not of Syria's choosing. As viewed by Syria, a commitment to the Palestinian cause is one thing, but for the PLO to determine Syria's options in the conflict is another matter entirely.

For Syria, there are three options: first, a political settlement with Israel; second, a military confrontation; and third,

preserving the *status quo* of 'no-war, no peace' until further notice. The first option is causing tension not only between the Syrians and the Palestinians, but between one group of Arab states, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and another led by Libya and Iraq. This option was articulated by Asad on numerous occasions. In his celebrated interview with *Newsweek* on March 3, 1975, he said: "If the Israelis return to the 1967 frontier and the West Bank and Gaza becomes a Palestinian state — the last obstacle to a final settlement will have been removed."

It should be noted here, however, that Asad's office issued a statement claiming that *Newsweek* had misquoted him on Syrian readiness to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. On the other hand, recent developments indicate that the Palestine Liberation Organization is quietly dropping its demand for the replacement of Israel by a "secular democratic state" and redefining its objective as an Arab Palestine on the West Bank and in Gaza. Furthermore, in their present "peace offensive", the Arab leaders most involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict are asking for the reconvening of the Geneva Middle East peace conference to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the framework of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. President Sadat of Egypt went so far as to suggest his readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel in the 1967 war and his agreement to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.

Nonetheless, the first option of political settlement with Israel remains unfeasible at present owing to one crucial factor — under the prevailing conditions it is unacceptable to both the PLO and the Israelis.

Chance of conflict

The less the first option appears feasible, the more likely that the second option — military confrontation — will occur. The confrontation, in view of the PLO's insistence on the "secular democratic" formula, is the only feasible option. Although there is a consensus between Syria and the PLO regarding the importance of this option, the cost of such a confrontation, as viewed by both, contributes to the disagreement between them. From the Palestinian perspective, the costs for the continuation of the conflict, as noted by a top PLO official, are as follows:

We do not have anything to lose. We have been fighting since the beginning of this century. We can, if need be, fight for another two centuries....

*Conflict viewed
as confrontation
between Moslems
and Christians*

can afford four or five further defeats, like the one the Arabs suffered in June 1967. In a way, this would revitalize the Palestinian camp.

Different calculations

However, Syrian calculations differ radically from those of the Palestinians. If this option is to be credible, the Syrians would have to be militarily prepared to face its consequences. For the Syrians, future wars will be far costlier than past ones. In addition to the incalculable human destruction, the Syrians feel that the destruction of their vulnerable infrastructure — partly if not entirely — is a foregone conclusion. They are aware of the fact that the Israeli military doctrine aims first and foremost at knocking out both Syria's armed forces and infrastructure. These objectives were succinctly articulated by none other than General Dayan during the October War:

We want to make a supreme, productive and effective effort to get Syria out of the war. . . . In order to achieve this, we want to hit them at two levels: first of all, to destroy the forces they sent here. . . . The second part concerns Syria itself. . . . The war should cost Syria so dearly that they will regret what they did. . . . If there is a war, then the Syrians must pay a heavy price for it. We did it today, hitting Syria itself — economic and military targets, power stations, oil installations, army camps, air fields, and also civilian economic targets.

Despite these ominous threats, President Ahd has asserted that:

If Israel remains obstinate and refuses to give up what does not belong to it, it

seems rather obvious to everyone that the Middle East will be heading for war once again. After all, that's what the October War was all about — the liberation of occupied Arab lands. If there isn't complete withdrawal and the occupation continues, we shall have conditions not for peace but for a new war — or the same conditions that prevailed prior to the October War.

However, the apparent elimination of the Western front, coupled with the present deployment of the Syrian army and the prevalent "moderate mood" of most Arab leaders, would not lend support to the pursuit of a policy of military confrontation on the part of Syria.

The unfeasibility of the first two options leads one to conclude that "no-war, no-peace" is at present the only option available. In fact, this has been, and will continue to be, the only option — even though it has been interrupted at times by either a flurry of diplomatic initiatives giving rise to hopes of a just settlement or by the outbreak of hostilities casting a long shadow on men's will to deal with their problems. There will be future diplomatic flurries. As a case in point, on January 25, President Carter announced that he would send Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to six countries in the Middle East during February "to seek new co-operation for a peaceful settlement". There will also, unfortunately, be future outbreaks of hostilities. But one cannot escape the conclusion that there will be a state of "no-war, no-peace" in the Middle East for many years to come. Perhaps the world is destined to live with this tragic conflict indefinitely.

*No support
for policy
of military
confrontation*

Coming in the next issue

F. A. Manor, senior editorial writer of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, argues that the time has come for Canada to abandon her peace-keeping role that has been but one long litany of woes".

Glen Buick, director of the Consular Policy Division in External Affairs, tells of Canadians in trouble abroad and how consular policy is designed to help. From Marrakech, where "a young Canadian marijuana-fancier languishes in jail", to San José, where another has lost all his money and his bus ticket to Managua, Nicaragua", the impera-

tive of the consular officer is "to afford protection and assistance to Canadian nationals".

Member of Parliament Doug Roche writes of his political profession: "When I see a political party — or even a politician — running for office on a platform and strategy to end world hunger in the next ten years, to provide every human being with clean water by 1990, to implement a housing program which will provide a decent shelter for every family in the world, then my own faith in modern politics will be renewed."

Assessment of Ramphal at Commonwealth Secretariat

By Derek Ingram

The Commonwealth's second Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, is moving towards the middle period of his five-year term, and the eve of the first heads-of-government conference (scheduled for London in June 1977) to be serviced under his direction is an appropriate moment to attempt some preliminary assessment of the Secretariat as it has developed since he took over.

Commonwealth countries chose wisely when they appointed Mr. Ramphal; nothing that has happened since has given reason to doubt that. Governments were right to pick a man of as much energy and initiative as his predecessor, Arnold Smith; it would have been disappointing if they had fallen back on a bureaucratic caretaker and allowed the Secretariat to run out of steam. There is no such danger with Mr. Ramphal.

It has also been important that the Commonwealth machinery should now be run by a man from one of the smallest and poorest of Commonwealth Third World countries; just as it made sense that the first Secretary-General came from a rich nation that carried political "clout".

The Secretariat has not changed direction under Mr. Ramphal. There has been a healthy continuity in mainstream policy. When Mr. Smith left office, the Commonwealth was already positioning itself in a wider global context. Having emerged from a period when it was concerned mainly with its own survival, the Commonwealth now had to step outside its boundaries as much as possible and to act in unison with, and complement, other international bodies and groupings.

Mr. Smith had always worked in this direction; during his ten years, the Secre-

tariat began to build a Commonwealth observer presence at conferences of UN agencies such as the World Health Organization and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). He quietly made his links with the European Economic Commission and those involved in the Yaoundé Convention, and the invitation to the tenth birthday celebration of the Organization of African Unity was a recognition by that body of the value of links with the Secretariat.

But for much of Mr. Smith's term the times were not propitious for these developments. The Commonwealth was still looked upon by the international community as having undertones of neo-colonialism; it took time for non-Commonwealth countries to assess how genuine was the change that had taken place in the nature of the Commonwealth. The appointment of Mr. Ramphal, a popular and respected Third World politician, in itself pushed the point home. The moment had come for the Commonwealth to develop a more robust, outward-looking policy, and at the end of the conference in Kingston in May 1973, the heads of government gave the Secretary-General elect just the direction he needed.

Their communiqué contains no fewer than 13 references to Commonwealth support for the work of the UN and its agencies — on Cyprus, on the Indian Ocean, on Belize, on Southern Africa, on the "New International Economic Order" and on industrial co-operation.

Experts Group

The idea of setting up the Commonwealth Experts Group to work out a program of practical measures directed at closing the gap between the rich and the poor was that it should be of service to the international community. The Group's eyes were turned on the UN seventh special session, UNCTAD IV and beyond. It was to provide recommendations not just for Commonwealth governments but as possible "input" for the Group of 77, the n-

Bureaucratic caretaker would have been disappointment

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ained movement, and what became the North-South dialogue. The Commonwealth being a cross-section of the world's countries that were able to work on a relatively informal basis among themselves, it might, the argument went, come up with suggestions for solving some of these world problems from which all would benefit. What was good for the global community must be good for the Commonwealth countries too.

Major theme

Thus the Commonwealth began to take an active part in the search for a new international economic order, and this is likely to remain a main theme in its affairs for many years to come. From the outset, Mr. Ramphal was personally involved. As Foreign Minister of Guyana, in which capacity he attended the Kingston conference, he had helped formulate the Caribbean case for a new order; now, in the Kingston communiqué, it was said that as Secretary-General elect he should be associated as early as possible with the work of the Group.

When the ten experts first met in Ottawa under the chairmanship of Mr. Aster McIntyre, Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community, Mr. Ramphal reminded them that the heads of government had envisaged that their recommendations would be global in scope. Again, when they met in London last December, he said "our Commonwealth was conceived not to usurp, not to divert but to reinforce, not to diminish but to supplement, the international effort" for the creation of a new order.

If the two reports of the Experts Group so far produced are not spectacular in content, they are nonetheless valuable, level-headed documents, which were received with respect at the UN and at UNCTAD; it would have helped if the reports had gone forward with more solid support from the Commonwealth's four developed countries, but their prevarication was indicative of the rich world's position on the new order.

The promise of the seventh session, which reached agreement on mechanisms for achieving a new order, was not fulfilled, for the world has moved back towards disorder. The third, and definitive, report of the Experts Group will be ready to form a basis for debate at the London summit meeting. The moment will be critical, since by then the outcome of the North-South dialogue and the first round of the UNCTAD talks on a Common Fund will be known. The prospects are not good, and the London meeting may be marked by

expressions of frustration from the developing countries that after two years of talking nothing much has happened.

Another report before the summit meeting will contain preliminary suggestions from the 11-man Team of Commonwealth Industrial Specialists for co-operation on industrial development. The need for measures "to promote the processing of primary commodities in their places of origin and the removal of barriers to trade in processed primary commodities and other manufactured goods" was expressed in the Kingston communiqué as a result of ideas put forward by Mr. Trudeau and President Nyerere of Tanzania. Mr. Ramphal assembled the team in London last January under the chairmanship of Mr. L. K. Jha, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir and formerly Indian Ambassador in Washington. With highly-industrialized countries like Britain and Canada and others, such as India and Nigeria, having considerable industrial capability, the Commonwealth is seen as containing the right ingredients to provide advice on the development of the weaker countries. Again, the work of the team is not an exclusive Commonwealth operation, and representatives of UNIDO and UNCTAD attended the opening talks.

On the economic side, the most spectacular and solid success of the Commonwealth Secretariat in the past few years has been the development of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. When it was launched in 1971, the idea was viewed with such scepticism by some Commonwealth countries that one or two of them, notably Australia, would not take part. Today it is unanimously acknowledged to be a "winner". This year the Fund is up to £8 million, and the problem is to keep pace with the requests for help. Outside agencies have watched its success with envy. The *francophone* Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation has begun to set up an organization modelled on the CFTC, and it would not be surprising if others tried to follow in the years to come.

Diplomatic efforts

In the 12 years of its existence, the Secretariat has never managed to achieve a major diplomatic success, but this has not been for lack of trying. Mr. Ramphal's efforts in this direction have already been substantial — particularly in regard to Southern Africa. With good reason, the Secretariat had quickly involved itself in Mozambique and Namibia. The Lisbon *coup* of 1974 was crucially important to the Rhodesian situation and to the three

*Commonwealth
Fund for Technical
Co-operation*

neighbouring Commonwealth countries — Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi. Mr. Smith had made early contact with Mr. Soares, then Portugal's Foreign Minister, and with Samora Machel's FRELIMO movement.

At Kingston, the Commonwealth pledged financial and other help to Mozambique so that it could impose sanctions and tighten the squeeze on the Smith regime. The Secretariat acted with speed; a sanctions committee meeting set up a special fund to be administered by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, and Mr. Ramphal offered Commonwealth help to the UN Secretary-General. When a United Nations team undertook a reconnaissance to Maputo, a key member was Gordon Goundrey of Canada, from the CFTC. This team was followed by Emeka Anyaoku (Nigeria), the Assistant Secretary-General, and John Syson (Britain), one of Mr. Ramphal's personal assistants. Later Mr. Ramphal visited Machel. All this activity made its impact on the Mozambique Government, which had hitherto looked on the Commonwealth with some suspicion.

Commonwealth help to Mozambique did not get under way as fast as had been hoped, largely because of difficulty in assessing the Mozambique Government's actual requirement, but two useful operations are now being carried out — help in developing the port of Maputo and the despatch of a medical team from Ghana of nurses, doctors and transport drivers paid for from the special fund, which now stands not far short of its £1-million target.

On Namibia, the Secretariat has worked closely with the Zambian Government and the Council of Namibia Office in Lusaka, a notable achievement to date being the placing of refugee Namibian children in schools in Commonwealth countries, mainly in Ghana.

A Commonwealth diplomatic effort of a different nature has occurred on Cyprus. At Kingston it was decided that a Commonwealth committee should help towards implementing the UN General Assembly resolutions on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus. The move was welcomed by President Makarios, but not by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Denktash, who cold-shouldered it. When Mr. Ramphal visited Cyprus, he saw Denktash as well as Makarios — something of a breakthrough — and it seems possible now that, before the London summit meeting, the committee will have visited Cyprus, met both sides, and submitted a report. Nothing has been done without full consultation with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who sees the Commonwealth moves

as strengthening his own hand in solving the problem.

The most significant development in the move towards an outward-looking Commonwealth was the decision by the UN General Assembly last autumn to grant the Secretariat observer status — a proposal made by Singapore and seconded by Australia and Nigeria. A few years ago such resolution would have been impossible to get through the Assembly; now it was accepted without a dissenting vote. When the Argentinian Ambassador, Mr. Pfirter, spoke, it was to say:

The Commonwealth Secretariat has made important contributions in the most varied fields, particularly in the socio-economic field, and we have no doubt that these positive contributions, which, in many cases, had direct repercussions on Latin America, will substantially increase with the new status of the Commonwealth Secretariat which it acquires today in the world forum.

The Commonwealth had now achieved international respectability. Mr. Waldheim, with whom Mr. Ramphal has developed a close relation, is known to be much impressed by the way it works. He admires the unstructured meetings it holds in private and without public statements. He wishes the UN could take a lesson from them and save itself from the endless "position" speeches delegates feel forced to make.

Crucial

In all these developments, Mr. Ramphal's personal diplomacy has been crucial. In the course of the first 18 months of his tenure, the new Secretary-General visited 22 Commonwealth countries, covering some 175,000 miles. This large amount of travelling has been particularly necessary in this period because, since the Kingston conference, there have been an exceptional number of changes of government in the Commonwealth. Whereas, between Ottawa and Kingston, there were only two changes (caused by the death of Norrie Kirk in Australia and Harold Wilson's return to power in Britain), in the past year and a half since Kingston, eight new heads of government have come to power, as the result of three deaths (one by assassination), one *coup* and four resignations: Fraser (Australia); Sayem (Bangladesh); Adams (Barbados), Callaghan (Britain); Hussein bin Onn (Malaysia); Obasanjo (Nigeria); Tanumalifi II (Western Samoa). (There are also two new members: Somare (Papua New Guinea) and Ian Cham (Seychelles).

For Ramphal it has been essential to establish a *rapprochement* with the governments of key countries like Nigeria, Australia and New Zealand. The swing to the right in the last two countries required visits to ensure that the warmer attitude to the Commonwealth that had developed underough Whitlam and Norman Kirk (and later Wallace Rowling) was maintained. The meeting of Cabinet officials in Canberra last May was particularly important in this context and its success made a favourable impression on the Fraser Government.

With New Zealand, a special effort had to be made because of the threat to the 1978 Commonwealth Games arising out of the All Blacks rugby tour of South Africa. Numerous meetings involving Canada, New Zealand, senior officials of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa and the Commonwealth Secretary-General resulted in a substantial effort by the New Zealand Government to dissuade its sportsmen from visiting South Africa and an African decision to lift the boycott.

Rhodesia

At the biggest diplomatic effort was on Rhodesia. If the Commonwealth and its Secretariat had not made much impact on the U.S. State Department before, they now did so. Ramphal and Kissinger have known each other for many years, and when Kissinger passed through London on his Southern Africa shuttle the two had long talks. Later, in the wake of Kissinger, Mr. Ramphal toured Africa talking to the front-line presidents.

When the Geneva conference was convened, Ramphal ordered that it should be the Secretariat's No. 1 priority. Mr. Ayaoku, who has made numberless visits to Africa over the years, discussing Rhodesia with heads of government, now went to Geneva as a Secretariat observer while Secretariat officials and outside experts were supplied, at the request of African nationalist delegations, as advisers.

The Secretariat was present at Geneva not to push a Commonwealth role for its own sake but to be available if negotiations developed in such a way as to involve Commonwealth help. The idea of a "Commonwealth presence" in Rhodesia dates back to the Ottawa heads-of-government conference in 1973, and several models have been worked on. "Presence" does not necessarily mean a military force; it could be a commission to ensure that any agreement is carried out properly by all sides and that fair elections are held, or a group of officers to help reorganize Rhodesia's armed forces. Or it might mean both or



Commonwealth's second Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, is shown meeting the press during his recent visit to Ottawa.

variants of both. More obviously, it would mean technical assistance on a considerable scale; already the Commonwealth's solid achievement in this field is the training of 2,500 Zimbabweans over the last ten years who are available to move back into Rhodesia and take over key posts after a settlement.

All parties involved in the Rhodesian problem now know that the Commonwealth is ready to participate if it is required. It is for Commonwealth countries to respond. Since no settlement is now likely by June, the subject will again be high on the summit agenda. Commonwealth leaders may have new ideas for further Commonwealth help.

So where does the Commonwealth Secretariat go from here? Ramphal's policy is to improve and expand its performance but not its size. His staff is at present about 300, and he has no plans to go above that. Rightly, he does not believe the Commonwealth wants a great bureaucracy. The Secretariat is effective because it retains mobility and flexibility of action; the CFTC has proved what leanly-run operation can achieve; the Commonwealth Foundation has done wonders with a staff that has only recently increased to nine.

Commonwealth is ready to participate in Rhodesia

What is important is the quality of the Secretariat staff. Governments must supply men and women of high capability; the Secretariat must not be seen as a body to which they can relegate people. Understandably, governments of developing countries find it especially hard to part with top civil servants; good men and women are in short supply. But the Secretariat is an investment for governments because of the experience it provides for staffs. One way of looking at it is that the Secretariat performs a service for member countries by offering up-and-coming government officials an experience that will make them better civil servants.

After an exhaustive examination of the working of the Secretariat, which he took in hand on taking office, Mr. Ramphal has not sought to make major changes in the basic working structure established by Arnold Smith. The one division that still needs more "muscle" is that dealing with information. Its impact is limited by the resources available to it; governments remain reluctant to acknowledge the vital importance of making the people of their countries more aware of the work of the Commonwealth. Every international organization faces this difficulty but, if the Commonwealth has gained credibility and respectability among the world's governments, it has still not done so with many of its own people.

Poor housing

One important aid to Secretariat efficiency would be a change in its housing. Marlborough House is a beautiful building but quite unsuitable for offices. Its rooms sprawl and, for perfectly good environmental reasons, cannot be structurally altered. But that is not the worst of it — the Secretariat does not have use of the whole building. The first floor is kept for British Government use and the offices of the Secretariat are scattered in five other locations in Westminster. One is on the opposite side of St. James's Park.

The host, the British Government, does not charge rent for Marlborough House but does so for all other offices, and this means unnecessary added expense for the Secretariat, as well as loss of efficiency. Yet the whole of Marlborough House, plus one annex, would be enough. Ideally, the Secretariat would be better off in a modern building somewhere else in Central London. Marlborough House does not exactly exude a modern Commonwealth image, and its positioning within what might be

termed a "British Establishment" enclave in Central London can give a misleading impression of the amount of influence the British Government might have over its activities. Yet London still seems the right place to house the Secretariat, since it is simply a busier diplomatic crossroads than any other Commonwealth capital.

The future of the Secretariat cannot be discussed without consideration of that perennial question of to what extent the Commonwealth should allow itself to become institutionalized. For many years the "conventional wisdom" was that any institutionalization would be fatal — that the Commonwealth was nothing if not a very informal association of nations that could make things up as it went along.

There were those who expressed grave doubts about its future when the Secretariat was born, and these doubts were repeated as the Secretariat seemed to be swelling apace. Today the doubts have gone, but the argument about how much institutionalization the Commonwealth can take is bound to be a continuing, unresolved, one.

Old magic

It is obvious that if the Commonwealth is to be of any value it has to perform useful, practical functions, and that these cannot be carried out without some central machinery. The old magic about the Commonwealth is that it has repeatedly shown that it can keep itself under control, evolving in a manner different from that of any other international body. It seems to work as others would like to work but cannot.

When it shows signs of becoming over-bureaucratized and formalized, the Commonwealth corrects itself; this happened at Singapore, when it suddenly found that there were too many officials and too many texts of speeches floating about for the health of heads-of-government meetings. If some practical proposals were to be accepted that required a new Commonwealth organization to administer it, then no one ought to be nervous; what must be ensured is that the new organization is as compact, flexible and informal, and leanly-run, as is humanly possible.

All the signs are that such a tradition is firmly implanted in the Commonwealth anyway. This is acknowledged by all Commonwealth governments to be the Commonwealth "style". It augurs well for the future.

*No attempt
to introduce
major changes*

Out of place . . .

£:

(Pages 34 and 35 of its November-December 1976 issue, *International Perspectives* published a criticism by Mr. P. Lyon of an article by Mr. M. Hurtig and the latter's response. I read and reread both the criticism and the rebuttal: unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that these gentlemen's comments do not belong in *International Perspectives*.

I recognize, of course, that these gentlemen are entitled to their own theories and ideas on what is best for the Canadian economy, even though their views may be poles apart. I also admit that they do not have to belong to a "mutual-admiration society" (the reader can sense that they don't, even though they express themselves in very polite terms). However, I absolutely and totally deny them the right to hurl their opposing opinions at one another through intermediaries. If these gentlemen do not like each other, that is their privilege, but for goodness' sake let them spare your readers, who have nothing to do with their sado-masochistic polemics. Doesn't *International Perspectives* try to maintain a high standard?

I should appreciate it if, in future, *International Perspectives* would avoid being used as a vehicle for such petty quarrels. After all, one economic interpretation is as good as another, since none of them is absolutely valid.

René Thibault

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Under this heading will be found a list of the most recent publications of the Department of External Affairs dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Department of External Affairs, Press Office, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa:

No. 8 (February 10, 1977) Trilateral agreement between Canada, Spain and the International Atomic Energy Agency

No. 9 (February 10, 1977) Signature of Canadian-U.S. agreement on Haines Road/Alaska Highway reconstruction.

No. 10 (February 18, 1977) Receipt of U.S. note announcing postponement of further action on Lonetree Reservoir (Garfield Diversion Unit).

No. 11 (February 21, 1977) Canadian teachers to work in People's Republic of China

No. 12 (February 21, 1977) Government response to report of International Joint Commission (IJC) on further regulation of Great Lakes.

No. 13 (February 22, 1977) Preparatory international conference on future of In-

national Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).

N 14 (February 24, 1977) Canada-U.S. reciprocal fisheries agreement—joint communiqué.

N 15 (March 1, 1977) Text of U.S. note of February 18, 1977, on Garrison Diversion Unit.

N 16 (March 4, 1977) Canadian delegation to the Seventh Commonwealth Education Conference, Accra, March 9-18, 1977.

N 17 (March 10, 1977) Text of statement by spokesman for Canadian Government at hearings of IJC on Garrison Diversion Unit, Winnipeg, March 10, 1977.

N 18 (March 14, 1977) Canadian representation at United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 14-25, 1977.

N 19 (March 29, 1977) Second meeting of the Club of Friends of the Sahel, Ottawa, May 30 - June 1, 1977.

N 20 (March 25, 1977) Appointment of Honorary Consul for Canada in Acapulco, Mexico.

N 21 (March 29, 1977) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to Mexico, April 24-28, 1977.

N 22 (March 25, 1977) Outcome of preparatory conference on future of ICNAF, Ottawa, March 14-24, 1977.

N 23 (March 29, 1977) Canada-Cuba fisheries negotiations, Ottawa, March 25 and 26, 1977—joint communiqué.

N 24 (March 29, 1977) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to Atlanta, Georgia, April 28 and 29, 1977.

N 25 (March 31, 1977) Visit of Mr. Dankoulo Dan Dicko, Secretary-General of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, Ottawa, April 1, 1977.

Reference Papers, published by the Information Services Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa:

N 25 The Commonwealth. (Revised April 1977)

Statements and Speeches, published by the Information Services Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa:

N 26/33 The Contractual Link: Why and How? A speech by Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Ambassador of Canada to the European Communities, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, November 24, 1976.

N 27/1 Canada and Brazil: Enormous Potential for Economic Co-operation. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in Brasilia, January 12, 1977.

No. 77/2 Japan—neither the Sword nor the Chrysanthemum. An address by Mr. Bruce Rankin, Ambassador of Canada to Japan, to the Empire Club of Toronto, March 10, 1977.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Dominica

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Dominica constituting an Agreement relating to Investments in Dominica insured by Canada through its Agent the Export Development Corporation

Bridgetown, Barbados, and Roseau, Dominica, February 4 and 17, 1977

In force February 17, 1977

France

Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic

Paris, June 15, 1976

In force provisionally, June 15, 1976

In force definitively, January 8, 1977

Grenada

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Grenada constituting an Agreement relating to Investments in Grenada insured by Canada through its Agent the Export Development Corporation

Bridgetown, Barbados, and St. George's, Grenada, February 8, 1977

In force February 8, 1977

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan constituting an Agreement concerning Textile Restraints

Ottawa, July 28, 1976

In force July 28, 1976

Terminated December 31, 1976

Mexico

Cultural Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Mexico

Mexico, January 25, 1976

In force provisionally January 25, 1976

In force definitively February 9, 1977

Montserrat

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Montserrat constituting an Agreement relating to Investments in Montserrat insured by Canada through its Agent the Export Development Corporation

Bridgetown, Barbados, and Plymouth, Montserrat, February 14 and 15, 1977

In force February 15, 1977

U.S.A.

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning Transit Pipelines

Washington, January 28, 1977

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reconstruction of Canadian Portions of the Alaska Highway
Ottawa, January 11 and February 11, 1977
In force February 11, 1977

Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to amend the Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, as amended
Washington, February 24, 1977

Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America
Washington, February 24, 1977

Treaty between Canada and the United States of America on the Execution of Penal Sentences
Washington, March 2, 1977

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement for the Establishment of an experimental Loran-C Power Chain in the Vicinity of the St. Mary's River in Ontario and Michigan
Washington, March 29, 1977
In force March 29, 1977, with effect from August 1, 1975

Multilateral


Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
Done at Washington, December 20, 1973
Signed by Canada February 10, 1977

Trilateral Safeguards Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada and Spain
Done at Vienna, February 10, 1977
In force February 10, 1977

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents
Done at New York, December 14, 1973
Signed by Canada June 26, 1974
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited August 4, 1976
In force for Canada February 20, 1977


Amendments to Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946
Done at Geneva May 22, 1973
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited June 14, 1974
In force for Canada February 3, 1977

Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Done at Washington, December 20, 1973
Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited March 9, 1977



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International Perspectives

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International Perspectives

Contents

July/August 1977

The hemisphere	
Canada and the Americas <i>James Guy</i>	3
Carter's opportunities and pitfalls/ <i>James Nelson Goodsell</i>	7
Environmental co-operation in CCMS/ <i>Patrick Kyba</i>	11
International development	
A politician's human terms/ <i>Douglas Roche</i>	15
Administrative look at transnationals/ <i>M. A. Crener and G. M. Hénault</i>	18
The consul's helping hand/ <i>Glen Buick</i>	23
Use against peacekeeping/ <i>F. S. Manor</i>	28
Use of the Left in France/ <i>J. M. Domenach</i>	32
Esurgent regionalism/ <i>A. W. Craig</i>	37
The 'littlest dominoes'/ <i>David Van Praagh</i>	42
Letters to the Editor	46
Reference section	48

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The growing relationship of Canada and the Americas

by James Guy

One of Pierre Elliott Trudeau's campaign promises during the 1968 election was to formulate a distinctive policy towards Latin America. Up to that time, Canada's relations with the countries of Latin America and the inter-American system were haphazard and disparate. No clear-cut policies toward these republics had been articulated by any Canadian Government. Indeed, much of the history of Canada's relations with Latin American countries reveals an *ad hoc* approach to inter-American affairs with no long-term policy direction or goals for Canada in the western hemisphere.

This does not mean that successive Canadian Governments before 1968 did not establish contacts with the Latin American republics. Mackenzie King opened diplomatic relations with six countries and signed the Inter-American Radio Agreement during the Second World War. Louis St. Laurent further increased Canada's diplomatic ties with the area and elevated some legations to embassies. During his years in office, a Canadian trade mission visited nine Latin American countries and Canada took part in the Pan-American Games for the first time in 1955, winning three gold medals.

The Government of John Diefenbaker established relations with nine more Latin American republics, all in 1961. Among other things, his Government created a Latin American Division in the Department of External Affairs, acquired membership in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and joined the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). During the Diefenbaker years, Canada's continued trade with Cuba in spite of the U.S. embargo demonstrated the Prime Minister's determination not to toe the line of American foreign policy in the western hemisphere. Lester B. Pearson's Government, in its turn, provided funds for Latin America by special arrangement in 1964. These funds, administered through the

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), initiated a "soft-loan" program designed primarily to facilitate Latin American development projects. This, however, proved to be the extent of Pearson's interest in advancing Canada's association with the nations south of the Rio Grande.

Throughout most of Canada's diplomatic history, the absence of a well-articulated set of policy goals towards Latin America was consistent with Canada's official determination to elevate its prestige and status by adopting a global orientation in the international system. Latin America and the co-ordinated inter-American system dominated by the United States failed to attract much Canadian interest. This was particularly evident in the postwar period, when Canada concentrated its external interests in the Commonwealth, the United Nations and NATO, and resisted opportunities to participate in hemispheric affairs. The problematical regional environment could not sustain the lofty international status for Canada envisaged by the makers of its foreign policy.

Reassessment needed

By 1968 it had become apparent to Prime Minister Trudeau that changing world conditions necessitated a complete reassessment of Canada's international role. The resulting review of traditional external ties laid the basis for a new promotional orientation in foreign policy, which, among other things, saw Canada cross the threshold into an expanded relation with the

Canada resisted opportunities to participate in hemispheric relations

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CP Photo

During his Latin American tour in January of this year, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson visited Brazil, Peru and Colombia. During the Brazilian leg of the trip, he signed an agreement between the two countries that opened the door for a joint venture in coal exploitation. Mr. Jamieson is shown here raising his glass to propose a toast following the signing ceremony.

nations of Latin America. The principal achievement of the Trudeau Government in this area has been to design a specific policy with long-term aspirations towards Latin America. The foreign policy review of 1968-1970 gave some recognition to the fact that Canada's external policies should appropriately reflect its own domestic aims, and that, in the new scheme of things, Canada should see itself primarily as a North American nation with a special role to play in the western hemisphere.

Mr. Trudeau's explicitly narrower focus on the world placed a greater emphasis on Canada's relations with the Latin American and Caribbean nations. The new policy was based mainly on the perception of trade advantages with Latin America. It was also based, however, on what became known as the "Third Option", a euphemism for Canada's aspirations for increased independence from the United States. The new direction was explicitly acknowledged in the Department of External Affairs booklet, *Foreign Policy for Canadians: Latin America*, which stated:

Closer relations with Latin American countries on a basis of mutual respect and reciprocal advantage would enhance

Canadian sovereignty and independence. Greater exposure to Latin American culture would enrich Canadian life. Increased trade with Latin America and judicious Canadian investment there would augment Canada's capacity to "pay its way" in the world. Similar closer dialogue with some of these countries about world problems could enhance Canada's capacity to play an independent role in international affairs.

At the administrative level, a Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, headed by a director-general, was established in External Affairs in 1971. One important feature of this new structure was the assurance it gave to Latin American nations that Canada intended to continue to increase its bilateral and multilateral ties with the countries of the region. The Bureau also added a dimension of predictability to Canada's Latin American policy, replacing the less-structured, non-anticipatory approaches of previous Canadian inter-American relations.

Step by step

The development since 1968 of a step-by-step association to the inter-American system has increased Canadian visibility in hemispheric affairs. At present Canada has membership in eight inter-American organizations, three of which are special bodies of the Organization of American States (OAS). A clear indication of the Government's intention of expanding participation in the inter-American system came in 1972 when full membership in the Inter-American Development Bank was acquired. Since the membership of the IDB is almost identical to that of the OAS, this new multilateral link provided an important testing-ground for gauging the degree of Canada's diplomatic influence in Latin America.

Canada's acquisition in 1972 of "permanent observer status" in the OAS was another indication of its adaptation to the western hemisphere environment. This new association with the OAS represented an emerging shift in Canada's foreign-policy commitments to a wider range of economic, social and political problems in the hemisphere. In the role of permanent observer, Canada is in a better position to weigh the implications of full membership in the OAS, a possibility that will demand more serious consideration as the country becomes further integrated into the inter-American system. Under close scrutiny by some Canadian observers is the future orientation of the OAS. Although the OAS was designed

originally for the collective defence of the hemisphere, it still remains to be seen whether and to what extent it will abandon its basic political and military efforts to deal with the so-called "threat of Communism" in favour of programs of economic and social development for Latin America.

The underlying assumption in Canada's policy *vis-à-vis* the OAS is that full membership in this organization is not necessarily a precondition for effective participation in the inter-American system. As the oldest international association of its kind, the inter-American system provides for its members the opportunity to interact on a regular basis at the cultural, economic, political and diplomatic levels. And, while the OAS is the leading decision-making institution, it is certainly not the only body through which hemispheric states may interact. Canada's policy has been to continue to increase its presence at the bilateral and multilateral levels without necessarily for the present acquiring full membership in the OAS.

Evidence of Canada's multilateral interests in the western hemisphere surfaced again in 1972, when the Trudeau Government was given permanent observer status in the Andean Community (ANCOM), which in 1969 formed a sub-regional economic grouping within the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is the first external contributor to ANCOM and has provided funds totalling \$5,800,000 to finance evaluative studies on economic integration and possibly to achieve some kind of economic association with the five member nations. The attraction of the Andean group for Canada has been the expectation that the 1980s would see the development of a modern industrial economy on a regional scale. The Andean Sub-regional Integration Agreement, signed in Bogotá in 1969, obligated member countries to development programs in the industrial sector that would promote expansion and specialization in the steel, automotive and petrochemical industries. This in turn has created possibilities for the export of Canadian machinery and other capital goods within the regional economic grouping.

The multilateral dimension is an important element of the Trudeau design to create a new hemispheric role for Canada. Multilateralism as a policy preference for Canada in the western hemisphere is seen as a useful device for reducing tensions arising out of conflicting bilateral relations with the United States. There have been

recent indications that the Carter Administration and the Trudeau Government intend to improve bilateral relations between their countries. Nonetheless both governments benefit from the recognition that multilateral associations provide a force of numbers that counterbalances their bilateral relation. Indeed, the likelihood that Canada will ever sign the Charter of the OAS and accept the military obligations arising out of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) is closely related to the way the Government perceives that such action would provide a more equitable negotiating position for its dealings with the U.S.

In addition to those already discussed, a number of other initiatives have been taken by Canada to stimulate a more active economic liaison with many of the countries of Latin America. For example, in 1968 CIDA created a new division — the Non-Governmental Organizations Division — to provide support to approved NGO projects for up to 50 per cent of their cost. Now all NGOs concerned with Latin America are eligible to receive assistance from the new division of CIDA. In 1971, CIDA also launched a bilateral-assistance program for Latin American countries that focuses on projects of technical and infrastructure development. By 1976, Latin American countries received 5 per cent (\$27 million) of Canada's bilateral disbursements to all parts of the world. Another action recently taken to promote Canada's economic ties with Latin America was the increase in the percentage of exports insured by the Export Development Corporation (EDC). From 1969 to 1976, the EDC increased export insurance to Latin America from 13.7 per cent to approximately 38 per cent.

Canada's trade with Latin America has shown impressive growth, and is expected to increase significantly in the years ahead. The intensification of trade with these countries became quite apparent in 1974, when exports grew by 83 per cent and imports by 105 per cent. Since 1968, the average annual growth of sales to Latin America has exceeded 20 per cent. This was greater than the average annual growth of sales to the U.S. (18 per cent), to the original European Economic Community (15 per cent) and to Britain (6 per cent).

In 1976, Canada's exports to Latin America totalled \$1,569.4 million, or about 5 per cent of its sales to the rest of the world. During the same year, Canada imported \$1,992.3 million from Latin

*More active
economic
liaison*

America. About 95 per cent of these imports came from eight Latin American countries, creating a recorded deficit of \$422.9 million. Of these imports from Latin America, \$1,243.5 million was for crude petroleum from Venezuela. It should be noted that the majority of Canada's imports from Latin America are crude and raw materials, representing more than 75 per cent of all commodities imported from the region. Since Venezuela is Canada's largest single source of imports, cautious conclusions must necessarily be drawn about the extent of import trade with the area as a whole.

Trade missions

The primary method used by Canada in recent attempts to expand trade has been the ministerial trade mission; many such groups have toured Latin American countries. This is not a new practice for Canada. Indeed, large-scale trade and cultural missions have been a recurring feature of Canadian economic ties with Latin America since 1865. But the largest number of such missions under one prime minister has occurred since 1968, particularly since 1974. During the past three years, seven ministerial missions have visited Latin America: two in 1974, one in 1975, two in 1976 and two as of May 1, 1977.

In foreign-policy terms, the January-February 1976 tour by the Prime Minister was the most significant and controversial. It was not only the first time that a Canadian first minister had visited a South American country in an official capacity but also the first time that a NATO head of government had set foot on Cuban soil since the revolution.

Mr. Trudeau's visit included three important Latin American countries: Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela. By virtue of its economic significance, Brazil (ranking second in trade with Canada in Latin America) might also have been added to the itinerary. But the ideological distance from Havana to Brasilia would have been too much for Mr. Trudeau to travel, if Canada wished to retain its international credibility as a supporter of left-of-centre political and social revolutions in Latin America. Indeed, the Prime Minister's shouts at Cienfuegos of "Viva Cuba y el pueblo cubano!", "Viva el Primer Ministro Comandante Fidel Castro!" and "Viva la amistad cubano-canadiense!" might have been interpreted by Cubans as glib and hypocritical had a trip to Brazil been included in the tour. As it was, the Trudeaus and their official entourage were

well received in all three countries in spite of some criticism in the Canadian media. Margaret Trudeau's singing and recitation of verses to the wives of the Latin American presidents — while interpreted in Canada as "melodramatic" and "odd" — was in reality the "Latin" thing to do and was warmly received as an important diplomatic gesture by her hostesses.

Brazil was visited by Canada's Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whalen, in September 1976, and the country was also included with Colombia and Peru in a ministerial visit by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in January 1977. On this last visit, Don Jamieson, in addition to the usual entourage of high ranking members of the Department of External Affairs, was also accompanied by representatives of the Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Association for Latin America (CALA), the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Finance, CIDA and the EDC. Brazil is moving fast toward super-power status in the western hemisphere; and Canada's economic relations with it have become important. After the U.S., Brazil ranks second in terms of Canadian investments abroad, and since 1975 Canada has become the fourth largest international investor in the Brazilian economy.

New focus

Since 1968, then, Canada seems to have developed a new focus in the geography of its foreign-policy concerns. There is a shift beginning in the geographical emphasis of Canada's external relations which have traditionally concentrated on Europe and the Commonwealth but now appear to point towards the many nations of the western hemisphere and the Pacific rim. This relatively new orientation should undoubtedly result in a more active and articulated level of political and economic linkage with Latin America.

Canada's promotional policies towards Latin America have tended to focus on trade and development assistance. At the same time, the Trudeau Government has increased multilateral links with the present inter-American system and strengthened bilateral ties with individual Latin American countries. Whether Canada is any closer to membership in the OAS remains an open question. It is clear, however, that there has developed a new accommodation of Canadian interests in the regional environment comprising the Americas.

*Prime Minister
first NATO leader
to visit Cuba
since revolution*

Opportunities and pitfalls for Carter in Latin America

By James Nelson Goodsell

A visitor from outer space, listening to Washington's rhetoric on Latin America, would be justified in assuming that the 50 independent nations south of the border are of prime importance to the United States.

After all, Presidents and Secretaries of State since the time of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull in the 1930s have given abundant lip-service to the idea of a special relation between the U.S. and its southern neighbours. Roosevelt had his "Good Neighbour Policy". Later, John F. Kennedy added a new dimension with the "Alliance for Progress". And Richard Nixon told the Latin Americans that "no one is more important" to the U.S.

The trouble with all this rhetoric is that it has often lacked substance, particularly in the most recent times. There was a genuine effort during the Roosevelt years to make the Good Neighbour Policy meaningful, with reciprocal trade arrangements and social programs aimed at improving the health of the peoples of the Americas. The Alliance for Progress had a similarly solid base, but unfortunately lost its way following the death of President Kennedy. In the past ten or 12 years, the words have masked either inaction or vaguely-directed action. It is no wonder that Latin Americans have increasingly voiced their scepticism about Washington's intentions. They recall Lyndon Johnson "gold-handing" his way through the summit-session of hemisphere presidents at Punta del Este in Uruguay in 1967 and arousing billions of dollars to support Latin American development — feeling all the while that the whole experience was a "charade", as one Bogota newspaper wrote.

Then there was Richard Nixon's professions of interest in building "a true relationship" through playing a low-profile game in Latin America. On first hearing, it sounded good, but then hemisphere opinion began to see Mr. Nixon's "low profile" as an amount to ignoring that part of the world. In retrospect, this might have been

a good thing for the disclosures of Central Intelligence Agency efforts to destabilize the Government of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende Gossens and other covert actions during the Nixon years made many a Latin American understandably suspicious about Washington's intentions.

Kissinger bored

Gerald Ford's attention was diverted elsewhere during his short Presidency, and Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State under both Nixon and Ford, seemed bored with Latin America. Hemisphere leaders felt it. One of the leading presidents of Latin America during the mid-1970s told this reporter: "I felt when talking with Kissinger that he was itching to get away and back to what he regarded as more important matters than talking to a president of a country whose name he could hardly remember, much less pronounce."

Dr. Kissinger did make several trips to Latin America during his final year as Secretary of State, but he incurred the ire of Spanish-speaking Latins when he accorded major-power status to Brazil, the hemisphere's lone Portuguese-speaking nation. "It might have been better if he had stayed at home," an Argentine foreign ministry official commented. "He then would not have stumbled his way into a gaffe that affected the sensitivities of Argentines and so many others." Comment from other sources was less charitable.

Dr. Goodsell is Latin American editor of the Christian Science Monitor. Before joining the Monitor, he lived in various Latin American countries, and he continues to make frequent visits to the area. A close observer of current events there, he did his doctoral work at Harvard on Latin American history. His most recent article in International Perspectives appeared in the September-October 1975 issue. The views expressed here are those of Dr. Goodsell.

able. Venezuela expressed open resentment, as did Mexico. "It was as if he had the power to anoint Washington's viceroy in Latin America," a Mexican editor wrote, reflecting the tenor of Mexican attitudes.

Underlying all this is a strong hemisphere feeling that Washington basically does not care about its southern neighbours — a view that is often shared by the few Latin American specialists in the U.S., who, when they forgather, commiserate one another on their mutual misfortune of specializing in an area of the world that is virtually ignored by their fellow countrymen. James Reston, the venerable columnist of *The New York Times*, wrote some years ago that citizens of the U.S. would do anything for Latin America "except read about it". That lament would seem to apply not only to the average citizen but also to many in the U.S. Government.

Legacy for Carter

It is this legacy of ignoring Latin America for the most part and then occasionally blundering into some ill-conceived pronouncement or action that faces Jimmy Carter of Georgia as he assumes the Presidency. He has the opportunity to begin anew to build better relations in the hemisphere, and his early actions, together with what observers see as his inclinations, suggest he may well do just that. The pitfalls in his path are enormous, however, and it will take more, much more, than goodwill on his part to make any headway towards changing the picture of neglect and inept action that has for so long characterized U.S. relations with Latin America.

Ironically, one of his most important assets in approaching this task is a basic willingness on the part of Latin America to accept new beginnings. Despite the legacy of ill will in Latin America, stirred up particularly in the past eight years under Presidents Nixon and Ford, the hemisphere awaits Carter's policy on Latin America with a good deal of eagerness and readiness to listen.

Will President Carter take advantage of this opportunity?

It is hard to know for sure. He indicated quite early his special interest in both Canada and Mexico as Washington's two closest neighbours and lent credence to this expression of interest by inviting both Prime Minister Trudeau and President José Lopez Portillo to Washington as his first state visitors. As far as Latin America is concerned, inviting Mr. Lopez Portillo before any other hemisphere leader is not a slight to the others — as was Dr. Kis-

singer's Brazil pronouncement. For I in Americans recognize the special relationship of next-door neighbours and the Lopez Portillo invitation, as the first official state visitor, has symbolic significance for a of Latin America.

But bringing Mr. Lopez Portillo to Washington and enunciating a new policy towards Latin America, and acting in accord with that policy, are two different things. Much will depend upon the team of hemisphere specialists Mr. Carter gathers around him. Much will also depend upon finding a solution to the long-standing dispute over the Panama Canal and its future. Again, much will depend upon the way in which Carter moves to open the U.S. market to more hemisphere goods. And, finally, much will depend upon the way in which Carter deals with the whole Cuban issue, including resumption of relations with the island republic and the settlement of a number of related disputes.

Panama

The Panama Canal question clearly looms largest at the moment. The Panamanians have long sought to win control not only of the waterway itself but of the 1,600-square-mile zone that surrounds it. Over the years, small concessions, including the hiring of Panamanians and the flying of the Panamanian flag, have given some crumbs of comfort to the Panamanians. But their real goal, and one that is supported by most Latin Americans, is full control of the operation of the Canal. Washington has been aware of this goal for some time, and has recognized it by carrying on three years of negotiations aimed at writing a new Panama Canal treaty to replace the document of 1914, which gives the U.S. the right to use, occupy and control the waterway and the surrounding zone "in perpetuity" and to act as "if it were the sovereign of the territory".

To many Panamanians, who see the whole situation as a vestige of colonialism in their midst, these clauses understandably rankle. After all, the Canal and Zone bisect Panama, and Panamanians tell visiting U.S. officials and citizens and newsmen that this division of their territory is as if a foreign power controlled the Mississippi River and a five-mile zone on either side.

Progress towards a new treaty, which would include the setting of a term for U.S. control of the Canal, has been slow. But, under the able direction of veteran U.S. diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, a good deal of progress has been made. President

Carter may accept opportunity to begin anew in Latin America

Carter would like to speed up the negotiations — and he has named Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) under President Johnson, as co-negotiator with Mr. Bunker. Their joint task will be not only to write the treaty but also to convince Congress and the U.S. public that it is in their interest to approve it. The latter task may be the more difficult one.

But, for now, the big job is one of defining in the treaty a date 20 or so years hence when the Canal will revert totally to Panamanian control. Some persons in both the Departments of State and Defense want the U.S. to retain control for another 50 years or so, but Panamanian strongman General Omar Torrijos Herrera asks of the year 2000 as the date. In fact, there are many in Washington who would go along with that date, since the Canal is proving less and less useful to the U.S. The largest naval ships and the super-tankers and ore-carriers cannot pass through its narrow locks. Moreover, the bulk, some 95 per cent, of intra-coastal shipping between the West Coast of the U.S. and the East and Gulf Coast now goes by land, "piggyback", on railroad cars and big tractor-trailer trucks.

Glorious era

Still, there is a lingering feeling that termination of U.S. control of the Canal and the Zone marks the end of a glorious era on the U.S. Many Americans see the Canal as man-made wonder — and indeed it is. But the days of gunboat diplomacy, in which the Canal was built, have past, as well as the era in which the U.S. set up the new nation of Panama in order that the Canal could be built.

Mr. Carter seems to recognize this. His choice of Mr. Linowitz as co-negotiator was not accidental. During the past three years, Mr. Linowitz, a Washington-based lawyer, has headed the privately-sponsored and unfunded Commission on United States/Latin American Relations and helped draft its two reports.

Its latest report, issued last December, urged the Carter Administration to take the initiative in writing a new Canal treaty. It called the dispute with Panama "the most urgent issue" to face the new Administration and exhorted Mr. Carter to make clear to the American public why a new and equitable treaty with Panama is not only desirable but urgently required". The reasons, the report said, included the whole fabric of U.S./Latin American relations. Without a new treaty, the U.S. can hardly proceed with other hemisphere

issues, since Latin America is solidly behind Panama in its desire for a new treaty and its demand for ultimate control — sooner rather than later — of the Canal and the Zone.


It is assumed in Washington that the President wants Mr. Linowitz to tell this to the U.S. Congress and public in his capacity as co-negotiator, and it is expected that the former Ambassador to the OAS will embark on an extensive speaking tour of the nation to bring the Panama issue to the public's attention, in the hope that this will win widespread support for the new treaty and prompt Congress to ratify it.

If Mr. Carter can bring all this off in the early months of his Administration, he will have done much to rid himself of the legacy of indifference towards Latin America that he inherits. But more is needed.

On Cuba, Washington faces equally thorny negotiations as it moves towards some sort of *rapprochement* with that island state. Latin America is divided on the Cuban question — some nations recognize Prime Minister (now President) Fidel Castro's Government, while others, like Washington, have no official relations with it. But the trend is towards restoring the Communist-controlled nation to the hemisphere system. Vocal Cuban exile elements, concentrated heavily in Florida, oppose any "togetherness" with their homeland so long as Dr. Castro remains in office. But the likelihood of a change in Cuba's governing apparatus is remote. The Cuban leader is firmly in the saddle. His involvement in Angola and its implications for the future of Africa remain a stumbling-block in the path of renewed relations, but the presence of 10,000 or more Cuban soldiers on African soil is not expected to last forever. Moreover, Cuba has a desire for at least economic ties with the U.S., as Dr. Castro has made clear in recent speeches. So a slow movement towards the renewal of Cuba-U.S. ties is likely, though it will require careful diplomatic juggling on the part of President Carter.

Even more difficult, in the long run, is the Latin American insistence upon better terms of trade for their products on the U.S. market. The Latin American complaints on this subject are not new. They go back to the years of President Roosevelt and his signing of trade agreements, many offering special preferences to Latin American countries. Successive Administrations have sweetened these trading arrangements in small ways, but much of what Latin America produces is

*Thorny problems
in achieving
rapprochement
with Cuba*



Fidel Castro. The mention of his name can still touch off a debate on Cuba's place in the hemispheric system — though the trend is towards normalization.

still subject to stiff U.S. tariffs and various embargo laws. Moreover, the whole issue of Third World trade with the U.S. is part and parcel of the question. To grant favourable conditions to Latin American goods at the expense of other nations in the Third World elicits howls of protest. "We're damned if we do and damned if we don't," complains a foreign affairs specialist attached to the Brookings Institution who has helped in U.S. trade negotiations with Latin America. Yet Washington is committed by promises made in various hemisphere gatherings to promote better trade relations and Mr. Carter has subscribed to these promises.

Then there is the issue of human rights, upon which Mr. Carter has indicated he plans to take a firm stand. A number of Latin American nations dominated by military regimes have earned poor marks on the human-rights issue. Chile's military government is a case in point; so is Argentina's; and various hemisphere organizations, including the OAS, have singled out Paraguay and Uruguay, as well as Cuba, on this issue. "This is going to present the Administration with a problem like walking on eggs — how to get across the support the U.S. has for human rights without interfering with the internal affairs of hemisphere nations," observed a State Department official. On his point, too much comment might be construed adversely by some governments that would long for the days of Richard Nixon's "benign neglect" of Latin America. But Mr. Carter is firm on this issue and it could cause him problems.

There are other issues: Brazil's acqui-

sition of nuclear technology, upon which could rely in making atomic warheads; seething uncertainties of the Caribbean with groups of "mini-states" that lack political and economic viability; rising commodity costs for coffee, bananas and other items; the flow of narcotics through Mexico, Jamaica and Colombia; and the illegal immigrants entering the U.S. from Mexico in ever-increasing numbers.

How Mr. Carter actually tackles these questions remains to be seen. But the early evidence suggests he intends to be an activist as far as Latin America is concerned. He knows some Spanish, speaking it haltingly but well enough to win admiring smiles from some Latin Americans. In an area where form often counts as well as substance, his efforts at Spanish are appreciated.

But it will take more than speaking Spanish to undo the legacy of the Nixon and Ford years of inaction, misdirection and faulty judgment. The events in Chile going as far back as the Kennedy years when Washington appears to have supported with cash and advice the opposition to Dr. Allende in his early bid for the Chilean Presidency, have left a bad taste in the mouths of Latin Americans. It is not that they have much sympathy for Allende — some do, but most do not. What worries them is that, if Washington has acted highhandedly to get what it wanted in Latin America in years past, it may well do so again. Mr. Carter has promised he will not engage in such activities. But Latin Americans are "from Missouri" — they have to be shown.

And that is probably going to be President Carter's biggest challenge — and his biggest opportunity. If he can demonstrate to Latin Americans that he does indeed care about them (as he has started to do by inviting Mr. Lopez Portillo to Washington as his first visitor); if he can show that he does not intend to let festering irritants remain (as he is trying to do with the Panama negotiations); if he can manage some diplomatic overtures to break log-jams (as he may well do in connection with Cuba); if he can, in short, begin to add substance to the rhetoric of good-neighbourliness that has been so much a part of U.S. policy towards Latin America for decades — he may well be able to usher in a new era for relations within the hemisphere.

Maybe then that visitor from outer space's observation would be proved accurate: that Washington regarded its relations with Latin America as of prime importance.

Environmental co-operation to meet political objectives

By Patrick Kyba

Environmentalists are prone to judge the value of an organization solely by its ability to solve environmental problems. Governments cannot afford such single-mindedness, for the environment is but one of several factors they must take into account when deciding whether to join and participate in an environmental organization. In the international context, an organization's worth may depend less on its environmental record than on its value as a device for achieving economic and political objectives. This does not mean that governments can ignore environmental considerations when making such judgments. Rather, it means that they apply a broader standard when assessing value. A large number of international environmental organizations have been created during the past decade. The difficulty for the Canadian Government has been to choose from among them those most appropriate to Canadian needs and ability to contribute. Public opinion insists that Canada belong to as many as possible, but its limited resources dictate that the Government select carefully from the options available in the light of its environmental, economic and political objectives.

The major international environmental organizations existing today are of two types. The vast majority are scientific. Canada belongs to over 60 of these, which contribute information of direct relevance to its environmental problems. The others are bodies combining environmental with other concerns; most of these were created for other purposes but have added environmental dimensions in the past ten years in response to the "ecological crisis and in the belief that solutions to environmental problems involve economic and political considerations. Canada has a direct interest in the work programs of any of these: NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, the Environment Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Senior Environment

Advisers of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the European Community's Environment Program and the United Nations Environment Program.

Of these, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) is unique, for it was created for political, not environmental, reasons and Canada's motives in accepting it were originally political, not environmental. Today, the political factors that sustained it are less important; it cannot compete with its counterparts on environmental grounds, and it meets few of the criteria the Canadian Government applies when deciding membership and participation in international environmental organizations. Nevertheless, the CCMS remains in existence and appears to have been accepted by Canadian politicians and public servants alike as worthy of Canada's continued participation. The question is, then, why has Canada devoted as large a part of its limited resources to the CCMS as it has?

Controversy

The Committee came into being late in 1969 in the midst of controversy. President Nixon proposed the idea to the NATO allies without their prior knowledge or consent and it took the United States several months to overcome the reservations of most members of the alliance. These countries, including Canada, did not object to the President's concern for "the quality of life in this final third of the twentieth century". Nor did they

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oppose enhanced information-exchange and co-ordination of effort on environmental matters between and among themselves. Rather, they did not believe the CCMS to be an appropriate instrument for the achievement of these objectives. They feared that the Committee would duplicate work better done elsewhere and add to the burdens of their understaffed environmental establishments. In addition, some observers regarded the proposal as a blatant attempt to defuse pacifist sentiment in the United States and resented the attempt to tie military affairs to the growing concern for the environment. American insistence proved too great to resist, but to this day the CCMS suffers from the circumstances of its creation.

Obligation

All NATO countries felt some pressure to approve the proposal and to participate in the activities of the CCMS. Canada, however, felt this obligation more keenly because of its long-standing desire to strengthen Article II of the NATO Charter — the more so because it had altered its military contribution to the alliance despite the objections of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, the two strongest supporters of the Committee. Acceptance of the Committee and participation in its work came to be viewed as a means of proving Canada's commitment to the alliance and of deflecting criticism of its withdrawal of troops from Europe.

Some advisers in the Departments of External Affairs and the Environment also concluded that the Committee could be used to improve Canada's environmental relations with the United States. Despite the existence of the International Joint Commission, several problems between the two countries remained unresolved, and they believed that projects could be devised under the auspices of the CCMS that would induce the Americans to co-operate with Canada in solving them. The Comprehensive River Basin Planning and Management Scheme within the larger Inland Waters Pollution Project, which was proposed by Canada at the first plenary session of the Committee, is an excellent example of this ploy, for its stated principal objective was to "demonstrate ways in which countries can co-operate in reducing water pollution to their mutual benefit". The river basin Canada chose to be the object of the study was that of the Saint John, a long-time focus of dispute with the United States.

Finally, the value of the CCMS in

Canadian eyes increased in direct proportion to the difficulties the Government encountered in the implementation of the Third Option. Canada's desire to forge a contractual link with the European Community in order to reduce its economic dependence on the United States did not immediately receive a favourable response, and the Committee came to be regarded as an additional *entrée* to Europe, another forum for the presentation of Canadian views to members of the Community, and a device whereby Canada might establish a tradition of environmental co-operation with individual members that might carry over to the Community itself. The environment is second only to culture as an area in which agreement on exchange views and personnel can be reached easily, and the first tangible evidence of the Community's acceptance of a contractual link with this country was indeed a commitment to exchange information on mutual environmental problems and to co-operate in their solution.

Continued participation

These reasons, all political, explain why Canada accepted the CCMS in the beginning. They do not explain why it continues to participate in its activities, for none are as important as in the past. The contractual link with Europe has been established. Canada's military commitment to the alliance has been confirmed by its recent decision to re-equip its forces, and it is improbable that anyone ever regarded Canadian participation in the Committee as an adequate substitute for tanks, ships and aircraft. Environmental differences with the United States remain, but these are better dealt with by the Joint Commission or through the contacts developed over the years between the Department of the Environment and the Environmental Protection Agency and environmental officers of External Affairs and the State Department.

Another reason existed then that amplifies the explanation. In 1969, near the beginning of widespread public concern for the environment, the Government had no clear idea of its environmental objectives or priorities. Nor had it developed the criteria that would have enabled it to choose from among the many new organizations those most appropriate to its needs and abilities. In consequence, the Government's environmental decisions, especially at the international level, tended to be responsive and unduly influenced by political and economic factors. The decision to accept the CCMS is a classic example

*Opportunity
to reaffirm
commitment
to alliance*

is policy of drift. Had the Government possessed a set of precise environmental objectives in 1969, it would have been in a better position to resist the American proposal. Had the Government applied to the Committee the criteria its public servants have developed since that time, it is unlikely that it would have participated in its activities even to the limited extent that it has done.

Basis of judgment

Today, all international environmental organizations are judged by their membership, objectives, work programs, operating procedures and demonstrated or potential value, and the result of this process, together with economic and political considerations, determines whether or not Canada will seek to join the organization and the resources it will commit to it. Applying these criteria to the CCMS, one comes away convinced that, on environmental grounds at least, the Committee should at best be a low-priority organization for this country.

Its membership is limited, which can be an advantage, but in this instance none of the most important international environmental problems of concern to the members of the alliance can be solved within the confines of NATO. Canada, for example, must look to the Law of the Sea Conference and bilateral agreements with several Warsaw Pact countries to solve its fisheries problems. This in itself ensures that the CCMS cannot be very important to Canada or any other member of the Alliance.

The objectives of the Committee are desirable. It is directed:

to examine methods of improving exchanges of views and environmental experiences amongst members of the Alliance, to consider specific environmental problems with the object of stimulating action to treat them by member governments, to perform various tasks aimed at improving the existing system of international environmental regulation, and to co-ordinate the efforts of NATO members in this area of concern.

Nevertheless, there is one glaring omission from these terms of reference, and in an area in which the CCMS might be expected to have a direct interest — the environmental impact of the military.

The alliance has a unique opportunity to make an important contribution to the accumulation of knowledge about, and the management of, the environment: it possesses both the scientific talent and the resources in

this area, and yet the Committee avoids the issue as it would the plague. NATO could study problems such as the disposal of ship- and shore-generated military wastes. It could investigate the possibility of using the Armed Forces infrastructure for environmental purposes. But it does not. Even a modest proposal to study the effects of military aircraft on the ozone layer, put forward by former Environment Minister Davis in 1973, failed to appear on the agenda of the next CCMS plenary, and has not been resurrected. Furthermore, neither the work program nor the operating procedures of the Committee enable it to achieve even its limited objectives.

In the first place, the CCMS has no work program of its own. Its secretariat is deliberately kept to a minimum, and it is expressly forbidden to do its own research. The secretariat can do no more than draw attention to areas of common concern, and depends totally on the whim of individual members for the taking-up of its suggestions. In consequence, there is simply no direction or coherence to the research done under its auspices.

Secondly, most of the work in the realms of information exchange and policy co-ordination are of necessity left to the liaison officers each delegation designates to deal with Committee business. None of these representatives, however, other than the one from the United States, is able to devote more than a very small proportion of his attention to CCMS affairs. The Canadian experience here is the norm rather than the exception. Canada's liaison officer since 1969 has been the third secretary of the Canadian delegation, who has never been free to give more than 10 per cent of his time to his Committee responsibilities. Furthermore, there are no regular meetings of the CCMS representatives in Brussels, and proposals to establish such gatherings have never been implemented.

Thirdly, the Committee meets formally twice a year only, and one of these sessions is given over entirely to progress reports on existing projects and proposals to begin new ones. The other is intended to facilitate frank exchanges of views on mutual problems, but until recently its value has been diminished by the lack of an agenda to focus discussion. These environmental "round tables" now concentrate on a single issue, but the lengthy span of time between them continues to lead to the reiteration of national policy statements rather than suggestions to solve these problems.

Finally, the Committee is hampered

Secretariat prohibited from undertaking research work

by the operating procedures of NATO itself. The alliance adheres faithfully to the practice of decision-making by consensus, which means that the Committee can act only if all members agree and that its recommendations are subject to the approval of each member government. The problem is evident in the follow-up to projects completed under Committee auspices. Two years ago, the CCMS instituted a yearly reporting procedure in order to follow the progress member governments had made in implementing Committee recommendations. To date, the agreement to report has not been honoured and the countries responsible for these projects have found it extremely difficult to obtain this information.

Saving grace

The saving grace of the CCMS has proved to be the universally-acclaimed value of the pilot-project idea it adopted as its principal means of fulfilling its mandate. Through this device, any government wishing to investigate a specific environmental problem is encouraged to bring its proposal before the Committee for approval and to seek the co-operation of other members. If approved, the pilot country and those who have agreed to assist are made responsible for funding and administering the project and for providing the required personnel and equipment. Thus, countries are free to participate only in those projects of direct interest to them, and this ensures their continued support until the projects are completed.

*Direct interest
determines
participation
in projects*

Nineteen projects have been approved by the CCMS and all NATO countries except Iceland have participated to some extent in at least one of them. Eight projects have been completed since 1969: Environment and Regional Planning, Disaster Assistance, Road Safety, Air Pollution, Inland-Water Pollution, Coastal-Water Pollution, Urban Transportation, and Health Care. Eleven others are in various stages of progress: Waste-Water Treatment, Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, Solar Energy, Geothermal Energy, Rational Use of Energy, Air-Pollution Assessment Methodology, Automotive Low-Pollution Propulsion System Development, Nutrition and Health, Remote Sensing of Marine Pollution, Flue-Gas Desulphurization, and the Quality of Drinking Water. Canada has suggested two projects, Inland-Water Pollution and Nutrition and Health. It is a co-pilot of two others, Coastal-Water Pollution and Remote Sensing of Marine Pollution. Canadian experts participate in the work of several others.

Not all 19 projects have proved to be well conceived or well-executed, but to date they have produced 73 publications of various types, and the distribution of these results to all members of NATO has contributed substantially to the Committee's image.

The demonstrated value of the pilot projects appears to have silenced the critics who in the past have urged the demise of the CCMS. It seems unlikely that the Committee will again encounter the strength of opposition expressed by the Parliament of the Netherlands in 1971, which moved the discontinuation of CCMS activities and the transfer of these activities to other international organizations. Nevertheless, it is also improbable that the Committee will become a high-priority environmental organization for Canada or for any NATO country. Ill-starred at birth, it is today simply too deficient in its scope, its work program and its capacity to meet its objectives to appeal greatly to its membership. Furthermore, it does not possess the power to overcome these deficiencies. It could contribute significantly to the fund of environmental knowledge were it to investigate the impact of the military on the environment, its secretariat could be increased and encouraged to do its own research, and its operating procedures could be improved dramatically. However, this is unlikely to occur since the Committee cannot institute such changes on its own and none of its members is willing to take up the cudgels on its behalf. The prevailing sentiment among its membership is that the Committee is best left as it is — that more harm than good would ensue if it were tampered with.

The Commonwealth analogy is appropriate here, for the CCMS appears to have arrived at a stage in its history where there are no major disadvantages in belonging to it and there are some benefits to be had if one wishes to take advantage of them. For Canada, the political benefits are that it pleases the United States and its continued participation and that the Committee provides it with an additional platform from which to present and explain its environmental views and policies to countries that are also members of the OECD and the European Community. The environmental benefits accrue from Canada's participation in the pilot projects of direct interest to it and its access to the results of those done by other countries. Despite this, however, it is clear that the CCMS can never be more than a low-priority international environmental organization for Canada.

Politician applies human terms to international economic order

3-Douglas Roche

One of the central facts of the world today is that the economic growth of the 21 most heavily industrialized countries is leaving behind the one billion people in the poorest countries.

The problem of extreme poverty is perpetuated by the control the developed world exercises over the bulk of the earth's wealth. The one-third of humanity in the developed nations consumes more than 80 per cent of the earth's resources. A baby born in Canada will grow up consuming 50 times the resources and energy as a baby in the developing regions will consume. This implies that the developed world is responsible for a much greater per capita environmental impact than the less developed nations.

In taking for granted ever-higher standards of living, the minority of rich countries get richer at the expense of the multiplying poor. That is not a formula for peace or security in a world already riddled with resource-depletion and proliferating nuclear technology.

Anyone who advocates narrowing the gap between the rich and poor nations, while at the same time envisaging a continued 3 to 5 percent increase every year in real income for the bulk of the people in the industrialized nations, is supporting irreconcilable policies.

Sustained growth in the Western world can only be maintained by paying low prices for commodities, protecting domestic industries and increasing production of consumer goods — which would, in turn, demand more resources. Merely to maintain their economic growth, the industrial countries must continue to appropriate a totally disproportionate share of the world's raw material and energy output. Redistribution would only be possible if the developed nations were willing to accept a new mode of life. There is not much chance of that so long as the industrial economy of the West is built on expansion and greed.

Arnold Toynbee put the point dramatically in *Mankind and Mother Earth*: Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? He could murder her by misusing his increased technological potency. Alternatively he could redeem her by overcoming the suicidal, aggressive greed that, in all living creatures, including Man himself, has been the price of the Great Mother's gift of life. This is the enigmatic question which now confronts man.

Positive values

Our approach to global justice should not start from the negative position of merely deploring the massive poverty and suffering in the developing world today as if there were nothing we could do beyond applying band aids. Rather, we should recognize the new, positive values of interdependency. Biological and physical interdependencies inherent in the basic structure of our planet are now paralleled by a network of man-made interdependencies that are changing the fabric and mechanics of our lives.

The acceleration of scientific and technological developments has opened up the possibility of maximizing the physical, mental and social well-being of every human being. Instruments probing the solar system have helped to develop a planetary science that enables us to understand better the physical structure, life chemistry and stabilizing systems of our planet. The detection and study of solar

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energy, climatic changes and atmospheric pollution will eventually contribute immeasurably to man's survival, no matter where he lives. There are now more than a dozen countries with their own satellites; telecommunications and education are within the reach of hundreds of millions of people who were previously isolated. Joint space programs have already led to legal treaties.

World-wide collections of data on the biosphere have been launched by governments under the environment program of the United Nations. Rapid technological development of the seabed has led the UN to declare the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdiction a common heritage of mankind. Atomic energy, electronics, computers and cybernetics, plant genetics and engineering, industrial agronomy, antibiotics, microbiology and laser technology — all these developments have profound implications for the non-industrialized part of the world.

Once we grasp the notion of interdependency, we detect its actuality in more and more places. The movement of trade, agricultural production and the use of energy all require new commitments and mechanisms to explore, distribute and manage the earth's resources better for the benefit of the whole population, present and future.

Stability

The relation between the economic activity of the highly-industrialized centres and that of the developing countries is at the core of world economic stability. The impact of world public opinion and international organizations is already felt in the call for a code of conduct for transnational corporations that have themselves scaled national walls with ease. Though transnational corporations are often, and correctly, characterized as exploiters, they have shown that, properly utilized, a transfer of skills and technology can introduce industry to new areas of the world.

The value of interdependency becomes clearer as we see that religion, race, culture and social sanctions no longer need be insuperable barriers that keep people apart. The extensive interplay today of diverse ideas and personalities through travel and communication is bound to affect our behaviour. I am not claiming that Utopia has arrived, nor am I closing my eyes to the tragic conflicts that continue to scar the earth. But I see, as a result of interdependency, the evolution of a stronger civilization as we apply mankind's knowledge, imagination and

organization to the practice of stewardship and restraint.

Many people despair at what appears to be the hopeless task of sharing the world's resources and recommend "lifeboat ethics", by which the rich decide to save some and leave the rest to drown. While I believe that compassion still outweighs cynicism in public opinion, the terrible complexity of achieving distributive justice is producing a scepticism that in turn feeds our selfishness. If we cannot do anything about poverty, why care?

The problem of global survival is not a lack of resources but a distortion of values. The will to apply equitably the benefits of technology, rather than simply to expand technology, is our greatest need today. Do we have the courage to preserve our sensitivity, awareness and responsibility in the face of radical change? For, as Rollo May writes in *The Courage to Create*: "We are living at a time when one age is dying and the new age is yet born."

It takes creative courage to discover new forms, new symbols and new patterns for the construction of a more humane society. The former age was one of narrow, nationalistic self-interest. The new age is one of global interdependencies.

Inescapable

We do not yet know how to cope with the demands of a new, planetary civilization — so, naturally, we resist it. But the movement towards some kind of world order is inescapable. What is now imperative is the creation of a new global ethic, one dedicated to providing enough food, shelter, education and health care for every human being, as well as the opportunity to live in self-fulfilment.

The primary purpose of economic growth should be to ensure the improvement of conditions for all. Every individual should have access to food, shelter, education, employment and health care in order to be free to develop his true potential and dignity in seeking the common good. A growth process that benefits only a wealthy minority and maintains or increases the disparities between and within countries is not development — it is exploitation.

For the past 15 years, the United Nations has been trying to arouse the political will to institute more equitable economic and social systems. There have been hundreds of conferences, but it took the monetary collapse, the oil crisis and the famines of the early 1970s to awaken

*Relationship
at the core
of economic
stability*

he politicians, who often respond only to confrontation on their very doorsteps.

The richer countries discovered that discussion and negotiation were no longer concerned with the amount of aid that should be given but with the structural changes that should be made in the world's monetary and trading systems. These changes were all spelt out in the program of action for a "New International Economic Order" that was adopted at the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in May 1974, and were reaffirmed at the seventh special session in September 1975. The program document begins by stating its aims — "to correct inequalities and redress existing injustices and ensure steadily accelerating economic development, peace and justice for present and future generations" — and goes on to outline plans of action for international trade, industrialization, science and technology, transfer of resources and food production.

New sharing

The developing countries want new arrangements for sharing the world's wealth and resources. The rich nations view these reforms with considerable suspicion — a natural reaction, since the present systems work to their advantage. Countries that depend on the importation of cheap resources from the developing nations will not look favourably on new regulations that will result in their paying more for such resources. On the other hand, developing nations are not likely to remain quiet much longer while the added value of their exports of primary commodities is absorbed by Western middlemen. And thus hard confrontation and tough negotiations are inevitable before any substantial movement towards a new economic order is achieved.

— The new economic order calls for linking of the price of raw materials exported by developing nations to the price paid by them for imported manufactured goods; the rich countries reply that prices must be allowed to reflect "market" forces.

— The new economic order demands some general agreement and international regulation of commodities; the rich countries call for a "case-by-case" approach and the retention of controls by national governments.

— The new economic order calls for the use of the International Monetary Fund as a development instrument; the rich countries defend its use as a central bank regulating currencies and international liquidity.

— The new economic order calls for the regulation of transnational corporations in the interest of developing countries; the rich countries defend the rights of these corporations.

It seems evident to the writer not only that Canada ought to have an integrated, comprehensive policy to respond to interlocking global problems but that such a policy ought to be given a high priority. For Canada can play a much greater international role at this turning-point in history. In fact, the global situation is thrusting upon us new opportunities as well as responsibilities; with a unified approach, we can help developing nations become self-reliant and acquire stronger trading partners as a result.

"Enlightened internationalism," as Professor John W. Holmes called it in *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power*, is going to cost more but it is the only realistic policy with which to respond to the new major issues — distribution of resources and population in the world at large. "What we have to note," he says, "is that the thrust is towards a principle of international sharing and it is directed against those countries which have the most resources and space *per capita*. The heat may be turned off the super-powers and on the rich, middle-power, middle-aged countries like Canada."

It became clear to the author during a study tour of Asia last fall that the developing world's leaders knew that the West would not make the changes necessary for a new economic order and that the developing nations, therefore, had to think and act beyond dependency. They were being forced to the conclusion that they must develop policies reflecting their own social and economic conditions in order to eliminate, once and for all, the traditional dependence on the industrialized nations. Instead of following Western models of high-technology development, they would learn to make better use of their own resources, of which the most important was manpower.

The ASEAN countries (Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia) meeting in Indonesia, specified more intense integrated rural-development projects. The training of community-development personnel was given a high priority.

The common front, first established for negotiation purposes, is now necessary for survival. The developed nations, for all their rhetoric, are not even halfway towards the international aid target of .7 per cent of gross national product. Moreover,

*Thinking
and acting
beyond
dependency*

in considering the changes implied by a new order, the West fears disruption of its traditional hold over the world economy.

Cynicism

The developing nations are now deeply cynical about the gestures made towards them. Since aid money increasingly seems to be of marginal importance to the whole development problem and since a larger part of all aid they receive now comes from the newly-rich Arab countries, why shouldn't the Third and Fourth Worlds band together in solidarity? What does it matter if the Arabs use the strength of solidarity to kick Israel out of the UN?

The West is cynical too about the sincerity of the developing countries in building up their own societies. Who believes that the fruits of a new order would find their way to the millions of peasants who will go on in drudgery while their own economic masters gorge themselves? Indonesia, Brazil, Iran, Peru and perhaps a dozen other countries may become upper-middle-class states, but will it mean anything in the lives of most Indonesians, Brazilians, Iranians and Peruvians?

More and more people on both sides of the development gap are now cynical about elaborate postponements, glamorous diversions and grandiose schemes. In Canada, there is a growing feeling that aid is really just conscience-cleansing.

At the root of all this cynicism is the weakness of our belief in the value and strength of the human being and the future of mankind. "Will mankind survive?" asks Robert Heilbroner in *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect*. "We know? The question I want to put is more searching. Who cares?" It is clear that most of us today do not care — or do not care enough.

Of course, there are many individuals and organizations dedicated to furthering the integrity of the global human being. I am not despondent. But when I see a political party — or even a politician — running for office on a platform and strategy to end world hunger in the next few years, to provide every human being with clean water by 1990, to implement a housing program that will provide a decent shelter for every family in the world, then my own faith in modern politics will be renewed.

Canadians will not support a new economic order until we understand the importance of changing our attitude towards what we think is our natural right and moving away from the endless pursuit of wasteful consumption. If enough Canadians do that and politicians feel the effect of such a movement, then as a country we shall be in a better frame of mind to negotiate the changes needed in international relations.

International development

Administrative perspective of transnational corporations

By M. A. Crener and G. M. Hénault

The debate over transnational corporations (TCs) has recently become a heated one; for proof we need only look to the Bishop of Recife, Brazil, Dom Helder Camara, who stated at the last Eucharistic Conference in Philadelphia in 1976 that a new form of Nazism, disguised as a fight against Communism, had taken root in Latin America. The multinational corporations, he said, were fostering internal colonialism in the first of the Christian continents.

Reactions of this kind to frequently ill-advised, occasionally ill-willed, actions

on the part of the TCs involve these organizations in a larger debate, one with another dimension, for there exists a ideological confrontation that underlies all analyses of the TCs. It might even be said that different ways of viewing the world are directly opposed in any discussion of the matter. The TCs become a vehicle through which the entire system of private enterprise, ownership of the means of production and continued growth is challenged.

What we shall attempt to isolate here

an approach to viewing the transnational corporation, its role and its effects and possibilities for development in the Third World, in the context of international economic relations.

Expansion policies

We shall limit the scope of our discussion to two basic ideas that fairly accurately sum up the methods and the expansion policy of a transnational:

- a) constant attention to growth, to maintain a satisfactory level of returns in the medium term;
- b) constant attention to effective management, for maximization of assets (variables that are essentially technological) and means (variables related to financial management and marketing).

Taking into account these two basic ideas, the following diagram illustrates the growth and expansion strategies of a corporation:

opted for either a market-expansion strategy or a strategy of technological innovation must keep account of the following factors in its strategy as a whole:

- total profitability within acceptable margins;
- a global growth-rate, meaning the progressive replacement of declining markets by others in many countries;
- a market structure such that the level of risk and/or geographical diffusion of assets is maintained below the level considered acceptable for the firm;
- minimization of costs of production and of transfers of goods and services between branches.

Thus criteria of this type (profitability, independence, growth and minimization of risk) have an impact on international competition, and multiplying a firm's operations over an international economic context has the effect of further accentuating political strains.

New technology and new products

	New technological change	Reconditioned or improved products	New products New technology
Existing markets	No change	Improved products	Replacement product or new technology in the production process
New regional markets	Geographical expansion of markets	Geographical expansion and improved products	Geographical expansion and new product technology
New customers/markets	Expansion of markets by customers	Expansion by customers and improved products	Diversification with expansion of customer market and new product technology
New international markets	Expansion of markets by internationalization	Expansion by internationalization and improved products	International diversification with international expansion of markets and new product technology

As the diagram shows, the passage from one stage to another on the technology axis, or the market axis, or a concomitant passage on both axes, or even one that moves farther along one axis than along the other, indicates the phase or stage reached by a corporation in its growth process and also fulfils the two conditions mentioned above. It can easily be seen that the box of the matrix obtained by the column entitled "New products, new technology" and the line "New international markets" represents the true beginning of the corporation's multinational status. The firm that has

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From there, the maintenance of such constraints for purposes of its own development leads the corporation very naturally into a situation that is truly political.

The data, even in the very rudimentary form of the table above, show that, depending on the emphasis placed on one criterion or another in the ultimate weighting of the strategy of the corporation as a whole, the degree to which the political element is taken into consideration influences the way in which the principals perceive the international situation. Carrying simplification to the extreme, it can be stated that, for some people, the existence of multinational operations can be explained in most cases by the oligopolistic nature of many industries. For others, the transnational firm is, in Marxist economic theory, merely the end of a process in which capital is first a social relation and the links between "centre" and "periphery" are means for the transfer of plus value according to the conception of "unequal exchange". How, then, can the growth of the TC in the world economic sphere and its political impact within the international system be reconciled?

For this reconciliation, we propose to discuss first the multinational presence in the international system, particularly in the developing countries (DCs) subsystem, and then our suggestion relating to socio-economic integration.

Industrial relations

The transnational corporations are becoming aware of their socio-economic impact and are admitting, not always in so many words, their abuse of power through such means as maintaining research-and-development activities in the home country, centralizing financial decision-making, and so on. Echoing G. Adam, S. Amin, C. Furtado, C. Michalet, C. Palloix, Brooke and Zimmers and others, M. Callon has stated that the TC reproduces unequal development. Sir Ernest Woodroffe, president of Unilever, summarizes a management point of view when he states that "the biggest threat to a multinational is that it is considered foreign and is therefore suspect, in its host country". He qualifies this somewhat by adding: "But the TC abroad often finds it is accused of rape by the very people who are trying to seduce it".

That said, let us look at several more contentious points in the heated debate on transnationals and development, bearing in mind that size and other characteristics typical of TCs make it impossible wholly

to separate economics and politics where they are concerned.

The imperfection of markets — owing to the monopoly of large corporations in administrative and technological skills — makes equalization of revenues across borders impossible. But this monopoly, according to the "Hymer-Kindleberger theory", means there will be international development of corporations for greater economic profitability.

At the same time, however, the drive for monopolistic or oligopolistic profits, with the frequent absence of true redistribution by means of the tax structure of individual countries, may prevent optimum utilization of resources, particularly, as Kindleberger notes, by the disruption of local markets.

In such a situation, as Penrose states, the power of the TCs to impose a monopoly price has the same characteristics of distribution as the power to levy taxes. The example of petroleum has led some (Kindleberger, Johnson) to write of the potential for competition and others (Marxist economists) to note the dangers of international monopolies.

Direct international investment brings capital, technology and administrative skills to the host country. However, to the extent to which international capital represents a true net addition to local capital must then be established. As noted by Penrose as well as Magdoff, who speaks of "financial burden", the capital is soon paid for by the returns. In addition, Kindleberger states that international investment may simply be a substitute for a national investment capacity that is lacking (for example, because of a preference for liquid funds).

International investment may also be at variance with the national plan or the wishes of the host country.

There is also the problem of research and technological progress. Johnson says that importing and adapting are less expensive than local manufacture. Here can be seen once again the conflict between cosmopolitan and national interests.

Of all the non-Marxists, it is Behrman who puts most stress on the differences between the aims of corporations and those of host countries — that is, efficiency in terms of the world economy may run counter to efficiency for host countries. He proposes three styles of action: restrictions on investments or industrial activities; strengthening of domestic industries; intergovernmental agreements.

The liberal writers, such as Kindleberger and Johnson, prefer incentives

Multinational presence in international system

measures such as tax and anti-trust legislation. They also maintain that host countries have the power to negotiate agreements with multinational groups, and among themselves.

Or, as stated in a recent article by Ulrich H. Jacoby, the supremacy of the transnationals is, in fact, based on their appropriation of the technological process and administrative skills, which in turn has made it possible for them, through trade manipulations, to maintain a hold over the developing countries that cannot be broken by existing classical political processes (such as expropriation and nationalization). Then, if the intrinsic relation between economics and politics can no longer be broken in its analytical process, why not formulate individual, specific relations that could determine different degrees of independence — particularly relative independence in the case of TC-DC relations? We see socio-economic integration as the preferred means of achieving continued interaction.

Managerial behaviour

It should be remembered that, among their characteristics, TCs may have a high degree of flexibility and an ability to adapt to a particular economic environment. Nestlé, for example, makes 50 kinds of coffee to meet the cultural differences of its markets, and most of its managers overseas speak the language of the host country. This is one of the reasons for the company's record of success internationally.

Host countries, particularly developing countries, have more demands and expect TCs to fit into the local environment. The problem of integration has, however, been seen only as an economic one. Robinson, for example, defined it as 'the degree to which a foreign-owned firm sub-contracts locally for the purchase of services, products and skills from locally-owned enterprise'.

Moving beyond the economic framework of negotiations between TCs and DCs in an attempt to include the socio-cultural aspects of conflicts between the two parties, one comes up against the rigidity of the notion of socio-economic integration and the problems involved in rendering it operational. However, we see a role for this idea in helping to reconcile opposing positions in the strictly political conflict, even when the ideologies of the two parties differ.

Integration

The integration of TCs and DCs is the last stage in a continuing process that begins

with the period of negotiation and extends through the periods of installation and adaptation.

Socio-economic integration can be viewed as an approach to administrative behaviour by means of which the TC accepts the national development objectives of the host country and contributes to achieving them. This kind of integration can be characterized by, among other things:

- the emergence of an organizational sub-culture that respects the value systems of the host country and is reflected in a form of administrative behaviour adapted to the environment;
- a micro-economic production system that provides goods meeting local needs or the macro-economic objectives of the host country (to illustrate the latter aspect, Mexico recently allowed direct investment by a Japanese automobile company on condition that a percentage of the cars assembled in Mexico be re-exported to South American markets to meet its foreign exchange needs);
- non-monopolistic marketing, in order to avoid the lack of competition with national products;
- a financial policy under which returns are invested locally.

One of the first stages of the socio-economic integration of TCs is thus achieved through the acceptance of different value systems.

Is this not, in fact, what the Canadian Department of External Affairs has suggested, in encouraging and inviting Canadian investors to "respect the policies and interests of the host country"?

Evaluating how TC strategies and DC development policies fit each other is very complex if an effort is made to examine all the dimensions having an influence on the question. It is possible, however, to isolate factors that give a relative picture of these interactions, and thus achieve a rough but operational measurement of socio-economic integration.

Following conventional usage, we may first accord the measurement a positive or negative rating according to whether there is agreement or disagreement between the converging or diverging directions of the micro-economic strategies and macro-economic policies. This sign may, therefore, be expressed in terms of the effects of the many variables that go into one of the calculation criteria. For example, to acquire a form of technology more cheaply, a country may decide to emphasize the

*Acceptance
of different
value systems*


clauses bearing on purchase or licensing of patents rather than insist that a research-and-development centre be set up locally. In this case, a TC's R and D activities outside the host country may be in line with the policy of the host country and will be measured as positive, whereas, for governments that insist on having local R and D centres, the same activity may come out negatively in the measurement.

The clauses of a contract must be well-defined in terms of what the DC expects from the TC and may be expressed as operational objectives to be reached in the short, medium or long term. The comparison between these governmental constraints on the activities of a TC and its activities then determines the degree of socio-economic integration expressed as a percentage.

To illustrate, we may consider the following criteria (the list is not to be construed as exhaustive):

- I Managerial behaviour and head-office/branch-plant relations;
- II centralization or decentralization of R and D;
- III centralization or decentralization of production;
- IV centralization or decentralization of marketing;
- V centralization or decentralization of financial activities;
- VI adaptation to local labour conditions.

This can be expressed in the form of the following graph:



Using this graph as a basis, a profile for each corporation can be drawn up that makes it possible to express socio-economic integration in visual form and then monitor the adjustments made between TC strategies and DC policies.

At that point, maximum and minimum interaction tolerance thresholds must be determined. The maximum threshold represents the highest level a TC may endorse without destroying those management objectives reflected in its philosophy of capitalist-type actions or without exceeding the tolerance level of certain administrators towards their value system. Beyond certain compromises, the board of directors of the TC may re-examine its participation even within the DC, if the board finds it extremist or non-profitable. The minimum threshold represents non-compliance by a TC with the development policies of a DC. This kind of abuse may be met with correctional and retaliatory measures by the DC, which may take the form of expropriation or nationalization, pure and simple.

Socio-economic integration, evaluated in this way, may be translated into concrete objectives and serve as a tool for measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of TCs and DCs.

In addition, it puts the onus on certain DC governments to formulate clear plans of action concerning what they expect from TCs. The framework of operations is thus better and more clearly defined, to the benefit of both parties concerned.

Only on this condition can strategic managerial behaviour in socio-economic integration become a stabilizing force in the development of DCs and at the same time lessen DC dependence.

Consuls lend a helping hand to innocents abroad—and others

by Glen Buick

The distress we have experienced since June 27 has been replaced by a feeling of great relief and of gratitude towards the Department of External Affairs for the concern it has shown for the well-being of Canadian nationals abroad.

(Letter — original in French — to the Director of Consular Operations, August 16, 1976)

"It is very reassuring to know that External is concerned not only with larger matters but also with the individual Canadian who has problems overseas."

(Letter to the Director of Consular Operations, September 27, 1976)

The quotations above are not unique, or even unusual. They are representative of dozens of letters that the Department of External Affairs receives each year acknowledging assistance from Canadian consular personnel in posts abroad or in the Department in Ottawa. We get complaints, too, but few enough to make us confident that we are at least on our way to meeting the consular imperative of protecting and helping Canadians travelling or living outside Canada. "Assistance" is not, of course, always of the kind one might expect from such exalted persons as diplomats and consuls. The Canadian Embassy in Spain recently sent us the following account of a consular case:

Subject is a retired Canadian who, after registering at a hotel in Madrid and leaving his baggage, identification and travellers' cheques in his hotel room, went out for dinner but could not find his way back to his hotel nor could he remember the name of the hotel. In spite of a thorough search of hotel directories by ourselves and numerous inquiries over a period of two days by Spanish police and tourist officials, the name and address of the hotel could not be determined. Finally, one of the locally-engaged staff and her boy friend volunteered to drive subject through the streets and, after four hours, the hotel was finally located. The subject's clothes and identification were found in his room. At Christmas, the Embassy received a thank-you letter from the subject in Canada. Total man-hours spent on the case: 20 hours.

The fact that more and more Canadians are travelling, working and living abroad has created a steadily-increasing demand for consular services of all kinds. During 1976 there were close to half a million requests for consular assistance at Canadian posts abroad. Our posts helped 3,145 stranded Canadians to obtain financial assistance, usually from relatives and friends in Canada. The posts helped to ensure that 627 Canadians who became ill or were involved in accidents obtained suitable medical treatment and assistance. They were notified of the deaths abroad of 456 Canadians, and made sure that next-of-kin were informed and, when necessary, that funeral arrangements were completed. More than 38,000 passports were issued by Canadian posts during 1976, and assistance with visas, advice, notarial services and information was provided in another 460,000 cases. The posts were made aware of the detention of 1,018 Canadians over the course of the year, helped them obtain legal counsel and ensured that they were

Steady increase in demand for services of consuls

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being treated humanely. Early this year, there were 236 Canadians known to be in jail abroad (90 in the United States, 18 in France, 17 in India, 13 in Germany, 12 in Mexico, ten in Spain and the rest scattered among 27 other countries). Of the 146 in prisons outside the U.S.A., over 80 per cent (120) are being held for "drug-related" offences.

Since more than 2,800,000 valid Canadian passports were in the hands of Canadian citizens at home and in various parts of the world, and more than 36 million Canadian residents visited the U.S. during 1976, it is clear that the demand for consular services is not likely to diminish appreciably. Under the circumstances, what sort of policy governs and should govern the availability of services to the Canadian public?

Successive Secretaries of State for External Affairs and Under-Secretaries have emphasized the importance of the consular role for the Department of External Affairs. The only direct contact, for most Canadians, with the Department of External Affairs comes through the provision of passport and consular services, and the need to provide these services effectively and efficiently is recognized. (This recognition has been reflected in the change of name from the Bureau of Consular Affairs to the Bureau of Consular Services.) Over the past few years, the Department has attempted not just to carry out these tasks well but to find ways of doing them still better. Among other activities, an improved training program for consular personnel at home and abroad has been instituted; more than 150 officers and support staff of the Departments of External Affairs, Manpower and Immigration, and Industry, Trade and Commerce underwent such training before being posted abroad in 1976.

There are 109 posts regularly performing consular duties, and honorary consuls have been appointed in areas where there is a demonstrated need for consular services that cannot be met by the present resources of the responsible posts, or by arrangement with another Commonwealth consular service. This program is not yet very extensive, but in the past 18 months honorary consuls have been appointed in Malaga, Spain, and in Guadalajara and Acapulco, Mexico. Our experience so far has been that these appointments represent a real increase in our ability to provide emergency services to Canadians in trouble in these areas of high concentration for Canadian residents and travellers.

The Department has also developed and improved contingency plans and procedures for responding to emergencies affecting Canadians in all parts of the world; has promoted the freer movement of peoples, as that phrase is used in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation of Europe, concentrating in particular on the reunification in Canada of divided families; and has developed and implemented a "consular awareness" program to increase the information available to Canadians travelling abroad with regard to potential problems, in order to reduce the likelihood of such problems.

Training

The training program, though brief, attempts to familiarize consular personnel with: the various administrative requirements for Canadians abroad, such as the issuing of passports and the exigencies of the Citizenship Act; the requirements for admission to Canada under the Immigration Act; the kind of notarial functions they may be asked to perform; and the variety of problems Canadians get into abroad. It attempts, too, to instil in consular staff a capacity for compassion and commonsense at least equal to their devotion to rules and regulations. The need for such an introduction may be underlined by the following excerpt from a report from one of our embassies in the northern half of Africa, describing the difficulties faced by Canadians who run foul of the law:

... cases of active maltreatment generally occur in the police stations during preliminary interrogation; they are extremely rare once the parties are actually transferred to the prison. In fact, the prison administration, given extremely limited financial and personnel resources, does its best to accord as humane a treatment (especially to foreign prisoners) as possible. That said, however, it must be stated flatly that the conditions in the prisons, by Canadian standards, are extremely poor. Overcrowded cells, with up to a dozen prisoners in a cell designed for two, are common. One Canadian reported that they were about 40 in the cell and at night slept sardine style on their sides, each prisoner jammed in tightly against his neighbour. Prison diets are meagre, consisting usually of hot water and bread for breakfast and lunch, with a bowl of soup for supper. In some prisons foreign prisoners are required to observe Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting) along with their . . . fellow inmates.

*Importance
of consular role
emphasized*

There is no heat and, as the winter can be quite cold at times, prisoners can be regarded as extremely lucky if they are allowed an extra blanket — “mattresses” consist of straw on the floor, if that. Medical treatment is sporadic . . . and the Embassy has to be watchful for cases of prisoners falling ill or with chronic medical problems. Although most foreign prisoners are left alone, misbehaviour is generally treated harshly, with a severe beating followed by head shaving and a week in solitary confinement being a standard punishment for such offences as swearing at a guard (who has, by the way, the right under law to take a prisoner to court for a new charge, trial and sentence if he so desires). One Canadian rather foolishly got upset because he was being arrested along with one or two others (he was driving a tour bus) and pushed a police officer — he was severely beaten, with the result that he went blind in one eye for a time because it got infected, and he was charged with “outrage” as well as possession of drugs.

What, in fact, is the Canadian consul supposed to do when one of his compatriots ends in jail? Canadians detained abroad may, as a matter of right, request protection from Canadian diplomatic and consular posts if they feel they have been subjected to discrimination, have suffered injurious treatment or have been denied due process of law in a foreign country. Under such circumstances, the consular officials will offer information, advice and assistance within their competence and authority. Specifically, Canadian consular officers will ensure that an accused has access to legal counsel by providing the names of several lawyers on request or, if he or she is destitute, referring the accused to the legal aid society. If free legal aid is not available to destitute persons, it may be possible to advance funds to pay legal fees. Consular officers will help the detained person get in touch with relatives and friends, keep them informed of the developments in the case, transmit mail and facilitate the occasional transfer of funds from them for the use of the accused. They will visit Canadian prisoners when such visits are desired and possible, to find out how they are and to ensure that their rights and dignity are respected. They will, where appropriate, make representations to local, regional and national authorities to obtain information, to accelerate judicial procedures, and to improve conditions of detention. They will assist in obtaining qualified medical attention, and

purchase, on a recoverable basis, court records or other legal documents when these are essential to the accused’s defence and he or she is destitute. Finally, they may arrange repatriation, on a recoverable basis, when the prisoner is indigent and the host state requires his departure forthwith. These services are provided to Canadians imprisoned, as possible and appropriate, without judgment by the consular official as to guilt or innocence. Doing what is possible for the accused frequently means many hours of work by more than one member of the mission staff and may involve substantial travel; 200 frustrating miles separate the Embassy in Rabat, Morocco, where the vice-consul works, from Marrakech, where a young Canadian marijuana-fancier languishes in jail, and when a Canadian labour leader was (erroneously) reported arrested in Bolivia, the consul had to fly some 600 miles from Lima, Peru, to investigate.

Sometimes it is easier. The gentleman who arrived at the Embassy in San José, Costa Rica, last January, having lost all his money and his bus ticket to Managua, Nicaragua, said he had had no contact with anyone in his family since 1962 and knew no one in Vancouver (his final destination) who could help him. Would the Government please get him home? It took one telegram to Ottawa and one (admittedly lucky) telephone call from the Consular Operations Division to New Westminster to locate his brother, who agreed to advance \$400 to bring him back. Two days later he was home.

Dual citizenship

A special set of problems is involved for consular officers in dealing with Canadians who are also citizens of other countries. The Department issues the following warning with every Canadian passport:

Through birth, derivation from parents, marriage, naturalization, you may be considered a citizen of another country and, even though under Canadian law you are a Canadian citizen, during a visit there you might find yourself in violation of local laws relating to compulsory military service, to taxation or to illegal emigration. In a situation of “dual nationality” the ability of Canadian authorities to assist you is limited because the foreign state has, within its boundaries, full jurisdiction over persons it considers its citizens.

It is suggested that, before leaving for a country whose citizen you may be considered to be, you verify your citizenship status with the embassy or con-

*200-mile journey
to assist
marijuana-
fancier*

sulate of that country in Canada and enquire whether there are any outstanding charges or obligations to which you will be subject on arrival.

That this is no idle warning is exemplified by the following case reported by the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade:

Subject, male, aged 26, returned to Yugoslavia for three-month visit. Had originally left legally with his parents as child of five. Stayed with grandparents in small Macedonian village. Called Embassy to report passport had been seized when he applied for extension of visa and informed he was liable for military service.

He subsequently visited Embassy, where he was informed of the provisions of Yugoslav law governing military service. He was also cautioned that, if he tried to leave the country illegally, he could be tried under the Penal Code for attempting to avoid military service and, even if successful in departure, he would then be in the position of not being able to return. A replacement passport could be issued but it would be of no use since it would not have the necessary exit visa.


He returned to his village and was subsequently inducted for his military service. Passport was therefore returned through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with a note stressing the subject's "Yugoslav citizenship".

Fourteen months later he reappeared, recovered passport and departed for Canada.

Sometimes it is not a case of a return visit, but a decision to leave Canada and return "home" — a decision that may be taken under emotional stress of one kind or another. Persons who are contemplating a return to the country of their original citizenship to live permanently should be aware that the experience of Canadian consular officers, particularly those stationed in Eastern European countries, has been that some people who have made this decision and have subsequently changed their minds about dwelling permanently in the country of their other citizenship have experienced great difficulty in obtaining permission to leave in order to return to Canada. In cases of this kind, there is, in fact, no guarantee that permission to leave the country of the person's other citizenship will be received from the local authorities. When permission is denied, there is often little that the Canadian Government can do to assist the person concerned in re-emigrating.

Essential services

Not all consular work involves Canadian in trouble abroad. An important part of the total time spent on consular work by Canadian embassies, high commissions and consulates is in providing essential services to aliens — chiefly visa issuance of various kinds, representations on behalf of individuals in Canada, and other tasks involved in family-reunification. Most of the consular activities of Canadian diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe and China and a substantial part of those in Cuba



come under this heading. The Canadian Government has traditionally sought, for humanitarian reasons, to persuade other governments to give sympathetic consideration to nationals applying for permission to emigrate in order to join members of their families who have settled in Canada. One of Canada's major concerns throughout the negotiations in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was to ensure the acceptance of a meaningful text in the area of human contacts, and particularly in that of the reunification of families. Encouraging other governments to let their citizens come forward is a slow, repetitive and frustrating process, and even when success is achieved it is rarely possible to claim that it was only the representations made that ultimately brought about the desired end.

One of the most important developments in Canadian consular policy over the past few years has been the development of an "awareness program" intended

*Military service
can be the fate
of dual citizens*

warn Canadians of problems they might encounter while travelling abroad. Besides drawing to the attention of travel agents and transportation companies cases on which it appears that their negligence has caused difficulty to travellers, the Bureau of Consular Services publishes annually a booklet that is widely distributed to the Canadian travelling public (including a copy given with each new passport issued). It contains advice to travellers and the addresses and telephone numbers of all Canadian embassies and consulates in the world. The booklet, which has been extensively revised this year, now carries the title *Bon Voyage, but . . .*. In addition, the department has carried out a special advertising and information campaign through the university student press warning younger travellers of some of the pitfalls of foreign travel (especially drug problems), as well as an advertising program in the Canadian "ethnic press" to warn Canadians about problems they may encounter when travelling in countries of their "former or other nationality". The Bureau has made and arranged public distribution of a 28-minute documentary film entitled *In Distress* (which focuses on some consular problems in Mexico) and participated in press interviews and television and radio programs to increase consular awareness. Consular Services has also published and distributed a wall-poster reminding the travelling public of the need for proper documentation (passports, visas, vaccination certificates, etc.). The message on all the media is basically the same: "Bon voyage . . . have a good trip, but remember, other countries are not like Canada. Foreign laws and customs are different — often much stricter — and the often complex legal processes of other countries apply fully to Canadians who may find themselves in trouble abroad. Most important, Canadian laws do not

apply abroad, just as foreign laws do not apply in Canada."

In 1883, in his book *The Institutes of the Law of Nations*, James Lorimer referred to the consul's office as "less dignified and less highly privileged, but scarcely less important, than that of the ambassador". Lorimer was not referring to the Canadian situation, of course — it was not until the Second World War that the title of consul was carried by a Canadian officer abroad, but his explicit recognition of the importance of the consular function is applicable to the Canadian consular service today. The consular service does not exist separate from the foreign service of Canada, and most Canadian ambassadors have done consular work at various stages in their careers before receiving ambassadorial appointments. They were guided in carrying out their consular duties by the following paragraph from the *Instructions for the Guidance of Officers Performing Consular Duties* of 1956, the Department's first formal consular manual:

The following instructions . . . are designed principally to provide guidance to consular officers and are not devised to impose uniform and categorical direction in those unusual situations where practical humanitarian action demands a deviation from the normal procedures. Consular officers, therefore, are expected to interpret these instructions reasonably and intelligently with due regard to the public interest, bearing in mind that no attempt has been made to provide for necessary and self-evident exceptions.

That they and their successors have taken such advice to heart seems likely to us when the Minister receives letters about our consular services like the one dated August 3, 1976, which concluded that "as a taxpayer, it was a pleasure to see my money well spent — for a change".

*Reasonable
and intelligent
interpretation
expected*

Coming in the next issue

Escott Reid breaks a four-year silence concerning Canadian policy on aid to poor countries. He calls for Canada to take the lead in proposing that rich countries abolish tariff and non-tariff barriers against all imports from very poor countries.

At the back of the issue, Reid's recently-published *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949* is the subject of a review article by James Eayrs. "Unlike most diplomatic memoirs," says Eayrs, "this is a work of careful scholarship."

John Holmes turns his attention to

the complex question of morality and foreign affairs. "The greatest danger," writes Holmes, "may be cynicism, that of the 'realist' who contends that there is no place for morality in an immoral world, and that of the 'moralist' whose sweeping denigrations have undermined faith in government itself, both national and international."

Alex Inglis covered the Downing Street summit meeting in May. Of the weekend meeting of the leaders of the seven leading Western industrialized nations, Inglis writes that "The whole process of economic summitry begun at Rambouillet was being put to the test".

By abandoning peace-keeping NATO could be reinforced

By F. S. Manor

"Would the international system be what it is if the United Nations did not exist?" Professor Raymond Aron asked in his authoritative work *Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations* (Doubleday, 1966). His answer was: "I do not know; I have confined myself to the assertion, obvious to me, that the United Nations has not exercised a major influence on the course of international relations."

Since then, the prestige and influence of the United Nations have further declined. It is in this context that one must ask whether Canada should continue to expend one of its scarcest resources — trained military manpower — on a purpose that, to the writer, seems as futile as it is dangerous.

I believe that the time has come for Canada to abandon its peace-keeping role, which has been one long tale of woe. This step should be taken now, before Canada's forces, especially those in the Middle East, face perils for which they are not equipped and that may have grave domestic and foreign repercussions.

The entire peace-keeping operation, faulty in conception and futile in execution, is hardly worth the dubious prestige acquired by Canada as "chevalier sans peur et sans reproche". Indeed, under the existing circumstances, Canada has come to assume more and more, in its peace-keeping role, the character of quixotic knight-errant.

The yearning is not new for a supranational body that would be able to pre-

serve law and order as a policeman on the beat ensures by his mere presence that order is kept and law obeyed. It has never been translated into reality because there is a vast difference between municipal law, of which the policeman — often unarmed, as in Britain — is the executive arm, and international law.

To quote Professor Aron again: "The law that would establish peace between nations would resemble constitutional law more than any other . . . and it is constitutional law that always remains closest to its violent origins." Thus a supranational law could probably be ushered in only by new violence, such as that inherent in the rise of a new empire. A peaceful attempt to bring into existence a supranational order has ever succeeded. We recall from our history lessons the futile fifteenth-century initiative by the Hussite King George of Bohemia, who tried to interest the King of France in a European league possessing its own military force; I recall from my own experience the attempts by the League of Nations to organize a similar force. The most famous instance was the supervision of the Saar plebiscite of 1935. I can still vividly recall the enthusiasm and relief with which the world then greeted the essay in international peace-keeping. Tensions had been rising and trouble was brewing, and then the League peace force stepped in, an earnest of better times to come when the League would ensure peace and tranquillity. The euphoria, however, was of short duration. "The year which witnessed the return of the Saar to Germany, so far from ushering a happier period in international relations, has seen darker storm clouds over Europe than any period since the guns stopped firing in the Great War," Professor H. L. Fisher wrote about this particular essay in peace-keeping (*A History of Europe*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1935).

Persistent dream

Yet the dream persists and is now given credence in Chapter VII of the Charter

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the United Nations. Article 43 provides that:

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

And Section 3 of this Article stipulates: "The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council."

Thirty-two years later we still have no such agreement or agreements — "the high that proved too high, the heroic far too hard. . .". Or, as Lord Acton once put it, "the statesman always seems to me in a non-moral position, because he has to consider what is possible as well as what is best. . .". The officials who drafted the Charter were anxious not to obscure the actualities of the international situation, well aware that the Yalta idea of "four policemen" who would keep peace in the world with an international force had become by 1945 a "dead duck"; by then the Soviet ideological tide was at the flood.

Sir Charles Webster, who was a British representative on the drafting committee, wrote that the proposals for the formation of a UN military staff committee were aimed mainly at ensuring "direct and continuous contact between those responsible for the armed forces of the great powers, such as had never been obtained in the League of Nations". Even this hope had "unfortunately . . . to be deferred" (*The Art and Practice of Diplomacy* by Charles Webster, Chatto & Windus, 1961).

Interestingly enough, Canada was then foremost among the nations that viewed the provisions of Article 43 with some misgiving. It was upon the insistence of Canada, supported by Britain, that Article 44 was inserted in the Charter to ensure that it was the national government, and not the Security Council, that determined how any national contingent was to be employed. Canada was willing to do good, but the lesson of the Chanak incident of 1922 was not to be lightly disregarded.

Idea unworkable

The idea of an international force under a UN military staff committee proved unworkable. However, a more moderate idea — that of an international police force

operating under UN auspices — continued to attract statesmen. In 1955, when Israel's borders were being violated by marauding terrorists who on occasion penetrated to the outskirts of Tel Aviv, Adlai Stevenson proposed that such an international police force patrol Israel's border. The idea did not get past the United States Foreign Relations Committee, and

It was during these weeks of crisis, when guns boomed in the Sinai, Hungarian insurgents battled Soviet tanks in Budapest, and Nikita Khrushchov threatened to drop nuclear bombs on London and Paris, that Canada's Lester B. Pearson seized the opportunity to realize his cherished notion of an impartial UN police force. His quick action helped to extricate Britain and France from an untenable position on the Suez Canal, and a symbolic force was interposed between the Egyptians and the Israelis. It was the high-water mark of peace-keeping, and Mr. Pearson was rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize.

Unfortunately, what was essentially a swift, *ad hoc* operation was soon transformed into the lofty ideal of permanent peace-keeping. It became gospel that international relations had taken on a new dimension, and an Ottawa spokesman proudly pointed to the fact that the new UN police force was growing, and "that is why the External Affairs Department is watching the force with fascinated interest and why it is of such great importance to the general public". "Mais où sont les neiges d'antan!"

When in October 1957 Nikita Khrushchov invented a new danger of war, this time between Syria and Turkey, Mr. Pearson was quick to propose that a UN police force be placed on the borders of the two countries. Before anybody could think that suggestion through, Khrushchov, at a cocktail party, released the dogs of that particular war and the strange episode was over.

Yet Canada did not abandon its ambition to see a permanent UN police force come into being "to stamp out a brush-fire type of international incident before it turned into a general holocaust". In June 1964, Canada was instrumental in calling an international conference to discuss the setting-up of such a force. In 1971, the conference was still hard at work.

Meanwhile, however, doubts began to be felt about the validity of the UN police force idea. In the Congo — a problem that, at the time of writing, seems to be back with us — the Swedes, who formed a sub-

*Ad hoc operation
was transformed
into lofty ideal*

stantial part of the UN force, badly burned their fingers in the effort to snuff out the Katanga secession movement. The Swedish contingent suffered casualties — which perceptibly cooled Sweden's ardour. "The problem is," a diplomat of that country told me at that time, "Swedish soldiers tend to have mothers, and the mothers tend to have votes."

The messy Congo affair revived Canadian scepticism about the workability of a UN police force. In 1963, John Diefenbaker observed, with remarkable foresight, that in any disagreement the national contingents serving in a UN peace force would follow instructions from their own governments rather than from the UN. And, as if to prove him right, in 1967 a number of the UN contingents returned home from the Sinai without awaiting the UN's decision about President Nasser's order evicting UN peace-keepers from Egyptian territory. When the shooting began, the UN Indian contingent, whether by accident or design, moved across the line of advance of the Israelis and was badly mauled.

The 1967 UN *débâcle* proved the futility of the peace-keeping idea, moving the then Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, to observe that an umbrella that is taken away as soon as it begins to rain is not much use.

Painful experience

Suez was the most painful UN peace-keeping disaster. But there was little success to be recorded in any other theatre where Canadians served as peace-keeping observers.

For years, Canadian servicemen patrolled the borders between Pakistan and India without being able to forestall ferocious wars between these two countries. Canadians served in the Congo, where the old rivalries remain as brutal as ever. Canadians were in the Yemen, today a fief of the Soviet Union, which, by dominating from Yemen and Somalia the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, threatens the West's Middle East oil supplies.

Canada served on the International Control Commission in Indochina with Poland and India, the latter acting as chairman. A bitter comment by Squadron-Leader Hugh Campbell is on record about this international operation: "The Poles demonstrated that impartiality is not in the Communist book".

I shall quote my own interview with a French-speaking Canadian officer attached to the ICC in Laos. On one occasion, Soviet planes operating from North Vietnam dropped supplies to the Com-

munist forces on the Plain of Jars. The Laotian Government lodged a complaint with the ICC, and the ICC travelled to the Plain of Jars to investigate. The Canadian officer noticed that some of the crates dropped from aircraft had burst open and could be seen to bristle with automatic weapons and ammunition. When the Canadian began to count the weapons he was promptly checked by his Polish colleague: "These are not machine-guns, this is rice". The Indian chairman remarked he could not understand the point of the dispute — he could not see any crates anywhere.

Cyprus

Last but certainly not least, Canadians are still on Cyprus, although in 1964 L. B. Pearson promised that Canadian soldiers would not be sent there for "an indefinite period" and that the force would truly contribute to peace and stability on the island. Instead, for ten years the UN force served as a convenient pretext for the two sides to refuse to come to terms. The bizonal idea accepted today by Archbishop Makarios was suggested to him by the Turks in 1964. When, in 1974 the Turks invaded the island, the UN umbrella was again quickly folded.

UN troops are not allowed to shoot unless shot at, as if they were British bobbies (though today even the British police go armed and have been known to shoot first); at the first sign of trouble they are told to head for the nearest evacuation-post. This is a humiliating role for a soldier.

I visited Cyprus in December 1974. The sun was shining, the orange-groves were golden with fruit, the bougainvillea provided splashes of colour very welcome after the drab white of the Canadian winter, where temperatures already stood well below the freezing-mark. There was an all-pervading scent of the Mediterranean pine mingling with the salty tang of the calm, blue Mediterranean. "When every prospect pleases . . ."

Now a good part of my life has been spent among soldiers, and I know that grumbling is a basic ingredient in a soldier's make-up. I am quite sure that the Assyrians who came down like wolves in the fold grumbled about too much meat and honey in their rations; we know that Alexander's soldiers grumbled, and when it came to grumbling Roman legionaries were the unsurpassed champions. Yet, in the midst of a Canadian winter, I thought a peaceful billet in such pleasant surroundings

*Little success
of peace-keeping
in any theatre*

oundings would be welcome even to the most accomplished grumbling artist.

However, I soon realized how frustrating and morale-destroying is a soldier's task when assigned to these futile peace-keeping duties, in which, as Mr. Pearson said in 1965, "there is no enemy to be defeated". A policeman can arrest a wrongdoer. A UN peace-keeper can merely plead, cajole and eventually file a grievance with UN headquarters in New York, where it will gather dust as have so many previous grievances. In 1976 the morale of Canadian peace-keepers was no better than in 1964, when "the majority of Canadian soldiers in the Sinai) were bored, frustrated by the tedious sameness of the daily routine". "I am an infantry officer trained to lead and fight," a subaltern told Terence Robertson of *Weekend Magazine* at that time. "They spent a fortune on me at home making me a good officer and a good fighter. . . ." In the Sinai he was watching dope smugglers and terrorists, whom he was not allowed to arrest but merely to bring to the notice of the Egyptian army, which promptly turned them loose.

Again, in 1964, the then commander of the Canadian contingent on Cyprus said he would not like to see professional Canadian soldiers left indefinitely on peace-keeping operations such as Cyprus. "it would sort of dilute their ability to wage war." There can be no doubt whatever, 13 years later, that UN tasks adversely affect the morale of soldiers.

A soldier's duty is to ensure the safety of his country and his society by the threat of force, or, if need be, its use. It is not his job to guard the warehouse of a Greek Cypriot car-dealer whose stock of new cars was stranded in the no-man's-land separating Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is not the job of a highly-trained senior officer to ascertain whether a Turkish observation-post is a few feet higher than the one on the Greek side.

Civil police

The Austrians and the Australians have sent their civil police to Cyprus. There is no reason why Canada should not follow suit. The present practice is wasteful, and deleterious to a soldier's morale since he knows that, although the job is futile, he has every chance of being killed. When, in 1974, Syrian forces fired one of their Soviet SAM missiles at an unarmed Canadian *Buffalo* aircraft, killing all aboard, they neither apologized nor offered to pay compensation to the families of the victims, nor did they express regret at the

loss of life of men who were in the area to protect the peace and tranquillity of the Syrians themselves.

Up to 1974, the Cyprus operation cost the Canadian tax-payer over \$75 million, and this at a time when, in the solitary successful peace-keeping operation — NATO —, Canadian soldiers were keeping their old *Centurion* tanks going "with the help of chewing-gum". Canada maintains 500 men on Cyprus and 850 men in the Sinai while NATO is crying for men and equipment to counter the three-to-one superiority of Soviet tanks and heavy artillery, as well as the 150,000 Soviet preponderance in manpower.

While the Cyprus operation has degenerated into a meaningless charade, the Sinai operation is full of danger. The diplomatic goal in the Middle East is peace, with each country living within its secure and recognized borders. Yet the continuing "binge" of arms-buying has brought the region to a terrifying level of destructive capacity.

The presence of the lightly-armed UN force amid the missiles and other sophisticated weaponry is meaningless. UN prestige having sunk as low as it has today, would anybody pay any attention to the UN presence? As they were in Indochina, Canadians are involved with a Polish contingent. The Poles were wished upon the UN force solely because of Canada's insistence on being included in the operation. The Egyptians did not want Canada, nor did the Soviet Union. Yet Canada insisted. Why?

The "Polish connection" could prove highly uncomfortable. Mr. Diefenbaker has alleged that, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Polish pilots flew Egyptian MiG planes, and to this day Poland has no diplomatic relations with Israel. Surely the lesson learned in Vietnam, that "impartiality is not in the Communist book", is still valid. No new developments in the Communist world would necessitate a revision of this assessment.

We also know from long experience that, in a crisis, each national contingent of a UN force follows orders from its own government, rather than from the UN. Thus it cannot be ruled out that, in the event of new hostilities, some of the UN contingents may quickly doff their blue UN hats and don the helmets of their national forces. Where would this leave the 850 Canadians?

The Economist of London has called the UN peace-keeping forces "reporters in uniform". Even Mr. Pearson became disillusioned in the end with peace-keeping,

*Staggering level
of destructive
capacity*

and in 1969 opposed the stationing of any new UN force in the Middle East.

The first priority of Canadian defence policy is to maintain international stability. Therefore, our troops should be where stability is most threatened, and where their soldierly qualities would help to redress the dangerous imbalance in weapons and manpower that exists on the Central Front.

UN peace-keeping does not contribute to international stability. On the contrary, by positing a fictitious set of circumstances that in no way correspond to harsh real-

ities, it has contributed to the further destabilization of unstable situations. At best, it is a waste of money and resources; at worst, it could cost Canadian lives.

The 1,350 Canadian soldiers now undergoing boredom on Cyprus and exposed to the threat of unpleasant surprises in the Sinai, belong on the Central Front where their duties would be those of soldiers and where they are urgently required to man Canada's new equipment. They should be assigned to NATO as quickly as possible.

Likely victory of French Left opens new political scenarios

By J. M. Domenach

The municipal elections of March 13 and 20, 1977, have brought us face to face with the question of what will happen in France in April 1978 if the Left wins the legislative election.

The coalition of Communists, Socialists and left-wing radicals, gathering in its wake some former Centrist supporters and, in the second round of polling, a large bloc of "ecology-conscious" voters, was able to win a considerable number of mayoralty races. Granted, municipal elections are not a fool-proof indicator; local situations are varied and complex, and can hardly be reduced to a bipolar confrontation, nor do voters consider these campaigns as crucially important in national politics as the legislative and presidential elections. However, over the past three years, the Union of the Left has been gaining ground steadily,

as indicated by surveys as well as successive elections, and a reasonable estimate of support for the Left in the spring of 1977 would be approximately 53 per cent of the electorate. This is precisely the figure it needs, given unfavourable war- ing, for a majority in the National Assembly.

The margin is indeed a narrow one; a shift of 1 per cent either way could make the difference. This is a characteristic of France shares with most of the world's great democracies, where majorities are won by small percentages. The success of Gaullism merely delayed the manifestation of this tendency, which can be seen as a healthy one in that it indicates an instinctive desire to offset one extreme by another and to minimize the likelihood of partisan highhandedness. After a quarter-century of political upheavals (1944-1968) and ten years of almost artificial stability (1969-1978), it is only normal for the French to want to change leaders, to bid farewell to an exceptional era and shake off a spell which has benefited de Gaulle's successors long enough — especially now that the steady rise in the standard of living has been halted by inflation and unemployment.

However, this very domination, prolonged by the de Gaulle heritage, means that the alternation of governing parties, a common occurrence in parliamentary democracies, has been an unknown experience in France for the past 20 years.

Mr. Domenach was active in the French Resistance movement during the Second World War. Since 1946 he has been associated with the journal Esprit, which he edited from 1957 to 1976. He is currently series editor at Les Editions du Seuil. He is a member of the French National Commission for UNESCO, vice-president of L'Association France-Québec and administrator of L'Office franco-québécois pour la Jeunesse. The most recent of his many books is Le Sauvage et l'Ordinateur (The Savage and the Computer). The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Domenach.

In addition, the Constitution adopted in 1958 makes alternation difficult, since the President's seven-year term of office is longer than the legislature's five years. Consequently, if the Union of the Left should emerge victorious, President Giscard d'Estaing would have to govern for three years with a majority that had been elected against him. This paradoxical situation exists in some countries, but it would be highly undesirable in France, where the Constitution does not seem to have allowed for such an eventuality and where usage has increased the powers of the President. Serious conflict seems inevitable, especially since the difference between the Majority and the Opposition does not lie in their programs alone but in tradition and ideology — a level at which not only political orientations but a whole system and the question of one's "choice of society" are involved.

Historical explanation

Look at the history of France will explain why each election almost stirs up a civil war. The Occupation, the most recent time of duress, added new wounds. Gaullism owes its longevity to the historical momentum it built up during this period. Even during the March elections, candidates in places like Saint-Etienne were able to win by getting a little more mileage out of the memory of the Resistance. It is true that attitudes have been changing more rapidly in recent years, especially in the Communist Party (PCF), which has gained 10 per cent of its adherents since May 1968. The PCF has dropped all references to the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", loosened its ties with the Soviet Union and spoken out in favour of pluralism and tolerance, all of which has enabled it in two years to blot out the memory of its former Stalinism and win back much of the influence it had lost. Also, the Socialist Party (PS) has obtained a considerable lead over the PCF, and this has helped them more to reassure those who vote for the Union of the Left.

However, there is still a good deal of ideological tension, as was demonstrated by the municipal elections, which were more politicized and "bipolarized" than ever — to the extent that the Centre was crushed. Struggles between old rivals for village mayoralties became epic ideological battles between Right and Left, Liberalism and Socialism (or "collectivism", as the majority calls it). France has become much more modern and tolerant, but the power ideology is still strong. We might note at this point that the effects of industrial-

ization and mass culture on the Catholics have had an unexpected consequence — the secularization of Catholicism has brought about a transfer of part of its effective potential to politics, in particular to the Socialist Party, thereby lending Socialism the weight of religion, and Marxism an element of dogmatic faith, all of which has contributed to reinforcing the emotional and quasi-mystical side of politics here. Our last Marxist will undoubtedly be a Breton canon.

All of these factors help to dramatize the prospect of a Leftist majority being elected, transforming what should be a normal, healthy event in every democracy into an anxiety-filled issue; between now and March 1978, many of us will spend a lot of time wondering what is going to happen.

Before looking at some of the possibilities, I should point out that it is not my intention to forecast the results of the 1978 election. The election might even be called sooner, as far as that goes, although I doubt it, since Prime Minister Barre is involved in an anti-inflation campaign whose results will not be evident for some months. I should like to consider what will happen if the Union of the Left obtains a majority in the National Assembly. There is a good possibility that this will happen, although it is not certain—I see its present chances as two out of three. A lot can happen at home and internationally between now and the election. The unity of the Leftist coalition could be weakened by international tension or even by an intensification of the debate on the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage. Strikes or civil disorder might also bring the voters back to the Majority. Or the Majority might regain its cohesiveness and its former image by rallying round a charismatic leader like Chirac (the "Bonaparte at the Pont d'Arcole" style is still very successful in France) or a reassuring one like Barre (the Poincaré or Pinay style also goes over well). Finally, the Government might have a new electoral law passed by the Assembly. The current system — the election of one member to each constituency by an absolute majority in two rounds of voting — works to the advantage of allied groups and, as things are at present, favours the Union of the Left. However, a return to proportional voting would go against the spirit of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, and it is unlikely that the Gaullists, headed by Chirac, would agree to it.

But it is also possible and even likely that the Majority will continue to vacillate

*Possibility
of majority
for Union
of the Left*



World Wide Ph

Challenged by a union of left-wing political groups, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing also has to contend with a rallying of right-wing Gaullist forces behind former Premier Jacques Chirac. Following his resignation as Giscard's Prime Minister, Chirac entered the race for Mayor of Paris and won. He is shown in this picture at the Paris city hall (L'Hôtel-de-Ville) following his March 25 victory.

and to contradict and discredit itself, and that the Opposition, sensing that it is virtually the Majority, will for a time contain its internal bickering. In any case, our speculations will be based on this latter hypothesis.

April 1978. The Union of the Left has won the legislative election. Mitterrand lays claim to the position of Prime Minister . . . that is the only part of the script of which we can be certain. But will President Giscard hand over control of the Government to him?

We have three views on this:

- the PCF's Marchais: "The President must either submit or resign." (Cf. the famous words spoken by Gam-

betta to MacMahon at the beginning of the Third Republic.)

- The PS's Deferre: "The President could hardly violate the law of universal suffrage, which is one of the basic laws of democracy."
- Giscard d'Estaing: "The alternation of governing parties is a feature of any advanced democratic society whose structure is not threatened by any of its main components."

Comparing these three statements provides an indication of the factors favouring a change of government and those against it. The restriction made by Giscard d'Estaing unquestionably refers to the PCF. But the PS would like to be ab-

to co-operate with the President, and the President with the PS.

Will they be able to? Either of them might be prevented from co-operating by either or both of two allies essential to their coalition, Marchais and Chirac. If this is the case, what will happen? The President could dissolve the Assembly and call for a new election, which would have to be held 20 to 40 days after dissolution. The Constitution stipulates that, in such a case, the Assembly cannot be dissolved again for a year.) This would ordinarily be a risky and even suicidal operation, unless new factors cropped up in the intervening time, such as a dispute between the PCF and the PS, trouble because of leftist "oneupmanship", and so on. Dissolution is, after proportional representation, the second recourse available to the President — but only as a last-ditch move; if the Left were to win the second election, the President would have to step down, thereby giving the Left total victory.

Communist participation

The second question that arises concerns the nature of the Government that would be headed by Mitterrand. Would the Communists participate in the Government, or would they prefer to lend their support without participating, as was the case in 1936 at the time of the Popular Front victory? The secretary-general of the PCF has stated in no uncertain terms that, if the Left should win, the Communists would join the Government. But Mitterrand has foreseen the other possibility: "I can tell you now that, if the others do not wish to help form the Government, we do."

This discord leads us to the heart of the matter: will the PS and the PCF be able, or indeed want, to govern together?

The past hangs heavy over relations between the two parties; it was the Socialists who in 1947 drove the Communists out of the Government. This opened a period of hostility that did not really end until 1976, when the PCF took the path of "Eurocommunism". However, while pressing the PS to join with it and steadfastly adhere to the "common program of government", the PCF has devised an alternative strategy — "the union of the people of France". In areas where the Union of the Left would not hang together, the PCF presented coalition slates with a few big-name Gaullists or "republicans" listed along with its own candidates. These slates were not successful, but they do indicate a possibility. The PCF not only has a minority strong enough to block the PS,

it also has its control of the leadership of the CGT, France's largest union, as a means of pressure. The success of the future Government of the Left depends on the CGT's being moderate.

Waiting in the wings is a third group, the Leftists, whose numbers are small but whose influence could be a determining factor in a crisis. The Leftists, either by direct involvement or by manipulating certain organizations (their influence over the CFDT, the second-largest union in France, is considerable), can exert the same kind of pressure on the PCF that the PCF can exert on the PS. But this pressure could have two contradictory effects: it might either force the PCF into intransigence and "oneupmanship" or drive it into the arms of the dominant party to form a bloc in order to maintain order, as is now the case in Italy.

Whether or not the Union of the Left could remain together if it came into power is, therefore, problematic, especially since there is already disagreement over some basic points. The first issue is nationalization; under the common program, this is limited to nine industrial groups, but the possibility of nationalizing any business whatever remains open, provided that nationalization is requested by the workers, proposed by the Government and consented to by Parliament. The PS wants to keep down the number of nationalizing measures, and the PCF wishes to increase them — or so it says. There is also the question of management by employees; here, it is the PS (at least certain elements in it) that is to the fore, whereas the PCF and the CGT are holding back. Finally, and above all, there is the general attitude that any Government whatever — but especially a Government that represents a large number of diverse and at times contradictory interests — must adopt in the face of inflation and the rising cost of raw materials. The attitude of the PCF is nowhere near as moderate as that of the Italian Communist Party, and there is no way of knowing yet whether, once in power, it would choose in favour of economic restraint or compliance with worker demands.

Foreign policy

Other difficulties will inevitably arise out of foreign policy. Despite its recent about-face, the PCF is not prepared seriously to condemn the violation of human rights in countries it persists in calling "socialist". Above all, the parties' visions of Europe are contradictory. The PS, which in spite of everything remains at-

*Disagreement
on basic points
already exists*

tached to European social democracy, is in favour of election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, whereas the Communists see this as a betrayal. It is not inconceivable that the PCF might appeal to the Gaullists to mobilize what is left of French nationalism against "monopoly-controlled Europe", and this would lead to the break-up of the Left. In short, with regard to Europe, and also Israel, the PS is potentially closer to Centrist sensibilities, or at least social democratic ones, than to Communism.

There is, then, no lack of causes of internal conflict in the Union of the Left. However, the importance of this conflict will depend on the amount of confidence established between the partners. The PCF still suspects the Socialist leaders of wanting to get rid of them in order to govern under the aegis of Giscard d'Estaing, along with the Centrist elements of the present Majority. The PS, for its part, wonders whether the Communist machine has really changed and whether the PCF is not simply attempting to establish supremacy by whatever means are necessary. The experience of jointly governing a number of municipalities will be decisive from this viewpoint. How will the newly-elected Socialists measure up to the Communists, perennial incumbents in many cases?

The fate of a Government of the Left would, however, depend less on these probable disagreements than on the way in which others played their parts, in particular the middle class and small and large employers (the army is no longer an obstacle). Even if there were a protest vote for the Left, there would, nevertheless, be little confidence in its ability to manage the country, since many still see the Left as being synonymous with inflation and devaluation. According to Mitterrand, 400 billion francs have already been transferred to Switzerland from France. If the Left assumes power in a climate of financial panic, it will have to resort to repressive measures and will soon become unpopular. For some Rightist elements, there is a temptation to turn this to their advantage. Many employers are hostile towards socialism, whose economic failure they feel has been only too clearly demonstrated in the East. There is cause for conjecture, and apprehension, over the question of how far some private leaders of the economy might go to prevent the election of a Government of the Left.

The cards are not all on the table, course. The situation will differ depending on the margin of victory won by the Left in the election. If the margin is slight, the experiment might be continued — for how long, we cannot determine objectively. I do not think that the Union of the Left could remain in power for long unless there were some unforeseen changes. First, an almost metaphysical cleavage continues to separate the PS from the PCF, despite the recent changes in the Communist Party. Secondly, their political views conflict on many points. The third, and last reason is that the rapid rise in popularity of the PS has concealed a deep-seated lack of uniformity. Many of those who voted for the PS are not prepared to go along with a Leftist experiment with the PCF. A March 1977 survey published in *Le Monde* showed that over a third of the voters have opinions that are in no way revolutionary; 80 per cent of those who voted PS described themselves as being at the centre of the political spectrum while only 15 per cent situated themselves to the Left!

Realignment possible

We should, therefore, not rule out the possibility of a realignment along a Centre-Left axis, which would seem to suit a large percentage of French voters — a percentage that the upheavals accompanying the coming into power of the Left could transform into a majority. No doubt Giscard d'Estaing, who has been looking for such an opening for quite some time, will attempt to take advantage of it by exploiting the rivalry between the PS and the PCF as much as possible when the time is right. But the success of such a scheme depends less on the PS than on Chirac, the President's vigorous but burdensome ally. It also depends on events. Finally, it depends on a factor that is difficult to evaluate: the reaction of the international community, especially the European states, which would not look kindly upon a Socialist-Communist Government, but would favour a social democratic Government alternating with a conservative one. In the end, this is perhaps rather a problem of civilization than of politics. We shall soon know the extent to which France has abandoned its tradition of extremism and passionate involvement in favour of the calm, rather dull, style of Anglo-Saxon democracy.

Experience of governing municipalities will be decisive

Britain, Canada and Europe face resurgent regionalism

by A. W. Craig

The phenomenon is so widespread, so spontaneous, so difficult to pin down that nobody knows exactly what to call it. The considerable problem in choosing the more exact term between nationalism and regionalism is relatively minor compared with selecting (or discarding) among "sub-nationalism", "minority nationalism", "ethnicity", "tribalism", "consociationalism", "separatism", "devolution", and a host of others.

In short, what is going on in Canada *vis-à-vis* the Province of Quebec at present is, to quite an extent, a duplication of a problem facing many other societies, in most other areas of the world. While the considerable limitations of the process of comparison should be remembered, some interesting points emerge when nationalism/regionalism elsewhere in the world is studied with the Canadian case in mind. This is particularly so when there is a broad similarity in basic variables, such as the nature of socio-economic structure, level of education, cultural background, and so on. In these terms, the most fruitful area of comparison for Canadians is to be found in Western Europe, especially Britain.

The general term to be used in this article will be regionalism — although many of the actors understandably prefer to call it nationalism — and some, indeed, separatism. Regionalism embraces a wide range of diverse positions and responses. It varies from the call for more attention to the local requirements of, say, Prince Edward Island, to aspiration to outright separatism. The great problems, and potential perils, of the latter choice are obvious. The main purpose of this article, however, is not to offer a detailed anatomy and delineation of the different kinds of regionalism. Rather, it is to make international comparisons of the viewpoints of centre and periphery and to enquire if and how these viewpoints can be reconciled.

Governments today face many problems, but the central one seems to be that

of finding the correct balance among central planning, meeting the needs of different parts of the country, and satisfying popular demands. Nations must try to do this within an international political and economic framework over which they have relatively little control.

Similarities

Britain and Canada differ in many ways, yet share, for obvious reasons, considerable similarities. This is particularly so at present. Britain faces its gravest constitutional crisis in over two and a half centuries, and many people in Canada feel that their institutional problems are the most serious since the establishment of the nation. A statement by the Scottish Office in November 1975 that the status quo was "not an option" would seem to hold true for Canada as well. Other comparisons can be drawn. The traditional political actors are divided and nonplussed: What are they to do? What can they do? New parties with new politicians, ideas, zeal, take the stage, in Scotland and Wales as in Quebec.

To some extent, a similar process is going on in other Western democracies. What gives it particular strength and fire in Britain and Canada, however, is the resurgence of feelings of distinct national identity. In Britain this is due in part to the lost economic and political status of a once-proud imperial power, while in Canada it seems to owe much to the insufficiency of an over-arching national identity

Traditional political actors are divided and nonplussed

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and nationalism. No matter what the causes, there has been growing polarization in both countries in recent years.

In the British case, the points of view of the two sides, or two sets of actors, merit attention. At the risk of labouring the obvious, the phenomenon has to be looked at in at least two ways – not only from, say, London, but also from Edinburgh and Cardiff.

In the British case, part of the problem is to decide where the centre is: London or Brussels? Alienation caused by excessive centralization has been exacerbated by Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. The farther one got from London, the greater was the incidence of M.P.s' and referendum votes against "going into Europe". In the referendum of June 1975, only 58 per cent of Scotland's population voted in favour of continued membership in the EEC, compared to 67 per cent for Britain as a whole. The remoter parts of Scotland – the Shetland Islands and the Western Isles – were the only regions of Britain to vote against the EEC. And the most popular model country to Scottish nationalists for many years, Norway, somewhat less populous but much more prosperous than Scotland because of local control of oil revenues, has chosen by referendum not even to join the EEC.

Problem recognized

The EEC recognizes the problems of excessive centralization and tries to do something about them; its regional policies are designed to meet one of the basic objectives of the Treaty of Rome – i.e. "to strengthen the unity of the economies of the Member States and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions".

However, regional development policy in the EEC is still new and untested. Its aims are as impeccable as those of Canada's Department of Regional Economic Expansion, which the Government in Ottawa set up in 1969 to analyse the problems and assist the development of both rural and urban areas in any or all of the provinces.

But the great gap between aims and achievements has widened rather than closed, many people in the outlying areas feel. Within the present nation states, the dominant approach is still unquestioningly centralist. Pierre Trudeau, for example, believes that, in the words of the great nineteenth-century liberal, Lord Acton:

"The coexistence of several nations under the same state is a test as well as the test of the security of its freedom. . . ."

Seen from the outskirts in Britain or Canada, however, the justifications for that "coexistence" are not as persuasive as they seem at the centre. And a number of other observers express dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. In his contribution to *Europe Tomorrow*, John Pinder, Director of P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) decries "the static nature of the peripheral regions of Western Europe – those that are outside the 'golden quadrangle' between Milan, Paris, the Netherlands, and the Ruhr":

This is a disgrace in a society which prides itself on maintaining full employment, and it would hardly have been tolerated had these regions been independent states. If the techniques for creating employment were not available, all the resources of government would have been used to employ them. But because of the centralizing ideology of the modern nation-state, those who hold the economic and political power have regarded high unemployment in a depressed region as a secondary matter, provided that the average for the nation-state as a whole is fairly low. Central governments, even if they have done more for regional development in recent years, have not made it the very high priority that it needs to be; big firms are more inclined to put component manufacturing subsidiaries in the development regions than facilities of central importance and national trade unions, by imposing a national wage level across thriving and struggling regions alike, quite unintentionally thwart the creation of employment in the less-favoured regions. . . .

One indicator of the difficulty of conciling the two sides is that alliance compacts are often made for different reasons on either side; Scotland, for instance, united with England in 1707 for economic reasons, while England's main motivation had to do with defence.

Partnership degenerating into regional dominance means that the policies allowed do not always meet the interests of the less-powerful or less-populous regions. Regional dissatisfaction is above all due to widespread perception that regional needs are not being met by the central government. When national identity is challenged by companies that dissatisfy, demands on the central government increase. A good illustration of this was provided by Daniel Johnson, Premier of Quebec, who

*British entry
into Europe
exacerbated
alienation*

In 1969 his government indicated what it felt was required for the preservation of Quebec's integrity and identity: "the freedom to make its own decisions affecting (i) the growth of its citizens as human beings (i.e. education, social security, and health); (ii) their economic development (i.e. the forging of any economic and financial tool deemed necessary); (iii) their cultural fulfilment (i.e. the arts and literature, etc.); and (iv) the presence of a broad of the Quebec community".

The responses required to meet such a wide range of demands indicate why the assertion of identity at present enjoys such widespread and active commitment among younger, more-educated members of society, in Britain as much as in Canada. There are also a lot of bread-and-butter issues, of course — resources, their control and their exploitation outstanding among them.

Natural resources

The first centre for Canadian studies outside North America was opened by Allan MacEachen in 1974 at the University of Edinburgh. The centre's convener, Professor J. Wreford Watson, formerly Chief Geographer of Canada, spoke on the topic "The use of natural resources, Canada and Britain" at the centre's first major seminar in 1974, on "Federalism: central regional relations":

Water and water-power are major resources of Scotland and Wales, since both countries are upland areas of high rainfall, and provide ideal sites for water storage and transmission, and for hydro-electric development. Each nation does have considerable say in and revenue from the use of water: nevertheless, devolution might give to them more specific aid, in especial, more *independent* powers, so that they could maximize their profits from these natural advantages. Very much more might be made, for example, from the sale or the proposed sale of water to England, or even from the attraction of industry to Wales and Scotland to make use of the wealth of water there. Above all, devolution should mean real responsibility in Scotland and Wales for their own development *without constant referral back to the central government*.

Both Scotland and Wales have various other resources — notably, at present, in the case of the former oil. Wreford Watson believes that "if devolution in Britain is to gain from the Canadian experience", it must make mutually-satisfactory tax-sharing arrangements "sufficient to allow

Scotland and Wales to develop their resources in their own way, and run their own services". In many ways, the problems of tax-sharing epitomize the problems of regionalism — as every Canadian knows. Nation states require ultimate control over the economies of their countries; even more do they require the satisfaction and co-operation of all their inhabitants. Another paper, "Oil, federalism, and devolution: a Canadian-British comparison", by James Kellas of the University of Glasgow, in *The Round Table* (1974), makes the point that "it is to Canadian experience that Scots may well turn as oil and home-rule come increasingly under discussion". "What", he asks, "are the lessons to be learned from that experience?" Solving the resources problem will indeed require that Britons as a whole examine the experience of various other countries — Canada in particular.

Responses

Those areas that are not at or near the centre express their concern in various ways: with riots in Southern Italy, with bombings in Corsica, with demonstrations in Brittany. One way in which the regions of Canada, especially the Atlantic Provinces and Quebec, and of Britain are in a sense more cohesive is that they had a clear sense of national identity for a longer period before Union or Confederation than subsequently. This identity is once more asserting itself in a wide range of activities. There is a plethora of studies. Incessant comparison is made with smaller, weaker areas that are nevertheless independent countries.

Neither at the centre nor at the periphery, of course, is there general agreement on the best course to follow; the problem is too deeprooted and too complex for easy solution. Bearing this in mind, some broad comparisons can still be made.

In some senses the situation in Britain is more serious than in Canada. As Kellas puts it: "In Canada, the federal system is as always the subject of intense political bargaining and constant adjustment." In other words, the provinces and the Central Government never have got on perfectly or even quietly — which is precisely why Canada has had a federal rather than a unitary system. In the case of the unitary state of Britain, division among the partners is newer and more difficult to handle. It is, furthermore, aggravated by other, more widespread consequences of one of its main causal factors, the political and economic decline of Britain. A 1971 BBC-TV series, and a book based upon it, were

Identity asserted in range of activities



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A month after his victory at the polls in the Quebec election, Parti Québécois leader René Lévesque met the Quebec legislature for the first time as Premier. He is shown here with Lieutenant-Governor Hugues Lajoie as they make their way to the opening session of the Assembly on December 14.

entitled *Why is Britain becoming harder to govern?*

Can centralism and regionalism be reconciled? In the Western European and Canadian cases, there is room for optimism, perhaps because there is no extreme polarization. These are, moreover, complex societies, whose inhabitants have various sets of loyalties, and most of whom are not diehard unionists or separatists. Significant sections of the regional populations feel that institutional or constitutional factors may not be the sole causes

of problems.

There is widespread popular feeling, especially in metropolitan regions, that minority nationalism and supra-nationalism, or confederation, are mutually exclusive. Regional assertiveness is decried at best as parochialism and at worst as regressive, reactionary nationalism, in an age when large-scale integration is seen as a prerequisite for political and economic progress.

A growing body of opinion holds, however, that the two extremes are f

on contradictory, and the arguments advanced to support this belief are attractive, at least in theory. A kind of "new federalism" propounded by de Rougemont and others gives intellectual force to sentiments such as "Small is beautiful", as Quebecers put it, "Democracy is like folklore, it's local". Regionalism and integration are seen as converging rather than contradictory. Pinder puts this case well: It is not realistic to expect that the needs of these regions will be satisfied by some improvement in the existing techniques, together with a greater readiness on the part of the central authorities to allocate resources to regional development. Until the regions have more political power, the resources that are needed to do the jobs properly will continue to be spent on the projects of those who have the necessary power; and the policies that underlie national wage agreements and monetary and fiscal arrangements, or the location of the head offices of big firms, will continue to favour the thriving centres of each nation-state. If we want to see prosperity distributed justly between the different regions, we must first redistribute political power. This does not mean that every little region should have complete national independence, such as national and regional extremists demand. That would be a giant step back into history, and away from a sensible ordering of the world's affairs, attuned to the conditions of modern life. What is needed is to transform the existing centralized nation-states into federal systems, with regional governments exercising considerable power, but with a sufficiently strong government remaining at the centre. It is notable that Europe's two federal states, Switzerland and the Federal German Republic, suffer relatively little from the dominance of a single swollen centre of prosperity, draining the economic strength away from other parts of the country; and the same is true of the United States of America. Seldom is there such striking evidence in favour of a radical political and economic proposition.

The "new federalism" has even won adherents in Brussels. Speaking in Edinburgh at the end of 1976, the then President-designate of the EEC, Roy Jenkins, indicated the two main themes of tendencies in European postwar integration: One predominant in the early period was towards political and economic integration, towards the creation of ever

bigger units, towards the establishment of unitary institutions requiring increasing cession of sovereignty from its member states. The other tendency, which is, I believe, now stronger than ever before, was towards diversification of the old structures of power and influence, and the creation of new ones with which ordinary people could identify themselves and in whose work they could play a direct and effective part. These tendencies may seem contradictory, if not irreconcilable. That is, I think, wrong. They come into conflict only at certain points and levels. . . .

[In devolution] four fundamental principles should be our guide: proper definition of the powers of the devolved legislative and executive bodies; minimum interference from the Parliament and Government in Westminster; fair methods of settling disputes; and the reservation of whatever concerns the United Kingdom as a whole to the Parliament in Westminster. Thus legitimate demands for Scottish control over Scottish affairs must be reconciled with equally legitimate requirements for democratic and effective government in the United Kingdom as a whole.

In some respects, what sectors of Western society are facing is a new form of the "participation crisis" that so preoccupied politicians and scholars a decade or so ago. The increasing complexities and difficulties facing central governments result in great dissatisfaction among the population, especially in the outlying regions. The argument of European regionalists that "the disparity between rich and declining regions is a modern version of the disintegration among social classes in nineteenth century capitalism" is too strident perhaps, but enduring tensions, however muted, are not capable of quick solutions. Writing in 1971, Northrop Frye observed that "separatism in the Atlantic or Prairie Provinces is often based on a feeling that Ontario regards itself as an Israel or Promised Land, with the outlying provinces in the role of desert wanderers". Rooted traditional feelings of superiority or of being dominated will take a very long time to disappear — if they ever do.

Politics is a difficult business because it has to concern itself with efficiency as well as responsibility. Part of the problem with the latter is accountability, but another basic problem is how, in fact, to consult the people to find out exactly what is wanted. This is made even more difficult in constitutional crises — which groups are to be consulted on which issues, when, and

*Complexities
of government
has increased
dissatisfaction*

offered which options? Small wonder that there is so much speculation, and that there are so few firm answers, on central institutional issues in Britain and Canada today.

In Britain during recent years, Governments have been manfully attempting to find out what the options were. The Royal Commission on the Constitution of 1973 (the *Kilbrandon Report*) considered the various possibilities: the unitary state, devolution, federalism and independence. Each of these has several variants, but the *Report* came out clearly in favour of devolution.

Royal commissions can be both more leisurely and more exact than governments. In the long term, we are possibly witnessing the decline of the nation state. In the short and intermediate terms, however, in which most of us live and think, we are in the present, with all its conflicting demands and requirements. Politicians have to be concerned with survival — their own and that of their governments. Devolution, or responses to regional pressures in general, will be very much a matter of trial and error, painful or boring compromise, and some sacrifice, or at least lowering of expectations, in some areas of society.

Malaysia and Singapore: the 'littlest dominoes'

By David Van Praagh

When Communist troops captured Saigon on April 30, 1975, the Commonwealth heads of government were meeting in Kingston, Jamaica. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India proposed a resolution offering unanimous congratulations to the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore balked. "There was no way," he said later, "I was going to congratulate my enemies on their victory."

More than two years after the fall of Saigon, Mrs. Gandhi has been removed from office by the voters of India. The Provisional Revolutionary Government, formerly the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong, has been swallowed up by

Hanoi in the cause of a greater Communist Vietnam. Mr. Lee survives politically, acutely aware that Singapore and Malaysia are potentially the "littlest dominoes" in Southeast Asia, but still bristling at the idea of an inevitable Communist victory.

The prescription for survival followed by the overseas Chinese leader is shared, at least in theory, by the Malay leader of the Federation of Malaysia. Mr. Lee summed it up in these words when he went to Kingston and Washington two years ago: "The key to the whole solution of insurgency is economic growth, progress and the spread of the fruits of the progress. Healthy economies, with decreasing unemployment, reduced birth-rates and increasing *per capita* income, must be felt by the majority of the people."

Fair distribution of economic benefits, in short, will assure political stability by minimizing popular discontent. If the leaders of more developing countries act on this belief, tensions would assuredly be reduced within and among nations. But this approach raises another question. Its proponents argue, in effect, that the political will on the part of the rulers to spread the fruits of modern technology and individual initiative takes precedence over political participation by the ruled in obtaining their due.

Malaysia and Singapore both retain parliamentary forms of government on the British model, with regular elections. But the ruling *élites* carefully control the political

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system to such an extent that it is impossible under present conditions to conceive of the party in power in either country being turned out by the voters, as Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party was in India.

If economic benefits are being fairly shared, this kind of system may still be better than one in which political freedom is made increasingly meaningless by growing economic inequity. It is surely better than the condition to which Mrs. Gandhi reduced India by taking away political freedom without offering better living standards to the masses.

But, partly because democracy is working again in the most populous non-communist developing country, it is relevant to ask if the rulers of the much smaller countries of Malaysia and Singapore are doing enough, and doing it in the right way, to stand up to growing pressures from disciplined Communist systems.

Two answers

There are two answers to this question, because Singapore and Malaysia are two nations. But their histories are so interconnected that it makes sense to consider their futures together. Moreover, whether or not one accepts the "domino theory" in the wake of Communist takeover of all Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, there is no question that Malaysia and Singapore interact economically and culturally because of their geographic proximity — and that both are influenced by the larger Southeast Asian nations of Thailand and Indonesia, as well as by Asian and non-Asian great powers with important interests in the region.

Malaysia and Singapore attained political independence late, in the anti-colonialist context of postwar Asia. Malaysia is underpopulated and is the world's largest producer of rubber and tin. Singapore's location commanding the Strait of Malacca between the Asian mainland and Indonesia made it admirably suited for military and entrepôt trade purposes. The great value of Malaysia and Singapore to European and other Asian powers, and the fact that Chinese and Indians were settled in both to develop their economic potential, meant that national movements were slow and erratic in taking shape.

In 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles sailed into what was to become one of the world's great harbours. But the first member of his crew ashore may have left a more lasting imprint by founding the first Chinese clan association in what was then a Malay fishing-village. British trading-houses and successive waves of Chinese

made Singapore a major commercial centre. The British also built a major naval base — of which Japan made short work in the early days of the Pacific war by sinking the *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* and invading Singapore from the direction opposite to that in which its guns were pointing.

Nevertheless, following the painful Japanese occupation, Singapore regained its military distinction as headquarters for the British Far East Command and retained it until 1971. The British reduced a well-planned Communist insurrection in Malaya to a handful of fleeing Chinese guerillas by the end of the 12-year "Emergency" in 1960, three years after Malaya won *Merdeka* or independence. The Gurkhas again fanned out from Singapore to blunt Sukarno's "Confrontation" with Malaysia, which was formed in 1963 from the nine states in the Malay Peninsula still under Malay sultans — the old Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore, British North Borneo (renamed Sabah), and Sarawak, formerly ruled by the White Rajahs of the Brooke family. Singapore had not been granted independence on its own because the British, and the Malays, feared what were considered the pro-Communist tendencies of its Chinese majority.

If the late-developing notion of a "Malaysian Malaysia" had taken root as a reaction to Indonesia's challenge, the Federation as it was originally envisaged might have lasted and might have been a stronger national entity than the Malaysia or Singapore of today. But the Malay sultans and their political associates in Kuala Lumpur saw this as a Chinese plot by Lee Kuan Yew, who turned out to be unequivocally anti-Communist. Singapore was forced out of the Federation, which was thus saved from having a Chinese majority, and racial politics were left to run their course in Malaysia. The year was 1965, when large-scale U.S. intervention in the Vietnam civil war was starting.

*Federation
could have been
stronger entity*

U.S. protection

With the British military forces on their way out, both Singapore and Malaysia, though never allied with the United States, looked increasingly to Washington for protection. Both countries made impressive economic strides, partly as a result of the fighting in Indochina (Singapore refined oil for U.S. bombers taking off from Thailand and manufactured medicine for the Viet Cong). But their political systems were weak in comparison. When the Chinese were perceived as making gains

via multiracial parties in the 1969 elections in Malaysia, bloody clashes between Malays and Chinese broke out in Kuala Lumpur, parliamentary government was suspended and direct Malay rule was enforced. When Lee took exception to press criticism in Singapore in 1971, he put two English-language newspapers out of business and arrested the executives of a Chinese-language newspaper accused of promoting Chinese "chauvinism".

Even economic progress in the two countries, great when compared with conditions in most other non-Communist developing nations, proved vulnerable or uneven when put to the test. Singapore's galloping growth-rate of 10 to 12 per cent or more, bolstered by refineries, new electronics industries and provision of international financial services, dropped quickly to perhaps 2 per cent when world recession set in with the Arab oil embargo in 1973. Malaysia's second five-year plan, which began in 1971 and was designed to ease Chinese entrepreneurs out of their commanding economic positions and to raise the economic levels of lower-income Malays, antagonized members of both groups by appearing to enrich those Malays who were already well off.

When the United States started its military withdrawal from Southeast Asia, Lee was too much of a realist to pursue international mirages. Under Abdul Razak, who succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister when the courtly Tunku was unable to cope with the 1969 racial crisis, Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China and sought to get the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — solidly behind its proposal for a neutral Southeast Asia. But the generals who were running Indonesia showed more interest in creating a defence umbrella to extend over other ASEAN members if they, the generals, considered it necessary. And the fall of Saigon in April 1975 began to bring home to the leaders of Malaysia and Singapore, if not yet to ordinary citizens, how weak and remote were these two nations with a combined population of less than 15 million.

Central trends

This thumbnail sketch of Malaysia-Singapore history indicates several central facts or trends:

The economic resources exist, and the human resources are there to exploit them, to create near-model societies.

Except for Lee Kuan Yew himself, the leadership needed to meet his criteria

for equitable distribution of economic payoffs from those resources has been lacking.

Preoccupation with racial differences has determined to a significant degree the political and economic rules of the game. This preoccupation, combined with a deep fear of Communist subversion, has prevented the healthy development of genuine democratic institutions such as a multi-party system, a free press and a parliamentary opposition.

While the directions of Malaysia and Singapore have been largely shaped by alien cultural, economic and political influences, which have made the creation of true nationalism difficult, the two countries have been increasingly cut adrift from positive foreign influences.

These tendencies have become more pronounced in the more than two years since the end of the Indochina war. If the negative trends continue, the possibility of a rapid collapse of normal conditions in Malaysia, such as happened virtually overnight in May 1969, cannot be ruled out, possibly accompanied by a drastic change in Singapore's status, effected by a foreign power. What has most worried the leaders of Malaysia and Singapore since the return of the military to power in Thailand in October 1976 is the chance of a breakdown of authority in that country owing to civil war, and the consequent vindication of the "domino" theory.

The biggest factors militating against such a development in Thailand are Thai nationalism and the precedent set in 1973-76 of its identification with a democratic system resting on more than anti-Communism. For these factors to become fully operative, Thai democrats will have to be regarded again, as they were when military rule was overthrown in October 1973, as national heroes. Meanwhile, Thai society shows signs of serious division with resentful students and ambitious generals representing opposite poles.

The chance that Malaysia and Singapore will become "dominoes" if Thailand falls is lessened by the economic resources and ingenuity of the two states. For the factors to become fully operative, the leaders of both countries will have to agree quickly to distribute wealth in ways that minimize racial differences and take account only of legitimate Communist threats. Meanwhile, valuable time is being lost in Southeast Asia. Events in neither Thailand nor Indonesia inspire confidence and the leadership in Hanoi is looking for ways to make the power of a united Vietnam felt.

To back up systematic and profitable development of rubber and tin, Malaysia has become more than self-sufficient in oil. It has weathered the recession well, and the living standards of many city-dwellers have risen dramatically. But many rural Malays remain outside the economic mainstream, though they enjoy privileged status as *bumiputras* (Moslem sons of the soil). While the third five-year plan aims to reduce potential Communist influence by helping lower-income Chinese, many Chinese villagers already suspected of Communist sympathies, often unfairly, can expect even less Government assistance and more official harassment.

Official statistics tend to minimize the number of Chinese in Malaysia's population of 12 million, but they are between four and five million. There are also more than a million Indians and tribesmen, many intermarried with Chinese, living in Sarawak and Sabah. Minorities generally, but especially the Chinese, have been alienated by laws that were designed to reduce Chinese domination of the economy but threaten in actuality to crack the Chinese cement holding it together. Although there are ways of bringing favoured Malays into businesses without changing the way they are run, this is impossible in the sensitive field of education. At least half the available places in universities are reserved for Malays, and it is an open secret that a B-plus Chinese student is considered equivalent to a C-minus Malayan one — and the Chinese needs an A-average to enter university. Moreover, instruction at the university level as well as at lower levels is increasingly in Malay, magnifying the risk that Malaysia will lose not only its Chinese professionals but also its contacts with the rest of the world except Indonesia.

Economic feat

Seen from almost any angle, Singapore's economic feat is prodigious. By UN criteria, it can no longer be classed as a developing nation. Its 2.2 million people (66 percent Chinese, 15 percent Malay, the rest Indians and Eurasians) enjoy the highest living standards in Asia outside Japan. Corruption has been eradicated. True to Lee Kuan Yew's word, Singapore has become largely a middle-class Asian society, with average *per capita* income approaching \$2,000 a year. Increasingly sophisticated industries have taken the place of services for British military personnel; Singapore's huge port is continuously adapting to new needs; and, as a financial centre and depository of

Asian dollars, Singapore carries weight internationally.

But a rescue operation by international banks was needed to save Singapore's Asian-dollar reserves when Pertamina, Indonesia's state oil monopoly, nearly went bankrupt owing to poor management. Lee is aware of the constant need to create more jobs. And even in Singapore some families are unhappy about being moved from Chinese shophouses or Malay *kampongs* to high-rise public-housing flats.

In the elections in Singapore last December, the People's Action Party led by Lee captured all 69 seats in Parliament for the third time running. Votes for scattered opposition candidates were cut to 26 per cent of the total from 29 per cent in the previous elections. Before the voting, Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam told a campaign rally that, while Communists were not, in reality, the main opposition, if opposition candidates gained, Malaysia and Indonesia would conclude that Singapore's Chinese were going Communist. If that happened, he warned, Malay troops would invade Singapore and a "race war" would ensue. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Lee declared publicly that he would not stand for a revival of "Chinese chauvinism". As soon as the votes were counted, he ordered the arrest, for indefinite detention without trial, of a defeated candidate who had been jailed in 1971 as the editor of Singapore's leading Chinese-language newspaper. The issue, then as now, was "playing up Chinese language and education issues", in the words of the Government, which requires that a Singapore student learn two languages — his own and one other, preferably English. In the weeks following, in an apparent effort to stifle dissent, the Government detained several journalists and lawyers and charged several former political candidates with criminal libel.

Political spectres

In Malaysia, the spectres of Communism and race conflict also hang over politics. When the old ruling alliance — made up of Malay, Chinese and Indian communal associations — began to lose ground to avowedly multiracial parties in the 1969 elections, first Malay authoritarian rule and then a new political grouping called the National Front came into being. The latter is the alliance *minus* any prominent Chinese politicians (except the chief minister of Penang) and *plus* former opposition parties that have been cajoled into sharing power in the states or at the

*Invasion
threatened
if opposition
victorious*

federal level. The sole exception is the Democratic Action Party, a Malaysian offshoot of Lee's PAP. The National Front easily swept one election. Under Prime Minister Hussein Onn, who took over when Razak died in early 1976, there has been a refreshing drive against corruption, and two state chief ministers notorious in this regard have been removed from office. But the conservative United Malays National Organization continues to dominate the Government, even while Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed openly calls the Malay leadership of the country "chaotic". The press and opposition politicians are severely restricted by law in what they can say. And the tendency to look for Communist scapegoats appears stronger than ever.

In late 1976, this habit went beyond previous bounds when three respected Malay intellectuals — Razak's former parliamentary secretary, a deputy minister who once worked as an interne for U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and a leading newspaper editor — were arrested for questioning about alleged Communist activity. None was formally charged. The arrests resulted at least partly from an investigation started by Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore.

The real but elusive Communist menace to both Malaysia and Singapore is the Malayan Communist Party, whose armed adherents have grown from the rag-tag of defeated rebels in 1960, numbering in the hundreds, to an estimated 2,500 guerillas today. This force, while of unknown efficiency and divided into three groups ideologically, enjoys a secure sanctuary in the hills round the Chinese

market-town of Betong in the southern part of Thailand. It also boasts moral support for over 30 years from China, where the shadowy Chin Peng, who is still believed to head the MCP, may be living. More numerous than the raiding parties that venture into Malaysian territory, or the failure of the Thai authorities to go after the "Beto salient", may be the make-up of the MCP. It has always been heavily Chinese, and today two-thirds of its members are probably thought to be Chinese. But half of them — one-third of the guerillas — are not Malaysian Chinese but Sino-Thais with possible links to Communist-led insurgents in other parts of Thailand, including the mid-south halfway between Bangkok and the Malaysian border.

This international connection could prove to be more important in the long run than the lifelines the leaders of Singapore, and even more of Malaysia, have thrown out to other countries. Lee Kuan Yew obtained in Peking in early 1960 assurances from the new Chinese leadership that, unlike the MCP, it considered Singapore separate from Malaysia, and that Singapore had the right to deal with subversion in its own way. But if "revolutionary" situations develop in Thailand and then in Malaysia and Singapore, China might have difficulty opting for stability over "liberation". The non-Communist leaders of Malaysia and Singapore have struggled hard for stability. Its maintenance may depend on the liberation of the peoples of Malaysia and Singapore before the Communists get a chance to push them into the mould reserved for "dominoes".

Letters to the Editor

Response to Painchaud...

Sir,

Professor Painchaud's initiative (*International Perspectives* May-June 1977) was particularly welcome as the three articles (September-October 1976) to which he is reacting were designed, in large part, to open a dialogue about an immensely complex and sensitive area that is often imperfectly understood and imperfectly applied. He has stated that the purpose of his article was to stimulate "preliminary reflections" and "critical analysis" of what he succinctly terms Canadian "cultural diplomacy". However, critical analysis — in this case of cultural diplomacy — presupposes a scholarly examination of these operations. Yet, over the length of a sulphurous indictment of what he sees as the Government's pretentious, vain, unrealistic, weak, naive, snobbish, propagandist and conformist activities, he has somehow avoided informed, critical analysis of any of the specific issues, explanations, definitions and qualifications contained in the

three articles. His analysis is applied largely to generalizations of his own concoction, which unfortunately bear little relation to the present status and rationale of the Department's activities in the cultural field.

It was also disquieting to find in an article devoted to "preliminary reflection" such categorical statements as: Canadian cultural diplomacy is based on a "tacit negotiation" of the two founding cultures and "this Canadian culture exists only in the imagination of a few government officials and politicians who have no contact with the realities of the country" (a statement that is difficult to square with his criticism that the Canadian Government "is incapable of formulating cultural policies as a coherent whole . . .").

One of Professor Painchaud's major apprehensions is that cultural diplomacy is a poorly-disguised vehicle for government propaganda. This is a very reasonable concern. However, one might have thought that the critic would have focused on the attempts of the practitioners to face up to the problem. George Cowley has written that "a free exchange of cultural accomplishments and ideas presupposes a certain independence from political objectives. Art for propaganda's sake loses its right to be called art and the right of its perpetrators to credibility" and that "Cultural-affairs specialists, as a defence against attempts to use their programs for short-term political or propaganda objectives, will encourage maximum participation by the private sector". In my piece, I had emphasized the Government's facilitative role, indicating that "the trick is to perform the role without allowing it to become a vehicle for selective Government messages, propaganda or an expurgated image, thus undermining the credibility of the program. Once the facilitative role is effectively played, the academic product must stand or fall on its own merits". If the policy represented by these statements is wrong, incomplete or misleading, one would expect detailed, constructive criticism.

The same failure to relate his analysis to the evidence available is apparent in his rhetorical questions about Canadian studies: "Lastly, what is to be understood by 'Canadian studies'?" "What foreign university can hope to cover all these dimensions of Canada in one coherent program?" Professor Painchaud suggests that little or no attention has been given to the documentary base upon which Canadian studies programs are to be erected. Answers, or at least attempts to deal with these questions, are to be found in my article.

Similarly, he recommends that funds consumed by Canadian studies would be better spent developing domestic academic expertise on Canadian foreign policy. However, he seems unaware of the varied range of the Department's programs designed specifically for this purpose, some of which have been in effect for ten years.

Canadian studies programs are also charged with being bereft of "any credibility" because the Federal Government is embarking on this initiative to the exclusion of the provinces. The consultative process with the provinces and the academic community is in need of improvement (and action is being taken). However, the process of consultation dates from the early stages of the development of the Canadian studies program (including discussions with federal-provincial mixed commissions and the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of Education).

Towards the end of his article, Professor Painchaud says that more effective and more genuinely academic methods of developing Canadian studies overseas exist. He then leaves this statement suspended in air, without any elucidation about budgeting, section, continuity, library support, etc.

Professor Painchaud has raised important issues about the propaganda role, the effectiveness, the scope, and the federal character of the programs which the Government is projecting abroad — and the Government is, of course, a legitimate target. But in this case too many straw men are in his sights.

John W. Graham,
Ste Foy, Quebec

... and again

I must express my appreciation to Professor Painchaud (*International Perspectives*, May/June 1977) for having taken the trouble to comment on the group of articles on cultural affairs to which I contributed (*International Perspectives*, September/October 1976), but register my disappointment that he seems to have given the material so cursory a reading.

Professor Painchaud is no doubt aware of nations that misuse cultural diplomacy for purely political and propaganda ends. The trouble is that he all too automatically assumes Canada does likewise. Even if we wanted to, where would we find professors in Canada who were mere apologists for the party line to send abroad to teach Canadian studies? For that matter, what Canadian orchestra would agree to play nothing but government overtures, or what Canadian ballet company dance only the party two-step? We could perhaps send theatre companies abroad who would perform only plays complimentary to Canada, but we don't; as I wrote in my own article, "theatre can reflect society convincingly only if it does so honestly. . . . *Louis Riel* and *Rita Joe* are as essential as *Anne of Green Gables*" (to mention three of our more prominent theatrical exports). The old saw has it that "a diplomat is someone who is sent abroad to lie for his country." One of the great delights in being a diplomat for Canada is that we don't have to; there is so much that is good about our country that we can ourselves give an honest picture of it and leave others totally free to do likewise.

George Cowley

Ottawa

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Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa:

No. 26 (April 6, 1977) Silver Jubilee tour of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Musical Ride in Ireland and England from May 3 to June 24.

No. 27 (April 6, 1977) Appointment of Mr. Maurice F. Strong to the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre.

No. 28 (April 12, 1977) Mr. Marcel Moreau receives Canada-Belgium Literary Prize.

No. 29 (April 12, 1977) Refined Radioactivity Objective for Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement available to public.

No. 30 (April 12, 1977) Diplomatic appointments: Mr. Arthur G. Campbell as Ambassador to Norway and concurrently to Iceland; Mr. William M. Wood as Ambassador to Republic of Zaire and concurrently to Burundi, Rwanda and People's Republic of the Congo.

No. 31 (April 14, 1977) Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement — fifth-year review.

No. 32 (April 19, 1977) Vice-President of Republic of Mali — official visit to Canada, April 20 to 22.

No. 33 (April 22, 1977) Vice-President of Mali — Canadian visit ends.

No. 34 (April 22, 1977) Fifth Student Commonwealth Conference, April 25-27.

No. 35 (April 29, 1977) Mr. Roger Rousseau appointed Ambassador to Venezuela.

No. 36 (April 29, 1977) Shanghai Ballet's visit to Canada major event in Canada-China relations.

No. 37 (May 4, 1977) Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer visits France.

No. 38 (May 13, 1977) Canadian Contemporary Painters — exhibition of Canada Council Art Bank works goes on tour sponsored by Department of External Affairs.

No. 39 (May 16, 1977) Canada-Finland air-transport agreement signed.

No. 40 (May 17, 1977) Canada-Yugoslavia trade agreement ratified.

No. 41 (May 18, 1977) Bologna Art Fair — Canadian participation.

No. 42 (May 19, 1977) Law of the Sea Conference, sixth session — Canadian delegation.

No. 43 (May 20, 1977) International Joint Commission Fourth Annual Report on Great Lakes Water Quality — Canada's response.

No. 44 (May 19, 1977) France-Canada Mixed Commission eighth session.

No. 45 (May 24, 1977) Conference on International Economic Co-operation, ministerial meeting, Paris, May 30 to June 1 — Canadian delegation.

No. 46 (undated) Notes for Canadian statement at Conference on International Economic Co-operation, Paris, May 30, by Honourable Alastair Gillespie.

No. 47 (June 1, 1977) Honourable Jean-Pierre Goyer — visit to French-speaking Africa.

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No. 77/3 Canada Reaffirms its Abhorrence of *Apartheid*. A statement to the Security Council of the United Nations, New York, March 30, 1977, by Mr. William H. Barton, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations.

No. 77/4 Canada-U.S. Relations — A Model Admired by Much of the World. Remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to a Joint Session of the United States Congress, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1977.

No. 77/5 Human Rights One of the Most Complex Foreign Policy Issues. An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to a Seminar Sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches and the Canadian Council of Catholic Bishops, Ottawa, March 16, 1977.

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Treaty Information

Bilateral

Cuba

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on Mutual Fisheries Relations
City of Havana, May 12, 1977
In force May 12, 1977

Finland

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Ottawa, May 16, 1977
In force provisionally May 16, 1977

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Agreement between the Government of Canada and the International Development Association to Provide for the Administration by the Association of Certain Functions to be Made Available by the Government of Canada for Specific Development Projects
Washington, April 22, 1977
In force April 22, 1977

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Ottawa, November 24, 1976
In force January 1, 1977
Terminated April 19, 1977,
with effect from January 1, 1977

Long-Term Grain Agreement between Government of Canada and the Government of the Polish People's Republic
Ottawa, April 19, 1977
In force April 19, 1977,
with effect from January 1, 1977

Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago relative to the Canada Perpetual Plan
Ottawa, April 26, 1977
In force April 26, 1977,
with effect from January 1, 1974

Yugoslavia

Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the

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Belgrade, October 24, 1973
In force May 17, 1977

Multilateral

Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the
Form of an International Will

Done at Washington, October 26, 1973

Canada's Instrument of Accession de-
posited January 24, 1977, with the
following declaration —

"the Government of Canada accedes to the
Convention providing a Uniform Law on
the Form of an International Will, done
at Washington, D.C., on October 26, 1973,
subject to the following declaration:

1. The Government of Canada declares
that pursuant to Article XIV of the
Convention, the Convention shall ex-
tend only to the provinces of Manitoba
and Newfoundland.

2. The Government of Canada further
declares that it will submit, at any
time after accession, other declarations,
in conformity with Article XIV of the
Convention, stating expressly the addi-
tional provinces to which the Conven-
tion shall extend, when such provinces
have enacted the necessary implemen-
ting legislation."

Amendments to the Convention of the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organ-
ization, 1948

Adopted November 14, 1975

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance de-
posited April 6, 1977

Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques

Done at Geneva, May 18, 1977

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56

Assisting the world's poorest people

Morality and foreign affairs

Canadian-American relations

Economic 'summitry' in London

Spain's apprenticeship in democracy

International Perspectives

Contents

September/October 1977

Development problems	
Assisting the world's poorest people/ <i>Escott Reid</i>	3
New international order/ <i>Paris Arnopoulos, Concordia U.</i>	8
Update on World Food Conference/ <i>Charles H. Weitz</i>	14
Morality, realism and foreign affairs <i>John W. Holmes</i>	20
New atmosphere in Canadian-American relations/ <i>Louis Balthazar</i>	25
Report on the Downing Street Summit/ <i>Alex Inglis</i>	29
Britain's apprenticeship in democracy <i>Jean-Pierre Thouez</i>	35
Chua Kuo-feng's rise to power <i>John R. Walker</i>	40
Review article — Escott Reid's <i>Time of Fear and Hope</i> / <i>James Eayrs</i>	44
Letters to the Editor	48
Reference section	50

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A blueprint for assisting the world's poorest people

by Escott Reid

This article is about what Canada (and other rich countries) might do to help improve the conditions of life of the 650 million very poor people who live in the very poor countries of the world. They do not have enough to eat. They clothe themselves in rags. They live in hovels. Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank, calls them the "absolute poor", those "severely-deprived human beings struggling to survive in a set of squalid and degrading circumstances almost beyond the power of our sophisticated imaginations and privileged circumstances to conceive". Rabindranath Tagore called them "eternal tenants in an extortionate world, having nothing of their own".

It is immoral for the mass of the people in rich countries to maintain a very high standard of living while these millions live in such conditions. It is also imprudent. "The North Atlantic community cannot be an island of stability and well-being in a sea of tempest and misery," I wrote in 1954 in a memorandum to Lester Pearson on what should be done to give effect to the undertakings in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1977 the Commonwealth Experts Group, in their final report to the governments of the Commonwealth, expressed their "conviction that the attainment of certain minimum levels of living in all countries represents a precondition for the achievement of greater stability within the international community and of world peace".

The very poor countries have a population of about 1,250 million, 30 per cent of the population of the world. (The poor countries likewise contain 30 per cent of the world's population. The two most populous poor countries are China and Nigeria.) The average income in the very poor countries in 1977 is less than \$300 (U.S.) a year. In the four most-populous very poor countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia), there live 950 million people. Almost all the other 300 million live in the rest of South Asia, in Southeast Asia, and in Africa south of the

Sahara and north of Rhodesia, Zambia and Angola. It seems likely that more than four out of five of the world's very poor people live in the very poor countries. The problem of how the rich countries can best help the very poor of the world is almost entirely the problem of how best to help the 650 million very poor men, women and children who live in the very poor countries. If we in the rich countries are to help these prisoners of starvation, these wretched of the earth, we must help the very poor countries.

The task is formidable but it is manageable, provided that there is a greater flow of resources from the rich countries to the very poor countries and provided that the governments of the very poor countries do the things many of them are now failing to do. Mahbub ul Haq, the director of the policy-planning department of the World Bank, stated recently that studies by the Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) show that an investment of \$15 billion a year for ten years could bring the very poor people of the very poor countries to "the threshold of human decency" and that the very poor countries themselves could probably contribute at least \$5 billion of the requisite \$15 billion. The \$15 billion figure proposed by the World Bank is one twenty-fifth of the world's annual expenditure on armaments.

Very poor countries must be helped

Mr. Reid has been Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, High Commissioner in India, Ambassador to Germany, Director of the South Asian and Middle Eastern Department of the World Bank and first Principal of Glendon College, Toronto. He is the author of Strengthening the World Bank, published in 1973 (University of Chicago Press for the Adlai Stevenson Institute), and Time of Fear and Hope: the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949, published in 1977 (McClelland and Stewart.) The views expressed here are those of Mr. Reid.

One way of increasing the flow of real resources from the rich countries to the very poor countries is an increase in the exports of the very poor countries. These countries cannot afford to use scarce resources of skill and capital to build up a possible export trade if they do not have the certainty that once this trade begins to surmount existing tariff and non-tariff barriers new barriers will not be raised against it. The interests of these countries would be served by the rich countries agreeing to move progressively over a certain fixed period, perhaps ten years, towards the abolition of all tariff and non-tariff barriers to all imports from the very poor countries. During the ten-year period of adjustment, the rich countries might impose a special temporary levy, which would be progressively diminished over the ten years, on such of these imports as threatened domestic industry and might use the proceeds of the levy to help firms and workers in the threatened industry to move out of it or at least out of its most-threatened sectors. (Restricting this trade concession to the very poor countries and not extending it to such countries as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore would lessen domestic opposition in the rich countries.)

One contribution Canada could make to helping the very poor countries would be to take the lead in proposing that the rich countries agree to abolish all tariff and non-tariff barriers to all imports from very poor countries without any reciprocal concessions. The non-tariff barriers include quantitative restrictions, so-called voluntary restrictions and fiscal charges. Canada might also announce, in association with as many countries as possible, that, regardless of the outcome of negotiations on such an agreement, it would itself grant these concessions. Canada should also establish an import-development office charged with the task of facilitating the sale in Canada of goods from the very poor countries. Britain and the Netherlands have already set up such offices; theirs help not only the very poor countries but all "developing countries". In addition, Canada should negotiate bilateral agreements with the very poor countries to facilitate the transfer of appropriate technology and managerial capacity to those countries from private enterprise in Canada.

Canada should propose that all the mineral resources of the continental shelf outside the 200-mile economic zone should be vested in the International Seabed Authority. It should also agree to share

with the Authority the revenues it receives from the exploitation of the mineral resources in the economic zone beyond, say, 40 miles from the coast. The revenue from the Authority should be transferred to the International Development Association (IDA) and the soft-loan departments of the regional development banks, to be used by them to assist the very poor countries in raising the levels of living of the very poor citizens.

Canada should also support the establishment of a direct link between special drawing rights and aid to very poor countries.

The provision of funds for the IDA and similar agencies from the exploitation of the seabed and from special drawing rights would constitute the beginning of an international system of taxation to the benefit of the very poor people in the very poor countries. This sort of policy could properly be interpreted as a recognition that the transfer of resources from the very poor of the world was an act of charity but of justice. The more this principle is recognized in deed as well as in word, the healthier will be the aid relationship between the rich countries and the very poor countries.

Canada should progressively increase the funds it provides to the Canadian International Development Agency, the International Development Research Centre, the World Bank, the IDA, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the regional development banks, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

One of the obstacles in the way of a sufficient increase in the flow of real resources from the rich countries to the very poor countries is the large consumption in the rich countries of food and such scarce food-producing resources as energy and fertilizers. An average North American uses five times as much grain a year as an average person in a very poor country, 1,800 pounds compared to 380. There are two ways of reducing consumption in rich countries: less consumption by individuals and smaller populations. The rich countries should take steps to reduce their consumption of beef from grain-fed animals, of energy and of fertilizers. They should not encourage an increase in their populations but should aim at stable population.

Almost all the very poor countries have failed to devote enough resources to the production of food. Their national policies have benefited the more affluent 10 per cent or so of the population, not the

*Abolition
of all tariff
and non-tariff
barriers*

*Facilitate
transfer
of technology*

poorer half. The biggest obstacle to rural development in South Asia, which probably contains at least half the very poor people of the world, is the concentration of political, social and economic power in the hands of a small rural élite, composed of the larger landowners and the money-lenders, who have aborted or distorted measures for land reform and benefited from economic development. Very few of the smaller farmers, the tenant farmers, the sharecroppers, the landless labourers or the under-employed village artisans have benefited — yet they and their families constitute about three-fifths of the rural population, and the rural population constitutes four-fifths of the population of South Asia.

Though labour is plentiful and capital scarce in the very poor countries, most of them give incentives to capital-intensive methods of production when not only the social but also the net economic benefits of labour-intensive methods would be greater. Among the incentives are: low interest-rates on loans and credits; over-valued exchange-rates; high levels of protection to capital-intensive local industries; iniquitously low rates of taxation on the larger landowners, which increase their profits and enable them to enlarge their farms at the expense of the smaller farmers and the tenant farmers; an advantage to the larger farmers over the smaller farmers in the availability and in the costs of irrigation water, fertilizers, seeds, credit and technical assistance; preference for the larger industrialists over the smaller industrialists in the allocation and the costs of credit and of scarce materials.

The very poor countries have not undertaken the massive programs of small-scale, labour-intensive, rural public works that would provide productive employment for the under-employed very poor people in the rural areas. Such public works would include projects for increasing agricultural production in both the short and the long run by levelling land, by building contour-embankments, damming rivulets and streams, constructing ponds for holding rain-water and irrigation and drainage channels, digging surface-cells, desilting existing canals and small reservoirs, and planting trees. The projects could be such as to yield a high real rate of economic return. Labour otherwise unemployed would create valuable capital goods. The production of food would be increased. Money would be put in the hands of the poorer peasants, the under-employed artisans and the landless labourers. They would spend this money on

the bare essentials of life, which they now lack. They would buy more food to fill their empty bellies, thus providing a market for the increased production of food resulting from the projects on which they have been employed. They would buy more clothing to replace their rags; in most of the very poor countries, simple clothing material can be produced locally. Thus the employment of the rural poor on productive work at reasonable rates of pay would create more production and more employment; it would increase the share of the very poor in the national income, and in almost all of the very poor countries it would lead to scarcely any increase in the demand for imports. It would therefore not be a drain on scarce foreign exchange.

Increased population, inefficient administration and corruption are causing the rapid deforestation of the Himalayas. Half Nepal's forest-cover was lost during the Sixties. Unless the process of deforestation is reversed, the Himalayan region will probably become a mountain desert in ten to 15 years. If this happens, the reservoirs for the great multi-purpose dams in Pakistan and India will silt up in 25 years rather than the calculated 50, and disastrous floods on the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra will ruin crops in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

The aid agency of a rich Western country can do little to help the governments of the very poor countries to face these problems. If it did try, it would lay itself open to the charge that, as the agent of one sovereign state, it was intervening in the most delicate of all domestic affairs of another sovereign state — the distribution of political power among the various classes of the community and the influence of inefficiency, corruption and political power on the formulation and implementation of government policies. An international lending agency is in a better position, because its influence will be increased the more the poorer countries that are members of the agency feel that they are partners in it.

The International Monetary Fund recently granted a loan to Britain for almost \$4 billion (U.S.); the interest-rate varies from 4 per cent to 6 per cent, and the loan was repayable in five years. In order to secure this loan, the British Government had to agree to make politically-difficult changes in its national economic policies. This agreement was set forth in a 3,000-word letter of intent from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Managing Director of the IMF. IMF pressure on the British

*Deforestation
of Himalayas
could lead to
silting of dams*

Government to make changes in its policies made it possible for the Government to pursue a tougher policy than it would otherwise have felt able to do.

The International Development Association will probably lend India \$3 billion (U.S.) during the next three years. No interest will be charged on the loan. Repayment on the loan will be spread over 50 years. But India, unlike Britain, will not, in order to secure the loan, have to agree to make politically-difficult changes in its national economic policies. The Indian Government will not be enabled, as a result of pressure from the IDA comparable to the pressure of the IMF on the British Government, to pursue a tougher policy (against for example, the rural élite) than it would otherwise have felt able to do. Thus there is one law for the rich countries and one law for the very poor countries.

The IDA does impose conditions on the granting of loans for individual projects in an effort to encourage labour-intensive methods in the construction of such projects and an equitable distribution of the benefits from them. It does not require changes in basic policies as a condition of agreeing to a three-year lending program, changes that would increase the likelihood that the receiving country would carry out development strategies and projects leading to a high level of employment in productive work, a high rate of increase in the production of food-grains and other essential goods and services, and an equitable distribution of these. Perhaps, if a very poor country felt itself to be as much a partner in the IDA as Britain feels itself to be in the IMF, it would be possible for the IDA to impose such conditions and for the very poor country to accept them. This would be in the interests of the very poor citizens of the very poor countries. It would make it more likely that their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter and productive work would be met — and, once these were met, the very poor would be better able to press for the social revolution needed in almost all the very poor countries.

The rich member countries of the World Bank, with about a quarter of the population of all the member countries, possess over three-fifths of the votes in the governing bodies of the Bank and the IDA. Nationals of rich countries hold four-fifths of the top 108 positions in the management of the Bank and the IDA. This preponderant power of the rich countries in the Bank and the IDA stands in the way of creating a true sense of part-

nership between the rich member countries and the poorer ones.

Making the World Bank and the IDA less unequal partnerships between the rich countries and the poorer countries does not, of course, imply the adoption in the agencies of the “one-state one-vote” system, which is the negation of democracy. This system would mean that the least populous member states of the Bank, with a total population of about 220 million, would possess as many votes in the governing bodies of the Bank as all the rest of the member states, with a total population of about 2,700 million. The four most populous very poor member countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia), with a population of 950 million, would have four votes and the least populous would have 65 votes.

What is required is not the adoption of the “one-state one-vote” system but a change in the weighting of votes. The present system of weighted voting is based on relative economic strength, as reflected in national income, imports, exports and central-bank reserves. If, in addition, weight were given to population, there would be a shift in voting power from the rich to the poorer countries. If, for example, each member country were given 50 additional votes in the Bank and 90 in the IDA for every million of its population, the votes held by the rich countries would drop by about nine percentage points.

Of course, more than this is required, if the poorer member countries of the Bank and the IDA are to be given a substantially greater share of power in the processes by which the Bank and the IDA make decisions and carry them out. In a book on the World Bank, published in 1973, I made a dozen suggestions on how to make the Bank and the IDA less unequal partnerships between the rich countries and the poorer countries. I contended then, and I contend now, that the less unequal the partnership the less the poorer countries will regard the management and staff of the Bank Group as outsiders and the less reluctant they will be to accept its advice. The suggestions I made in 1973 do not go far enough, but they are a beginning. It is time we made a beginning.

Many of the suggestions I have made for making the World Bank Group (the Bank, the IDA and the International Finance Corporation) into a less unequal partnership will be distasteful to powerful groups in the rich countries and it is the rich countries that provide almost all the financial resources of the Bank Group.

*One law for rich
and another
for very poor*

ut it is to be hoped that in the rich countries "statesmen with a wide vision, social consciousness and a sense of history" will accept the responsibility of persuading voters and legislatures to agree to the changes in the Bank Group. Great enterprises and little minds go ill together.

Increasing effectiveness

is not only the World Bank, the IDA and the IFC that need to be made more effective agencies of the international community in helping the governments of the very poor and the poor countries to speed up social and economic development, and helping governments of rich countries to pursue the right kinds of objective on the sharing of resources. There are also the IMF, the regional banks, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the ILO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN International Development Organization, the UNCTAD, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But the first agency to which the Canadian Government should devote its attention is, in my opinion, the World Bank Group. Afterwards the Government should examine what could be done to strengthen the other agencies.

I have three reasons for recommending this primacy for the Bank Group. It is by far the most important of the agencies; it will this year be lending or investing almost \$9 billion. The proposals made by the President of the Bank for a substantial increase in the capital of the Bank will necessarily call for a thorough review of the Bank's role and of the adequacy of its structures, policies and procedures. The Bank Group is, so far as I am aware, the only important international agency concerned with development on which a full-length study has been published setting forth a detailed set of proposals for strengthening it by changes in its constitution, administration and policies, with particular emphasis on changes designed to make it a less unequal partnership between the rich countries and the poor countries. In my book *Strengthening the World Bank*, I made 38 principal proposals and a large number of minor ones. It is now four years since I completed this book, and some of its proposals require amendment. What I suggest is that the Canadian Government could use a revised version of the proposals set forth in the

book as a basis of discussion with the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, which are the ones most likely to share Canada's approach to the problem. The consensus reached in these informal discussions might then be discussed with a wider group of countries, which might include France, West Germany, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and two *francophone* African countries. The matter might then go to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries and to a Commonwealth meeting and a meeting of La Francophonie before being submitted formally to the governors of the World Bank Group.

This is the way most of the international agencies were formed during and immediately after the Second World War. First a small group of countries worked out tentative proposals; then more and more countries were consulted, and finally an international conference was held. This would seem to be the best way to make reforms in the dozen or so international agencies concerned with development. To move directly to discussion by the governing body of the agency is less likely to produce the "new structures" the Prime Minister called for in March 1975 in his Mansion House speech — "the institutions and regimes of immense dimensions and novel attributes" that he has stated are essential. It is more likely to produce what he has called a "tinkering with the present system", because it would make it easier for vested interests in the agency, allied with the forces of inertia, to block profound changes. Solutions, as the Prime Minister said, must be sought "with boldness and with excitement, not with hesitancy and uncertainty".

I have made eight recommendations on Canadian policy. Seven do not involve additional expenditures by the Government: abolition of barriers to imports from very poor countries; bilateral agreements with very poor countries to facilitate the transfer of technology; change in the Canadian position on mineral resources on the seabed; a link between special drawing rights and aid to very poor countries; reduction of consumption of scarce goods by Canada; and taking the initiative in proposing measures to strengthen the World Bank Group and other international agencies concerned with the development of very poor countries.

*Best method
to reform
international
development
agencies*

New international order may not be mainly economic

By Paris Arnopoulos

The seventh special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974 marked a milestone in contemporary world affairs when it called for the establishment of a "new international economic order" (NIEO) and proposed a program of action to lead towards this goal.

Since then, scholars have been studying the implications of this new order and diplomats have been negotiating the implementation of its program. In the past year, three leading teams of experts, under the direction of the economists Leontief, Herrera and Tinbergen, have released the results of their studies on various aspects of the NIEO; at the same time, two multilateral conferences, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC), have been debating how this "new order" could be put into effect.

The demands for an NIEO arose from a widespread perception that there was something fundamentally wrong with the present state of world affairs. The storm of crises that has been lashing the world lately has built up to global proportions and, if left to continue unabated, would result in irreversible damage to, and even the collapse of, the present international system.

Here we shall consider these problems, and the issues they produce, from the functional, geographic and strategic points of view. In this way, we shall be able to discuss the salient aspects of the present crisis and the possible directions in which

it might move, with and without the intervention of an NIEO.

The significance of this intervention cannot be overemphasized, because it will shape the kind of world in which mankind will enter the next century. It is for this reason that we shall expose certain inadequacies of the proposed NIEO and effecting real changes in the present international system. For such changes to take place, the original UN call for a new international economic order should be enlarged to include social and political considerations as well as economic.

Since any significant economic development can only proceed within a broad social change, the proposed NIEO must evolve along with a general process towards a "new international order" (NIO). It is in this wider context that we shall assess the proposed changes in the international system and evaluate the means and ends of the NIEO policies in the foreseeable future.

Social complexity

One of the most significant developments in the modern world is the increasing complexity of social systems. This functional sophistication of human instruments and institutions makes societies much more problem-prone than previously, at the same time as it makes these problems much more difficult to solve. It seems that the intricacy and magnitude of world affairs move events beyond human control and surpass our ability to deal with them.

The difficulty of understanding social problems and controlling their effects is evident in many areas of public affairs. Here we shall look at the most important forces in the economic, social and political arenas, out of whose interaction arise the complex issues in the present international system the NIEO is proposing to correct.

The problem of relative underdevelopment in some parts of the world and overdevelopment in others appears to be at the basis of international economic

Demands arose from perception of fundamental malfunction

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ues. All countries want to engage in the process of economic growth — not only in order to provide their people with their basic needs but also to increase the production and consumption of manufactured goods. Accordingly, increasing the gross national product has become the sole measure of progress and the ultimate criterion of success.

This process, however, has met with certain complications, both natural and artificial. To begin with, the uneven distribution of natural resources in the world has endowed some countries with an abundance of energy and materials, and has left others with a scarcity. This natural maldistribution creates unequal development potentials, which in time widen into economic gaps between the rich and poor nations.

Natural inequalities are further exacerbated by different cultural tendencies, technological capabilities and historical precedents. Thus, industrially-advanced countries have acquired a decided advantage over agrarian societies because they can harness large amounts of energy. This capability is readily translated into power, whereby the strong can dominate the weak nations.

For this reason, although international trade is supposed to maximize the comparative advantage of complementary capabilities, it actually favours the rich and strong systems. Thus, unequal terms of trade compound the inherent discrepancies among nations, enriching the strong and impoverishing the weak even more.

So far, all attempts to reverse this tendency through international aid have failed. Both the first and second UN Development Decades have not only fallen short of their targets but have witnessed deterioration in the condition of most countries. The aid given is too little and too late to compensate for the discriminatory terms of trade and alleviate the increasing indebtedness of the poor to the rich.

The NIEO proposes to cure this endemic condition of the present international system by major changes in economic relations among nations. Through large transfers of technology, resources and capital, as well as improved terms of trade and increased aid, the NIEO aims to spread economic development all over the world and thus effect a more equitable distribution of the common wealth.

In aiming for economic development, the NIEO expects to solve the major social

problems caused by overpopulation, poverty, unemployment and oppression. However, even though economic and social factors interact, it is not easy to determine cause-effect relations between them, especially in complex matters of population growth, cultural change and class structures.

The “population explosion”, for instance, has created an imbalance between people and resources within certain areas. Such imbalances are particularly acute in cases of food scarcity in some countries while there is abundance in others. In order to correct these imbalances, the NIEO proposes to increase production and improve distribution of resources by industrialization of the economic and modernization of the social systems of the world.

Dangerous road

This road, however, is very dangerous because it involves great social changes. Industrialization destroys traditional cultures and breaks historical continuities, thus disorienting people and distorting their values. Its accompanying urbanization unbalances the social groups of both town and countryside, thereby creating more problems than it solves.

Moreover, it is now accepted that economic development does not necessarily alleviate social injustice. On the contrary, it may promote greater disparities if the benefits of growth are not equitably distributed. In societies where there exist rigid class differences and hierarchical structures, distribution cannot but be unequal, thus increasing the inequalities. This situation, along with the rising expectations of all people, create frustration, alienation and conflict, which eventually lead either to suppression or to revolution.

If the earth had sufficient resources to maintain a good rate of economic growth indefinitely, the problematic social by-products could be submerged in the euphoria of material improvement. This is, in fact, what has happened so far in the advanced industrial systems. But, as we are approaching the limits of economic growth, these social problems are now coming to the fore. When production can no longer increase the total wealth, distribution becomes the most critical issue of society. This, in effect, is looming ahead on a global scale, and the NIEO has no way of preventing it.

Although power politics are supposed to be kept out of the NIEO, they do come in whenever the issue of redistribution is

*Equitable
distribution
of development
benefits
required*

raised. If the NIEO means anything, it signifies real shifts of power in the world. These shifts are bound to affect matters of national security, international law and intergovernmental organization.

The most serious political problems of the world arise from the unceasing search of states for national security. The international system cannot, by its very nature, secure the existence of any one of its members, and thus leaves the survival of nations to their own resourcefulness. Military force, nuclear weapons, the arms race, defence alliances are all manifestations of this basic insecurity.

Unfortunately, since one state's security is another's insecurity, the search for security escalates into a vicious spiral that must either be broken or lead to war. Moreover, the increasing cost of military establishments diverts funds from social development and imposes great strains upon national economies. The proponents of the NIEO recognize that, as long as the arms race goes on, development will suffer, so they have called for a transfer of funds from military budgets to development aid. Such a move, however, is almost impossible under present circumstances of increasing scarcity, insecurity and disorder.

Because of its economic, social and political inadequacies, the present international system has become unacceptable to many people. And thus its legitimacy is questioned and its laws are in dispute. This is particularly so in the areas most affected by technology, where new methods and institutions are evolving rapidly. In these areas, traditional national jurisdictions overlap and conflict with modern transnational activities, making it necessary to develop new codes of conduct and dispute-settlement procedures to handle novel situations.

The complexity of the problems and the intransigence of the interests involved, however, make this legislating process very tortuous. After a few years of protracted wrangling in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and UNCTAD, to mention only two arenas, the nation states of the world have still a long way to go before reaching any consensus on the new rules of the international game.

Yet the pressures are rising for a new international order. The many disadvantaged nations are challenging the supremacy of the few satisfied ones and demanding a greater say in the management of the world. Many intergovernmental organizations, for a long time dominated by the great powers, are now under pressure from their dissatisfied majorities.

If the political system is to avoid a creeping institutional irrelevance, if not a galloping structural obsolescence, in both the national and international arenas, governments must change radically. The new political order will have to include better representation mechanisms, improved decision-making procedures and more effective administrative practices. The new international economic order will never come about without these social and political reforms.

Geopolitical view

Looking at the world from the geopolitical point of view, one is struck by the increasing interdependence of its units. With the growing complexity of its social systems, the world is becoming more interdependent at all levels of activity — global, regional and national. Changing the present international order must, therefore, take into account this general trend and devise policies to deal with it.

Increasingly intricate international relations are another manifestation of the functional complexity of the global system, which more and more resembles "space ship earth". Thus, whatever happens to one part in some way affects the others. The policies of every member are therefore of concern to the others and unilateral actions are no longer acceptable among states.

It is natural that this increased interdependence creates more friction within the international system, and often leads to serious crises and conflicts. It has become clear by now that all these interacting relations have to be highly coordinated and harmonized; otherwise they will deteriorate into chaos. This sophisticated system we have created in "a state of absent-mindedness" is so fragile that unless it is consciously and methodically maintained, it is bound to break down.

Perhaps the most striking manifestation of global interdependence is the vigorous growth and permeating spread of private activities and corporate enterprises across national boundaries. Political divisions are cross-cut by social and economic relations so that the public and private spheres of action overlap in many areas. This situation adds nongovernmental conflicts to intergovernmental ones, thereby complicating the problems even more.

The NIEO proposes to solve these problems by greater control of transnational corporation (TNCs) and better co-ordination of intergovernmental organizations. Adopting a code of conduct for transnationals is the first step towards the

*Impossibility
of transferring
resources
from armaments
to development*

subordination of private enterprises to public policies. After that, internationalizing many of these transnational activities would bring them under greater political control and public accountability. The difficulty here is that many countries prefer nationalization of TNCs in order to place them under direct and exclusive local control, rather than international supervision.

These contradictory national, transnational and international (not to mention infranational and supranational) policies cannot all succeed. Some must be implemented at the expense of the others. This, in effect, is the central dilemma of international organization. As the world system becomes more complex and interdependent, it becomes more difficult to govern at the same time as it becomes more necessary that it be governed.

This tendency is attested by the growth of the United Nations system in step with its increasing difficulties. On the one hand, the UN must be strengthened in order to perform its multiplying functions of co-ordination and regulation of international activities. On the other hand, nations demand more local independence to "do their own thing" and greater freedom of action to decide their own destinies. Faced with these two opposing imperatives, it seems that the NIEO will either have to accept some kind of world government or to devolve to a simpler and more self-contained state system of relatively independent communities.

Conflicting systems

In spite, or perhaps because, of its growing interdependence, the world is still deeply divided between conflicting economic, political and cultural systems. The widest fissures run East-West and North-South. Recent events have shown that the older ideo-political cleavage has entered a period of attenuation, whereas the more recent socio-economic gap is growing into confrontation, thus replacing the Cold War as the most critical issue of the day.

At the heart of the North-South conflict is the 13:1 ratio indicating the wealth gap between the rich and the poor nations of the world. Worse still, this gap has been growing steadily from 10:1 in 1960, and is likely to reach 14:1 by 1980. This means that two-thirds of humanity subsist in abject poverty, while one-third enjoys unprecedented wealth. Obviously this situation cannot continue without increasing oppression of the resulting dissatisfaction of the masses.

The NIEO proposes to close this widening gap, at least by half (6:1), within this century. This is indeed a formidable goal, given the present power configuration in the world. As we have already mentioned, the economic problems of increasing production and the political problems of improving distribution appear to rule out the possibility of any such evolution taking place peacefully.

However one may deplore world inequalities, it would be economically impossible to raise the material standard of living of everyone to the levels of the Northwest, and politically unrealistic to expect the rich to lower their standards by distributing their wealth among the poor. As long as materialistic values prevail in the North and the "catching-up" syndrome motivates the South, protracted conflict will be the outcome.

In order to avoid this eventuality, the nations of the world must redefine "development" in social rather than economic terms. The so-called "North-South gap" is as much semantic as it is real because it focuses on material production as the measure of all things. A better-balanced social index may, however, show that the gap between the "qualities of life" in the North and South is not so great after all.

*Redefinition
of development
in social terms*

State sovereignty

Another complication of the present international system is the existence of more than 150 political units superimposed upon a transnational economic network. Since political exigencies do not necessarily coincide with economic efficiency, it is difficult to harmonize both territorial and functional rationality. Yet, as the economic system of the world has become more interdependent, the political system has fragmented into a greater number of independent units. Thus the political decolonization of the world has been going on at the same time as the rise of economic imperialism.

It is clearly impossible to maximize both territorial independence and functional interdependence. Either nation states will have to surrender many of their sovereign prerogatives to international organizations and transnational corporations in return for material benefit or they will have to try to increase their self-determination even at the expense of deprivation.

Of course, people want both political independence and economic development, but very often they end up with neither. Unless a country is in the enviable posi-

tion of having enough natural and human resources to render it both economically self-sufficient and politically self-governing, it is likely to sacrifice one for the other or lose both in the attempt. As many countries have found out, surrendering their independence does not guarantee a better life for most of their people.

Because of this experience, some people believe that it is not so much the international economic order that needs to be changed as the national orders of various countries. Even a new international economic order cannot perform miracles to correct the inherent problems of national systems; only the local communities themselves can do that. The international order, therefore, has a limited role to play in the development of any country.

*Limited role
in development
of any country*

Realizing potential

If economic development means realizing the potential of a community to provide for the basic needs of its members, the economic viability of a nation should be measured by the extent to which it fulfils this function. Once basic human needs (nutrition, sanitation, shelter, training, work and leisure) are met, further development should depend on particular cultural and natural constraints.

The best that an NIEO could do is help societies become economically viable as an absolute priority. Beyond that, every nation should determine for itself how far its resources allow it to go and what its values permit it to attain — always provided that it does not interfere with the same determination by others. It is unreasonable to expect much more from the international system, without engaging in economic domination, political interference or cultural imperialism.

Our analysis so far indicates that the various crises that have come upon us are not merely incidental but are symptoms of deep and persistent trends in world history. Because of this, it seems that the "muddling through" approach of the present international system is less and less effective in handling its problems. Unfortunately, many key proposals of the NIEO will do nothing to change this situation; on the contrary, they might exacerbate it. What is needed to apply to such historical forces is a more fundamental restructuring of national and international systems.

Perhaps the prime mover of modern developments is the dramatic transformation of nature by technology. This change has led to artificial economic growth that consumes inordinate quantities of energy

and resources, thus degrading the environment and increasing the rate of its entropy.

Moreover, the technological innovations of science have institutionalized rapid change in social systems. This historic acceleration of change and movement in human affairs has created great instability and transitoriness both in individual psychologies and in group relations.

These trends have had certain significant repercussions in the international system. The uneven rates of change have produced great gaps between socio-economic systems. The main cleavage between the more- and less-developed countries (MDCs and LDCs) had grown from an estimated ratio of 3:1 in 1800 to 6:1 in 1900, and is not likely to be less than 12:1 in the year 2000.

Three possibilities

As things are evolving, we can envisage three possibilities for the foreseeable future: the rich will continue to get richer though at a reduced rate, and the poor will get poorer; the limits to growth will catch up to and impoverish everyone; there will be a basic change of values and structures from which everyone will benefit.

Of these alternative directions the world could conceivably take, the first is the most probable in the short run and the second the most likely by the next century, if things continue as before. A few people can exploit the many for a long time, and the many can exploit nature for a short time, but they cannot all keep up this pace indefinitely.

Recent events make it increasingly clear that we cannot maintain concurrent economic growth of the whole system. Either a few can grow at the expense of the many or everyone will have to accept a general, steady-state condition of material production and consumption at a lower level. It is up to us to make the best out of this inevitability by sufficient socio-cultural change.

Such change will require a shifting of our aspirations away from demands for more manufactured products towards more intangible and more permanent goods, more equitably distributed. To do otherwise would increase the frustration of unfulfilled promises for most of the world's people. Disillusion of this kind is dangerous because it often leads to desperate actions and nihilistic behaviour.

The NIEO reflects the rising demands of the LDCs for greater material prosperity, which the MDCs must help them attain. These demands are backed by strong economic, social and political argu-

ments. The LDCs appeal to the self-interest and moral responsibility of the MDCs, as well as to the legitimacy of their expectations of compensation. At the same time, they hint at reprisals and warn of impending social instability if they do not get their fair share of the world's common wealth.

The aim of these promises and threats is to win concessions from the MDCs, in the form of improved terms of trade, preferential financing, transfers of technology and increased grants-in-aid, in order to close the North-South gap. However, one may seriously question both the means and ends of such a strategy. Apart from the physical impossibility of closing the gap, there is grave doubt of its social desirability because it identifies development with Westernization.

As to the means, many of the proposals are contradictory, and would not lead to the stated goals in any case. The attempt to increase global interdependence by international division of labour, trade liberalization and resource transfers and, at the same time, to increase national independence by local barriers, price controls and TNC regulation is self-contradictory.

For any net benefits to accrue to the South from these policies, they must clearly discriminate against the North. Even if so unlikely a development occurred, it would be an insidious way to perpetuate the dependence of the weak upon the strong. A paternalistic policy of this nature would tend to sap the independent development of both parties. Such unequal interdependence could hardly lead to equality and mutual respect.

Apart from the merits of the LDC demands and their supporting arguments, there is also the question of the pressure they can bring to bear upon the MDCs to accept them. In this matter, the bargaining power of the LDCs has been grossly exaggerated. Although it may be true that the collective power of the LDCs is considerable, the ability and willingness of their governments to apply this potential is virtually non-existent.

The relative strength of LDCs and MDCs and their interdependent relations clearly favour the latter. More important, the governing élites of most LDCs are closely tied to the MDCs, upon which they depend for their survival. This coincidence of interests would render any extreme action on the part of the LDC governments suicidal. So long as the governing minorities of the LDCs have a lot to lose by pushing the MDCs too hard, they will not risk the destruction of the present inter-

national order for the doubtful benefits of a new one.

Policy prospects

The most likely cause of an NIO would be natural pressures rather than LDC demands. Our dynamic, complex and interdependent system requires great amounts of energy to keep it in operation. It is thus easy to predict that, as the energy resources of the world are becoming scarcer and costlier, we are bound to reach a critical point of inflection where recent trends will be reversed sufficiently to restore the natural balance between the supply and demand of power.

For any society to escape the catastrophic effects of such a reversal of its way of life it must plan a gradual disengagement from this escalating power spiral. This means it has to try to live within its own means by increasing its self-reliance and decreasing its dependence on the resources and good-will of others to keep it afloat. So unpopular a policy, of course, can only succeed in communities of strong cohesion, responsible citizenship and collective self-discipline.

These requirements indicate that the real power of a nation to survive such traumatic shocks depends not only on its natural resources and economic strength but also on its social organization and political ideology. The role of good government in this difficult situation is to provide realistic goals and credible leadership that will inspire people to make sacrifices in order to attain them.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to combine all these conditions in the same place at the right time. Where there is enough political will, there is no economic way, and *vice versa*. As environmental and economic trends move in one direction, social and political forces keep going in another. Meanwhile, governments are caught in the momentum of past policies because they were once successful and are still lucrative for some. Thus, although the old international order is breaking down, the remaining vested interests, coupled with social inertia, prevent the development of an NIO.

The common thread running through the demands for a new international economic order is that all countries, rich and poor alike, have urgent and inseparable problems that are rapidly getting out of control. More specifically, the present international system suffers from: energy and resource scarcities attributable to the accelerated growth of the MDCs; gross inequalities and widespread poverty owing

Capacity to survive depends on social organization

Traditional tinkering has produced more problems

to unbalanced growth in the LDCs; and international frictions and conflicts owing to the perceived inequities of the interdependent relations between MDCs and LDCs.

The deep roots of these problems and the complex interactions among them compound our inability to grasp and resolve them. The traditional attitude of pragmatic or "agnostic" crisis-management and *ad hoc* tinkering has produced more problems than it has solved because it has coped with immediate and proximate issues at the expense of the ultimate and universal ones.

The NIEO tries to avoid this weakness by considering global problems in the longer run. Its program, however, assumes the continuation of things past, both in values and in structures. Thus it embraces industrialization, modernization, integration and the technological "fix" as the path to the future. And so it is an optimistic economic solution to problems that are beyond economics.

In order to tackle these broader social problems, nation states would have to go considerably further than the NIEO and change their internal systems. A truly new international order would arise only with the development of new national orders based on the principles of resource conservation and steady-state economics in the MDCs, balanced growth and equitable distribution in the LDCs, and self-reliance and independence on the part of all social systems.

Accordingly, "development" should be redefined by each culture to fit the particular values and capacities of its society, so that its goals may be attained by self-directed and self-generated means. To do so, social systems must respect natural limits to growth and optimize their quality of life within these limits in their own way. In any case, whether we like it or not, either by social planning or natural catastrophe, this will be the eventual development of the NIO.

Update on Rome

Whatever became of the World Food Conference?

By Charles H. Weitz

The United Nations World Food Conference, held in Rome in November 1974, was convened in an atmosphere of urgency and crisis.

In 1972, global food-production fell for the first time since the Second World War — a startling reduction of some 33 million tons. Bad weather had reduced harvests in the U.S.S.R., Southeast Asia, Australia and elsewhere and this, together with the needs of increasing population

and rising demand, reduced available reserves to a perilous level. The sense of crisis was heightened by shortages of fertilizers, pesticides and other production requisites. While grain-exporting countries benefited from rising commodity prices, the food-deficit countries suffered even more as the prices of all imports, including food and petroleum, rose dramatically. Five years of drought in the African Sahel inflicted starvation and severe malnutrition on millions, and drought brought widespread hunger to Ethiopia and the Indian subcontinent, with dramatic death tolls.

By the middle of 1973, the continuation of these conditions elicited urgent requests for a world food conference at the ministerial level from a meeting of the heads of state of non-aligned nations in Algiers and from the UN General Assembly in New York, based on a proposal made by U.S. Secretary of State Henry

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issinger. Underlying both requests was the conviction that the food problem had become so critical that the debate should be moved from technical forums to the global political level. Thus, on action by the General Assembly, the food problem was moved from the UN institutions created specifically to deal with it to the United Nations itself, with an appeal to heads of governments and foreign and development ministers. It was a move, in effect, from the economic to the political realm.

Benchmark

The World Food Conference remains today a benchmark against which to measure progress. It had the quality of a top-action photo, bringing before an almost universally representative gathering materials, provided largely by the Food and Agriculture Organization, giving precise and well-documented analysis of trends in the current world food situation, projections of the vast dimensions of the future problems should the existing trends of population-growth, food-production and international trade continue, and an action plan designed to deal with the situation. This background documentation served to reaffirm earlier FAO studies, which had indicated, even in the face of the bright promises of the "Green Revolution", that there were alarming trends in the world's food-population balance. Existing institutions and resources were also shown to be inadequate to the task of solving the problems.

On the basis of the preparatory documents and two weeks of intense debate among the delegates of more than 130 countries, the conference brought forth a general declaration of principles and 22 resolutions. The declaration proclaimed: "Every man, woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition . . . and it is a fundamental responsibility of governments to work together for higher food production and a more equitable and efficient distribution of food between countries and within countries." The resolutions, which addressed specific problems, more or less fitted together into a strategy for attacking the economic and technical roots of malnutrition and underdevelopment over the long term.

The Rome conference exhibited an extraordinary degree of consensus in defining goals and in adopting concrete action proposals and proposals for new institutional machinery to implement them. All this was accomplished in the

full glare of unprecedented attention from both the mass media and non-governmental groups that made hunger a main concern.

Three main lines of action were established by the conference, and confirmed by the UN General Assembly. First, there was to be action to establish a more reliable internationally co-ordinated stock system. This included underwriting the food-security system initiated by the FAO and approved by its Council in 1971, earmarking stocks of grain for an emergency reserve, and setting an annual target of ten million tons for food-aid programs.

Secondly, there was the recognition that any long-term solutions to the food problem depended upon sharply-increased food-production, particularly in the food-deficit countries, requiring a higher priority for agriculture in national government planning and significantly increased external assistance to agriculture, directed to the priority areas spelt out in the action plan.

These objectives were expressed in specific proposals to:

- create a World Food Council as an umbrella organization to co-ordinate policies and work with UN agencies concerned with food-production, nutrition, food security and food aid;
- establish within the UN system an international fund for agricultural development as a source of additional financing;
- support the FAO-initiated international undertaking on world food security based on a co-ordinated system of nationally-held grain reserves with a committee on world food security to review regularly the world's supply and demand for essential foodstuffs and recommend short-term or long-term policy action;
- create a food-aid system with an annual target of ten million tons;
- establish an emergency food-reserve stock or fund to be used for urgent emergency relief;
- establish a fertilizer-aid program to increase supplies for developing nations;
- promote irrigation, drainage and flood-control programs in Third World countries;
- establish a pesticide-aid program, with research into residual and environmental effects;
- develop nutrition programs, including special emphasis on children and other vulnerable groups;
- recognize women's role in agriculture and food-production, their right to

*Conditions
for long-term
solutions
to food problem*

equality, and the special nutritional needs of mothers;
— implement structural reform in agriculture to provide the masses of small farmers and landless labourers with the incentive and the possibility to increase production.

Not static

To rely too heavily on the picture presented by the World Food Conference is to lend to institutions and activities a static quality that does not represent the magnitude and complexities of global food dynamics. Moreover, in view of the objectives given to the conference, there was inevitable pressure to isolate food and agricultural issues from other problem areas of economic and social development, particularly those related to energy and environment. But the conference did outline a workable global food policy and proposed institutional mechanisms to implement it.

The Rome Food Conference was bracketed between the sixth and seventh special sessions of the UN General Assembly, out of which rose the Declaration and Plan of Action on the New International Economic Order, which included a chapter on food and agriculture. Agricultural questions are also involved in two of four commissions established by the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC), for which Canada's Allan MacEachen has served as co-chairman. Twelve of the 18 commodities designated in the common buffer-stock fund proposal emanating from the fourth session of UNCTAD (the UN Conference on Trade and Development) at Nairobi last year are agricultural. Questions of reserve stocks of grain are being treated within the framework both of the International Wheat Council and of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations sponsored by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. There is no lack of attention being given to food issues.

The immediate food situation has improved significantly since the World Food Conference, owing principally to more favourable weather conditions but also to increased plantings in some of the major cereal-exporting nations, such as the United States and Canada. Generally good harvests in 1975 and 1976 have been reflected in increased consumption in developing countries, somewhat lower import requirements in these nations, a softening of world cereal prices and the first significant increase in world stocks of grain in five years. At the time of writing (May

1977), prospects for 1977 appear favourable, though at levels lower than 1975-76. It is, however, too early to predict.

Corollaries of these developments, however, have been a reduction in U.S. winter-wheat acreage and a Canadian Wheat Board recommendation for reduced spring-wheat plantings on the Prairies, reflecting producer concern about low prices and building surpluses — a situation too reminiscent of prevailing conditions in the late Sixties that contributed to the crisis of the Seventies. The current existence of bumper cereal crops in major grain-producing areas may lead to a reduction of output by producers while world food insecurity persists — a cruel irony but illustrative of the continuing lack of coordination in world agricultural production.

Better prepared

While the basic elements of the 1972-73 crisis remain, and major droughts or economic dislocations could plunge the world back into the tragedy of the 1970s without current world buffer stocks, the world is better prepared to handle the consequences than it was in 1973 or 1974.

Improvement in the supply situation has not eliminated many of the more disturbing longer-term trends that were the focus of the World Food Conference. In national terms, there remain a considerable number of least-developed countries and those most severely affected, where the gap between population and food production continues to grow with little prospect for improved production or foreign-exchange earnings to overcome the deficit. In most developing, and in some industrialized, countries, the poor continue to suffer chronic malnutrition. It appears unlikely that there has been any reduction in the size of this group from the 43 million estimated at the time of the conference — indeed, the numbers may have grown.

On the face of it, however, the general agricultural situation has now begun to recover to levels prevailing before 1972. There were large increases in food and agricultural production in the developing countries in 1975, and to a lesser extent in 1976. World cereal stocks, which had fallen to alarming levels, began to be replenished in 1975-76, and it is hoped that they will show a further increase by the end of the current 1976-77 crop season. Prices of cereals and other main agricultural products, and also of chemical fertilizers, have tended to stabilize at lower levels. There was an expansion in the flow of international development assistance for

Conference outlined workable food policy

agriculture in 1975, but this level was still far short of the requirements estimated by the FAO at the time of the World Food Conference. Preliminary figures for 1976 indicate that even this inadequate level of external assistance declined in 1976. An important new source of finance, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), is about to begin operations, but its financial importance must not be overestimated; to its first disbursement of \$1 billion it can add about \$2-300 million a year to the external resources needed, which, stated in 1975 prices, would now amount to some \$8-9.5 billion annually.

Most longer-term trends remain unsatisfactory, and (with the important exception of the prospective establishment of the IFAD) little real progress has been made towards achieving either the general or the specific goals set by the World Food Conference. Although the trend in agricultural production in the developing countries since the beginning of this decade has somewhat improved, it remains far below the 4 percent annual average increase called for by International Development Strategy for DD-2 (the Second Development Decade) and reaffirmed by the World Food Conference.

Production trends are particularly disquieting in many parts of Africa, especially in the countries classified as least-developed and most-seriously affected. Although cereal stocks have increased, little progress has been made by governments in establishing a co-ordinated system for world food security.

Earnings suffered

The agricultural export earnings of the developing countries have suffered as a result of the economic recession in the developed countries, while their import bills have continued to rise. Birth-rates appear to have begun to decline, but some authorities attribute this to a temporary increase in the crude death-rate (so-called 'surplus' deaths), and further attribute it to the effects of prolonged inadequate food supplies over large areas. There has been little real progress in the many international trade negotiations; food aid in cereals has still not reached the target of ten million tons a year recommended by the World Food Conference.

While, as we have said, part of the recent improvement in the immediate world food-supply situation is owing to more favourable (normal) weather, higher prices for agricultural goods in 1972, 1973 and 1974 have brought an expansion of the

area under cultivation for food crops and of the supply, while the price pattern for fertilizers and other "inputs" has improved. Increased attention to agriculture, in the form of greater investment in national development plans and of various special programs and measures, is beginning to show results in some countries, but the improvement is far from universal.

It is increasingly recognized that the disappointing performance so far of agriculture in many developing countries has had serious effects not only on food supplies and the balance of payments but also on the welfare of very large sections of the populations of these countries, since the majority of the world's poor live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihood.

There is also increasing recognition that development measures must be designed specifically to meet the basic needs of the poorest population groups. The approach to rural and other types of development that is oriented towards poverty and basic needs gained acceptance during the International Labour Organization's World Employment Conference in June 1976. It will also be reflected at the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, which is to be held by the FAO in July 1979.

Role of women

The need to involve women more actively in development, not least in their crucial role as food-producers in many developing countries, is more clearly recognized as a result of the World Conference on International Women's Year in June-July 1975. But in none of these important fields are there yet significant signs of action. Only if such action is initiated, and soon, can we expect to see any effect on the course of development in the few remaining years of the Second Development Decade.

With only three years of DD-II still to go, however, attention is turning to the need to prepare an improved strategy for the 1980s (DD-III) and for the remaining years of the century. The year 2000, barely a generation ahead, is increasingly seen as the most suitable target date for the achievement of the World Food Conference's primary goal of the elimination of hunger and malnutrition. The FAO has begun work on a global-perspective study, "Agriculture: Towards 2000", intended as its chief contribution to United Nations system-wide planning for the 1980s and beyond. But plans and perspectives remain just that, without response and action.

*Majority
of world's poor
in rural areas*

So far this outline of events since the World Food Conference has not dealt directly with the role of the developed countries, whose prime responsibility lies mainly in improving the quality and quantity of development assistance and in the provision of food aid. But also, concerning international trade relations, in which developed market economies have a major voice and which are at the heart of the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, there has been very little progress. Much still depends on the aftermath of the Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation, and on forthcoming UNCTAD discussions and negotiations on an integrated program for commodities, including a common fund. Progress has also been slow in the discussions of a new international arrangement, with substantive economic provisions, to replace the International Wheat Agreement of 1971, which was extended in 1976 to June 30, 1978.

According to the latest figures from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for all activities covered by the OECD's "broad" definition of agriculture, official commitments of development assistance from DAC countries and from members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries rose from \$2,159 million (U.S.) in 1973 to \$4,206 million in 1974 and \$5,522 million in 1975. The increase of 31 per cent in current prices during 1975 represents about 17 per cent in real terms (deflated by the UN index of the unit value of world exports of manufactured goods). Official development assistance for agriculture rose from \$2,887 million in 1974 to \$3,335 million in 1975, but its share in the total commitments for agriculture fell from 69 per cent to 60 per cent.

For the activities covered by the "narrow" OECD definition of agriculture (which excludes rural infrastructure, agro-industries, the construction of plants producing fertilizers and other factors, as well as regional and river projects), official commitments rose from \$3,132 million in 1974 to \$3,548 million in 1975. The increase of 13 per cent in current prices amounts to only 1 per cent in real terms. On the basis of the "narrow" definition, which comes closer to that used in estimating requirements for the World Food Conference, the commitments in 1975 fell short of requirements by around 60 per cent.

It appears, in fact, that there may be an interruption in the recent expansion in the flow of development assistance for agriculture. Commitments from DAC bilateral sources decreased (on the "broad" definition) from \$1,725 million in 1974 to \$1,516 million in 1975. This decrease was more than offset by increased commitments from multilateral agencies (from \$1,975 million in 1974 to \$2,902 million in 1975) and OPEC bilateral sources (from \$336 million to \$1,010 million). But provisional data for 1976 indicate a decrease in commitments for agriculture by the World Bank and the regional development banks taken together, which are the major multilateral sources. Thus, unless bilateral commitments (for which data are not yet available) increased sharply in 1976 there is likely to have been a fall in the total flow of development assistance for agriculture, even in terms of current prices.

Food aid

Food aid in cereals is now significantly lower than at the beginning of DD-II. Shipments declined from 12.7 million tons in 1970-71 to 11.8 million in 1971-72 and 9.6 million in 1972-73. Shipments declined further to 8.4 million tons in 1974-75 but were back to 9 million tons in 1975-76. Allocations for 1976-77 indicate a renewed decline to 8.3 million tons. The minimum target of ten million tons recommended by the World Food Conference in November 1974 was not met in 1974-75 or 1975-76, and the shortfall appears likely to be even greater in the current season.

The World Food Conference also recommended the forward planning of food aid in physical terms, and several countries, including Canada, have now adopted this approach. The International Emergency Food Reserve of not less than 500,000 tons of cereals, called for by the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly, has received only a few pledges to date.

The U.S. Government announced at the May meeting of the UN-FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs that it was prepared to contribute up to 125,000 tons of food aid to this reserve in company with other donors; the Federal Republic of Germany also said it would make 35,000 tons of grain available, while Sweden increased its previous pledge to 55,000 tons for 1977 and 40,000 tons for 1978 and 1979.

Perhaps, with these important changes, other major grain-producing countries will also act so that the emergency reserve can become operative.

The continuing unsatisfactory condition of the food and agricultural sector must be seen in the broader context of the world economic crisis. Unlike the World Food Conference, which was explicitly limited in scope — focused as it had to be on specific areas for action —, any general assessment of progress must take place within the context of a general international development effort.

Within recent years, the UN system has been the centre of far-reaching debates, negotiations and recommendations directed towards the establishment of a more rational and juster international economic order. The sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly, devoted to the economic issues, represented the high points of this process. The Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade constitute major attempts to fashion a new framework of international economic relations.

As the Director-General of the FAO, Mr. E. Saouma, has recently pointed out, it is now widely recognized by developed and developing countries alike that the economic order that has prevailed for the past 50 years has failed adequately to serve the needs of the world community. It has worked against the poor, and it is doubtful whether it has even satisfactorily served the needs of the rich industrial nations. It has certainly not brought about a pattern of development of the rich nations that can sustain itself indefinitely into the future without depletion of resources and damage to the environment. Above all, it has resulted in a large and expanding gap between the rich and poor nations, which is at present about 12:1 in terms of *per capita* gross national product. A gap of this order, even if it does not increase, poses a potential threat to international peace and security.

The economies and social structures of the developing countries are overwhelmingly agricultural, and they have no chance of becoming industrialized societies overnight or even in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the importance of agriculture has had to make its way laboriously into international development councils and, with equal difficulty, into the awareness of the food-deficit nations themselves. Most developing countries have had an unbalanced approach to development, with priority emphasis on industrialization and

urban interests, which has caused the neglect of the majority interests of the rural areas and people. The consequences have led not only to current food shortages but to the continued economic depression of the majority of the world's population, who live in rural areas.

Generally, in developed countries, economic growth has occurred as a result of industrialization fed by transfer of resources from agriculture to industry, but not at the expense of agriculture. The two sectors, in general, complemented each other in growth. While it would be too much to say this pattern has not characterized development efforts in the past two decades (indeed, some developing countries have made significant strides in both agricultural and industrial development), nonetheless sufficient priority has not been given to the needs of the rural areas, the rural poor and agriculture's complementary role in development. Even after the sixth special session of the General Assembly had recognized the importance of the food problem, UN discussions and other forums returned their attention to economic relations in general, and interest in and concern for food and agriculture again waned.

Despite the apparent recognition of agriculture's role as a major force in development and the simultaneous role of industrialization in encouraging the growth of agriculture — by means of roads, transport, fertilizers, equipment, machinery, storage, processing, etc. —, agriculture today is still not given the priority it warrants in development budgets or assistance strategy to overcome the structural problems that inhibit it.

This, together with steadily-rising population pressures in the Third World countries that indicate, without serious doubt, a doubling of the world's population by the next century, spells out the reasons why the gravest concern is warranted that we shall not achieve by the year 2000 man's right to be free from hunger.

Things are not simple. The well-being and nutrition of human beings constitute a complex phenomenon, which is part of a context that changes with history and evolves with local and international structures. Food-production must be well-planned and fully integrated with all the other efforts towards establishing a juster economic order. In spite of present estimates of the lack of sufficient progress since the World Food Conference, much is being done, and much can be done better, if nations sustain the political will to act.

*Agriculture
still not given
priority
it warrants*

Everything has its season — and that adds to complexity

By John W. Holmes

*"Everything's got a moral, if only you can find it" —
Lewis Carroll.*

The argument about morality and foreign policy is never-ending. There is no "solution", for any solution would be a "final solution", the not-unfamiliar posture of a state that, knowing itself to be the guardian and promoter of right, can do no wrong. It is rather a matter of agonizing reappraisals so long as there is life in the body politic and a conscience and democracy. Either as a community or within ourselves as citizens, we always need the moralist who cares for values and the pragmatist who can chart the way without doing more harm than good.

The assurance of "moralists" is often alarming. Whether they argue for the exorcising of North Vietnam, Chile, South Africa, Uganda or China, they know God is on their side. Because truth is theirs, they may lie, traduce the motives of their antagonists, steal documents, and indiscriminately set their eclectic wills against that of governments chosen by all the people. The assurance of the self-designated "realists" is no less alarming. These hard-headed guardians of our national interest cannot envisage one step beyond the next. Having helped to establish the code for an international jungle, they insist on the necessity of a country adopting that code to survive. They ignore the fact that nations must do as they would be done by if they are to survive in this interdependent world. It is the absolutists of both kinds who are dangerous, those for whom compromise is weakness or sin.

"Moralists" can too often be charged with fixing their gaze on the issues of

others far away to the neglect of more troublesome issues at home. The rear-echelon crusaders who demand from the security of Canadian campuses violent revolution in the Middle East or southern Africa ignore the perspective of those Israelis, Zambians or South Africans who will provide the blood. If Canadian reformers spent as much time learning French or English as they have marching and waving banners on behalf of United States blacks, California fruit-pickers, or Biafrans, the great Canadian experiment in racial tolerance might not today be in such a parlous state. That is an argument, however, not for ignoring wickedness abroad or renouncing Canadian responsibility towards, for example, Rhodesia or Chile but just for devoting equal time to pains at home that hurt more. As MacKenzie King commented: "It is a sort of escapist position to be continually taking up matters relating to other countries than our own . . .". King was not the most consistent guide to morals in foreign policy, but he did have a traditional Canadian canniness about means as well as ends. Although he believed, perhaps excessively, in the need for calculation in a moral foreign policy, he also recognized that there were times when we did have to stand up and be counted — in 1939, for example — against a truly diabolic challenge.

Compromise is necessary to save individual countries and the world at large from destruction, but it is not an absolute value. There are times when defiance of the law is the only way — provided the cause is of sufficient consequence to compensate for the endangering of respect for the law. When Canada rejected the jurisdiction of the International Court over its pollution-control zone in the Arctic on the grounds that existing international law was inadequate, it may have been right, but this is a type of action to be taken very rarely

*Alarming
assurance
of moralists*

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and never lightly. The "realist", too, can be right to protest when his country is destroying itself or some other people in the name of some unachievable moral cause. It is a question whether the war in Vietnam was ended when the moralists in the United States overcame the realists or when the realists overcame the moralists.

When is the right path ever clear? What would have been the moral thing to do in 1939 if the allied leaders had known that the Nazis were on the verge of discovering the atomic bomb? Would there not have been a moral case for the continuation of appeasement? The murder of Paris and London could serve no good purpose. Would it not have been better for people to remain alive so that they might eventually restore civilization? George Kennan made a similar argument in the Fifties for the slogan "better Red than dead" if the Russians occupied Western Europe.

In a nuclear age, the arguments for appeasement are strong. But no blanket formula gets us through the maze. Moral values may be eternal, but their application in international politics must be *ad hoc*. There is no alternative to grappling with complexity, looking at both sides of every argument and at the step-by-step consequences of each policy. Of course, one can get lost in a maze. There is a time for cutting through argument to some clean simplicity, but not before the argument has been explored *à tous azimuts*. Consider, for example, some of our present dilemmas.

In the name of morality, many Canadians demand stricter safeguards on uranium and reactors sold abroad and the placing of principle above commercial interest. In the name of morality, many (and often the same) Canadians insist on a priority for the needs and wishes of the Third World. The Third World, however, is exceedingly critical of the restrictions the Canadian Government has already placed on nuclear technology. In their eyes, these restrictions reflect a contempt for their sense of responsibility and are a means by which a rich country denies them the benefits of nuclear technology.

Similarly, it seems wicked of the industrial countries to sell even conventional arms to the poor countries. Yet the alternatives are hard to envisage. We can hardly tell them to be good children and not to want nasty arms. It is not conceivable that arms could be limited to developed countries or, at the other extreme, offered free to the poor. Should the poor, therefore, be forced into setting

up their own arms factories? On the other hand, does the logic of these negative arguments mean that we abandon the effort to control the proliferation of arms? Obviously not, but we must grapple with such paradoxes.

Armament and disarmament in the nuclear age present peculiar moral dilemmas. Many moralists tend to be against arms and defence spending on principle. They reject deterrence theory without working their way through it, though it can be argued that the idea of mutual deterrence marked a great moral advance. When the super-powers recognized the desirability of their antagonists being confident of a second-strike capacity, we had moved away from the traditional logic of military superiority. Arguments for disarmament that ignore the logic of deterrence on which present Canadian, NATO, and presumably also Soviet, defence policies are based are unlikely to convince. In the confrontation-negotiation situation attained by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we have a rudimentary sort of structure for stability. These military alliances can be seen as the props of *détente*. To regard deterrence as a permanent solution, however, or to argue blindly for stoking our side of it, as some realists do, shows an immoral disregard for the fate of man. Deterrence can be at best only a transitional phase, an exceedingly dangerous phase, from which we must move to firmer foundations as soon as possible. At the same time, we must be cautious in dismantling in the name of peace the one structure of peace that has, in a limited way, worked.

There remains a good case for demanding an end to the mad "overkill" for which the super-powers provide. Before we call for general and complete disarmament, however, there are critical questions to be considered. First, what would be the economic fate of small powers in an unarmed world? Secondly, is there a moral purpose in demanding a policy when there is no hope of any great power accepting it? The impossible demand may be a noble gesture — might it not also be a "cop-out"? Should we not fix our attention on the ways and means being discussed now in Geneva and Vienna of mutually dismantling, or at least controlling, the spread of arms?

But can we afford to wait for their slow progress? If not, what is the alternative? For Canada the possibilities are particularly frustrating. As "the safest country in the world", our disarmament is more likely to be seen as getting a free

*Arguments
for disarmament
cannot ignore
the logic
of deterrence*



Wide World Photo

U.S. President Jimmy Carter has taken a highly vocal position on a number of "moral" issues in foreign policy. In a 30-minute address to the reconvened session of the UN General Assembly on March 18, the President put strong emphasis on human rights. He is shown here approaching the podium after being introduced by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

ride than setting a good example. We cannot, however, sit complacently, mindlessly justifying armament on our side by what the other side is doing. But are our leaders more likely to respond to slogans like "Ban the Bomb" or to proposals that are within the bounds of probability and might just start reversing the cycle? Intelligence is required as well as emotion. Or is the situation so apocalyptic that there is a pragmatic case for howling for apocalyptic solutions?

Sanctions

The moral issues over which we agonize a good deal these days involve the question of sanctions — military, economic, diplomatic and moral. What do we do about wickedness in other countries? It is difficult to ignore gross violations of human rights in Czechoslovakia, Chile, Uganda, and in many other countries whose sins have attracted less attention. But we must first make reasonably sure of the facts, and that is not easy. We have to resist believing the claims only of those whom our prejudices induce us to credit. Horror stories are the stock in trade of those with causes, left or right, black or white. Even when the facts seem indisputable, we still must determine what action we can take, if any. The first human instinct is to cut

the offender dead. There is certainly something to be said for making it clear that sin does not win friends and may even alienate customers, and that the UN Charter and covenants are to be respected. It also makes the disapprover feel good, and that is a temptation to be resisted.

Is it enough to sit in judgment? Presumably the purpose is to stop the violation of rights. Governments have to be changed by persuasion, and we should worry about how to accomplish that. Persuading them that they have been wicked is not usually the most effective way. Saving their faces may be less satisfying but more likely to get results. It is a disconcerting fact that more people are probably saved from death, torture or captivity by quiet negotiation than by public denunciation.

There is no escaping these prudent calculations over tactics, sordid as they may seem to the high-minded. There is an argument, for example, for expelling South Africa from the UN, but there is an argument also for not isolating all South Africans from the international community if we hope to change their ways. Is it *ipso facto* true, as alleged, that we are hypocritical if we have any intercourse, especially commercial, with a government whose policies we have deplored?

*Intelligence
is required
as well as
emotion*

We have been through the same arguments over Russia, Cuba, China and South Africa. The Canadian conclusion, with exceptions, is that there is little to be gained by breaking diplomatic and economic relations, which, in our philosophy, do not imply approval or disapproval.

Yet we have, of course, engaged with others in boycotts, embargoes and such policies as, for example, prohibiting arms sales to either side in a troubled region and restricting sales of "strategic materials" to Communist states. In one case, Rhodesia, we have participated in a policy of full-fledged economic sanctions undertaken as a co-operative UN project. (A Canadian embargo is by itself unlikely to move any government.) The sanctions against Rhodesia did not bring swift results, though history may yet say they played a part in wearing down the Smith Government. On the whole, however, the record of economic sanctions is discouraging. If Canadian Governments are wary of them, they are motivated as much by doubts of their efficacy as by a desire to protect Canada's commercial interests. The benefits to Canada of a peaceful solution in southern Africa would be of so much greater value than the minor profits of our industry and commerce in that area that it is inconceivable any Canadian Government would refuse to support a program of economic sanctions that had a sound chance of achieving the desired result. In the meantime, we have also to take into consideration the argument that *apartheid* is more likely to be undermined by the need of the large corporations for skilled black labour than by the impoverishment of the whole country. That is not an unanswerable argument, but it has to be met.

The purpose here is not to suggest that the arguments for or against an economic boycott of countries that violate human rights are conclusive but that a calculation of tactics and a sense of proportion are required if the exorcism is to be more than a self-indulgent gesture. We must consider in each case whether sanctions are likely to work, whether they might do more harm than good, and whether such a blunt instrument is advisable in a world where offending régimes are much more plentiful than the UN agenda suggests. The Canadian Government is exhorted to cut off relations with one régime or another at least once a month.

These issues are confused by the realist argument that the national interest is such that we cannot afford a moral policy and by the moralist argument that

expediency is by definition wicked. All foreign policy should be guided by moral principles but expediency is not necessarily wicked. The world has achieved a precarious state of co-existence within a UN system. Its essence is a recognition of mutual interest in restraining the forces of anarchy by whatever rules can be negotiated. Toleration of each other's domestic actions is essential to the system as it stands. Perceptions of misbehaviour vary dramatically, and are not exactly equitable. Can we afford to risk the precarious structure that keeps us from destruction by fomenting tensions over human rights beyond our reach? On the other hand will such inhumanity fester and explode if we ignore it? Clearly not even the extinction of *apartheid* in South Africa would justify setting off a nuclear war. But should we be frightened by such grandiose arguments into doing nothing? Should we not recognize that there are situations in which we dare not risk the consequences and others in which, if our calculations are precise, we can do something, or at least try?

These dilemmas have been revived by President Jimmy Carter with his appealing call for moral leadership after a murky decade. Henry Kissinger is not regarded as having been a moralist in foreign policy, but it should be noted that his *Realpolitik* accomplished what professed moralists failed to achieve, the withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam, the reversal of United States policy towards China, a more even hand in the Middle East and the critical breakthrough in Rhodesia. President Carter has revived faith in grassroots American decency, a quality that, though it lends itself easily to hypocrisy, is a virtue on which all of us rely. Carter's appeal is all the more attractive because it is touched by humility, a recognition that all peoples err, even God's chosen republic.

Not only Americans but their friends as well are attracted by the idea of re-asserting those moral values Western countries have learned over centuries, which have been maligned by the Communists and by some leaders of the Third World. There is an argument for talking back, for defending principles that, at the very least, reflect the best of Western culture and, many believe, have a universal applicability — though none of us has, of course, been consistently faithful. Our Western economic system has had consequences not all of which are good, but it has displayed a greater capacity to adapt than have more ideological systems. The American message President Carter is

*Jimmy Carter's
appealing call
for moral
leadership*

reviving has been, and still is, grossly distorted in practice but, unlike Soviet political economy, it never ceases to be revolutionary. The danger comes from the crusaders whose eyes have seen the glory.

The President's intention is praiseworthy but the problems are immediate. What if the legitimate campaign for civil rights in the U.S.S.R. upsets the crucial negotiations for strategic arms limitation? The President made clear that he would go on with SALT regardless, but what if the atmosphere were too badly soured for negotiation and the Russian hardliners were encouraged? If the arms talks fail, shall we be into a new arms race, totally unrestrained by the ethics of mutual deterrence? Can we, on the other hand, ignore the cynical disregard by the Eastern European powers of the "Third Basket" of the Helsinki Agreement, in which they promised greater respect for human rights, and more particularly the greater freedom of movement of men and ideas by which alone Europe can be tranquillized?

Dare we by our silence imply that the use of psychiatry to punish and tame political dissidents is acceptable? Can we afford to abandon causes for which men in all countries have died, which could easily be lost in a world of peoples struggling desperately to exist? Are we so greatly intimidated by our guilt complexes and excessive fair-mindedness that we do not dare to be right in our Western tradition? Then there were the exceptions, as always, for nasty régimes that were nevertheless strategically vital, not just to the U.S.A. but to the maintenance of international balance and stability. Would human rights be better respected in South Korea if Kim II Sung took over? It is not easy to get the values straight.

Is the key to confidence to be found paradoxically in greater humility? Our own principles of law and government are based on the recognition that we are all sinners, that we need to discipline ourselves. We discuss internationally ways and means to deal with crimes that we all acknowledge to be a problem. Increasingly, countries are sharing experience with civil rights legislation. Every government — even our own, we recognize — is prone to disregard human rights, either by carelessness or because they think some national interest requires them to act so. Our police are honourable men, but even the British police, with perhaps the most honourable traditions, have acknowledged the use of torture under provocation in Ulster.

Clearly, there is no equality of sin: some countries deserve condemnation more than others, but there is no international consensus on that. President Carter has made an effort to eschew favouritism by cutting off assistance to allies that offend against humanity. There seems little hope of reform if the Western powers defend the rights of man by simply presenting a list of charges against the "other side" and, of course, being charged back. Might we not start with a few "true confessions", recognizing that we are all together in the struggle to civilize ourselves?

The greatest danger may be cynicism, that of the realist who contends that there is no place for morality in an immoral world and that of the moralist whose sweeping denunciations have undermined faith in government itself, both national and international. The world is, largely for technological reasons, a more dangerous place now than it ever was, but there are also more grounds for hope. A historical perspective reveals the phenomenal growth over the past quarter-century of man's capacity and will to regulate his actions by international law and international institutions. As Kal Holsti has pointed out, in a majority of all relations between governments "the techniques used to influence each other usually fall within the bounds of international law and the United Nations Charter". He asks whether "one instance of the use of violent power, even for unworthy objectives, means that that state's policy-makers are immoral in *all* their relationships? Or does it warrant the cynicism of some observers, who claim that, in any case, power is always the final arbiter in international politics, and that might makes right?" This indiscriminate talk about power is the stock-in-trade of realists and moralists on a platform. How they love to talk sentimentally about power and thereby intimidate the listener! What we need are more precise analyses of the nature of power — and shrewder calculations, therefore, of what we can accomplish to promote morality in a wicked world.

It is of particular concern to Canada that cynicism went so far in the United States because the health, strength and good conduct of that country are essential to our survival and to the survival of so many values we share with Americans. The United States is not a monolith. It is a highly-complex country that can lose its head to the seductive strains of *The Battle Hymn of the Republic* and also give the world moral leadership unequalled in his-

Intimidated
by our guilt
complexes?

ory. Canadians, as well as people in free and unfree countries everywhere, should and probably will welcome President Carter's affirmation of the continuing, if more subdued, moral leadership of America. If we Canadians are to follow his lead, we must, of course, not overdo it.

Contradictions abound in this essay and there is little consistency in the argu-

ments used. Perhaps it is an argument against consistency. Well, not entirely — for it is also an argument for not losing sight of what seem, with good reason, to be permanent values. "To every thing there is a season," the Preacher said. "... a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; a time to love, and a time to hate; a time of war and a time of peace."

A new atmosphere pervades Canadian-American relations

by Louis Balthazar

In December 1975, the American Ambassador to Canada, Mr William Porter, who was due to return to Washington, took his leave of Ottawa in a rather unusual way. Departing from the protocol that generally governs relations between the two capitals, he invited several hand-picked journalists to a private reception and made a statement about his country's dissatisfaction with the Canadian policies of restricting foreign investment, increasing the price of oil and gas exported to the U.S., blocking American television advertising and (since he did not bother to distinguish between the federal and provincial fields) nationalizing the Saskatchewan potash industry. Mr Porter's conclusion was that Canada could no longer be regarded as a friendly and reliable country. He made special point of speaking "on the record".

Though Prime Minister Trudeau reacted sharply in the House of Commons to the Ambassador's remarks and the State Department in Washington endorsed what Mr Porter had said, little more was heard of the matter. Nevertheless, the whole affair revealed the state of tension that existed between the two countries at that time. It was said everywhere that Canada could no longer be regarded as having a special or privileged relation with the United States. Canadians were adopting "nationalist" policies towards the U.S., and the Americans, more and more exasperated, were talking of retaliation.

And yet, little more than a year after Mr Porter's spectacular departure, the tension, as if by magic, had suddenly eased. In February 1977, Mr Trudeau ad-

ressed the U.S. Congress without making a single reference to Canadian grievances and American political circles with some interest in Canadian affairs seemed to be congratulating themselves on the excellence of relations with their neighbours to the north. What is more, Canadians were no longer talking of the "Third Option" (the policy of reducing vulnerability to the U.S. by increasing trade with Europe and Japan). They were worried about the negative connotations of this expression in the Canadian-American context. In fact, the Americans had not been worried by the idea of the Third Option, since they hoped that it might lessen their partner's inferiority complex.

What had happened in such a short time to transform relations that had been described as having gone sour and to take the edge off an aroused Canadian nationalism? The entrance on the scene of a new American President may have had something to do with the change in Canadian policy, especially since Mr Carter had pledged himself to restore good relations between his country and its allies, particularly its neighbours in the northern

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hemisphere. But that is not the whole explanation. Mr Ford and Mr Trudeau got on extremely well, it is said, and the people assigned by Ford and Kissinger to look after relations with Canada were still in office six months after Carter and Vance had been sworn in. Neither the U.S. Ambassador to Ottawa nor the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Canada in the State Department had been transferred. So the change of administration did not have a great deal to do with the improvement in Canadian-American relations. The reasons have to be sought elsewhere.

A fragile nationalism

First, it has to be said that Canadian nationalism has never rested on the most solid of foundations. Unlike the United States, Canada hesitated for a long time before declaring itself to be one nation. Even today, a large part of the population of this country does not find its first national allegiance in Canada. For years, our statesmen and the intellectual élite of English Canada have been preaching internationalism and multilateralism. The Canadian nationalism that was the inspiration behind the new policies towards the United States may have had its roots in Macdonald's "national policy", but as a twentieth-century phenomenon it goes back a mere 15 years at most, to the time when Walter Gordon was the defender of Southern Ontario's economic interests. By revealing the extraordinary extent to which Canada's culture and economy depended on outside forces, the Committee for an Independent Canada was able to extend its influence to other regions of the country.

But whenever there has been a show of nationalism, there have been influential individuals or groups to protest in the name of Canadian-American friendship. The Mel Hurtigs of this country have always come up against the Peyton Lyons (see the special issue of *International Perspectives* on the United States, July 1976, and the November/December 1976 issue). Gordon Sinclair, the Toronto broadcaster, was expressing a very Canadian point of view when, at the height of opposition to the U.S. military presence in Vietnam, he came to the defence of the Americans in no uncertain manner. At the same time (at least this is what an American official attached to the Embassy in Ottawa told me with some pride), Canadians were enlisting in the U.S. armed forces to fight in Vietnam in about the same numbers as American deserters were taking refuge in Canada.

So it seems that Canadian nationalism had to be directed against Canada as much as against Americans. Many south of the border were well aware of this, and made a point of declaring that their best allies were Canadians.

The nationalists have always had to do battle with the continentalists, who have been unceasing in their defence of the cause of cultural enrichment and autonomy through economic integration which should bring about wealth and, consequently, cultural autonomy.

At the time that the Canadian Radio television and Telecommunications Commission was harassing American television shows that were invading Canada's air waves, most Canadians were still watching the American programs in preference to those produced in Canada. The disappearance of *Time Canada* may have helped *Maclean's* to increase its circulation slightly, but it has not stopped Canadians from reading the American edition of *Time*.

Finally, the provincial governments have never rallied to the cause of Canadian nationalism. Wealthy provinces such as Alberta and British Columbia are unwilling to pay the price and poor provinces, hard hit by unemployment, such as Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces, would rather see jobs created by American investment than have Federal Government restrictions imposed in the name of economic nationalism.

So it seems that Canadian nationalism has to reach a threshold beyond which it cannot pass, owing to a sort of backlash on the part of the populace. Periods of intense nationalism must then be followed by periods during which the feeling of independence is weakening — such as the one we are now experiencing.

Mutual understanding

There are still other factors that explain why Canadian nationalism has become subdued. President Nixon and his Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, were as much responsible for the manifestations of Canadian nationalism as Canadians themselves. It was Mr Nixon who signalled the end of the special relationship when he said that the two countries had to base their policies towards each other on their own sometimes differing interests. Mr Connally, because of his narrow and inflexible view of American economic interests, became a prime target for Canadian nationalists, who saw his obstinate refusal to exempt Canada from the Amer-

English Canada has been preaching internationalism and multilateralism

can surtax on imports (August 1971) as a typical example of "American arrogance".

But Nixon and Connally have disappeared from the political scene and the Americans have gradually become used to living with Canadian susceptibilities, realizing at least that it is not in their interests to clash headlong with the Canadian feeling of independence. It should be added that Canada's diplomats have been intiring in their efforts to "explain" Canadian Government policies to their various contacts in the United States.

As a result, the bitter reaction of many Americans has given way to understanding. Whether they liked it or not, they finally accepted the increase in the price of oil and gas imports from Canada. In time, the reduction in the volume of such imports was regarded as an inevitable fact of life, when it was understood that Canadian energy reserves were not going to last for ever. Even the Third Option came to be considered as a positive element, when it was realized that it meant nothing more than an economic promotion campaign in Europe and Japan.

If in 1975 an influential American could write that one might "perceive Canada as in the throes of a delayed nineteenth-century nationalism", in 1977 few people in the United States still see Canadian nationalism as a threat. We may not yet be sure that they see the Canadian point of view with any great clarity, but at least there is now, in circles with some interest in Canada, more than ever before, a willingness to understand and a growing sympathy with their neighbour.

The mechanisms of communication that exist at several levels and, at the time of the Second World War, were already quite numerous and functioned smoothly, have been improved considerably over the last few years. Recently, the American Attorney-General came to Ottawa to confer with his Canadian counterpart on setting up an "early warning system" to prevent anti-trust groups from extending their operations across the border, as happened with the American Congressional investigation into the uranium cartel.

Canadians, for their part, do not have such a negative opinion of Americans as they had a few years ago. American foreign policy is no longer felt to be as detestable as it was at the time of the Vietnam war. Mr Carter's emphasis on human rights is not without its attraction for Canadians, who have always tended to moralize about international affairs. In the post-Watergate era, Canadians are finding it less

difficult to admire American domestic policies. In short, the present situation contains all the necessary ingredients for releasing the underlying pro-American feelings of the Canadian people and political circles.

Economic situation

The economic situation, too, is helping to take the edge off Canadian nationalism. The inflation and unemployment rates are still high enough to be a source of anxiety throughout the country, and eyes turn naturally to the United States, where they are lower and where a degree of economic recovery should have a beneficial effect on Canada.

Under these circumstances, it is not so easy to indulge in criticism of Canada's dependence on its powerful neighbour and to decry American investment as a form of plunder. Direct investment from the United States has, in fact, decreased over the last few years and voices are now being raised in Canada to express the fear that we are not attracting enough American capital.

For some years now, provincial governments have been working very hard to attract subsidiaries of American companies in the hope that this would create new jobs and confer other benefits on their economies. Even the new government in Quebec, however nationalist it may be, is not talking of closing the door on American capital but rather of encouraging the integration of investment into a French Quebec structure. It was, after all, in New York that Mr Lévesque made his first speech as Premier outside the province.

There is also some anxiety about the slowdown in trade with the U.S. We may not yet be at the stage of questioning the objectives of the Third Option but this is not the time for inflexible policies of diversification. In the words of a senior Canadian official: "We want to sell badly, anywhere! We want it so much that we can't afford to discriminate."

For many people, Canada's dependence on the United States is no longer such a great evil. If it were to mean a strong economic recovery, it would probably even be welcomed. Are we going to see a return to the Fifties, when we submitted so willingly to American economic domination? It would be premature to think so, but we cannot exclude the possibility. Economic conditions have led Canadians to adopt a less rigid attitude towards the United States.

The greatest blow to Canadian nationalism was undoubtedly the election of

*United States
direct investment
has decreased
in past years*

November 15, 1976, in Quebec, which made common knowledge of what Quebecers have known for a long time — that pan-Canadian nationalism had never held much attraction for the French-speaking population of Quebec. Canada cannot compete with the United States as one united country against another, for it is not united. Canada is breaking up from within and there are two nationalisms in the country, not one.

It might have been expected that, faced with such a strong showing of Quebec national feeling, English-Canadian nationalists would have closed ranks and taken a new lease on life. But this has not happened — on the contrary. The affirmation of a distinct Canadian identity in which there might well be room for two languages has never received much support from French-speaking Canadians. It has not yet succeeded in accommodating two societies, two cultures and two territories. English-speaking Canadians, who for nearly a century have defined their country in terms that took little account of French Canadians, no longer seem able to define themselves as different from both the Americans and the *Francophones* of Quebec. The great fear that has been aroused by the threat of an independent Quebec is the Balkanization of Canada and the annexation of the various English-speaking regions by the United States. And yet it is this very fear that has brought Canadians and Americans closer together. When talking of the possibility of an independent Quebec or of the Quebec government's nationalist policies, English Canada and the United States employ the same vocabulary — disastrous venture, extremist position, linguistic fanaticism, irrational policies, and so on.

Observers on both sides of the border agree that the Quebec issue has overshadowed all others. It is as if Ottawa and Washington no longer dared adopt different attitudes — Ottawa for fear that it will lose American support in dealing with the Quebec threat and Washington for fear that it will put a weapon into the hands of the province's "separatist" government. Mr Trudeau went to Washington to visit Mr Carter but also, it seems, to seek American sympathy for the cause of a united Canada and to address from the rostrum his fellow Canadians who were watching him on television. Some Members of Congress were even a little offended by it. "He had nothing new to say to us," they complained. "He was speaking to Canada first and foremost." Not the slightest allusion was made to any Canadian-American

disagreements. One theme dominated Trudeau's speech — "Canada's unity will not be fractured". It should be noted that Mr Lévesque had already carried the debate on Confederation into American territory by addressing Canadian television viewers from New York in January.

The Americans, for their part, while undertaking not to intervene in this Canadian debate, did not conceal where the preferences lay. The New York businessmen were grudging in their applause for Mr Lévesque, while Members of the Congress gave Mr Trudeau an ovation when he appointed himself the champion of Canadian unity. President Carter himself expressed his support for Confederation and the American press took a united stand against the "danger posed by Quebec". This is probably as far as the American will go, since they are aware of the effect that any more explicit intervention might have on public opinion in Quebec.

The Parti Québécois government has contributed to the creation of a completely new climate for Canadian-American relations as a whole, a climate that is likely to result in the links between Canadians and Americans being strengthened and to the drawing of a veil over old quarrels.

Problems remain

In spite of all this, there remain genuine problems affecting the two countries and disagreements that could be reactivated at any moment. Whether some or all the factors mentioned above disappear or change in some way, we may still witness the revival of Canadian nationalism and American reprisals.

Just a few of these problems are: the transportation of Alaska gas; the Maine/New Brunswick maritime border; trans-border pollution; the question of fishing rights arising from the changes in the laws on coastal jurisdiction; the requirement that Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. companies comply with American laws; and the Canadian policy on the relaying of U.S. television programs by Canadian TV stations.

All these problems, which are probably both more numerous and more susceptible of solution than those that beset any other bilateral relation in the world, provide an almost endless list of possible scripts for the relations between Ottawa and Washington. Whatever these scenarios may be, two factors will remain operative for a good number of years and make it possible to forecast the general nature of relations between the two capitals. First, in spite of the easing of tension, the

*Great fear
of Balkanization
of Canada*

American attitude towards Canada has changed so much that it will be difficult to return to the era of the special relation. It is not uncommon to hear politicians raise doubts about Canada's "good faith", at least about the total confidence that addition required should be placed in a faithful and compliant neighbour. This is probably all to the good if it means that

Americans no longer feel that Canada is just an extension of their own country. Second, the bonds between the American and English-Canadian cultures are so many and so long-established, and Canadian nationalism is so fragile, that it is almost impossible to conceive of any tension ever leading to international conflict.

Economic summitry reaches time of testing in London

by Alex I. Inglis

London was at its best in early May 1977. Spring had already arrived and decked the parks and squares in rich green proof that last year's drought had been a passing phenomenon. Everywhere workmen were starting to hoist banners and decorations in preparation for the pageantry that would soon begin to mark the Queen's silver Jubilee. The crowns and coats-of-arms adorning a thousand wrought-iron fences were being given a fresh coat of gold paint, and every now and then a pedestrian would be stopped short by the sight of one of the 25 double-decker buses that had changed their traditional red for silver grey.

Lest these Jubilee celebrations be seen as merely the cosmetic remains of a faded glory (though still useful for injecting extra tourist dollars into a troubled economy awaiting the promised revitalization of North Sea oil, and even more valuable in reminding the island people of their common heritage as they wrestle with the problem of dividing among the component nations the sovereignty they have pooled for centuries), British Prime Minister James Callaghan had also arranged that London in the late spring and early summer of 1977 would be a scene of real power. Between early May and mid-June, he had invited three summit meetings of varying size to meet in London. The first of these, on May 7 and 8, would be the smallest and most important. For at the heads of the seven leading Western industrialized countries would gather for the third economic summit meeting in less

than 18 months. After a one-day break, most of the seven were joined by other heads of government to meet as the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The third round of "summitry" was slated for a month later, when the Commonwealth heads-of-government meeting was timed to coincide with the official Jubilee celebrations.

In the weeks leading up to the economic summit meeting (which he had dubbed the "Downing Street Summit"), Prime Minister Callaghan must have wondered at his own sanity in having invited his fellow leaders to London. For a while it appeared as though time had run out for his minority Government as the defeat of the "Devolution Bill" in the Commons brought the country to the brink of an election. Only an eleventh-hour deal with the Liberal Party saved Callaghan from having to fit an election campaign around his unalterable schedule of summitry.

The Downing Street Summit was the third in the series of economic summit meetings that began at Rambouillet, France, in mid-November 1975, at the

Mr. Inglis was in London during the Downing Street Summit in May 1977. Although he is editor of International Perspectives, the views expressed in this article are purely his own. They are not intended to reflect the policy of the Department or to state an editorial position for this magazine.

invitation of French President Giscard d'Estaing, and continued in Puerto Rico in June 1976, at the invitation of U.S. President Gerald Ford. The 1977 meeting, however, may very well prove to be more than just the most important event in an important year of activities in London. Not only was the economic condition of the Western world under review at No. 10 Downing Street but, in fact, the whole process of economic summitry begun at Rambouillet was being put to the test. The Rambouillet meeting had taken place against the background of the dislocation and recession that had set in by the early Seventies and had been drastically heightened and greatly increased by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) escalation of oil prices and limitation of oil supplies. In their final communique at Rambouillet, the leaders clearly identified economic recovery and the reduction of unemployment, without "unleashing additional inflationary forces", as their most urgent task. They were, however, "confident . . . that recovery is under way" and went on to declare: "We will not allow the recovery to falter". The continued economic improvement of late 1975 and early 1976 seemed to reflect the success of the decisions taken and the co-operation established at Rambouillet. As a result, when the leaders met at Puerto Rico in June 1976, they were in agreement that the recession was over, and apparently felt that they could now relax and let the world bask with them in the warm sunshine of their success.

"During the recession," read the communique from Puerto Rico "there was widespread concern regarding the longer-run vitality of our economies. These concerns have proved to be unwarranted. Renewed confidence in the future has replaced doubts about the economic and financial outlook. Economic recovery is well under way and in many of our countries there has been substantial progress in combating inflation and reducing unemployment . . . restoration of balanced growth is within our grasp. We do not intend to lose this opportunity." What was needed now was effective management of "a transition to expansion".

In the months that followed, however, it became evident that the easy optimism of Puerto Rico had been based on a misreading of the economic indicators. The return of good times had, in fact, been illusory. The problems that had seemed to be evaporating proved to be still very substantial. It was essential to develop new strategies if these problems were to

be overcome and recovery achieved. What there was added to the continuing economic problems the very basic political fact that the leadership of the most powerful Western country passed in January from Gerald Ford to Jimmy Carter, the scene was set for Prime Minister Callaghan's invitation to his six fellow heads of government to meet with him at No. 10 Downing Street.

Unknown quantity

In office for less than four months at the time of the summit meeting, Carter was still very much the unknown quantity in the international equation. For two thirds of the other participants, the weekend in London would provide the first opportunity to meet and assess the new American President. For some, the likelihood of confrontation seemed high. In particular, before the conference began, it appeared that Carter's outspoken position on the "moral" issues of foreign policy was destined to bring him into direct conflict with the leader of the second most powerful member of the "summit club", Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany. The most visible item of dispute between the two men centred on Carter's high-profile approach to the problem of human rights in Eastern Europe. Carter's support of Soviet dissidents and his clear statement of intent at the UN in March were mere examples of the type of approach that worried the Germans, who have to live with the geographic reality that Eastern Europe is their next-door neighbour. Chancellor Schmidt, faced with his share of domestic political problems, was quite content to continue with the quiet diplomacy of the *modus vivendi* established at Helsinki, by which, in 1975 alone, more than 60,000 family contacts had been arranged across the German border. Schmidt feared that Carter's blunt approach could jeopardize this considerably-eased situation.

Of perhaps even greater importance, however, was the German (and French) suspicion of the motivation behind Carter's declared nuclear policy, especially the strong U.S. objection to the German contract to build a reprocessing plant in Brazil and the refusal to authorize further exports of uranium to Europe until American-sanctioned safeguards were accepted. To some it appeared that the Americans might be motivated less by a real concern over proliferation than by a desire to monopolize the international market for nuclear plants and equipment.

*At Puerto Rico
leaders thought
recession
was over*



Wide World Photo

strained relations between the U.S. and West Germany on a number of issues created some doubt as to whether the Downing Street Summit would serve any useful purpose. At a series of bilateral meetings, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt managed to find common ground on the most contentious issues. Carter and Schmidt are shown here after a pre-conference bilateral meeting at Winfield House, the U.S. Ambassador's residence in London.

If the Downing Street summit meeting was to have any hope of success, it was essential that the first encounter between Carter and Schmidt should produce a reconciliation. The crucial meetings, then, could not be those held at the square table of the state dining-room at No. 10 Downing Street but the series of bilateral meetings that would take place in the wings and, in particular, those between Carter and Schmidt. Only on May 6, the eve of the conference, could observers be reasonably sure that the necessary political will to overcome differences would be found. While President Carter was "mainstreaming" in Northern England, it was announced in Washington that the suspended supplies of enriched uranium to Western industrialized countries would be resumed forthwith. The American action, by removing the most pressing point of contention with the Germans and by reducing European suspicion of American intentions, guaranteed the success of the bilateral meetings and hence of the summit meeting.

With the immediate nuclear problem out of the way, Carter had little difficulty in selling the other leaders an American

package to resolve outstanding disagreements on nuclear questions. That package itself, however, in turn became the subject of some confusion, at least in the public eye. The American initiative called for an "urgent" review of the entire nuclear cycle, from the mining of uranium to the disposal of waste, in order to resolve the political and scientific differences between the participating countries. This "urgent study" was linked in the appendix of the communique to a reference to "a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months". In addition, during the press conference held by the seven leaders when they released the communique, Prime Minister Callaghan — in answering questions for the seven — said, in response to one such question: "So what we are now doing is setting up a full study of the way in which objectives can be achieved, namely to ensure that the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind can be spread without the nuclear proliferation risk being extended too This study, as we said just now, will take a period, we hope, of about two months, and then we shall be ready to proceed from there."

*Nuclear
package
the subject
of confusion*

As a result, it was widely understood that a report would be forthcoming within two months but at the time of writing it is obvious that the study group will hardly be in existence by the time the two months are up. The intent, officials now say, had never been to have the study completed in two months but only to have the terms of reference decided.

Whatever the ambiguity of the declaration, however, and notwithstanding the opting of officials for the less-pressing interpretation of the summit decree, it would seem unlikely that the attempt to come to grips with nuclear problems will be allowed to flounder. Given the expression of will of the political leaders and the growing reliance on nuclear energy, the success of the review has become one of the tests of summitry to come out of Downing Street. The review does not have to yield a common Western nuclear policy, but it will bode ill for the future if it does not lead to a working reconciliation of the different Western nuclear policies.

Important as it is, however, the nuclear review formula was only one of the six main points of the Downing Street communique. The six points were:

— Our most urgent task is to create more jobs while continuing to reduce inflation. Inflation does not reduce unemployment. On the contrary, it is one of its major causes. We are particularly concerned about the problem of unemployment among young people. We have agreed that there will be an exchange of experience and ideas on providing the young with job opportunities.

— We commit our governments to stated economic growth targets or to stabilization policies which, taken as a whole, should provide a basis for sustained non-inflationary growth, in our own countries and world-wide and for reduction of imbalances in international payments.

— Improved financing facilities are needed. The International Monetary Fund must play a prominent role. We commit ourselves to seek additional resources for the IMF and support the linkage of its lending practices to the adoption of appropriate stabilization policies.

— We will provide strong political leadership to expand opportunities for trade to strengthen the open international trading system, which will increase job opportunities. We reject protectionism: it would foster unemployment, increase inflation and undermine the welfare of our peoples. We will give a new impetus

to the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Our objective is to make substantive progress in key areas in 1977. In this field structural changes in the world economy must be taken into consideration.

— We will further conserve energy and increase and diversify production, so that we reduce our dependence on oil. We agree on the need to increase nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements. We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfil these purposes.

— The world economy can only grow on a sustained and equitable basis if developing countries share in that growth. We are agreed to do all in our power to achieve a successful conclusion of the CIEC and we commit ourselves to continued constructive dialogue with developing countries. We aim to increase the flow of aid and other resources to those countries. We invite the COMECON countries to do the same. We support multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, whose general resources should be increased sufficiently to permit its lending to rise in real terms. We stress the importance of secure private investments to foster world economic progress.

Canadian interests

Canadian interest was obviously keen on the nuclear question, and not only because of the importance of that question to the success or failure of summitry. Ever since India tested its "peaceful nuclear explosion", the Canadian Government has been trying to hammer out a policy that, while acknowledging that nuclear power is here to stay, would further reduce the dangers of proliferation. At the same time, the Government has been concerned lest it find itself isolated in international forums. Always worried about the implications of being found internationally, to "the right" of the United States, the Canadian Government is, as a rule, equally concerned about being too far to "the left" of the U.S. On the nuclear question, the balance seemed too elusive. For a time, the Canadian position was too far in advance of its neighbours and then, suddenly, with the appearance of Jimmy Carter at the White House, Canadians were uncomfortably to the right. The U.S. backtracking under European pressure restored the balance, however, and Prime Minister Trudeau was

*Unemployment
considered
most urgent task*

Obviously not upset when he told a press conference in London: "To be quite candid, the difference that emerged was not between the United States and us, it was between the United States and us on the one hand and some other countries on the other who are not convinced that repressing has to be or should be forbidden or safeguarded."

Only slightly behind the nuclear issue in terms of Canadian interests was the sixth item in the communique – the promise that the leaders would "do all in our power" to ensure the success of the CIEC (Conference on International Economic Co-operation). The "North-South dialogue", as the CIEC is commonly called, was, like economic summitry, the brainchild of the French. Canada, however, having accepted the co-chairmanship of the conference, had pledged itself to bringing the conference to a successful conclusion and thus staked a good deal of its credibility in the Third World on the outcome. Going into the summit meetings, Ivan Rand, the Prime Minister's senior adviser in international relations, told the press that the Canadian goal with regard to the CIEC was to ensure that the summit's communique was "so worded as to provide an appropriately constructive atmosphere for the CIEC session" at the end of May. The communique's wording ("all in our power") went beyond this minimum and, while officials were willing to acknowledge off the record that the summit sessions on this topic had been tough and the consensus not as broad as the communique indicated, Canada had emerged, in fact, with more than it had sought. As a result, the CIEC itself was able to claim a limited success when it concluded in Paris at the end of May.

freer trade

The third area of Canadian interest at the summit meeting was the degree to which the seven could move towards freer trade and, in particular, open the door to greater progress in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. In this gain, Canada came away from the meeting reasonably well-satisfied. The communique's wording was hopeful, and the major reservation, reflecting the traditional protectionist stance of some of the participants, was relegated to the appendix. Even here, however, the "but" was a large one. Progress in the multilateral trade negotiations "should not remove the right of individual countries under existing international agreements to avoid significant market disruption".

There was one other Canadian interest that went unmentioned and in doing so satisfied Canadian needs. That was the simple question of attendance. The initial economic summit meeting at Rambouillet had not included Canada as a participant. Had the Rambouillet conference been limited to the "G5" (Britain, France, Germany, Japan and United States), Canada would probably have accepted its exclusion without a murmur. In issuing the invitations to attend, however, Giscard had included Italy, then on the brink of fiscal disaster and economic collapse. The inclusion of Italy, by many criteria a much less potent force on the Western economic front, led Canada to mount a major diplomatic campaign to ensure that, if a process of summitry was under way, there would be Canadian participation. By the time Gerald Ford called the Puerto Rico meeting, the Canadian campaign had succeeded to the point where an invitation was issued to Prime Minister Trudeau. It had not, however, succeeded to the point where the invitation was issued as a matter of right. Rather Canada was invited because of "the close ties and co-operation between the United States of America and Canada and the fact that the meeting is being held in the Western hemisphere". At London there was no need for this type of justification.

No doubt a major reason for the lack of challenge was the acceptance by the other leaders of Canada's importance in the international economic system. Perhaps it also reflected an awareness by the other leaders of the value of Pierre Elliott Trudeau's presence. At Puerto Rico, Trudeau had called on the leaders to abandon set speeches and participate in the type of open and informal exchange that is so dear to his heart and that he has promoted with considerable success in other forums – most notably in the Commonwealth. On the surface, the Trudeau technique of informal exchanges seems like a simple matter. In fact, with national leaders speaking on behalf of their countries, it is a most difficult one. It requires more careful preparation, better briefing and greater self-confidence. (Trudeau's value to the economic summit meeting, as to other international gatherings, is no doubt also enhanced because, with nine years of government experience, he is one of the most senior of world leaders. Both at the economic summit meeting and at the NATO follow-up meeting, no other national leader could challenge his seniority. Ten years is a long time in politics.)

*Diplomatic
campaign
for Canadian
participation*

Perhaps, however, in the final analysis there was no opposition to Canadian participation at Downing Street because President Giscard d'Estaing of France (who had been the hold-out on Canadian participation in 1976) had other questions of membership in the "summit club" to worry about. During the preparatory work for the summit meeting, the question came up of the participation of Roy Jenkins, formerly British Chancellor of the Exchequer and now President of the Commission of the European Communities, the semi-government of the EEC. Giscard's concern was twofold — first, that the inclusion of Jenkins would give Britain a larger voice than the others at the conference table and, secondly, that his presence as President of the Commission would diminish the voice of France, since on some issues Jenkins would tend to speak for The Nine, including France.

Having succeeded in the preparatory stages in having Jenkin's attendance limited to the second day of the summit meeting, when the leaders would be dealing with more specific issues than the macro-economic and nuclear questions of the first day, Giscard then played a high-profile protest game. Although he had originally intended to attend only the first day himself and to leave French representation on the second day in the hands of Prime Minister Raymond Barre, second thoughts persuaded him that the meeting itself was of such importance that he could not afford to miss the second day. He therefore contented himself with more symbolic protests, such as sending Barre home on the second day and he himself boycotting Callaghan's informal eve-of-the conference dinner for the leaders.

Assessments

Giscard was not alone in his assessment of the importance of the Downing Street summit. The U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, said, at the conclusion of the two-day meeting, that there was "more substance to this summit than to any other". Prime Minister Trudeau saw the meeting as a success for the industrialized democracies, while Fukuda of Japan and Giscard d'Estaing of France and Helmut Schmidt of Germany all pointed to the conference as having avoided the failures of the 1930s in facing economic problems of similar magnitude, which failure had eventually led to the Second World War.

No doubt these statements contain the usual element of hyperbole that follows successful international gatherings. They serve, however, to highlight the fact that

this summit meeting was indeed important and may mark the testing of economic summitry as an instrument meeting the difficult international problems confronting the world's leaders. The fact that it accepted the need for an urgent review of nuclear energy (and, by implication, urgent national reviews of all energy sources) has already been mentioned. But possibly the most significant decision of the Downing Street Summit, and the one that really put summitry to the test, almost did not come to light. Its only mention in all the official documents and in the concluding pre-conference was the almost casual remark at the end of President Carter's closing statement that the preparatory group would remain in existence to review the follow-up.

The President said:

We have resolved to continue the function of the highly-skilled personnel who prepared for this conference. They will follow up to be sure that our conference has not been an idle discussion and not just consummated when we issue a very unanimous report, and believe that this will be an innovation which will remind us all in the months and weeks ahead as we go back home that we have obligations to fulfil and that in many ways our own reputations are at stake to carry out the promise that we are now making this afternoon to the world that looks to us for the solution of these difficult problems.

That group is a high-powered one of senior officials and advisers. The three Canadian participants were Ivan Head, Peter Towe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (whose appointment as Ambassador to the U.S. has recently been announced), and William Hood, Associate Deputy Minister of Finance.

Leaving them "in place" means either that the follow-up to the conference will be effective or that its failure will be known.

The road ahead will not be an easy one. The new "buzz word" that appeared in a great deal of the conference documentation, in briefings and on the lips of many of the participants, including Prime Minister Trudeau, was that the world had undergone "structural changes". To questions as to the meaning of the phrase, the best answer usually available is a reference to the effects of the OPEC oil-price increases and the resulting transfer of wealth to Arab oil countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, which have now accumulated some \$200 billion without having discovered

Giscard contented with symbolic protests

now to return that capital to effective economic activity. In other words, while the leaders of the world are talking about "structural changes" which they say have occurred, what they are really dealing with is the tremendous pressures being exerted on existing structures designed for different situations. It is to be hoped that

their rhetoric does not blind the leaders to the need to make such changes in the world economic structure as are necessary to render it capable of withstanding these pressures, finding new channels for resources and accommodating the needs of North-South, East-West and a dozen yet unheard of combinations.

Apprenticeship in democracy with Spain's 'civilized' right

by Jean-Pierre Thouez

In an article published in a previous issue of this journal (September/October 1976), I mentioned the main problems facing the Spanish Government, and the conditions laid down by the various opposition groups in order to ensure that the general elections of June 15 would be democratic. Since that article appeared, events have gathered momentum and the referendum of December 1976 has put a legal end to the political institutions established by General Franco. The changes that have taken place during the second Government of the monarchy, led since July 1976 by Adolfo Suarez, underline the complexities of the country's evolution towards democracy in the three years following the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco. Before analysing the election results, we felt it would be useful to present a few of the factors that shape the Spanish political system and help to explain its limitations.

A knowledge of Spanish history contributes to an understanding of Spanish political life. The historian Ricardo de la Cierva wrote of Spain: "In the beginning was the right . . ." This beginning, which we can situate between 1450 and 1500, when Spain became a nation and the first European state, was marked by "reconquest" within and "conquest" without; these complementary events have had a profound effect on the five centuries of Spanish nationhood. The "reconquest" was a crusade, the "conquest" a missionary venture. In both cases, the cross of the Church and the sword of the State were bound closely together. Spain was to retain this twofold structure for centuries; it would be one of the few European

states the revolutionary ideas of the Napoleonic Empire would not penetrate. This may be explained by the fact that Spain was, and would remain, a nation of peasant farmers — of "fellahin", according to Ortega y Gasset, quoted by José Maria Peman in his work on the history of Spain. Spain was rightist, and any leftist trends were foreign to it.

With the coming of the nineteenth century, industrialization, urbanization and capitalism threatened the traditional structures. The rise of an urban proletariat more accessible to outside influences is a particularly good illustration of the social evolution that was taking place, because the right, instead of changing, became bound by tradition — that is, by what Ortega y Gasset calls "particularisms", or the defence of particular interests. The right discovered regionalism in its Basque, Catalan and Galician forms and succumbed to the temptation of nationalism. The advent of the constituent *Cortes* of Cadiz in 1812 marked a new liberal trend, but it was quickly suppressed by Ferdinand VII. His was the dying spasm of the historical right. His daughter, Isabella II, left the power to her ministers, and it was she who shaped the Spanish right wing of the modern era. Her reign was,

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however, marked by two "incidents": the revolution of September 1868 and the short-lived First Republic of 1873-1874. What changed under Isabella II was that the historical right became a sociological right; the Spanish people became a clientele, a target. The climate was favourable, and economic and social change exploded the old structures.

In the political sphere, the Liberal Party, influenced from abroad, grew stronger and adopted a more socialist outlook. Spain entered the twentieth century under a modern, intelligent and Liberal right wing in the contemporary European mould. But this experiment in dialogue with the masses ended under the reign of Alfonso XIII with the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera. The army, diverted for a time by the Carlist Wars, which caused it to give its support to the Liberals, reasserted itself. It was no longer content to dabble in political matters; it wanted to govern. Once in power, the army revitalized the economy, gained victory in Africa and re-established law and order. The Spanish people did not forget. In the crisis of 1929, Primo de Rivera went into exile, and in 1931 Alfonso XIII abdicated.

During the five years of the Republic, power alternated between right and left. It should be noted that, even during that period, the usual right-left division did not exist. Instead there was a republican right and a monarchist left. Still, what is generally called "the left" committed several errors, as reflected in the general upheaval of 1934, its anticlerical policy, disorder in the streets and an attack on the structures of the army. The right called for a return to traditional values, stressing faith and the army and the objective of national unity in order to combat the forces of separatism. The *Falange* took as its emblem the yoke and arrows of the Catholic kings. From then on, there was confrontation. Conflict, especially in the realm of ideas, was to be based on the notions of left and right, which were taken up and developed in the rest of Europe. This was less true on the human level, since commitment was often the result of geographical accident rather than partisan choice.

On April 1, 1939, General Franco became the *Caudillo* of a "united, great, free" Spain. With Franco the right came into power alone and held it for some 40 years. The right had absolute power because the value of tradition in Spain had become ingrained in the system; the right had sweeping power because it monopolized political life. The pillars of the

system had previously been the army, the church and the aristocracy. Under Franco only the aristocracy was replaced — the upper middle class. Everything seemed immutable and yet everything changed slowly, insidiously: the aging and disappearance of the leaders of 1939, the wave of change of Vatican II and the emergence of a middle class, and a more enlightened, more moderate class of technocrats, including *Opus Dei*. The advent of Juan Carlos serves to stress the continuity of the right: it was authoritarian under Arias Navarro; it will be enlightened under Adolfo Suarez. The difference lies in the rate of change. Is the system, which was born on the right, prepared to break with its past? To what extent can it create a new Spain?

Continuity of right

To understand the leadership's spirit of openness, we must analyse the political behaviour and the continuity of the right in political institutions and actions. Juan Carlos does not deny the sociological make-up of Spain; he knows rightist Spain and he wants a new right. To this end 20 million voters must be convinced and won over — and the vast majority of the population has always taken an apparently contradictory attitude to the consultations organized by the Franco regime.

From 1940 to 1975, the referendum always took on the triumphant appearance of a plebiscite. Voting for the Government became a habitual expression of the nation's collective conscience. Each time, the regime skilfully offered the hope of a more open society and of progress and liberalization. In December 1966, the Organic Law of the State offered the "possibility of progress towards a system more closely resembling that of other European nations. Cautious and restrictive application of its provisions, which were ratified by the people, destroyed this hope or, rather, this illusion. The first Government of the monarchy of Juan Carlos, led by Arias Navarro, who had earlier replaced Admiral Carrero Blanco, proposed and implemented, with great reluctance, a liberal transition program, the essential feature of which had already been defined by Navarro on February 12, 1974. For the Spanish people, the personification of political trends lies more in the man than in his political allegiance. Devoted to the *Caudillo*, Navarro represented the authoritarian and ideological right. He removed the last representative of *Opus Dei* in the Government, Lopez Rodó, by appointing him Spanish Ambassador in Vienna.

Alternation
of power
between
left and right



Wide World Photo

On June 15, Spanish voters took part in the first free election to be held in their country in 41 years. When the decision was over, Premier Adolfo Suarez and his Democratic Centre Union Party had been confirmed as the Government of the country. The Premier and his wife are shown here casting their votes on election day.

Rodo's departure won Navarro a great deal of popularity among a large section of the population.

Navarro's past was a very checkered one, which did not predispose him to the *apertura* ("opening-up") that was to occur in the second Government of Juan Carlos, led by Adolfo Suarez. It is true that, from 1974 on, Navarro had to face the criticism of the extreme right and of its weekly publication *Fuerza Nueva*. This was the first time a wing of the Francoist regime had taken a dramatic stand in opposition to the Government. On the other hand, the task of the "civilized" or enlightened right — *la derecha civilizada* — was to prepare for the future by trying to gain a small foothold in power. Its position was expressed early in 1975 in an independent daily, *El Pais*, to which José Maria de Areilza, Ramon Tames and Manuel Fraga Iribarne — in other words, the right without the ultras — contributed.

If there was general agreement on the fact that Prince Juan Carlos would assume responsibility for the destiny of the Spanish state with the support of the armed forces, no one knew what path he would choose. At first it was one of continuity. On December 2, 1976, Juan Carlos appointed Torrecato Fernandez Miranda, Secretary-General of the Falangist *Movi-*

miento, the only party, to preside over the *Cortes* and the Council of the Realm. On December 5, he announced that Arias Navarro would continue as head of the Government, while bringing in representatives of the "civilized right": José M. de Areilza as Foreign Affairs Minister, Fraga Iribarne as Minister of the Interior and A. Garrigues as Justice Minister. As we pointed out above, not only was the transition program implemented with reluctance but the Government also began to act erratically. Public demonstrations got out of hand, the authorities closed their eyes to many violations of the laws of the Francoist state, the opposition organized itself for the fray and the system was in danger of running into serious difficulty.

New wind

In spite of everything, there was a new wind blowing. The proposals of Arias Navarro accepted the principle of evolution; the creation of a house of deputies and a senate that would be patterned on the legislative bodies in most European countries; amendment of the anti-terrorism decree of August 1975 (civil jurisdiction instead of the exclusive authority of the military, summary instead of expeditious procedures and so on); interpreta-

tion of the law in such a way as to introduce some degree of tolerance; and the role of opinion polls, which were forbidden under Franco — issues that reflected the interest of the Spanish people in the legalization of political parties; and related activities. The next step was to sanction the continuous democratization of the regime, as had been done in other countries, though reinstatement of democratic liberties was still far off.

Without going into the contradictions and ambiguities of this period, we shall comment on the role of the opposition. In the first six months of 1976, the Democratic Junta and the Platform for a Democratic Coalition, the two main opposition forces, merged. In spite of their ideological differences, the socialists of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communists, in particular, decided to unite their efforts within a democratic movement in which most of the leftist parties, as well as the Christian Democrats of Ruiz Gimenez and of Gil Robles, joined. The purpose of this merger was to hasten the demise of the Francoist system. The result was a deeper division of the right, and there were clashes over the various reform proposals by the Government on the right of assembly, freedom of association and amendment of the penal code, including Article 172, regarding political parties. Juan Carlos had to take sides. On July 1, 1976, he dismissed Na-

varro and in his stead appointed a man of his own generation and a personal friend, Adolfo Suarez.

To avoid confrontation, the moderate right decided to open the way to dialogue, convinced that a democracy imposed from above had no chance of success. The new head of the Government accelerated the opening-up process, though the basic situation remained the same. He adapted the structures of the Francoist state to this delicate period of transition from authoritarianism to limited monarchy. The amnesty for political prisoners (except those accused of terrorism and separatism), the permission to Spanish exiles to return home, the dialogue with the leaders of the left, the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), the referendum of December 15, 1976, on political reform, and the general elections of June 15 were all symptomatic of this spirit of "openness" and of the hopes to which it permitted expression.

Electoral law

Let there be no mistake, however — the right remains the right. This is an unquestionable but logical fact. One has only to glance at the electoral law, which resulted from a compromise between the Government and the Francoist right, supported by certain sections of the army. The opposition hoped for a congress of some 50 members, closer to the composition of the



Wide World Photo

Victory signs and cheers were the order of the day at the Democratic Centre Union headquarters in Madrid on June 16. Supporters had gathered at the party's headquarters during the early hours of June 16 to await the outcome of the election, and a typical election victory party was the result.

parliament of the Second Republic more representative of the Spanish people. As it turned out, however, 6,000 candidates ran for 150 seats in the Congress of Deputies and 207 senate seats. Furthermore, the King would have the power to appoint additional senators, to a maximum of one-fifth of the elected members. Lastly, the deputies would be elected proportionally, and the senators by majority vote.

This system was coupled with conditions that favoured the rural, more conservative provinces, and gave an initial advantage to the largest organizations. An example of over-representation of the rural provinces is Soria in Castile, which will have one deputy for every 33,000 inhabitants and one senator for every 26,000. Madrid and Barcelona, on the other hand, each deputy will represent 140,000 and each senator one million votes. Among 30 parties or coalitions, nine appeared to be really significant: the Popular Alliance (neo-Francoist, led by F. Iribarne and L. Rodo), the PCE, the Popular Socialist Party, the Spanish Social Reform (social democratic), the Socialist Democratic Alliance (former PSDE and social democratic groups), the PSOE of F. Gonzalez, the Christian Democratic Federation, the Federation of the Democratic Left of Ruiz Gimenez and the Centre Democratic Union. The last-mentioned party, led by Mr. Suarez, was expected to win 32 per cent of the votes, a figure that raises doubts about the objectivity of the electoral process. According to the German professor D. Nohlen, quoted by Mr. Ullrich in *Le Monde* in May 1977, "corrective mechanisms are, in fact, changing the proportional system into a majority-vote system."

Furthermore, despite the "realistic and moderate" line urged by the opposition (or rightist) parties, the scramble for seats gave rise to serious clashes when lists of candidates were being drawn up at election meetings, thereby seriously weakening the currents of unity and brotherhood. Finally, the natural inclination to vote for the Government, which was an important factor in the referendum of December 15, favoured Mr. Suarez. His strategy was simple: attract the middle-class vote and win the support of business managers and administrators with a view to establishing a constitution tailor-made for the monarchy. The extreme right had made too many mistakes to be able to reverse this trend, while the divided left could count only on the undecided voters, who represented some 40 per cent of the

total. In this context, note should be taken of dramatic events such as kidnappings, bombings and assassination attempts (especially in the Basque region) that were staged in order to create an atmosphere of violence. However, the attitude of the Church, at least as expressed by Cardinal Vincent Enrrique Tarancon, favours social harmony in a pluralist society.

Dividends

Nevertheless, the Government's strategy paid dividends; the Centre Democratic Union won. The most noteworthy features of the elections were: first, the massive participation of the Spanish people (more than 80 per cent of those eligible voted); secondly, the very poor results — in comparison to the forecasts — achieved by the Spanish Communist Party, which did not fare as well as the neo-Francoist Popular Alliance; and, finally, the role of official opposition that has fallen to the PSOE.

Forming a Government will not be easy for Suarez. On the one hand, he will have to take into account the political complexion of his own coalition, which brings together a dozen small liberal, social-democratic, independent and Christian Democrat groups; on the other hand, he will have to seek alliances, probably with the Popular Alliance, though Fraga Iribarne is considered his personal enemy. Since July 1976, however, Suarez has proved that he is an organization man and a very skilful politician, whose style and speeches strike the public imagination, and that he is capable of keeping the initiative.

*Suarez
has proved
a skilful
politician*

"The 'civilized' right wing, with its more modern, more sophisticated rightist strategy, has managed to conserve Spain's historical continuity. This fact invites a few critical considerations, the first of which concerns the forerunners of the Union and the second the consequences of this evolution towards democracy.

The Centre Democratic Union was built on the ruins of an initial attempt at centrist coalition by Mr. de Areilza, considered the most liberal minister on the right, who was forced to withdraw from membership of the Union, which is now made up of Suarez's friends (the Blues), former Francoist university officials and young conservatives connected with the technocratic, European-style business world.

Secondly, the most significant political event of the period following the elections will be the drafting of a new constitution, and specifically the attempt to define the place of royalty in Spanish political life — particularly because the

possible rise to power of the left cannot challenge the monarchist framework of the state. Finally, the economic and social situation will have to be improved, and in this area Government and opposition recommend different approaches to development. How can the work of renewing the production system, improving relations

with regional communities and working towards political pluralism begin without destroying the efforts currently being made to engage in dialogue and co-operation? For Spain this challenge is what may be called the "apprenticeship of democracy."

Hua Kuo-feng's rise to power and the problems he must face

By John R. Walker

Editor's note: Since this article was written news reports out of Peking indicate that Teng Hsiao-ping has returned to a position of authority within the Chinese hierarchy.

Since there was no formal mechanism for a change of leadership in the People's Republic of China, and since the perfectibility of man had not been achieved in his lifetime, it was perhaps inevitable that a struggle for power should accompany the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Despite the assurances of the Chinese and their friendly foreign publicists abroad that only the class struggle continued to exist in China, it was evident to anyone living in that country during the past three and a half years that both an ideological struggle and a personal power struggle were building up as the great philosopher-king entered the ninth decade of his extraordinary life.

In essence, and this is a purely personal assessment based on the inadequate information available to a working journalist in China, this struggle was both a public and a secret one. Behind the red walls of Chungnanhai, where the leaders live in Peking, there was apparently a very bitter and highly personal battle for control of the party, the bureaucracy and the army. But in public, focused largely through the media, there was a growing ideological struggle between the "fundamentalists" of the Maoist tenet, led by his fourth wife, Chiang Ching, and her Shanghai allies, and the "pragmatists" or middle-roads, who were close to Premier Chou En-lai and the rehabilitated Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.

In this reporter's view, that ideological struggle was intensified first by the reappearance of Teng Hsiao-ping in April

1973, after seven years ignominious seclusion, and secondly by Chou En-lai's determination to set China on course for a major "leap forward" into the super-power ranks by the end of this century. Since Teng Hsiao-ping had clearly been brought back from Cultural Revolution humiliation by Premier Chou with Mao's approval to organize this leap into modernization and industrialization, Teng in a sense became the catalyst of the most recent power struggle.

The confrontation began in a general way at the Tenth National Party Congress in August 1973, when the 67-year-old Wang Hung-wen, the fourth member of the now infamous "Gang of Four", was suddenly elevated to Number Three spot in the Party leadership. Teng Hsiao-ping fought back by restoring power many of his old Army and Government friends who had been demoted during the Cultural Revolution. And, in January 1975, Teng was Vice-Chairman of the Party, which ran the country, Senior Vice-President of the Government, which administered it, and Chief of Staff of the Army, which guarded the Revolution.

Chou's legacy

At the Fourth National People's Congress that same month, a dying Premier Chou En-lai presented his legacy to the country in the shape of a major two-stage plan to industrialize and modernize China in a quarter of a century — a monumental effort to surpass the existing super-power by the year 2000. And it appears to have

*Bitter battle
for control
of the party*

n Teng Hsiao-ping's program for the
plementation of this plan that precipi-
ed the final showdown with the "funda-
ntalists", that very "Gang of Four" who
helped to humble him in 1966.

The propaganda battles over material
incentives, factory rules and specialization,
use of foreign technology, the rustica-
n of youth and improvement in the
quality of education marked the build-up
his struggle between the radical-funda-
ntalists and the pragmatists, until Mao
Tse-tung himself took a hand in the debate
pointed the fatal finger at Vice-
Premier Teng as going the capitalist road
in.

Chou's death

The death of Premier Chou En-lai in
January 1976 sharpened the conflict and
an to bring the power struggle into the
open. For, although the fundamentalists
at the power, with Mao's support, to pre-
vent Teng Hsiao-ping from becoming
Premier, they could not put their own
principal contender, Chang Chun-chiao,
to that vital job.

Instead a relatively little-known mem-
ber of the Central Committee, Number
seven in the hierarchy, Hua Kuo-feng,
was named Acting Premier, and Teng dis-
appeared from official public view. But
elevation had only been blessed, ap-
parently, by the Politbureau, not by the
Central Committee, and the internal
struggle went on in an increasingly public
manner, culminating in the violent inci-
dents in Tienanmen Square on April 5.

The events of that Ching Ming Festi-
val weekend in Peking's great central
square of Tienanmen a year ago were re-
markable for two reasons. They were the
first major demonstration of public dissent
against the hierarchy in almost a decade.
Furthermore, whether the riotous incidents
that climaxed the weekend were organized
or not, the cause that sparked them — a
massive tribute to Chou En-lai and his
plans for the future and denunciations
of Chiang Ching and the radicals — was
extremely popular. And, more important,
both the weekend and the riotous April
Monday, the majority of demonstrators
and avid spectators were young people
under 30, the future standard-bearers of
the Revolution. Here was the first overt
indication that ten years of puritanical,
ideological campaigning for the new so-
cialist man had not yet totally converted
the new generation. These youthful Com-
munists were publicly pledging their sup-
port for a Chou En-lai kind of Chinese
future, and were apparently ready to wait

a little longer to produce that selfless man
in the classless society whom Mao and his
fundamentalists had been preaching.

This open defiance of the regime was
too much for the authorities, and once
again a hastily-summoned Politbureau
stripped Teng Hsiao-ping of all his titles,
though it left him his party card. And Hua
Kuo-feng was officially proclaimed, with
Mao's blessing, as Premier and Vice-Chair-
man of the Party. But still the Central
Committee had not yet been called upon
to give its blessing.

It was soon apparent that similar
disturbances on Ching Ming weekend had
occurred in many major cities throughout
China, with the exception of Shanghai,
whose administration was firmly under the
control of Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-
yuan and Wang Hung-wen. Unrest grew in
the provinces as the summer drew on, and
Mao Tse-tung became so obviously infirm
that he could no longer be allowed to see
foreign leaders. Omens of the end of
dynasties appeared — an eclipse of the sun,
meteors falling in the northeast, and
finally the major earthquake at Tangshan
on July 28 — all combining to compound
the rumors that spread everywhere with
the visible absence of the great leader from
the national scene.

The Tangshan earthquake, which
devastated one of North China's major
coal and steel cities and badly damaged
the ports of Hsinkang and Tientsin, came
at a time when the economic situation
generally was in a chaotic state as a result
of the shelving of Teng Hsiao-ping's pro-
gram for the new Five-Year Plan. But, in
facing up to this major calamity, the new
Premier Hua Kuo-feng was able to show
on a national scale his decisiveness and
administrative talents. At the same time,
the fact that the People's Liberation Army
had to be called on for the massive rescue
and rehabilitation task provided a national
forum for demonstrating Hua's close rela-
tions with the army, a factor that had
always been essential in previous power
struggles in the Chinese Communist Party.

When, therefore, on September 9 the
great Chairman died, the setting for the
latest showdown was established and the
only question was how soon the *dénoue-*

*Demonstrations
in major cities
throughout China*

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The views expressed in this article are
those of Mr. Walker.*

ment would occur and in what fashion. Mao Tse-tung's funeral, unlike the highly emotional one for Chou En-lai, was a very "structured", highly-secure and rather totalitarian exercise, during which Hua Kuo-feng was clearly in command and Chiang Ching and her three senior allies were visibly sulking in the wings.

We know very little of what really happened during the next month until the sudden purge of the "Gang of Four" on October 6. The rumours of an attempted *coup*, the charges of the forging of Mao's last testament, have all been surpassed by the surfeit of charges and revelations that have since appeared in the Chinese press. None of these stories would seem to nullify the impression that Hua Kuo-feng, after careful soundings among Party and Army colleagues, decided on a pre-emptive strike against his four major rivals in the leadership. The very swiftness of these moves, and the failure of the Shanghai four to mobilize effectively their one real power-base, the armed Shanghai militia, seem to indicate that no real *coup d'état* had yet been put in motion by the "Gang of Four".

Thus a depleted Politbureau was called on to name Hua as Chairman of the Party in succession to Mao Tse-tung, and the news was announced on October 8 that Mao's body would be preserved like Lenin's in a mausoleum, now being completed in Tienanmen Square, and that Hua would be editing the final volume and consolidated works of the great prophet for future generations.

Spontaneous reaction

The reaction to the news of the purge in Peking was one of considerable spontaneity and the lack of major violence throughout the country, despite evidence of unrest and conflict of a sporadic nature since then, would seem to indicate that the defeat of the radicals was not unpopular with the broad masses. And yet, for the past decade, millions of young people have been taught that they are the "wave of the future", that they are as good as the best of the *cadres*, that the classless society is the historical inevitability of the years to come. And so, in some fashion or other, Hua Kuo-feng must produce an ideological line that maintains the enthusiasm of the superannuated Red Guards and the pragmatism of the Red bureaucracy.

It will be a difficult task for this modest-seeming, until now self-effacing, party commissar. So little was known of him when he was catapulted to power last year that foreign experts were still saying he was born in Hunan, Mao's home prov-

ince. It was not until he spoke for the first time in the Great Hall of the People that one heard his rich Shansi accent, and only until after he took over in October that the Chinese press began to give some details of his life in Shansi, where he was born 57 years ago.

Hua has no glamorous military background like the members of the "second generation". As a party organizer in Chiao-cheng county in Shansi, he went on no "Long March", but in 1942 he helped to mobilize the masses in Luchiao to launch an anti-nibbling campaign against the Japanese. After the war, he was a political commissar helping to organize a agrarian reform in that province. In 1949, a robust young man in army uniform" a Hsinhua News Agency puts it now, he arrived in Hunan and began his long and steady climb to power in Mao's home province. He spent 20 years at the grassroots making a name for himself as a troubleshooter, an agricultural specialist, an industrial developer, a provincial leader and a good Maoist.

During those years, he got to know some highly influential leaders at the centre, such as Li Hsien-nien, who was Chou En-lai's economic expert, Yeh Chien-yü, the present Defence Minister, and, more important of all, Mao himself. Surviving Red Guard attacks during the Cultural Revolution, Hua was named to the Central Committee in 1969, was transferred to Peking in 1971, was assigned to head investigation into the Lin Piao affair, was elected to the Politbureau in 1973, and became Minister of Public Security and then leading spokesman on national and cultural affairs in 1975.

Now the new Chairman, who is trying to maintain unity and stability in the wake of last autumn's traumatic events, must also face a plenary session of the Central Committee convened to authorize officially the Chairmanship bestowed upon him by the Politbureau. And he should probably early this fall, call the eleven National Party Congress into session to confirm all the Party changes necessitated by recent events. On the 22-member Politbureau, for instance, there are ten vacancies, five through death and five through purging. And, of course, one of those purged, Teng Hsiao-ping, may be his most difficult problem. This tough old organizer who has twice been fired from the top leadership, is still apparently very much around in Peking, the best-known veteran in the hierarchy, a man with far more influential friends in the Army and the bureaucracy than Hua Kuo-feng, and still

*Depleted
Politbureau
named Hua
as Chairman*

in Party member in good standing, despite the nation-wide vilification poured upon him by the radical-fundamentalists last year. Somehow he will have to be eased back into some top leadership role without creating insoluble problems for the new Chairman.

The economy

If he can resolve these political problems, Chairman Hua must get the economy going again and establish the goals for the new regime. And this he has already done, at an extensive industrial conference in Taching, the model industrial complex, and in Peking, which ended in mid-May. Here the new leadership in effect reaffirmed the goal set by the late Premier Chou En-lai in 1975 — a two-stage plan to mechanize Chinese agriculture by the 1980s and to put China into the front rank of industrial nations, like the U.S. and the Soviet Union, by the year 2000.

Digging back into Chairman Mao's old works, of which he is now editor-in-chief, Hua Kuo-feng reminded the conference that in 1956 Mao had asserted that China could and should surpass the United States economically in 50 years. To do so today, however, apparently will require not only Mao's idealistic incentives but also some of Teng Hsiao-ping's pragmatism. The conference was told that the "Gang of Four" were wrong to oppose the promotion of production and the establishment of rules and regulations in factories, to incite factionalism in political debate, to oppose "socialist accumulation" for expanded reproduction, and to prevent the development of factory experts and refuse foreign technology.

Material incentives are still officially frowned on, but overtime pay is admitted to be occasionally necessary and there is no longer any talk about eliminating the eight-grade wage system that provided those capitalistic pay differentials in the factories. In the communes, sideline production is not encouraged, but whether the new regime can boost production enough for the big new industrial base without such farm incentives is another question. After all, what is being asked of China's 800 million people over the next 23 years is a quantum leap forward, far surpassing the very creditable advances they have made in their first 28 years as the New China. And no longer will there be the living voice of the great revolutionary leader to make exhortation a sufficient incentive for such a massive undertaking.

For what Chairman Hua would seem to face is that classic dilemma of the Communist state, about which Mao warned and against which he fought all his life. With the slackening of revolutionary fervor and the growth of the desire for material incentives, the rise of the bureaucracy becomes inevitable — and probably an "elitist" society like that which developed when the Soviet Union lost its revolutionary zeal. Given the apparent desire of the new Hua leadership to modernize and industrialize China in a hurry, the need for an educated, technically-advanced bureaucracy may well be forced upon it unless the leadership is prepared, as Mao was, to encourage cultural revolutions every decade to promote class struggle and keep the leadership pure. And, if it does continue to follow that Maoist line, can the goals of the new leap forward ever be accomplished with such destabilizing rectification programs always going on?

Soviet relations

Another factor that should encourage the new regime to opt for stabilizing programs is the need to present a united front to the Soviet Union. The new regime has already made it very clear that ideologically there is no way the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties are likely to get together in the near future. The negative example of Soviet backsliding from the true faith is the inspiration of Chinese Party righteousness. At the same time, the Russian military threat and territorial intransigence do not encourage early diplomatic relations. The question may arise if there should be in the future Army leaders who want to obtain some Soviet modern military technology, for keeping the Army happy, and on his side, may be another of Hua's major problems.

Since the Hua regime appears to be ready to open more doors to the outside world, the opportunities to improve its relations with China will be available to the United States, but still only on the same old terms of ending its ties with Taiwan.

If Chairman Hua can remove some of the excesses of the cultural revolution of the past decade, relax the rules a little without losing the ideological goals, hold his Party Congress, and perhaps a National People's Congress too, he may manage to survive and, with his native cunning, apparent ruthlessness and careful planning, even to outlast Teng Hsiao-ping and all the rest of the old-line leaders.

*Need to present
united front
to Soviet Union*

Composing the message for Joe

Escott Reid's Time of Fear and Hope

By James Eayrs

"Imaginative gestures, stirring leads, and elaborate blueprints of policy, so beloved of those who are free of responsibilities of governments, are seldom of the stuff of practical statesmanship in international affairs." So a former permanent under-secretary of the British Foreign Office instructs the readers of his memoirs, and in that instruction we recognize the traditional creed of foreign service officers everywhere.

One Canadian foreign service officer chose to disregard it. For Escott Reid, whether on post in New Delhi, Bonn and (with the World Bank) Washington, or at home-base in Ottawa, the imaginative gesture, the stirring lead — even the elaborate blueprint of policy — made the diplomatic life worth living. It was fortunate for him, for what became the Atlantic Alliance and, arguably, for world peace that during the years 1947 to 1949 he was so situated within the Department of External Affairs — in the East Block, as L.B. Pearson's second-in-command — as to be able to bring to bear on the grand negotiation then under way in Washington his formidable and fertile intellect.

Time of Fear and Hope is far more than a memoir of Reid's own involvement in the making of the North Atlantic Treaty, far more also than an account of Canada's pivotal role — though it is both of these. It is, as well, a study of the policy objectives and the negotiating problems of all 12 participating governments (even of non-participants such as Sweden and Ireland). It offers much material of inter-

est to specialists in British, French and American foreign policy (an entire chapter is devoted to the involvement of the U.S. Senate), and is a mine of information about modern diplomatic practice and negotiating techniques. Students of Canadian foreign policy will find it fascinating.

Unlike most diplomatic memoirs, this is a work of careful scholarship. Without benefit of an ant colony of research assistants such as the one that helped Dean Acheson produce *Present at the Creation* the author (who was also present at the creation, and far longer than Acheson — indeed, the latter's late-coming to the negotiations in January 1949 was a major cause of the difficulties that arose unexpectedly during the final days) has provided a detailed and meticulously documented account of each of the issues to which the discussions gave rise — membership, treaty area, commitment (the problem of the "pledge") and, of course, the struggle for "Article 2". The account is firmly based on the memoirs of participants; on the papers of the author and of the late Hume Wrong (Canada's Ambassador to Washington and hence on-the-spot negotiator throughout), deposited at the Public Archives of Canada; on official files of the Department of External Affairs; and on diplomatic documents published by the U.S. Government in its series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. (Without access to the material contained in Volume III for 1948 and Volume IV for 1949 in these American sources, the author could not have produced anything like so comprehensive and definitive a study.) The scholarly apparatus accompanying the text is cumbersome: footnotes on some pages, reference to sources at the back of the book, substantive notes also at the back, even references to sources for those substantive notes. The attentive reader is required to keep not one place but four — an exacting task, as this

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reviewer discovered, in a brisk wind — but is a good guess that any reader of this book will be attentive.

Foreign offices, it has been remarked, have no secrets: the dictum of A.J.P. Taylor is, on the whole, sustained by *Time of Fear and Hope*. Its readers may not have known beforehand that, prior to the general election in Italy in March 1948, the then director of the U.S. State Department's policy-planning staff recommended leaning on the Italian Government to outlaw the Communist Party, so as to provide an excuse for American military intervention in the civil war sure to follow. (General Marshall did not act on this suggestion — wisely, one would think.) But for the most part, readers will find these pages useful for their detailed confirmation of what in general outline is already known.

Students of Canadian foreign policy, for example, will find additional evidence for believing that Canada's early interest in and unflagging pursuit of a North Atlantic treaty bringing the United States into a military alliance with Britain and the countries of Western Europe is to be explained by the uneasiness of its officials at the alternative prospect of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and the United States. As Norman Robertson recalled trenchantly from London in April 1948: "A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationships with other countries in Western Europe and in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great lengths and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership" (132). Just so.

Writing at that time, the U.S. Secretary of Defense observed, on visiting Ottawa, that Canada "is equally as strong as [sic] Britain for the formation of the alliance", pronouncing this a "curious act". There was nothing curious about it, and the use of the word betrays American obtuseness about Canadian fear no less than about Canadian hope. As Reid puts it succinctly: "The alliance would contain the United States as well as the Soviet Union" (139). That, however, is written with hindsight.

The author justifiably cites the passage in his speech to the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs on August 13, 1947,

as early advocacy of the Atlantic alliance, perhaps even the earliest: "This may be the first public statement advocating a collective defence organization of the Western world". However, an earlier speech (which Reid could well have drafted) delivered by Pearson at the University of Rochester on June 16 had tentatively put it forward: "If mutual tolerance between two basically opposed forms of society within the United Nations should prove impossible, the nations of the West would then have to decide whether to adjust their pace to that of the slowest member, or to go ahead to a really effective international order with those states who are really willing to co-operate".

Reid's speech at Lake Couchiching made Pearson's passage much more explicit by its reference to "an organization [in which] each member state could accept a binding obligation to pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of the other members if *any* power should be found to have committed aggression against any one of its members". Despite the disclaimer that Reid added ("I am not saying that the time has come when these things ought to be done"), his words were regarded as highly controversial, and their author took the precaution of clearing them with Pearson who (he now knows) took the precaution of clearing them with Louis St. Laurent. We are not told, however, whether St. Laurent took the precaution of clearing them with Mackenzie King. The Prime Minister, whose mood had become not so much one of fear and hope as one of fear and trembling and whose responses were by then erratic, might easily have ordered the key passage deleted from the text or even the cancellation of Reid's speech.

The author omits from this account a rather telling detail provided by him in a version published in 1967: "Mr. Pearson gave me permission, but suggested that it would be just as well if this particular passage were omitted from the copies of the speech given to the press at the conference". If so inconspicuous a *ballon d'essai* was unlikely to get shot down at once, it was unlikely to get much attention, either. Nor did it, hovering aloft for several days without attracting any attention at all, then drifting out of sight. The Department of External Affairs then decided to publish the speech as delivered, including the controversial passage, in its series of mimeographed press releases *Statements and Speeches*. Thus was the grand design revealed to the world. Quiet diplomacy indeed.

*Reid's speech
at Couchiching
made explicit
Pearson's message
at Rochester*

Much is disclosed about modern negotiating techniques and diplomatic practice. For example: "... even when representatives were acting under instructions, they sometimes pretended that they were expressing only their personal views" (48). "... Lovett said it had been agreed that the results of the meeting would not be reported to the respective governments. Lovett nonetheless reported the results of the meeting to his government. Presumably all the other participants did likewise" (56). "In December of 1948 the Ambassadors' Committee agreed to mislead the public. They decided that the draft treaty and commentary prepared by the Permanent Commission of the Brussels powers should not be presented to the Ambassadors' Committee in any form, and that it should be given to the Working Group not 'as a complete document' but as 'proposals item by item' ... This would make it possible for the participants to say that they had not received a draft treaty" (74). "Governments had agreed in July not to refer to the discussions in telegrams or over the telephone. Yet there was a voluminous exchange of telegrams between the Canadian Embassy in Washington and the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa about the discussions; and Pearson and Wrong had many talks about them over the telephone" (75).

These attempts to mislead both publics and fellow delegates were caused in part by the ultra-secrecy in which (so all but one participant assumed) the negotiation was held. The author devotes a chapter to a sophisticated discussion of secret diplomacy, noting the "paradox ... that, while knowledge of the tripartite talks of March 1948 was kept from the public and from friendly governments, it was not kept from the Soviet Government". A member of the inner circle of the 15 persons "in the know" was Donald McLean — British diplomat, Soviet agent. (It is this reviewer's impression, derived from his own work in the files, that McLean, who remained on the inside of the negotiations until September 1948, was entrusted by the rest with the important task of keeping the minutes or the "agreed record" — which, if true, would certainly have eased his other important task of reporting to the Kremlin.

The author shrewdly observes that McLean's Soviet connection was not necessarily disadvantageous to the West. It would have been so had the negotiation ended in failure, for in that event Moscow would have had much material with which to stir up discord and disarray among

Western governments and publics. But as things turned out, "his presence may have been advantageous for the West". In his reports to Moscow, he presumably informed the Soviet Government that there was one in the top-secret discussions evincing any desire to embark on a preventive strike against the Soviet Union while the United States still had a monopoly of the atomic bomb" (80). This rendered us service. If Soviet agents who penetrated the arcane counsels of the West did exist, there are occasions when it would be necessary to invent them.

The author makes one imaginative suggestion: "The Soviet Government would make a great contribution to understanding of the Cold War if it were to publish Donald McLean's reports on the making of the North Atlantic Treaty" (81). Not bloody likely.

The negotiators took extraordinary precautions against the artillery of the press and, with one exception, there were no leaks. The exception was caused by James Reston of the *New York Times*, whose "buddy system" approach to journalism had earned him the confidence of the inner circle to the point where he joined it as an honorary member. In November 1948 and again in February 1949, Reston "made proposals privately to the participants for the incorporation in the treaty of a provision of special military agreements ... " (73). Perhaps annoyed that the treaty was not turning out just the way he wanted, Reston so forgot himself as to publish "an accurate story of the differences of opinion between the negotiating governments over the wording of the pledge"; the story appeared in the *Times* on February 10. The leak disturbed Pearson: "Now that the precise differences have been made public in the press," Reid wrote then of his chief's action, "he feels that the time may have come when he will have to discuss the difficulties with his colleagues in Cabinet. Heaven forbid.

There was a price to be paid for such lone-ranger diplomacy, and the author tells us what it was: "... Ministers became involved in the decision-making process who knew little or nothing of the policies which Canada had pursued in the negotiations ... This was one reason why, after the treaty was signed, the Canadian Government was half-hearted over implementing those non-military provisions of the treaty for which it had fought so hard during the negotiation" (86). The main opponent of Article 10 proved to be not Dean Acheson, U.

*Sophisticated
discussion
of secret
diplomacy*

secretary of State, but Douglas Abbott, Canadian Minister of Finance.

For students of "dyadic politics" there are occasional moments of truth. Surely". Pearson minuted in the margin of a memorandum by the author arguing, with customary cogency, the case against Portugal's membership, "we cannot insist on the exclusion of Portugal against U.S. opposition" (200).

The diplomats who thickly populate these pages are portrayed as bloodless creatures — effigies from some wax museum of statecraft, whose human side we seldom see. If, as the author tells us, the final phase of the negotiation was acrimonious, when "governments uttered veiled or open threats and counter-threats", and tempers became frayed" (63), which among them "blew their stacks", and which retained their cool"? What sort of chaps were Gladwyn Jebb, who (the author allows) came across as "arrogant and aloof" to those who did not know him well? The icy Acheson, to whom "arrogant" was likewise applied? Baron Silvercruys and Wilhelm Morgenstierne, whose names suggest actors sent by Central Casting to play plenipotentiaries at Elsinore? Did Dr. van Cleffens of the Netherlands consistently grim with that mordant wit displayed by his suggestion that two words only would suffice as the preamble for the North Atlantic Treaty: "Dear Joe"?

With Hume Wrong, our negotiator on-the-spot, the author waged from Ottawa "a dual . . . which lasted throughout the whole 12 months of the negotiations" (137). Their feuding was in part the product of different perspectives from headquarters and the field: "Wrong, being away from Ottawa . . . was not as conscious . . . of political necessities in Canada. Being Ambassador in Washington, he was more conscious than we in Ottawa of political necessities in the United States" (233). It was in part the product of policy disagreement: Wrong was firmly of the "Dear Joe" school of thought about the treaty, while Reid wanted it aimed as

much at Western publics as at Stalin, devoting precious time and energy to drafting moralizing preambles in lofty language that drew withering rebukes from Wrong (and Robertson). It was in part the product of temperament. Wrong and Reid were too much alike to get along — each self-confident, sure of his judgment, inflexible. Unseemly bureaucratic in-fighting ensued between them in November 1948, the two officials exchanging messages of mounting asperity while simultaneously attempting to gain the ear of higher authority: "I received yesterday from Wrong a somewhat disturbing teletype . . ." (Reid to Pearson); "Reid's changes, trivial though they may be . . ." (Wrong to A.D.P. Heeney). At one stage, one of them — Wrong — more or less apologized: "I regret that my message to you . . . was so abruptly worded". Such slight magnanimity Wrong could well afford, for he got the better of the argument — over the details of which the author has seen fit to draw a veil.

The only diplomat whose strengths and weaknesses are to any degree exposed is the author himself, and he is unsparingly self-critical: ". . . I would have suffered fewer disappointments and frustrations and accomplished more if I had played my cards better . . . I should have used less emotionally-charged language in my communications . . . I would have been more effective if I had not given the impression that my intensity was almost feverish" (228). ". . . overwork exacerbated my two chief weaknesses as a diplomat: I was a perfectionist and I displayed *trop de zèle*" (231). These are not invariably defects, even in a diplomat. It may be that Canada and the world would be in better shape today had Canadian Governments paid greater heed than they did to this devoted public servant.

Reid, Escott. *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

*Mounting
asperity
in exchange
of messages*

Painchaud replies...

Sir,

Officially, *International Perspectives* is a journal of "opinion". It was with this in mind that I wrote my article on cultural diplomacy that appeared in the May/June 1977 issue and has drawn comments from certain readers. I had no intention of presenting a complete, scientific analysis of the subject. To do this, the journal would have had to be of a different nature, and, in particular, I should have needed more space to discuss the wide variety of problems involved. I chose, therefore, to take a controversial approach to the subject, and my clearly-stated purpose was to provoke discussion, which is the first stage in any truly relevant scientific research activity.

The use that Canada intends to make of culture in its external relations is based primarily on unspoken principles, which should — I still believe — be reconsidered. Furthermore, this discussion is not unrelated to another debate on culture that is beginning to develop within Canada and finds expression in the bizarre statements made by certain ministers regarding the role of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. It is obvious that, henceforth, culture will be a major political theme, and I feel that an examination of culture in terms of the ideological viewpoints it conveys is not without its merits.

Furthermore, to judge from their reactions, the opinions of some of your readers reflect these viewpoints. I cannot blame them for this, even though they are blithely doing themselves what they seem to be criticizing me for. Their reaction proves very simply that, before embarking on any scientific analysis, the debate on culture first calls certain basic options into question. I wanted to bring these options out into the open, as it were, and submit them for general discussion.

Having said this, I should like to point out that I was not specifically alluding to any of the articles by Department of External Affairs officials published in the preceding issue of the journal and, if I was critical of certain aspects of Government activity in the cultural field, my intention was not to condemn all our cultural-diplomacy programs. However, I did feel that these officials had had the opportunity to present an adequate defence of their views and that I was, therefore, free to draw attention to other aspects of the problem.

Moreover, I find it rather strange that, in a single issue, *International Perspectives* published three articles on Canadian cultural relations by Department of External Affairs officials that expressed the Government's official views, although the views expressed were supposed to be those of the authors. These articles were also incorporated in a booklet and distributed by the Department. At no time was it thought advisable to set them in a broader context, where they could have been compared with points of view other than those of the Department.* In fact, what emerged was nothing more than a defence of official policies. This, I believe, is an excellent example of a subtle but very real form of Government propaganda, which is difficult to attack because it appears to be carried out with the best intentions in the world.

It is precisely this kind of propaganda that can be used in cultural diplomacy.

Paul Painchaud
Quebec City

**Editor's note:* It was precisely *because* they thought it "advisable" to set these articles "in a broader context, where they could be compared with points of view other than those of the Department" that the Editors invited Professor Painchaud to make his contribution to the May/June issue.

...and is challenged again

In his account of Canadian cultural diplomacy (*International Perspectives*, May/June 1977), Paul Painchaud suggests that, because the Federal Government alone, without the provinces, originated certain academic programs, this action somehow discounts the credibility of the initiative. He asks how academic authorities, receiving "large sums", will agree to introduce "elements that run counter to federal policies". He also asks: "How can one hope that Quebec's political dimension will be represented . . . in any meaningful way?"

If he had troubled to look at the program mounted through the Centre of Canadian Studies at the University of Edinburgh, he would have found some lively contradiction in his argument. This program, so far from being "imposed", arose spontaneously from the interest and conviction of a group of professors in the University who had had direct, and in some cases extended, experience of Canada, both in governmental activities and in university teaching and research. The Centre was funded jointly by the University, the Foundation for Canadian Studies in the United Kingdom and the Department of External Affairs. In the academic year 1976-77, three academic courses had nearly 8 undergraduates enrolled. The two principal instructors attached to the Centre during 1976-77 were bilingual Canadians, one of whom taught a half-course on the literature of French Canada (in French); the other, a senior academic serving as visiting professor, devoted an entire term to the "French fact" in Canada, drawing upon French-language sources (which nearly all of the advanced students could read intelligently), strongly reinforced through the year by a gift of 200 contemporary books, published by firms in Quebec, presented by the government of the province. There was detailed attention throughout the year to developments in Quebec and their "reverberations in Canadian life", represented also by the arranging of an all-day symposium on "French Canada Today", which included a consideration of political, artistic and industrial developments.


Apart from the teaching and seminar activities, the Centre has become a focus for interest in Canada within the University and throughout a wider community; there is a understandable concern for "devolution" for Scotland measured against the experience of federalism in Canada. The work of the Centre, in short, does indeed reach "beyond government conformity", and "nationalistic and ethnocentric complacency" has no part in its program. The further argument that efforts to promote Canadian studies abroad should await the clearer articulation of studies about Canada within Canada may be both shortsighted and running against the tide. It is certainly arguable that perceptions of Canada formed abroad may have a realistic impact on the determination of Canadian policy; but if one were to defer any activity abroad until minds had been made up in Canada many useful opportunities would have been forfeited.

James A. Gibson
Edinburgh, Scotland

... Oops!

It is a pity that your columns have perpetrated, in a letter by Mr. George Cowley (*International Perspectives*, July/August), the common but incorrect rendering of the old saw which asserts that "a diplomat is someone who is sent abroad to lie for his country". What Sir Henry Wotton, Secretary to the Earl of Essex during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I of England and subsequently an ambassador himself (the original "old sawyer" in question) actually said was that an ambassador is "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country". There are those of us who prefer to consider more accurate the more innocuous meaning in this Elizabethan pun.

John M. Fraser
Ottawa



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New international order

Report on Paris dialogue

Sovereignty and natural resources

Sino-Canadian relations

Youth unemployment

Rewriting the laws of war

International Perspectives

Contents

November/December 1977

North-South dialogue	
Realistic approach to new order/ <i>Marcel Merle</i>	3
Lessons of CIEC/ <i>David Wright</i>	7
Natural resources	
Limitations on sovereignty/ <i>Winston Chambers and John Reid</i>	13
International minerals policy for Canada <i>Alexander Dow</i>	19
Sino-Canadian relations/ <i>Gerard Hervouet</i>	25
Youth unemployment/ <i>Thomas Land</i>	29
Chile under the military/ <i>Jacques Zylberberg</i>	32
Geneva Protocols of 1977/ <i>L. C. Green</i>	36
Letter to the Editor	43
Reference section	44
Index 1977	49

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Need for realistic approach to new international order

By Marcel Merle

The contemporary mind, shaped as it is by the mass media, has a need for slogans and sensational statements — the effect, if not the intent, of which is often to mask the reality they are supposed to reveal. They do, however, have the advantage of revealing the aspirations of the masses more accurately than any scientific analysis could do. So it is with the phrase “new international economic order”, which has been repeated, commented on and discussed so much that it has become the focal-point of the hopes and fears of large sections of the population, thereby acquiring a sort of magical aura. Proof of this lies in the impassioned arguments that occur whenever the question is raised: there can be no compromise or appeasement between partisans and adversaries of the “new international economic order” — any concession is viewed as treachery, any critical observation as a manoeuvre inspired by the adversary, and any independent reflection as evidence of unacceptable scepticism.

Under such conditions, an objective analysis appears difficult but necessary — difficult because of the semantic pitfalls that must be avoided and necessary because reasoning must be based on fact and not myth. That is our reason for writing this paper.

Not cut and dried

The idea of a new international economic order is without doubt an attractive one. Who could object to a plan that proposed to improve, if not radically change, a situation fraught with inequality and injustice? There is, however, some uncertainty as to

whether this matter is as cut and dried as at first appears.

The initial doubt arises when we turn towards the past, keeping in mind that that is where the present had its roots. Can we really say that there was an “international economic order” in the past? Emmanuel Mounier’s jibe about the “established disorder” has often been used and still has some validity, provided it is not used to avoid the real issues. For, in the final analysis, what order are we talking about? That of the colonial powers, which are always easy to blame for all the world’s ills but whose domination ended almost 20 years ago and which now play only supporting roles? That of the United States, which for years has been entangled in an inextricable web of economic difficulties? Or that of Germany and Japan, which seem to have found in military defeat and forced disarmament the secret of industrial and commercial success?

We know the answer to these questions. Beyond the changing patterns of competition that cause first one state and then another to get ahead, it is the “system” that is at issue, the system that ensures the domination of the wealthy countries over the poor ones. But this immediately gives rise to another question: what system are we talking about — the capitalist system or the industrial system? In the case of the former, it must be determined whether the prosperity of the United States, Canada, Western Europe and a few other countries is essentially due to the revenue they derive from the economies of the underdeveloped countries. Even Marx doubted this, and many economists are still debating the question. In the case of the industrial system, technological advance becomes, regardless of the political regime involved, the determining factor in the discrepancies in wealth that characterize the established disorder. But the remedy required is obviously not the same as it would be for the capitalist system.

The secret of industrial and commercial success?

Professor Merle teaches political science at the Sorbonne and at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and the École nationale d'administration. He is vice-president of the International Political Science Association and has written widely on international affairs. The views expressed here are those of Professor Merle.

The old "international economic order" was unquestionably characterized by great inequalities and severe imbalances. Both were and still are the cause of domination; the question that remains is, what domination we are referring to, and whether putting an end to it will be sufficient to bring about a reduction, as if by magic, in the discrepancies among chances for development. To answer this question, it is not enough to examine the past; only the future can tell.

The future

The second question has to do precisely with the future. This whole issue is being looked at as if there were a way of erasing the past with the stroke of a pen and setting up by decree a new international economic system beginning at a given time on a given day. The voluntaristic inspiration behind this project will make it difficult to convince economists, either Marxist or liberal, of its validity. Both groups adhere to the belief that exchanges are governed by laws (of conflict in the first case, and of co-operation in the second), but laws that are always the expression of an interplay of forces. Of course, a given sector or activity can be made subject to regulations — for example, the attempted stabilization of the prices of raw materials under the Lomé agreements or the gradual removal of customs barriers by the periodic negotiations held under the auspices of the GATT — but the idea of a formal declaration to abolish all forms of privilege everywhere is the type of romantic illusion that is generally followed by cruel disillusionment, as history has shown. When the petroleum-exporting countries wanted to alter the established economic order to favour themselves, they did not call an international conference to discuss the problem — they simply took a unilateral decision to quadruple the price of raw petroleum and made the law of supply and demand and the cartel technique work for them instead of against them, as had been the case for half a century.

This example brings us to our third question, which has to do with the present. Exactly when this "new international economic order" will come about has been the subject of feverish conjecture, but in reality is it not already with us? Granted, there are still a lot of claims to be settled, and for the moment there are no solutions to a good many inequalities that are a cause for concern for the future. But a reversal of the flow of exchange has already begun. Although the industrialized countries still have a large lead over the

others because of their technological advantage, they have lost the monopoly of power and are now being forced to share with newly-rich countries the fruits of growth. Petroleum revenues are only the most obvious sign of a change that is already affecting all forms of international exchange; it is now the petroleum-exporting countries that have the highest investment capacity and are taking advantage of it to acquire shares in the West's largest industrial enterprises, such as Krupp and Fiat. Products from certain developing countries in which industrialization has barely got under way are already competing effectively with domestic products in the markets of countries with a high standard of living, as is indicated by the predicament of Europe's textile industry. This trend can only continue in the coming decades, unless there is a return to widespread protectionism, which would generate economic recession and social tension.

Irreversible change

There is no better illustration of the blindness of Western politicians, Communist militants included, than their obstinacy in attaching the name "crisis" to a situation that would be described more accurately as an irreversible change. The leaders, and to an even greater extent the public, persist in viewing as something accidental or a simple combination of circumstances a recession that is actually the result of a change in the structures of the world's economy. How long will it be before it is understood by the wealthy countries — and also by the proletarian nations that are victims in reverse of the same misconception — that it was the exceptional period of expansion that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s and was without precedent in the world's history that constituted the accident or anomaly in a process that is now, in fact, returning to its normal course?

When viewed in a proper perspective (past, present and future), the theme of the "new international economic order" is therefore seen to be largely legendary. It bears an uncanny resemblance to the dream of the Golden Age that has always haunted mankind, except that it looks to the future for that ideal society the secret of which had previously been thought to be in the remote past.

Does this mean that behind the magic of the words there is nothing but a Utopia with no basis in reality and no hope of fulfilment? Certainly not. But it would be a serious mistake to count, yet again, on

*Romantic
illusion
leads to
disillusion*

he imbalances and afflictions of two-thirds of mankind "working themselves out". Never has there been a greater need for planning in order to attempt to put the world back on the right course before a catastrophe occurs.

But the success of any such undertaking depends less on shock therapy or spectacular operations than on a series of measures in which psychotherapy must occupy as important a position as the art of compromise.

Most urgent task

The most urgent task is to explain to the public the problem as it exists. This means, first of all, demonstrating that a transformation of the world's economic relations is inevitable, and that it is better to prepare for it now than to have to undergo its effects passively at some time in the future. Whatever the circumstances, two factors will necessitate a redistribution of wealth. One is the unequal rate of population-growth between the wealthy nations, which are already doomed by their selfishness to decline and decay, and the underdeveloped nations, which as a group double their population each generation; the other is the interdependence of all countries, at every level and in every field, as a result of technical progress, so that information and ideas travel even more rapidly than goods and people. Under these conditions, no theory can justify and no force maintain a situation in which a minority of the world's population is hoarding the greater part of its resources. In one form or another, there will have to be a redistribution.

Regardless of how it is brought about, this transfer will have formidable consequences on both sides. There is no doubt reason to hope that, in the long term, a more rational distribution of resources will be of benefit to all — even to the adherents of capitalism, who stand to gain if their clients are financially solvent. But, in the short term, equalization of opportunity cannot be brought about without a change in the manner of life of the developed countries, which in their over-consumption are using up some of the resources required for the development of the others. The facts indicate that the very political forces that say they are on the side of the Third World are often the ones that, at least while they form the opposition, make promise upon glittering promise to improve the standard of living, reduce the length of the work week, lower the retirement age and provide greater social benefits. Of course, the sacrifices must be

equally shared among the members of each society, and a common ploy used by the right is to invoke outside constraints as a reason for maintaining or reinforcing the status quo.

The left is no less guilty of deception when it encourages the development of a consumer society and at the same time promises aid to the underprivileged people of the Third World. There is no denying that these tendencies are a reflection of the aspirations of a society corrupted by the all-out search for comfort and material ease. The rude awakening will be when it becomes obvious that in all probability more work will be required to earn less money — even if this "less" is still vastly superior to what the people of the Third World can hope to attain for some time.

The countries of the Third World are also subject to illusion and compromise, such as the illusion of solidarity nobly proclaimed by international assemblies but immediately belied by squabbling to protect the respective interests and rivalry arising from national ambitions (for example, the Arab countries and black Africa), or the illusion of being able to attain rapidly a level of development that required two centuries of relentless toil on the part of the industrialized countries. As for the compromises, these concern mainly the ruling classes, which in poor countries often enjoy exorbitant privileges and endeavour, with the complicity of the industrialized powers, to protect their personal interests, while at the same time their representatives are delivering incendiary discourses in the international organizations. Conservatism at home generally seems to be quite compatible with revolutionary ideologies abroad. Why pretend to be unaware that the spectacle of waste, corruption and tyranny is used to justify continuing domination by the rich countries?

As for the choice of a model for development, this gives rise to controversies that are still, for the time being, gratuitous. After having repudiated outside aid and a trading approach, the more radical theorists are now espousing a "self-centred" type of development as the only means of breaking the chain of outside domination. But this kind of plan rarely corresponds with reality. Very few countries are willing to run the risk of self-sufficiency, thereby giving up the advantages to be gained, at least for the present, from foreign aid. Once caught up in the system, it is difficult to escape the attraction of the Western model of development. Consequently, a new form of complicity

*Domestic
conservatives
and international
revolutionaries*

is being established, which is reinforcing the structures of domination. On both sides, the priority of short-term considerations over long-term ones is hindering the chances of transforming the system and is greatly increasing the chances for a catastrophe in the future.

Even if all the partners were properly informed of these risks, it would still be necessary to consent to the type of surgery that would permit the functioning of the world's economic system to be effectively modified in order to bring greater equality of opportunity. The experiments carried out so far by all types of organization (the UN, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the "North-South" conference and so on) have not been very encouraging, but at least they have proved the uselessness of the "all-or-nothing" approach, which begins with solemn declarations completely out of touch with reality, such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, or the "all-at-once" approach, which at the very most makes it possible to draw up a statement of disagreement, as was the case at the end of the Paris conference on North-South dialogue. For the moment, the only other choice is that of the straight and narrow way of sectional or regional adjustments and *ad hoc* compromises. Will the partners involved have the wisdom to allow the construction, stone upon stone, of a new international economic order? There is reason to doubt it.

New balance

In fact it is only recently that there has been any awareness that no new economic order will be possible without a transformation of the international political order — that is, without a redistribution of power and a new balance between the decision-making centres. But though the objective is relatively easy to define the notions of how to attain it are still singularly confused. The Third World countries are arguing in favour of a "democratization" of international institutions. They neglect to take into account the fact that in most of these institutions they are already automatically in a majority position — which is most unpalatable to the major powers — and any attempt at giving resolutions made under such conditions the force of law would be nullified by power structures that no written document can abolish. Others are challenging — not without

reason — the representativeness of states and governments and calling for a generalized system of self-management. It is difficult to visualize this working in a community of four to six billion, and even more difficult to imagine a means by which governments could be deprived of their prerogatives.

Here again, all that can be done is to count on the wisdom of governments to allow gradual transfers of sovereignty without which no "public authority having world-wide jurisdiction", to use the words of John XXIII in *Pacem in terris*, can assume responsibility for the world's economic development. In other words, we are running round in circles and have made scarcely any progress since the time when Rousseau, referring to the Abbé de Saint Pierre's plan for perpetual peace, wrote "For this to come to pass, the sum of individual interests would have to be subservient to the common interest, and each person would have to believe that the common good was also the greatest good he could seek for himself. This would require a meeting of so many minds and so many interests that one can scarcely hope for such a combination of circumstances to occur by chance. . . . The wrongdoings and abuses which so many turn to their own gain occur unbidden, but something that is useful to the public can scarcely be introduced except by force, since private interests are almost always opposed to public interests."

Not encouraging

The prospects for a change in the short term are not, then, very encouraging. But it is not pessimistic, surely, to situate and size-up the obstacles that crop up along the way once the desired objective has been defined. Irresponsibility lies rather with those who are giving credence to mirages by letting the public believe that all that is required to reconcile the divergent interests is a little goodwill, and that the solution for all contradictions is at hand. There has never been a more difficult enterprise than that of changing in one or two generations, the "system" that prevails throughout the entire world. In the absence of a competent pilot, only a profound change in attitudes will make it possible to chart a common course through the rocks and shoals that bar the way to the evolution required and constitute an ever-present threat of disaster.

*Transformation
of international
political order*

Lessons of the Paris dialogue

By David S. Wright

The Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC) or "North-South Conference", which met in Paris for a year and a half, ended its work several months ago. That it terminated its own existence may have come as a surprise to many people who have become accustomed to international bodies whose main function appears to be self-perpetuation. The results were mixed. Developing countries regretted that the conference did not succeed in achieving a new international economic order. Few realists in the Third World actually believed such an achievement possible in 18 months, however. Developed countries regretted the failure to reach agreement on continuing energy consultations with OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries).

There were some significant achievements. A \$1-billion program of special action for the poorest countries was established by industrialized countries. Some, including Canada, contributed to this by writing off debts of the poorest developing countries. For the first time, support for the idea of a common fund for commodity-price stabilization was given by industrialized countries. The real issues on this question remain to be negotiated. Important commitments were made by a number of developed countries on the future of their levels of development assistance. Many elements of a comprehensive program of energy co-operation were agreed upon. The failure to agree on a continuing

energy dialogue leaves unanswered the question of what institutional arrangements will be used to implement the agreements on substance.

On balance, enough progress was made to keep the continuing North-South dialogue civil for the time being. There was not enough progress, however, to cause an upsurge in confidence in the capacity of the international community to cope with some of the most fundamental problems it faces. The final ministerial session was tense and difficult. Collapse of the conference and a breakdown of the dialogue into confrontation were real possibilities. This was averted, but not without enormous effort.

Will to succeed

CIEC was a very difficult conference to put together. The major economic powers had to agree on a limited number of participants (27), whom to include and whom to exclude, and what subjects would be dealt with. The conference was established outside the conventional United Nations structure. The international community was willing to experiment only because of extraordinary circumstances, notably the economic situation resulting from oil-price increases. It is most unlikely that the major economic powers, particularly the key developing countries and OPEC, will soon agree to organize another such conference. They are more comfortable with UN-based structures, which guarantee that their views will be heard but unfortunately do not always produce real, as distinct from paper, results. A sharply-defined and easily-recognizable new economic crisis would be required to point them in less conventional directions. Because an opportunity to make real progress in solving global economic problems is rare, it must be taken seriously by governments. CIEC was taken very seriously in most quarters.

Among existing international economic bodies, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the IMF

Conference established outside conventional structure

Mr Wright is Head of the General Economic Policy Section in the Department of External Affairs. He was a member of the Canadian delegation to the Conference on International Economic Co-operation in Paris and headed the CIEC task force in Ottawa. A graduate of McGill and Columbia Universities, Mr Wright has served in Rome and at the United Nations in New York and has contributed several articles to International Perspectives in the past. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.

(International Monetary Fund) offer continuing opportunity for progress on trade and monetary issues. Their North-South application, however, has so far been limited, since the major industrialized trading nations dominate both organizations and the decisions taken tend to reflect their interests. CIEC was a compromise of sorts. Developing countries had a stronger voice than they have in the IMF or GATT but not as strong as they have at the UN. Developed countries came to CIEC more prepared genuinely to negotiate than they are at the UN, although perhaps less so than they are in the IMF or GATT.

Most participants wanted CIEC to be a success, though few were willing to pay much of a price for success. The will to succeed varied with political and economic circumstances. Elections in some key countries resulted in changed attitudes towards North-South issues, notably in the United States. Poor performance by industrialized economies during the period of the conference and high rates of both unemployment and inflation diminished the willingness of developed countries to make the adjustments to their own economies necessary to help bring developing countries more fully into the international economic system.

It was argued, though never widely accepted, that some developing countries, primarily more militant OPEC members, wanted CIEC to fail so that they would have a justification to increase the price of oil substantially. There were certainly within the group of developing countries very different interests being pursued, and some were more inclined to work for success than others. The developing countries without strong natural-resource bases, which depended both on western economic assistance and imported oil, stood to lose the most from outright failure. They would suffer from the impact of failure on public opinion in donor countries and on the political will to continue giving aid. They would also suffer from a probable increase in the oil price, which Saudi Arabia, the strongest force for moderation in OPEC, had linked directly to the outcome of the conference. This link was not accepted publicly by developed countries, though some took it quite seriously in private. In preparing their final positions, governments could not ignore the possibility that a breakdown of the conference might lead to a significant oil-price increase.

Success in an area as complex and vast as "international economic co-opera-

tion" is really a term of shorthand or convenience. Clearly, it cannot realistically equated with solving all the major problems. With respect to a conference, it can mean concluding the work with an agreed perception that some progress has been made, progress that makes the continuation of the effort worth while. In the somewhat narrow sense, CIEC can be termed a success. It was not, however, a breakthrough. Perhaps it could have been but only in happier economic circumstances, which would have seen great willingness to take steps with short-term national costs and only long-term international benefits. Of course, in such circumstances, a conference like CIEC might never have been attempted. The economic crisis generates both an intense search for solutions and a disinclination to make adjustments for the purpose of achieving solutions. This sounds like a prescription for failure.

A final word on success and failure. Developing countries do not as a rule speak openly of success in North-South discussions. To do so would jeopardize their future negotiating positions, which they measure against their far-ranging proposals for a new international economic order. Thus they consistently speak of results falling short of their expectations and of disappointment, in order to keep whatever pressure they can on developed countries for future concessions.

Lessons for dialogue

A number of lessons may be drawn from the 18 months of CIEC on the conduct of a negotiation of this kind. First, there is the question of national participation. Limiting the number of members to 20 was of advantage in making progress and in reaching consensus on some questions. The countries taking part represented half the population of the world and three quarters of its economic production. All the major economic powers, excluding the East Europeans and China, were present.

There was a disadvantage, however, in that the developing countries used the exclusion from the conference of so many smaller Third World countries as a reason for not agreeing to some points — the most important being energy consultations. They argued that on such an important matter they would have to consult the Group of 77 (which now numbers over 110 developing countries). It did not escape their attention that, while their representation was 19 out of 110 or so, 10 developed countries were represented at the conference (because of the single sea-

*Few willing
to pay much
for success
of conference*

f the European Community) out of a total OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) membership of 24. This added to their reluctance to make concessions on their demands because of the apparent over-weighting in the conference in favour of developed countries. The 19 did not want to be criticized by the 110 for being too conciliatory.

The exclusion of the Soviet Union and the East European countries simplified the dialogue between North and South. The usual Soviet interventions laying blame on capitalism and imperialism and offering little of substance did not occur. Avoided were the sterile debates on the Middle East or southern Africa that often accompany economic discussions at the UN. The exclusion of the Soviet Union from CIEC reflects the present state of the North-South dialogue, in which the Soviets have not played a constructive part. It would be in the interest of all, however, to have the Soviets and East Europeans participate in efforts to improve the economic situation of developing countries. The non-participation by the Soviets in the North-South dialogue, whether self-imposed or imposed by others, will in the long term be both economically and politically destabilizing.

The value was demonstrated of having moderates on both sides of the dialogue play a leading role. One of the problems of the North-South dialogue as it takes place in most international forums is that the developed and developing countries speak to one another as groups or blocs. Hence it is important that group positions be sufficiently advanced at the negotiating phase to avoid a gap so large as to cause confrontation. It would seem that Venezuela and Canada were good choices for the co-chairmanship of the conference because of their moderation and their respective understandings of the point of view of the other side.

There were further lessons to be drawn from the experience of trying to cover as broad an agenda as CIEC covered. The conference provided an opportunity to look at the international economic system in broad political, and not merely technical, terms. This was valuable, though the process of analysis itself does not necessarily produce results. For real action, concentration on a few key issues was required. Developing countries were unwilling to accept this. Efforts aimed at concentrating negotiations on a few questions in the action-oriented phase of the conference consistently met

with failure. For developing countries, with unity a constant problem, to drop the demands of one of their members to concentrate on another issue was politically painful. Their position remained, until the final days of the conference, an amalgam of the individual demands of all developing countries packaged as a new economic order. This was not conducive to serious negotiation, as political efforts to alter positions in both developed and developing countries were diffused rather than focused on the few key issues where progress was both possible and important.

Three more lessons emerged — the value of working in private session, the importance of consensus as opposed to voting, and the need for deadlines to achieve progress. Working in private session brought the benefits of frank exchanges and the avoidance of too much political grandstanding. It also resulted in fewer set speeches and more off-the-cuff remarks and real dialogue. The rule of consensus applied throughout CIEC, and worked well. No group was able to threaten to vote as a bloc to carry a measure over significant opposition. Countries which were isolated within their groups had pressure applied on them to join in consensus. The need to agree, to permit continuation of the dialogue, forced countries to re-examine their positions if they seemed to be out of phase with the views of the majority. The need for consensus led to a good deal of group caucusing. Such caucusing has become a very familiar phenomenon at international meetings and often group caucus meetings take considerably more time than the meetings among the groups.

The conference moved slowly. It produced results best when the pressure of time was greatest. In the last few hours of a 40-hour, non-stop negotiation on the final report of CIEC, an agreed assessment was reached on the results and a detailed listing of areas of agreement and disagreement was negotiated. More was visibly accomplished in those tense hours than in the months that preceded them. There is a danger of allowing too much time to study problems because they lose their immediacy, and the political will that has led to their being addressed may fade as time passes. Political will and interest are generated by focusing the attention of political leaders on specific events at particular points in time. The time-frame may have to be created, even artificially, if only to present an opportunity to take key decisions. After a lengthy delay following the American election and

Political grandstanding curtailed



Wide World phot

Despite his move from External Affairs to being President of the Privy Council, Allan MacEachen continued as Co-chairman of CIEC. He is shown here on the Champs Elysees during the April 1977 session of the conference. In the background the Arc de Triomphe speaks eloquently of his hopes for the North-South dialogue.

after slow progress in its first year, CIEC's concluding phase resulted in highly-active negotiations. There were reviews of and decisions on national policies on several key issues within a period of a few weeks because of the direct involvement of many world leaders. The personal participation in negotiations and drafting by Secretary Vance of the United States, Dr. Owen of the European Community, Mr. Amouzegar of Iran, Sheikh Yamani of Saudi Arabia, and the two co-chairmen, Mr. MacEachen and Dr. Pérez-Guerrero, was crucial to the progress achieved in the final days.

Lessons for policy

For many countries, energy was the key issue at CIEC. Certainly, the origins of the conference lay in the energy crisis and its economic consequences. Perceptions of the energy situation have changed during CIEC, and in part because of it. Eighteen months of energy dialogue between OPEC, developing-country consumers and industrialized countries resulted in a considerable amount of education as to the different viewpoints which exist. OPEC countries, notably Saudi Arabia but also many of the others, are much more aware of the dangers of too rapid an oil-price escalation, both for the industrialized economies (and for their

own investments in these countries) and for developing-country importers of oil. These latter countries account for the substantial portion of the payments deficit that corresponds to the enormous surpluses accumulated in some OPEC countries.

Developed countries now rarely make statements about the oil price being too high, nor do they call for its reduction as they did one or two years ago. Some in industrialized countries judge, realistically, that oil prices will continue to increase until the cost of alternative sources of energy is reached. Some even conclude that, despite the economic disruption, the sharp oil-price increase of a few years ago was necessary to shake up enormously wasteful consumption patterns in industrialized countries. Had it not happened then, they argue, the future energy crisis would have been much more severe. There is now a broad consensus on the needs for conservation and for intensive efforts to develop non-petroleum-based energy sources.

With all the improved understanding on energy, it is regrettable that, at the end of the day, OPEC rejected a continuation of energy consultations. Perhaps industrialized countries did not press this objective hard enough or early enough. They were concerned about having to pay too high a price for such a dialogue. OPEC

and some developing countries may have taken a short-sighted position in rejecting energy consultations. They wanted to continue to use the oil-price lever to extract concessions from developed countries on the North-South issues and judged that energy consultations would diminish this leverage in some way. They were also mindful of the political sensitivities of the great number of developing countries outside the CIEC discussions. Paradoxically, the countries which had the most to gain from energy consultations were, in fact, developing-country importers. They did not press OPEC for fear of offending a potential benefactor. Yet OPEC needs their political support to add respectability to its stand on oil prices. Some new form of energy consultation may emerge in the next few years. For the time being at least, such consultations will be bilateral.

In the areas of commodities and trade, the 18-month debate was not very satisfying. Commodity questions focused on a common fund for price stabilization. Although the general idea of a fund was agreed to, very different perceptions remain on its nature and functioning. Developed countries would accept a common fund that would emerge out of already-established commodity agreements with buffer-stock funds of their own. Such a fund would thus be a pooling of individual funds. Developing countries want the broader common fund established first, to provide a stimulus to individual commodity agreements, negotiations on which have been lagging. They also have a broader perception of what the fund will do once it is in existence, seeing it as having a transfer of resources function (to poorer countries) as well as a commodity-price-stabilization function.

The common fund debate, which has gone on for a few years, has an air of unreality to it. There is no agreement on the commodities which would be covered. Sugar, cocoa, coffee, tin, rubber and copper have been mentioned in various quarters, but each would present special problems. Developing countries themselves find that their enthusiasm for the broad political concept of a common fund diminishes when discussion turns to the particular commodity in which they have an interest. The debate on the common fund may not lead to much in the real world of commodity trade. A common fund may some day be established, but perhaps more as an aid fund rather than a fund for intervention in commodity markets to stabilize prices.

It is apparent, however, that governments will increasingly intervene in commodity markets. It is not plausible that the availability and price of crucial commodities will continue to be determined by the vagaries of private commodity speculators or of multinational corporations. Commodity market management is an area in which governments will have to become more expert, and there is no doubt that they are already heading in this direction. Governments may attempt, more and more, to manage supply and availability of exports of raw materials as well as demand for imports. They may intervene to play a role in setting prices, guided probably by longer-term market trends dictated by supply and demand.

On trade, and particularly trade liberalization, there was little progress at the CIEC. The real focus of developed country attention on trade was on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) in Geneva. Willingness to provide greater access to markets on the part of industrialized countries is lacking, reflecting difficult national economic situations and the resurgence of protectionist pressures. In most developed countries, the views of producers wanting protection take precedence over the concerns of consumers. Unfortunately, by some, the MTNs are looked upon as a problem rather than an opportunity, and tariff reductions are looked upon as concessions granted in negotiations rather than a common objective.

The indebtedness of developing countries was one of the major issues discussed at the CIEC. Some progress was made towards a better appreciation of the situation. Regarding aid-related debt of the poorest countries, Canada and some others took significant steps, writing off debt of least-developed countries and deciding to give aid to those countries on a grant-only basis in the future. The much larger issue of the enormous debt accumulated by middle-income developing countries, largely through commercial borrowing from private banks, was not tackled directly, nor did many developing countries want it to be. The problem is that some developing countries with access to private capital markets do not want to subject themselves to stringent IMF conditions for borrowing in the higher-credit "tranches". Thus they turn to commercial banks, which assess their credit-worthiness on a case-by-case basis and do not impose strict conditions on their economic policies. In this manner, they have accumulated debt-service obligations which they may eventually have difficulty in meeting. This area will bear

*Resurgence
of protectionist
pressures*

some careful watching in the coming months, the danger being that a major default could have a destabilizing effect on the international banking and monetary system.

Broad conclusions

Some broad conclusions may be drawn in the light of the experience and lessons of the CIEC. First, countries of differing viewpoints and conflicting economic interests can sit down and make a serious attempt at resolving the issues that divide them. There is a willingness to bargain on the part of developed countries, even though they are fully aware that they will be making short-term economic concessions aimed at a longer-term, and an uncertain, political good. Developed countries know that, regardless of votes in the UN, they hold the power to alter the course of the international economy. Developing countries have some of this power, too. The most obvious example is OPEC, but other countries, such as Brazil, are beginning to exercise their economic power internationally.

The powerful countries will not be pushed to the wall by resolutions or rhetoric. They will, however, respond to changing economic realities and consequent changing perceptions of their own interests. They will pay almost no attention to debate on economic issues that bears little relation to reality. They will be polite but unreceptive. There is, therefore, a danger that too much emphasis by developing countries in international meetings on a holistic new world order will have the effect of "tuning-out" the powerful countries just at the point where their perceptions of the world should be encouraged to evolve. The powerful must exercise leadership based not only on the pursuit of their own interests but also on

an appreciation of the international consequences of such pursuit. This appreciation will not be encouraged by emphasis on paper rather than real results in the North-South dialogue. It will be encouraged if major economic powers and major poor countries are able to talk and negotiate rationally. The CIEC provided such an opportunity and was used to good effect. Perhaps an adaptation of the CIEC formula will have to be used again in the future. Circumstances may demand this.

It would be essential to include the major economic powers in such a forum if improved global economic management is the goal, as indeed it should be. The OECD serves a very useful purpose for co-ordination and consultation among industrialized countries on the full range of international economic issues. Membership in the OECD is based on history and politics, and to some extent on likemindedness. Economics may require that something broader exists in the future to encompass more of the countries that wield economic power. OPEC would be an essential element, as would be the Soviets and the key Third World powers such as Brazil, Mexico and India.

One of the weaknesses of the North-South dialogue is that it is too "dichotomized". Industrialized and developing countries sit in an adversary relationship even if they are talking about economic co-operation. This is not entirely the fault of developed countries. Developing countries are prisoners of the dogma of their own Group of 77. A broader partnership of the OECD kind might help to provide leadership on global economic questions that would reflect not only the pursuit of legitimate national goals but an appreciation of the international consequences of achieving them, both on the powerful and on the weak.

Although they manifest themselves in a variety of troubling ways, including open conflicts, it is now apparent that the principal concerns of most members are, in fact, economic. The UN and its agencies have their work cut out for them if we are to move closer to a more just and equitable world economic order. The barriers to success are enormous, as unemployment and inflation continue to plague even the wealthiest countries. Unless a spirit of reasonableness prevails, unless demands and responses are tailored to present economic realities, I must caution that even in Canada, which is far from being the least generous of the developed countries,

pressures will develop to focus on our own considerable problems, even to the exclusion of the international consequences. I need hardly tell you that we are not alone in this difficulty. Canada's goal is to build on the foundations we helped to create through our co-chairmanship of the CIEC. Given the proper climate, we will work hard to devise a strategy that is both broadly acceptable and realistic.

Extract from the speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 1977, by Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson.

Limitations on sovereignty over natural resources

by Winston Chambers and John Reid

All nation states that perceive their natural-resource heritage as one of the mainsprings of their economic development embrace the principle of "permanent sovereignty over natural resources" embodied in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. For many former colonial territories, this principle expresses a universal recognition of their sovereign powers. By asserting the sovereign rights of all states to trade and dispose of their natural resources in the interest of economic development and the well-being of their citizens, the principle constitutes a unique international instrument.

It provides a legal rationale for nationalization, legal authority for requesting multinational enterprises to take full account of domestic resource-development priorities, and protection of national autonomies from extraterritorial encroachment. Since 1962, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII) on "permanent sovereignty over natural resources", this doctrine has come to occupy a central place in international discussions of trade and development. Today, it is of fundamental concern in a variety of international deliberations; indeed, "full exercise by developing countries of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources" is seen by the United Nations General Assembly as playing "an important role in the achievement of the goals and objectives of the [Second United Nations Development] Decade" (Resolution 2626 (XXV)).

The realities of international commerce, however, appear to cast considerable doubt on the validity of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources. The manner in which multinational firms employ technology and investment capital dictates the pattern and location of resource development throughout the world, and erodes national sovereignty over natural resources. The Canadian experience illustrates the realities of global resource-development

Canadians have been lulled into complacency by a long-standing assumption that the nation's rich endowment of natural resources will ensure economic prosperity for future generations. Much of this unquestioned faith in the natural-resource heritage is rooted in the historical development of Canada, which has been viewed mainly as the record of a scattered group of colonies that attained nationhood and proceeded to exploit their natural advantage in raw materials, exporting primary materials to metropolitan consumers in order to achieve a rapid improvement in living standards. In 1911, Sir Wilfrid Laurier rhetorically asked the House of Commons:

Why did our ancestors leave their respective lands and come to this country . . . if it was not for the purpose of taking hold of the natural resources and using them for their benefit?

From the perspective of our forefathers, perhaps the easiest — and, indeed, the only — path to prosperity in an age of colonial empires was to exploit the natural resources at their disposal. It followed from this choice that the exploitation and development of resources became the rationale of economic life in Canada.

Minerals and mineral materials have become increasingly important in the context of Canadian economic development. As early as 1936, the mining industry was recognized as the vanguard of the Canadian economy. T.A. Crerar, then federal

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Minister of Mines, identified mineral exports as the prime source of revenues to fill the gap in Canada's export trade occasioned by declining farm-product sales. "Fortunately," he declared, "this breach was filled by products of our mineral industry . . . [without which] our position in international finance would have been endangered, our unemployment would have been greatly increased, even beyond what it is, and our progress along the road to recovery would have been very seriously delayed."

Recent pronouncements about the potential role of mineral resources in providing the basis for continued economic prosperity have tended to reinforce earlier perceptions of the role of natural resources in economic development. These are, however, largely irrelevant to today's world, and demonstrate an apparent lack of understanding of the determinants of global resource-development, and hence of the relation between resource-management and economic development — a relation that clearly demonstrates that natural resources, though crucial, cannot of themselves ensure economic growth and development.

While nineteenth-century nation-builders could not have foreseen the extent to which domestic resource policies would be affected by (1) the trend towards the increasing internationalization of business activities reflected in the growth of world trade, (2) the growth and dominance of the multinational enterprise in global resource-management and -development, and (3) the emergence of the multinational enterprise as the principal agent for the mobilization of investment capital and for the international development transfer of technology, contemporary policy-makers, concerned with the use of natural resources as a vehicle for economic growth and industrial diversification, can hardly neglect these realities.

The new realities are best seen against the background of traditional perceptions of trade and economic development. The traditional model of international trade advocates that a country should specialize in the production and export of those goods and services that employ the "abundant-factor" endowment of the country and import those goods and services that employ those factors of production that are in short supply in that country.

The Canadian experience agrees generally with this traditional model of specialization. The bulk of our trade has been in minerals, forestry, fishing and agricultural commodities. The Canadian economy

has experienced since the turn of the century a remarkable growth in the production of a wide variety of mineral commodities. Canada has become the world's third-largest producer of minerals and mineral materials (behind the U.S.S.R. and the United States). It is prominent among the world's sources of supply for nickel, zinc, asbestos and silver, and a major supplier of many other strategic minerals. Canada's crude and fabricated mineral exports were valued at over \$1 billion in 1975 — a dramatic increase from a total value of mineral production of \$129 million in 1914 and \$1.1 billion in 1951.

Throughout the years, two important trends have emerged in Canada's mineral trade and development. First, there has been no significant change in the ratio of fabricated mineral products to Canada's total mineral-export trade. The largest portion of the nation's mineral exports remains in raw and semi-processed form. Secondly, the growth-rate of mineral production in Canada has been declining since 1950. Though Canada's mineral exports have, in absolute terms, been increasing its relative position as a major supplier of minerals and mineral materials has been declining markedly in recent times.

The foregoing developments have occurred in spite of a phenomenal growth in world demand for minerals occasioned by population growth and rising *per capita* real incomes.

Canada's failure to foster further processing and the development of mineral based manufacturing results in part from a set of internal and external political and economic forces that have led to the acceptance of the traditional model of international trade and development. But it seems that close adherence to this form of economic development results in a lopsided industrial structure. The "factor-abundant", specialization approach does encourage economic growth. It may also, however, generate an unbalanced, and socially undesirable, economic development. Balanced economic development is an essential ingredient of stability in an open economy.

Canada's mineral wealth offers a prime source for the development of a more diversified and workable industrial structure. Unfortunately, some policy-makers are apt to think that the possession of a mineral resource is sufficient to ensure a desired pattern of development based on the exploitation of that resource. Throughout the nineteenth century — indeed, even 30 years ago — this view may have been valid. Today, however, the

*Earlier
perceptions
reinforced*

relative resource-endowment of various countries, though crucial, is but one of many factors that determine the rate, pattern and geographical distribution of world resource-development.

To understand why factor-endowment confers less advantage than it once did, it is necessary to examine the principal determinants of resource-exploration, -mining and -processing among resource-producer countries.

The most important determinant is the demand for minerals and mineral materials. In meeting this demand, the mining companies, for the most part large multinationals, decide where to locate new mining operations and/or to expand existing capacity. In doing so, they are influenced both by the relative attractiveness of the natural-resource endowment and by the investment incentives offered by the governments of various countries. More specifically, the mining companies take into consideration:

- (1) the quality and quantity of ore deposits;
- (2) the nature of infrastructural facilities, ranging from the availability of professional and skilled manpower to transportation and communication networks and adequate energy supplies;
- (3) the host country's view of the role of minerals in its industrial development;
- (4) the degree of political stability (uncertainty about nationalization, war, taxes and other factors deter prospective investors);
- (5) fiscal, monetary, commercial and industrial policies of the countries in question.

In the aggregate, these elements determine the relative attractiveness of various countries for mineral-investment undertakings. In doing so, they are examined by the multinational mining companies in terms not only of how they are likely to affect profits but also of the extent to which they could curtail management's decision-making powers.

While, however, these determinants are basic, they are not all-inclusive. Two other determinants — technology and investment capital — transcend all the rest. Technology in this sense refers not only to machinery and equipment but also to the expertise of managers, scientists, engineers, technicians and other categories of skilled labour.

Technology and investment capital can be used to alter the relative attractiveness of resource-producing countries for

mining investment. Technology, for instance, can be employed to increase supply and reduce unit costs of production at all stages, from exploration through fabrication. Modern techniques of exploration are uncovering new ore-bodies in Brazil, Australia and Papua New Guinea, as well as in the depths of the oceans, and these discoveries are altering the international competitive position of traditional resource-producing countries. At the same time, the recovery-rate of metal and by-products from the processing of new ores, scrap metal and tailings has been increased dramatically through the application of innovative extractive technology

It is clear that technology is an indispensable element in resource-development. Equally important is the availability of adequate supplies of investment capital — indeed, such capital is an essential prerequisite for resource-exploration and -development. The mineral industry must, however, compete for scarce investment funds with other industrial sectors in domestic and international capital markets. It is here that multinational enterprises play a unique role in bringing technology and investment capital together for developing natural resources. This capability derives from the special characteristics of the MNEs, which may be listed as follows:

- (1) their established facility as main purveyors of technology;
- (2) their extensive knowledge about the distribution and quality of mineral deposits throughout the world;
- (3) their access to international and domestic capital markets through a system of intercorporate linkages;
- (4) their integrated and diversified structure, coupled with a large share of international markets;
- (5) their recognized capacity for ensuring security of supply of minerals and mineral commodities for industrialized economies.

These characteristics of the multinational companies, particularly their control over technology and their ability to influence the flow and direction of capital investment in minerals, constitute formidable bargaining levers, which may be employed to secure special economic and political advantages for the companies concerned.

To appreciate how powerful these MNE bargaining instruments really are, it is necessary to understand the degree to which the economic welfare of various countries relies on and is sensitive to the deployment of capital investment and technology by the multinationals.

*Technology
indispensable
in resource-
development*

Broadly speaking, the operations of the MNEs link three major groups of countries. The first group — generally, the home-base of the world's largest MNEs — consists of such highly-industrialized economies as the European Economic Community, Japan and the U.S.A., which rely heavily on imports of minerals and mineral materials. The second group — usually host countries of affiliates of many MNEs — comprises countries like Canada, Australia and the Republic of South Africa, which, though highly-industrialized, are de-

pendent upon mineral exports for a significant part of their gross national product. Finally, there are those developing countries — Zambia, Chile and Peru, for example (also host countries for affiliates of MNEs) — for which mineral exports are the mainstay of their economies.

The MNEs and their affiliates form a major system of economic links among the three groups of countries. The links can readily be seen through the various markets for raw materials, investment capital, products and technology. The industrially



High technology is an essential element in competitive modern mining operations. In an underground mine at Flin Flon, Manitoba, this mucking-machine scoops up ore and loads it automatically in ten-ton cars hitched on behind.

NFB photo

advanced, resource-deficient countries have come to regard MNEs as agencies that provide their economies with adequate supplies of raw materials for maintaining and expanding their industrial complexes. On the other hand, the resource-producer countries view the MNEs as the main agents providing direct investment and technology to exploit and develop their resources, while developing or utilizing indigenous managerial, professional and skilled manpower.

Thus the global trade-and-development activities of the MNEs link the three groups of countries in a network of interdependent economic and political relations. But the pattern of trading that has emerged from these relations has proved unsatisfactory to the major resource-producer countries and has been the source of controversy in the so-called "North/South dialogue".

Many of the disquieting conditions of existing trading patterns originated in the era of colonialism, when low-cost supplies of raw materials were secured by metropolitan industrialists exploiting the rich resource-endowment of the colonies. For the most part, these *entrepreneurs* were unconcerned with the balanced development of the colonial economies. Consequently, while raw-material exports became the mainstay of colonial economic life, they did not construct the base for industrial diversification. This partly explains the lopsided structure of many developing economies today, as well as their vulnerability to the cyclical and secular changes of business activity in the industrially-advanced world.

Developing countries have long recognized that they can reduce this vulnerability and raise living standards by broadening their industrial structures. Beginning with meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964, developing countries have questioned the traditional framework of trading patterns and institutional arrangements within which they must seek the realization of their development and trade objectives. Developing countries, lobbying as the Group of 77, are still calling for a restructuring of international trade that will ensure greater equity in the distribution of world output. To this end, the Group of 77 is demanding, among other things, trade-liberalization, monetary reform, the transfer of real resources from developed economies, the transfer of technology, further processing, access to capital markets of

developed economies, and a code of conduct for multinational enterprises.

Technology and investment capital are considered essential to the development of a nation's natural-resource endowment. Economic nationalists in Chile, Zaire, Peru and Zambia were quick to recognize in the 1960s that investment capital and mining technology were critical elements in maintaining the viability of their mining operations. In all cases, after government takeovers in the copper-mining industry in these countries, newly-formed state producers were obliged to accord favourable investment concessions to foreign mineral companies in return for their management, technological and marketing expertise. In many cases, the costs of these services outweighed the anticipated economic benefits from nationalization. Eventually, one might have expected developing countries to sharpen their skills and become less reliant on the foreign company's ability to raise investment capital and provide industrial technology. But this did not happen. Recently, Marshall T. Mays, the former President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), observed:

Cost of services outweighed expected benefits

The economic impact of oil-price increases on most developing countries and the resulting impact on already scarce foreign-exchange resources have greatly magnified the importance of foreign capital in LDC mineral projects. Operational difficulties with some state-run mines also have underscored the need for private technology. Thus we now sense a growing desire among developing nations — even in some that have notoriously bad reputations for their past treatment of foreign investors — to enlist the capital and skills of the U.S. mining industry in the development of their mineral resources.

Three noteworthy facts emerge from the foregoing. First, investment capital and technology are essential to mineral-resource exploration and development. Secondly, MNEs play a dominant role in the integration and use of investment capital and technology in the global development and distribution of mineral resources. Thirdly, an MNE's decision as to where to invest is not guided solely by the quality and quantity of mineral deposits as such but also by the relative attractiveness of the set of investment incentives offered by each country. Thus the richness of mineral deposits, though clearly of considerable importance, is but one element in the incentive package offered to the

MNEs by countries competing to develop their natural resources.

In this perspective, is sovereignty over natural resources a reality or an illusion? How valid is the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which gives explicit recognition to the sovereignty of nation states over their natural resources? Concern voiced by the Group of 77 at UNCTAD IV and in other international forums about technological dependency, access to capital markets and the vulnerability of their economies to the behaviour of MNEs amounts to a tacit admission of the *de facto* invalidity of any form of resource-control based on a nineteenth-century conception of sovereignty.

There is, therefore, a trade-off between the preservation of sovereignty over natural resources, on the one hand, and the procurement of investment capital and technology, on the other. This trade-off, moreover, is not peculiar to developing, resource-producing countries. It also applies in countries such as Canada, Australia and the Republic of South Africa, where economic prosperity is largely affected by mineral-exploration, development and trade.

It is unfortunate that neither of these groups of countries are being realistic about the place that the latter group should occupy in the North/South dialogue — which, indeed, has polarized countries into two groups, developed and developing. Countries like Canada are seen simply as industrialized economies. This view overlooks the fact that such countries are heir to many of the resource-development problems that have elicited the demand for a new international economic order.

International economic interdependence limits the autonomy of nation states to pursue national objectives with purely domestic instruments. Within the international economy, there is considerable mobility of technology and investment capital, both which are now almost exclusively controlled by MNEs. These assets are in effective demand by all countries wishing to develop their natural resources. Consequently, the MNEs, whose primary concern is profit, employ their control of technology and access to investment capital as a formidable bargaining instrument for exacting the most favourable investment conditions from countries competing for capital and technology.

This dependence on investment capital and technology, as well as the ensuing rivalry, place the MNEs in a commanding position so far as resource-development is

concerned in many countries. Thus the ability of many resource-producers to develop their own minerals is being diminished. Even where nation states have nationalized the operations of the MNE, these states have been obliged to enter into contractual arrangements with MNEs to procure essential technological, managerial and marketing expertise.

The extent to which the behaviour of MNEs curtails sovereignty, and hence the ability of the nation state to develop its mineral-resource heritage as it sees fit, is determined by the country's economic structure and system of government. Where the economy is not diversified and economic prosperity derives mainly from mineral operations, the country may be obliged to sacrifice some political and economic autonomy for scarce investment funds and industrial technology. Moreover, the political system itself may further weaken a country in its contractual arrangements with MNEs. In federal systems such as those of Canada and Australia, where mineral resources fall solely within the jurisdiction of provincial or state governments, government decision-making respecting mineral-resource development is balkanized. This situation encourages open competition for foreign capital and industrial technology among provinces or states. Moreover, it leads to the fragmentation of development policies and international policy positions respecting the development of the nation's mineral resources.

In the Canadian context, the division of responsibilities between the two levels of government places additional strain on the federal development of a national policy. The apparent division of jurisdiction over mineral resources limits the Federal Government's employment of international institutions and arrangements to further mineral-development priorities.

A major implication of this analysis is the need to minimize encroachment on sovereignty while maximizing the net economic and social benefits from mineral-resource exploration and development. In other words, it is clearly in the interest of nation states, when they enter into contractual arrangements with MNEs, to ensure that these arrangements, while recognizing corporate objectives, seek to minimize the economic, social and political costs associated with the procurement of technology and investment capital.

To this end, many host countries, including Canada, could benefit from pursuing policies designed to foster greater government — industry co-operation in the

*Sovereignty
traded against
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of capital*

development of appropriate technology, especially in virtue of the current tendency of industry to redefine its role as a seller of management and technical expertise. Moreover, certain federal systems could profit from promoting greater co-operation between the two senior levels of government so as to strengthen the bargaining

position of the provinces or states in dealing with MNEs.

Difficult though the attainment of these objectives may appear, they constitute a potentially-rewarding challenge to policy-makers seeking the maximum economic and social benefits to be derived from a nation's mineral-resource endowment.

Multinationals and mineral resources

International minerals policy should be adopted by Canada

By Alexander Dow

Nations possessing commercial mineral deposits seek to exploit this resource to obtain economic growth, improved employment opportunities and a source of export earnings. Increasingly, too, emphasis rests on the broader aim of attaining the greatest possible economic development for the entire economy from extractive mining industries. Such a goal recognizes not only that the total value of what is extracted and exported is of importance to a mining economy but that so also is the proportion of that value that stays in the economy and the associated structure of production created by the industry.

Canada is a major world producer of minerals. Long the world leader in nickel production, it is also now the leading producer of zinc. Its lead and copper output ranks Canada as a major world producer. In addition, it is a significant producer on a world scale of asbestos, cobalt, iron ore, molybdenum, potash, silver, sulphur, tungsten and uranium. Many other minerals are produced in quantities of less significance to the total world supply.

The political economy of modern extractive industry is such that the attendant goal of maximum economic development in each producer nation can be achieved to the full only by co-operation at various levels between producer nations. As "hewers of wood and drawers of water", Canada and these less-developed countries producing minerals share certain economic interests, which may be pursued jointly.

That Canada is rich, and to some degree industrialized, whereas the LDCs involved are poor and to a great extent non-industrialized does not alter the similarity of their problems in this regard and the mutual nature of the benefits accruing to a co-ordination of trade policies.

Inevitably, self-interest succours trade policies, as tariffs, quotas and exchange controls attest throughout the international economy. With minerals, it is a fortunate coincidence that Canadian interests and the impetus of the "new international economic order" permit Canada the option of an honourable trade policy. To explain the rationale for this policy, which is not currently being energetically pursued, requires an excursion into the political economy of the modern mining industry.

Vital industry

Few realize the extent to which the mineral industry is vital to the Canadian economy. Even excluding petroleum and natural-gas exports, more than one-quarter of Canada's visible exports regularly take the form of crude minerals and fabricated mineral products. Since Canada has an

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open economy, in which merchandise exports form a high proportion of the gross national product (generally about one-fifth), this contribution is of considerable importance. Even after netting-out the mineral industry's demands for foreign materials and machinery, it is certain that mineral sales ensure a substantial earning of foreign exchange for Canada.

Considered solely in output terms, mining and mineral fabricating (still excluding oil and gas) again emerge as of major importance to the Canadian economy. In *Towards a Mineral Policy For Canada* (1974), the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources estimated the direct contribution as 5.6 per cent of the GNP in 1971. With indirect multiplier effects added, the impact rises to a massive 15 per cent of the GNP. Admittedly, such estimates of indirect "linkage effects" to transportation, construction, machine-tool industries, etc., must be treated with considerable caution, as they most likely overestimate the final, general impact on the economy; but they do serve to highlight the substantial importance of mineral production to Canada.

In Canada, as in the LDCs, foreign ownership of mines and mineral-processing is the rule. According to the *Canadian Minerals Yearbook* (1972), some 61.1 per cent of the capital employed in metal mines and 63.1 per cent of that in non-metal mines at the end of 1970 were controlled by non-residents. In fact, this conclusion is based on the conservative Statistics Canada practice of designating control by 50 percent ownership or more. It is well known that, with equity widely disseminated, a much smaller bloc of shares will ensure effective control of a modern corporation. Finally, according to Wallace Clement in *The Canadian Corporate Elite* (1975), about 79 per cent of the profits in Canadian mining attach to the foreign-owned assets in the industry. Somehow foreign owners end up holding more profitable assets than do domestic-asset owners.

Like Zambia, Chile, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, to mention but a few LDCs with commercial minerals, Canada is dealing with large and profitable multinational firms in the domestic-minerals industry. For the most part, these multinationals are foreign-controlled. However, Noranda Mines in Quebec and Cominco in British Columbia do exist as indigenous mining giants. As for the powerful International Nickel Company, the true locus of control, whether in Toronto or in New York, is a matter of much ambiguity.

It is instructive to investigate briefly the Canadian tax take from the minerals industry in the recent past. Metal mining showed the highest average rate of return at over 13 per cent, of any sector in the Canadian economy from 1962 to 1975. Yet a comparison of book profit before tax and taxable income in the period 1965-70 shows that taxes were levied on only 16.8 per cent of book profits in metal mining. By comparison manufacturing paid taxes on 64.8 per cent of book profits, construction on 64.4 per cent and wholesale and retail trade on over 85 per cent (Statistics Canada, *Corporation Taxation Statistics*). A mass of tax exemptions (at 100 per cent for three years on new ventures), tax write-offs for exploration and development (100 per cent and immediate), tax-depletion allowances and concessionary tax rates led to mining's contributing proportionately less than other industry to Canadian revenues.

The report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (the "Carter Commission") concluded in 1966 that the special tax concessions enjoyed by the mining industry should be abolished. Not until 1973 did the modification of the federal tax exemptions and depletion allowances, together with increased provincial royalties, establish a more realistic taxation level on mining corporations — whose reaction is of interest here. The chorus of protest extended across Canada in the media, resounded through the provincial seats of government and reverberated in Ottawa. Constantly encountered at this time was the threat that, if the industry were thwarted, future investment would be diverted outside Canadian borders. In this instance, Canada experienced the pressure, typical of multinational enterprise, that is frequently encountered by LDC host governments. The threat of location elsewhere is used by the mining corporations as a strategy to minimize taxes and maximize post-tax profits.

Mining and development

The problem facing a country seeking economic development with heavy dependence on a mining industry is an absorption problem. How can the mining industry in its productive activity, and the proceeds from the industry, stimulate economic development in the rest of the economy?

The crux of this particular problem was identified by Hans Singer more than a quarter of a century ago in a now classic article ("The Distribution of the Gains between Investing and Borrowing Coun-

Foreign
ownership
is the rule

tries", *American Economic Association Proceedings*, 1950). Singer observed, in a wider discussion, that the "multiplier effects" of much foreign investment were experienced in the economy of the investor and not in the recipient economy because of its dualistic economic structure. He commented: "Could it not be that in many cases the productive facilities for export from underdeveloped countries which were so largely a result of foreign investment never became a part of the internal economic structure of those underdeveloped countries themselves, except in the purely geographical and physical sense?"

The advance of development economics in the years since Singer posed this penetrating question now permits the isolation of the conditions necessary for extractive industry to contribute to the possibility of economic development. A certain simplification of complex realities is involved in the analysis, as is the case with all economic abstraction. In general, however, two main criteria may be proposed as sign-posts to policy-makers anxious to determine whether mining will generate significant economic benefits:

- (a) Are there likely to be substantial linkages?
- (b) Will the economic rent accruing to the minerals stay within the domestic economy, at least in part?

Linkages are the economist's succinct term referring to the connection between a particular economic activity and the rest of the economy. An industry buying goods and materials stimulates the domestic production of these items; this is a "backward linkage". Likewise, the availability of the industry's product may stimulate further processing or fabricating within the economy; this is a "forward linkage".

Regrettably, the backward and forward linkages generated by multinational extractive industry are rather limited. The more traditional the economy, the truer is this precept. Backward linkages do occur to some extent in the form of infrastructure provision in the areas of energy, transportation and accommodation — dams, railways and housing. Canada does manufacture some mining equipment, though much is imported. In the LDCs, tools and machinery for mining and milling ores are inevitably purchased abroad.

As for forward linkages, the fact is, to use the phraseology of a United Nations report, "the primary-metals industry has little effect in promoting the growth of light industry" (UNIDO [United Nations International Develop-

ment Organization], *Non-Ferrous Metals*, 1972). Generally, forward linkages within the primary-metals industry (from concentrate to refined metal to fabricated products) are attained by political means. In LDCs, multinational corporations cite the economies of large-scale production to justify the export of crude ores to refineries and rolling-mills in the corporate metropolis. In Canada, the ratio of fabricated to crude materials in mineral exports is rather better, at 2:3, than in LDC producer countries, but much room remains for increasing the proportion of Canadian value added in minerals' trading.

Canadian example

A fine illustration of the problem is to be found in Canada's economic history. The nickel industry in Canada before the First World War resembled in its situation that of the modern metal-mining industry in LDCs. A foreign company under the patronage of J. P. Morgan — the original International Nickel Company (INCO) — was developing the Sudbury ore-body with a minimum of further processing in Canada. Almost 25 years of cumulative public pressure resulted in 1915 in the establishment of the Royal Ontario Nickel Commission. The report of this body characterized the reasons for the public pressure in terms still typical of modern Canadian nationalists: "There is, first, the natural desire to have all the work on raw material which is produced here done at home, up to the point of turning out the finished article. Employment is given to Canadian workmen, Canadian chemists and Canadian experts. The rewards of this labour are spent in Canada and swell the volume of Canadian business. There is a feeling of impatience at seeing Canadians hewers of wood and drawers of water, while, in another country, technical and skilled work is performed in refining an article of Canadian origin."

A prior rebuttal of these aspirations had been submitted to a Canadian House of Commons standing committee by INCO in 1910. Included is the following refrain, familiar still in the development context: "Certainly nickel could be refined in Canada, but not at a price which would enable it to compete with nickel produced abroad. If the industry were attempted in southern Ontario, the sulphur fumes would be considered a nuisance. An export duty on matte would close up the works at Copper Cliff (Ontario) and consequently the mines also, in which case the company would bring ore or matte from their nickel lands in New Caledonia to be refined at



NFB photo

Open-pit mining can be conducted much less expensively than underground operations. Countries that wish to guarantee the working of less-accessible and lower-grade ore deposits must ensure that part of the profits from the mining of rich surface-ores are set aside for future use. The open-pit operation illustrated above is at Atikokan, Ontario.

Bayonne (U.S.A.). The new Caledonian ore is easier and less expensive to refine than that from Sudbury; the disadvantages are, the heavy freight rates and the great distance from New York. As to profits, the profit on refined nickel was about $7\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound. There was no understanding between the International Nickel Company and the Société le Nickel or the Rothschilds. On the contrary, they were rivals and competitors."

Before the completion of the Royal Commission's deliberations, there arose a scare that Canadian nickel was being exported from the U.S. by submarine to help the German war effort against the British Empire. A popular clamour grew for state intervention. In 1917, before the Commission's report was delivered, INCO had started to build the Port Colborne refinery, which has operated profitably in Ontario ever since.

This anecdote is descriptive of the relation between multinational company and host nation in that it reveals the importance of bargaining power between company and government. The power of the corporation is strengthened by capital requirements, technology considerations and questions of market access. Owing to these bargaining "counters", the corpora-

tion presents to the host LDC the effective threat of location elsewhere. Co-operation between governments can mitigate the strength of these factors and allow an improved economic outcome to each participant country.

An international minerals policy for Canada should recognize the mutuality of interest between Canada and LDC producer nations in such matters of political economy. As part of the Program in Support of the New International Economic Order, the encouragement of further processing of raw materials is a recognized LDC goal. International tariff reductions in semi-processed metals are an example of an advance desirable for all producer governments seeking improved forward linkages for an export-oriented mining industry. Canada has been pursuing this objective in the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with little apparent success. Apparent lack of support from similarly-placed LDCs may indicate an absence of mutual understanding.

Even a simple intergovernmental information exchange, by improving the information flow to host governments, allows a better estimate of the actual profit-rate corporate mining capital will

deem acceptable. Incentives and taxation levels can be judged more confidently as a result. Producer associations, such as the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper-Exporting Countries (CIPEC), seem to be serving this function. In addition, they serve to promote mutual understanding. To date Canada has shunned these organizations despite their endorsement in the Program in Support of the New International Economic Order.

Three elements

The returns to extractive industry under modern conditions consist of three distinct elements: normal profits, monopoly rent and Ricardian rent. Normal profits are those returns that would attract private capital into mineral production in a given location (with a given risk factor) if the industry were competitive in the special sense in which the economist employs that term. Monopoly rent is the term applicable to these profits (in excess of a normal profit) that arise when a corporation enjoys scarcity prices either by manipulation of supplies in a position of dominant market power (or in collusion with other producers) or owing to world shortages. Such a rent may also arise from the sole possession of certain technical know-how – as, for example, the patented knowledge of how to produce a metal product with specific qualities. It is these two elements, normal profits and monopoly rent, that comprise the returns of multinational corporations operating in manufacturing.

In addition, those companies in natural-resource industries will earn Ricardian economic rent (resource rent) on their world-wide operations. Ricardian economic rent is a surplus that occurs in metal mining owing to the differential quality of different ore-bodies and the disseminated nature of the metal present in any one ore-body. A mining concern will expand its world-wide operations only if, at the marginal mine, its costs of production are expected to be covered, including at least a normal return on capital. On the likely postulate that better ore-bodies are developed before inferior ones, a surplus is being earned on the lower-cost ores when world prices are sufficient to cover costs on the higher-cost operations. Thus Ricardian rent arises on existing mines whenever the development of more costly mining complexes becomes justifiable to the profit-seeking multinational corporation.

Even within an ore-body, however, there will be diminishing returns experienced with more intensive exploitation, as ore of lower and lower quality is extracted

for crushing and liberation. At that metal price which justifies a particular cut-off grade in the mine, a surplus is being earned on the ore of higher quality. This surplus is also Ricardian economic rent.

The peculiarity of this element of multinational corporate earnings is that it is not necessary as an incentive to produce. It is true that, if certain jurisdictions permit a producing company to keep such Ricardian rent, it will be attracted by that prospective gain. However, if all jurisdictions were to collect successfully all Ricardian rent, the level output in the industry would be unaffected. Such a situation presents considerable scope for mutual benefits from intercountry co-operation.

The other interesting feature of Ricardian rent is that liberal and socialist alike agree that it belongs to the state. Its collection is not to be equated with taxation but with the recovery in money of the asset value to the natural resource-owner (the state) of a diminishing asset. Ore-bodies are non-renewable assets, whose value is appropriated by private capital if not collected by host governments using methods designed for that purpose. Profit taxation, aimed frequently at monopoly rent, will not collect Ricardian economic rents successfully unless specially tailored to that task.

*Ricardian
rent belongs
to the state*

Mutual advantage

Mutual advantage is attainable from co-operation between Canada and LDCs in economic policies concerning minerals production and trade. Canada is in a similar position to an LDC possessing minerals, since both are “hewers of wood and drawers of water” struggling to attain an independent economic identity. Both face a web of interwoven multinational mining capital. Neither can afford to dispense entirely with multinational mining expertise or to reject the market access offered by such corporations.

But it seems that further gains are possible within this framework with respect to economic rent, the collection of which is of critical importance to any government seeking economic development from a mining industry. Yet the experiences of Canada, the old colonial regimes in Africa and the new mineral countries, such as Botswana and Papua New Guinea, reveal a chronic tendency for multinational mining corporations to pay extremely low taxes and royalties. The threat of location elsewhere, with the accompanying loss of technological expertise and market access, has been the wedge by which such concessions have been gained. An exaggerated

emphasis on the risks of mining has also dulled the acquisitive urge of revenue-seeking governments. Concerted action by governments in the harmonization of royalties to collect resource rents and in the taxation of monopoly profits would reduce the force of the multinational threat. Location elsewhere ceases to be an option if "elsewhere" also ensures an equivalent regime of rent-collection.

*Economic-rent
collection
has created
problems*

Unexceptionable in theory, the collection of economic rent has in practice created considerable problems. For instance, it is difficult to separate the capital expended in discovering and "proving" an ore-body from the inherent value of the ore itself. The harmonization of resource-rent collection round the world is likely to be difficult in that the "capital content" implicit in exploration and development differs from situation to situation. Thus agreement as to appropriate tax and royalty methods and rates may be hard to attain.

The ray of light to guide the officials concerned would be that, so long as all (or nearly all) the resource rent (but *only* the resource rent) were collected in each producer-country, there would be no tendency for production to fall. Host governments might also be led to co-operate more closely by the appreciation of how minimal were the natural linkage effects of metal-mining on economic development. Either the Ricardian economic rent is collected successfully or else a wasting asset disappears completely with mine-exhaustion — and with it evaporate some possibilities for economic development by industrial or agricultural diversification.

The collection of monopoly rent is in a slightly different category, though inter-governmental co-operation can also play a role in altering its distribution in favour of producer-governments. Again, the problem is one of presenting a common front in all relevant jurisdictions. The most successful example of such action has been the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) cartel, which even succeeded in raising the world prices of oil and so the level of monopoly rents. For several reasons, of which the existence of substitutes is the most compelling, such dramatic intervention is unlikely to be successful for other commodities. Furthermore, there is no established ethical or ideological justification for any one interest appropriating monopoly rents. Normally the preserve of private capital, their distribution between corporation, government and consumer is purely a matter of relative market power.

Imminent reform

The structure of international trade in commodities is of great significance for producer co-operation; at present its reform appears imminent. The Conference on International Economic Co-operation the Paris meeting of 27 nations representative of industrialized and non-industrialized interests, ended in June 1977 with only a modicum of agreement. Yet one result of these "North-South" negotiations, which had dwelt on issues central to the "new international economic order", is a commitment by the industrialized nations to change the institutional framework of trade in raw materials. Agreement in principle to a common fund to support schemes for commodity-price stabilization is being followed this November by the beginning of negotiations in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) relating to the "nuts and bolts" of the fund's operations. Closely related to the foregoing is the agreement on the need for measures of international co-operation in the marketing and distribution of raw materials.

As a large exporter of minerals, Canada has as much interest in stabilizing commodity prices (and employment in the industry) as the LDC producer-nations. Thus Canadian support should now be accorded enthusiastically to the efforts to devise a workable, integrated commodity-price stabilization program. In particular, efforts may be made to have included in the program those minerals that are of particular importance to Canada.

Indeed, present realities dictate that Canada should turn to wholehearted support for the several producer associations now formed (or embryonic) for minerals in which Canada has a significant export trade. Canadian insistence on consumer-country participation in such associations (the present policy stance) is misplaced, in view of Canada's interests as a major mineral-producer. The moral legitimacy of such associations is not in doubt, owing to their endorsement by the United Nations in the Program in Support of the New International Economic Order.

Indeed, as previously noted, associations for copper, iron ore, zinc, sulphur, etc., are not likely to operate as has the OPEC oil cartel to raise world prices. Their more modest successes are likely to consist in improving the bargaining power of nation states facing multinational mining companies, with, as a result, enhanced revenues from resource-rent collection and more forward linkages of mining within the national economies of participant

countries. Straightforward price-stabilization, with or without common fund support, is also an aim of such producer associations.

Examples of producer associations to which Canada should make immediate advances are the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper-Exporting Countries (CIPEC) and the Association of Iron-Ore Exporting Countries (AIOEC). CIPEC has as members or associates Zambia, Zaire, Chile, Peru, Indonesia, Australia and Papua New Guinea. Though as a copper-producer Canada ranks well below the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as a contributor to world trade, with Zambia and Chile, it is of the first rank. Canadian participation in CIPEC would strengthen the organization considerably. The Association of Iron-Ore Exporting Countries is a more recent producer association, with such members as Algeria, Australia, Chile, Sweden, India, Venezuela, Tunisia, Liberia, Mauritania and Peru. Canada has declined one invita-

tion to join this organization. One hopes the next invitation will be accepted.

A suitable note on which to end, emphasizing rent considerations, is the exhortation of Eric Kierans, the former Liberal Cabinet Minister and gadfly of Canadian natural-resource policy. In his *Report on Natural Resource Policy in Manitoba*, Kierans comments as follows:

Resource development is the transformation of natural wealth into liquid form. Seeking to keep that surplus, the economic rent from exhaustible resources 'at home' is surely a legitimate and necessary objective of government policy.

What is legitimate for Manitoba is legitimate for Canada and for the developing countries fortunate enough to be endowed with valuable mineral deposits. It should become the joint task of Canada and other mineral-producing nations to strive for this outcome in decision-making chambers round the world.

Sino-Canadian relations: resignation and optimism

By Gérard Hervouet

It is always difficult to assess bilateral relations that are unmarked by dramatic events. Since October 13, 1970, when diplomatic relations were established between Canada and China, very few problems have arisen, and both parties have endeavoured to avoid creating any. Must it, therefore, be concluded that these relations have reached a plateau, and that in future only simple, delicate readjustments will be needed?

It is a well-known fact that recognition of China was a milestone in Canadian foreign policy. In accordance with the guidelines defined in the 1970 White Paper on foreign policy, relations with China have enabled Canada to place a noticeably greater emphasis on links with the Far East. Notwithstanding the key aspects and, in many respects, the obviously symbolic value of this initiative, may not Canada have created the impression that it did not know whether it was doing too much or too little?

In our view, it would be quite wrong to conclude that, in general, Canadian di-

plomacy lacked realism in its relations with China. The 1969 negotiations, the formula for recognition — copied since that time by several other countries — and the competence of Canadian experts attest to the efforts made and the energy poured into the task of coming to grips with realities in China. An unexpected result of such a policy is, perhaps, that, by being too eager to succeed, one is captivated by the charm of those with whom one is dealing and de-

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velops expectations that were not there in the beginning. This seems to have been the case in the first few years, especially with respect to trade.

Many countries experienced these illusions and disappointments, and most of them resigned themselves to the fact that they had to follow the pace set by Chinese diplomacy — a pace resulting from internal upheavals usually unforeseen by foreign observers. For various other reasons, which we shall mention later, Canada must be prepared to accept a more gradual development of its relations with China, but it should take pleasure in the fact that progress has been smooth and continuous.

Trade benefits

Diplomatic recognition immediately produced benefits in the area of trade. Two weeks after it occurred, in fact, Canada negotiated a contract with China for what was at the time the largest wheat deal ever made. In the spring of 1971, barely two weeks after the first Canadian Amba-

sador to China, Ralph Collins, assumed his duties in Peking, the first Canadian Government trade mission arrived, headed by Jean-Luc Pépin, then Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

According to Mr. Pépin himself, the purpose of the mission was essentially economic, and in September 1971 he submitted an extremely positive report to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the end of the trip, the Chinese leaders assured the Minister that they would continue to consider Canada as China's main supplier of wheat. This meant, above all, that China would call on Canada first as a favoured partner when it wanted to import wheat. This promise has never been broken. In 1973 the Peking Government concluded an agreement with Canada to buy 224 million bushels of wheat over the following three years.

The ministerial missions that followed the one headed by Mr. Pépin also gave cause for satisfaction. In August 1972, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, opened in Peking the larg-

As part of the cultural exchange program between Canada and China, the Shanghai Ballet spent four days in Ottawa last May during the company's first Western tour. Dancers are shown above in a scene from The White Haired Girl, a modern revolutionary ballet.



est trade fair that Canada had ever held abroad. However, Mr. Sharp's large delegation was clearly political and served to counterbalance the previous mission of the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. These visits, as well as subsequent ones by Cabinet Ministers Donald Macdonald and Jeanne Sauvé, helped to weave a network of contacts, agreements and exchanges that enabled Canada to benefit from a full range of international relations with China.

Prime Minister Trudeau's visit in October 1973 put the finishing touches to these efforts. The warm relations established with China's leaders, and the results achieved, made this trip a great success, both for the Prime Minister's personal prestige and for Canadian diplomacy. A trade agreement was signed that included a most-favoured-nation clause, conveyed the intention of both sides to increase the number of their exchanges and established a joint trade committee that would meet annually. Another result of this trip was that the Canadian and Chinese Governments reached an immigration agreement allowing citizens of the People's Republic of China to come to Canada as part of a program of reuniting families. It is interesting to note that China has never made this kind of agreement with any other country. Since 1973, 2,000 Chinese have taken advantage of this agreement.

Though it is obviously impossible to list all the achievements that might give Canada reason to rejoice, it may safely be said that, in general, diplomatic recognition of the Peking Government has benefited Canada. While it is difficult to evaluate actual political gains, one can see that there has been a steady increase in the volume of trade since 1970, except for the last two years. There has also been a very significant increase in scientific, technological, cultural and sports exchanges. The question now is whether it is possible to do more in the future. For almost two years relations between the two countries seem to have had difficulty in finding their "second wind". The factors that have led to this situation, on both the Canadian and Chinese sides, have to be examined.

The enthusiasm reflected in recent reports of Canadian missions to China would seem to represent something of a change from the realism of the early Seventies. This seems to be especially true in the realm of trade. A simple perusal of the annual figures for trade with China since 1970 shows that there was a significant imbalance between exports and imports that was very much in Canada's

favour. Even more interesting is the fact that, from 1961 to 1969, grain sales always represented more than 96 per cent of all Canadian exports to China, and in some years the figure was as high as 99.9 per cent.

Since the time of Canada's diplomatic recognition of China, both parties have tried to correct these imbalances by considerably increasing Chinese imports to Canada. In spite of these efforts, officials of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce have estimated that it would still be possible to increase Canadian exports. In fact, when Jean-Luc Pépin returned from China, he stated that the Chinese wished to export a wide variety of products but were not insisting on objectives such as the balancing of trade, equal increases in exports or anything of that kind. A working group was set up to co-ordinate action taken to tap the potential of the Chinese market. Its object was clear: to increase trade between the two countries, and Canadian exports to China, by selling a wider range of products. These efforts were not fruitless, since the proportion of grain exports has decreased progressively since 1971, with a cyclical exception in 1975, and Canada has sold more aluminum, timber products, potash and telecommunication and railway equipment.

However, despite the Chinese Government's assurances that it could easily buy from Canada manufactured products it now obtains elsewhere, orders have still been given to other countries. For example, though China presented the Canadian Government — and even Prime Minister Trudeau, during his visit in 1973 — with the prospective purchase of "turn-key" factories, this kind of project does not yet seem to have materialized. In 1975 China imported 11 full units from Japan, West Germany, Britain, Italy and the United States.

Trade declining

Over the last two years for which figures are available (1975-1976), the volume of trade between Canada and China has decreased. Several factors may serve to explain this downward trend. The main ones seem to be the Chinese Government's need to reduce its trade deficit and, even more important, China's growing interest in its political and trade relations with Western Europe. China demonstrated this interest when it decided, in May 1975, to establish diplomatic relations with the Commission of the European Communities in Brussels, Canada and the United States

*Grain declines
as proportion
of exports
to China*

inevitably suffered because of this new direction in Chinese foreign policy.

There has also been a change in the kinds of product imported by China during this period; the proportion of agricultural products has decreased, while that of machinery and equipment has increased. These factors partly explain why the Peking Government has preferred an annual rather than a longer-term renewal of the 1973 agreement on the purchase of Canadian wheat. Experts on China's economy estimate that sales of wheat should continue for several years, and Canada will undoubtedly remain a favoured partner. However, the sums involved in these sales and the obvious imbalance in trade between the two countries may prevent a further development of trade relations. It is, therefore, just as important for Canada to know what China does not want to buy as it is for China to know what it can sell.

Canadian initiatives

Although Canada, a "second world" country in Chinese political terminology, seems to rank very high in the estimation of the Peking Government, it cannot expect to supersede countries the Chinese leaders feel are politically and economically more important. This may partly explain why the initiative has nearly always come from the Canadian side.

One of the characteristics of Chinese diplomacy is that it is not averse to being courted. To take a simple example of this well-known fact, since 1970 the Chinese have sent the Minister of Foreign Trade, in 1972, and a deputy minister, in 1976, to visit Canada — whereas no fewer than nine Canadian ministers and prominent Parliamentary figures — including, in 1973, the Prime Minister — have visited China during the same period. This fact may seem inconsequential but the constant necessity of rekindling friendship by means of the symbolic gestures that still greatly influence the Chinese must be appreciated. It is also interesting — almost amusing — to note that the Federal Government spent a quarter of a million dollars on restoring the home of Dr Norman Bethune in Gravenhurst, Ontario. Although before that time probably at least 95 out of 100 Canadians had never heard of Dr Bethune, who died for the revolution in China in

1939, he is a well-known figure to all Chinese citizens and since his death has become a symbolic bond between China and Canada.

It is somewhat unjust to reproach the Government for too much initiative in its diplomatic policy in this area, since all the countries that have relations with China know that this is the price they have to pay in order to establish links with a socialist country in which traditional behaviour is still firmly anchored. The very obvious strengthening of cultural relations during the last two years seems to suggest that the time has arrived for individuals, groups and provinces to become more involved than the countries themselves. Perhaps the Canadian Government should allow others to take more responsibility for launching programs under the agreements it has concluded. The attempt to involve China in a network of transnational relations would be futile, but it is possible to make China more aware of the complex reality of Canada.

The efforts that have been made in the cultural and scientific fields seem to have produced very positive results, as is shown by the success of the Shanghai Ballet's visit to Canada and the Canadian Brass's tour of China. Since China seems to be giving priority to modernization and scientific research, it would be advisable to encourage exchanges in these fields.

Ever since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, many observers have noted that China has considered Canada as a close ally of the United States and therefore as a useful vantage-point from which to observe American society. This view has not been so popular since the People's Republic of China became a member of the United Nations. It is still possible, however, that, if there were a *rapprochement* in the near future between the Peking and Washington Governments, Canada would again act as a bridge and meeting-place. There is also every reason to believe that, politically speaking, the Chinese Government will now be more interested in Canada since the international press has indicated that Canadian unity is threatened over the medium term.

Postscript

The visit to Canada of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Huang Hua, at the beginning of October, represented mainly the payment of a debt of courtesy that Peking had, in previous years, neither been able, nor wished, to honour. This visit does not appear to have disturbed, to any significant extent, the dynamics of Chinese-Canadian relations. An improvement, in the exchanges — chiefly commercial — between the two countries may, however, be expected, but it remains the business of Canada to make every effort to persuade China that Canada too can contribute to the next phase in the modernization of Chinese society.

*Chinese
diplomacy
not averse
to courting*

The leisure generation demands a livelihood

By Thomas Land

Structural changes in industry confront many school-leavers with the real prospect of holding no employment during much of their lives. The rest of society, still steeped in the work ethics of the first industrial revolution, will have to meet their material needs. The industrialized world is seeking suggestions to tackle — or hide the problem.

The Commission of the European Communities is urgently seeking fresh ideas for the expenditure of about \$15 million earmarked for the next four years to combat rising unemployment among young people. Various proposals are being prepared in the nine member nations, some of whose specialists are looking to Canada, which has just launched an imaginative youth-employment program. But their schemes, urgently debated throughout the industrialized world, may not affect the core of the problem unless their authors ask some penetrating questions about the real needs and priorities of modern society, and even examine the very "work ethic" on which all productive activities are based.

The money was set aside by the European Community ministers of education, acting in alarm over the recent spectacular increase in the number of young people among the unemployed — whose numbers have already reached levels unprecedented since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Total unemployment in the Community is well over five million; and more than one out of every three jobless persons is under 25, may never have been employed — and may not be so for the rest of his life.

A recent study published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) described unemployed youth as "a new underprivileged group". Transatlantic observers such as *The New York Times* warn that a revolution by embittered and unemployed young Europeans may be around the corner.

Unemployment is a world-wide phenomenon and an inescapable problem for all mankind in this final and dangerous quarter of the twentieth century. It is due,

in the technologically-sophisticated countries, to a basic restructuring of industry, the effects of which are currently exacerbated by the prolonged, slow economic growth. Only about 17 million of the world's 315 million unemployed are Westerners. But the severity of unemployment in many industrialized countries is being examined for the first time on a global basis by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva because of its effects on the rich world's ability to help the developing regions.

Unquestioned

Strangely enough, the present phenomenon of high youth unemployment has been foreseen for more than three decades but has gone unquestioned. While industry and agriculture gathered the profits of high technology by shifting towards more skill-intensive and capital-intensive activities, the super-salesmen of the second industrial revolution depicted the rise of future societies free of the burden of repetitive work. Industry was to remain the domain of relatively few responsible specialists able to provide for the carefree leisure of millions.

The first generation of Westerners thus condemned to leisure yet wholly unprepared for it now demands work — or at least a livelihood. Demonstrations by un-

High youth unemployment foreseen for decades

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employed young people in the nine capitals of the EC are taken very seriously by officialdom, which has painful memories of the Paris uprising in the spring of 1968. Current experience in North America, where youth unemployment is even higher than in Europe and where in the big cities it is increasingly associated with prostitution, drug-addiction and violent crime, also prompts official action — but of the wrong kind.

Proposals under preparation in the EC capitals tend to focus on the principle of paying industry to expose school-leavers to the work environment as an educational, rather than economic, measure. There are already various national schemes following the example of Canada and the United States, where unemployed school-leavers are paid low wages for “community” work that could be otherwise more effectively carried out by properly-trained and -organized labour. Such projects include the removal from public places of aerosol-sprayed graffiti often put up by the youngsters themselves outside working hours.

The dimensions of the problem of youth unemployment were illustrated by the attention it was given, at the top of the agenda, during the summit conference of the world's seven richest nations — Canada, the United States, Britain, France, Italy, West Germany and Japan — in London earlier this year. Yet bureaucracies still try to hide the problem from the public.

In West Germany, for example, federal grants are given to organizations and firms running extra vocational-training courses — in other words, training future employees whom they are unlikely to need. In the Netherlands, 16-year-olds who do not wish to attend day-school full-time are obliged to undergo part-time schooling. In Sweden, grants are available to employers for the training of employees who might otherwise be laid off because of recession. Britain has just announced an annual subsidy of \$320 million to keep nearly a quarter of a million unemployed youngsters busy and quiet. Washington has committed \$15,900 million to the same purpose over the next two years.

Western Europe's education and manpower planners, on the lookout for new ideas, are watching with interest and admiration a set of Canadian work and training projects that display much inventiveness and concern — yet are essentially as irrelevant to the causes of youth unemployment as less-imaginative experiments carried out elsewhere.

Fresh thinking by the Department of Manpower in Ottawa had previously inspired initiatives by governments abroad, as in the case of Britain's youth-employment scheme launched late in 1975 under the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) and modelled on Canada's Local Initiatives Program. The LIP project, started in Canada in 1971, was concerned mainly with traditionally-high seasonal unemployment during the winter months. The idea was to finance labour-intensive work projects designed to improve the standards of community life on a non-profit basis. About 100,000 people have been employed under the Government-financed scheme — building bridges, repairing buildings and giving advice at public consumer centres.

Canada is going much further this time, and the EC may well follow suit. One fresh Canadian project, launched in June in the context of the national manpower strategy, which has attracted much attention here, will provide secondary-school “dropouts” with nine weeks' exposure to work to help them to decide whether to return to school or to enter the labour market. The program is run in co-operation with local boards of trade and chambers of commerce. Ottawa is to pay 50 per cent of the wages involved, to a maximum of \$500 a person.

The winter component of the scheme will be concerned with school-leavers who are likely to find it very hard to obtain or hold employment without special assistance. They will be offered nine weeks of work experience, subsidized by the administration, with employers participating in the program between October and June. Another project planned for this summer is to provide Government finance for established organizations, groups and municipalities that are creating seasonal employment for students in activities of community value. One condition of the program is that the jobs should relate to the career plans of students and should ease their eventual entry into the labour market.

Government departments are also instructed to set up new work projects in their spheres of responsibility without duplicating existing operations. Students may be employed in such tasks as cleaning up rivers. The aim is to create seasonal jobs that give students an element of physical and mental challenge in a practical work-setting.

Full-time secondary and post-secondary students are to be offered work-related education courses in industrial

*Top of agenda
during summit
conference*

settings tailored to their academic pursuits. The project, to be financed jointly by Ottawa and the provinces, is intended to improve students' understanding of industry and enable them to make realistic career decisions before leaving school.

All these Canadian schemes, as well as some others of less immediate interest to European planners, will cost \$350 million in the first year. A basic philosophy of optimism is evident in all of them, concerned as they are with preserving the employment potential of a growing and important segment of the population for whom actual work is not now available. Labour specialists throughout the rich world are impressed with "the danger of making unemployables of our unemployed", as a spokesman for Britain's MSC recently put it. "Lack of a job early in one's working life means that one misses the vital formative experience of work, the essential disciplines which we take for granted," he added.

Such fears, and the corresponding national work and training programs, would be justified if industry were likely to need a huge reserve of labour some time in the future. But the contrary is true.

For the latest OECD report forecasts continued inflation, unemployment, foreign-trade and domestic-demand problems throughout the Western industrialized countries in the foreseeable future, with nothing to justify long-term optimism. And the ILO warns that, even if the recession were to disappear miraculously overnight, there would still be large numbers of young people seeking jobs without a hope of finding any.

The current recession began with the oil crisis of 1973, following a long and uninterrupted period of spectacular industrial growth. But the seeds of the problem were sown well before the oil crisis, the ILO says. A textbook example is the British labour market — there were 28,000 unemployed teenagers in Britain in 1968, 58,000 in 1971, 175,000 in 1975 and more than 200,000 in 1976. A similar pattern has been evident in many other countries, including Canada, the United States, France and Italy, all of which had high levels of youth unemployment in the 1960s.

Thus, the ILO considers, the recession has merely accelerated the trend, but so dramatically that:

"Now about 40 per cent of the unemployment total in the world's 23 richest countries are young people under 25 years, although they constitute only 22 per cent of the total population . . . Teenagers are

hardest hit, especially those looking for their first jobs. Even in countries with relatively low levels of joblessness, such as Sweden and Norway, teenage unemployment is twice or thrice as high as that of other workers."

As industry requires a constantly-diminishing human intake, children still in school are increasingly taught to prize the prospect of employment and to compete for places. The school systems tend to reinforce the trend by becoming increasingly selective and competitive themselves, a process that starts in primary school. The constant siphoning-off of gifted, and "motivated", youngsters leads to a downgrading of all the rest, who go to general and vocational schools when educational levels are also losing value. When the youngsters leave them, they are confronted with the strange world of the labour market, which requires skills, knowledge and behaviour they have not acquired. An estimated one-third of unemployed teenagers in the EC have completed compulsory schooling without receiving any additional vocational education; and, the ILO emphasizes, increasing numbers of school-leavers do not meet the standards required for training in modern industry.

That, however, is only a minor aspect of the essential problem of unemployment, since industry is quite capable of training all the people it needs. In fact, both sides of industry throughout the West are erecting barriers, for opposite reasons, against job-seekers. The plight of the jobless young thus becomes a political embarrassment and an excuse for bureaucratic organization in national youth-employment programs that can, at best, postpone problems for the future.

Corporate managers are understandably reluctant to hire new workers who are difficult and expensive to fire under the protection of labour legislation and the powerful trade unions. The rapid rise of labour costs combines with accelerating technological development in all industries to reduce the existing labour force and to promote the acquisition of more equipment, rather than more employees, even at times when vacancies do arise. Industrial firms volunteering to take on small numbers of school-leavers in response to pleas by government are concerned essentially with the public-relations value of such gestures, which simply cannot solve the employment problems of a whole generation.

Trade unions are in business to look after the interests of the people who are

*Labour market
requires skills
not acquired
in school*

already employed, and not those seeking employment. That means maintaining and promoting high wages and fringe benefits, protecting jobs that are constantly threatened by increasing technological sophistication, and negotiating lucrative redundancy agreements when employment is lost through the introduction of new techniques. Since these functions can be fulfilled only through the maintenance of a monopoly, or a near-monopoly, of the labour supply, the trade unions cannot but view with suspicion the increasing armies of young jobless who are kept busy and underpaid by the youth employment programs.

Technology has not, of course, eliminated all unimaginative or humiliating work. The millions of "guest workers" imported into Western Europe from less-prosperous countries for such employment before the oil crisis was increasingly being replaced by young natives, the products of the European "baby booms" of the 1950s and 1960s, who have been educated with an inordinate emphasis on career success. Their lowering of long-term career expectations — itself a huge potential source of social friction — thus affirms an earlier OECD study warning Western industri-

alized countries that they are unlikely to return to a steady economic growth without the acceptance by their populations of changes in their mode of life.

Thus, to vast numbers of the unemployed young, the structural changes in industry introduced by their fathers have brought the real prospect of no employment — except, perhaps, in marginal business — for much of their lives. The sooner the truth is openly acknowledged, the less painful it may be for them to adjust to the industrial realities of the present and the future for which they have been ill prepared by the misleading pressures and expectations of their elders.

These structural changes also confront the rest of society with the inescapable need to allocate economic resources to meet the needs of people for whom "the essential (work) disciplines which we take for granted" are necessarily meaningless. Few issues are politically less palatable in a world still steeped in the work ethic of the first industrial revolution, which glorified human labour in the service of a now outmoded technology. Few issues are more urgent for the unemployed young — our own children.

Chile under the military

By Jacques Zylberberg

Under the Presidency of Salvador Allende, a growing populist movement in Chile finally backfired against its leaders. Traditional political institutions collapsed under the two-way pressure of opposing factions within the country and destabilizing efforts from without. The military élite was the only group that remained capable of filling the political vacuum created by the mutual neutralization of the parties in conflict. The military bureaucracy was the one state institution that was still cohesive and potent despite the political upheaval.

From 1970 to 1973, the army as an organization had refused to support the various generals, from Viala to Prats, who had responded to a multitude of pleas from pressure groups, political parties, the Chilean Government, the multinational corporations and the Nixon Administra-

tion. This assortment of pleas, however, served to legitimize the concerted offensive by the army chiefs who finally seized power.

The collegial nature of the junta and the militarization of the various state institutions ensure that the military intervention will continue. After usurping constitutional, legislative and executive power, the army put an end to the relative autonomy of the administrative institutions. The administration was restructured in line with military models, efficiency being guaranteed through a massive influx of officers into the public service. Militarization ensured that the administration would function in a homogeneous, centralized manner, in contrast to the splintering and break-up of bureaucratic structures under the previous regime. In addition, the military clamped state

control over all aspects of society; the development of society gave way to the development of the state. Under this all-encompassing military rule, two civilian institutions, the Supreme Court of Justice and the General Comptroller, have survived, thanks to their ready acceptance of the rulers' decrees.

Internal war

The seizure of power by the military marked the beginning of an internal war against the structures of the leftist national-populist state, which was blamed for the political disorder, for the economic crisis and, finally, for subversion. The internal war was, of course, directed first against the political leaders of the previous regime and the sections of the working class that had supported them, and, finally, against the entire working class. External security was relegated to the background in the haste to suppress the nation, the restless internal social groups and their movements. The people were now cast as the main enemy standing in the way of the stability and expansion of a state saved by the military from Communist anarchy.

There is no need to repeat the details of the physical repression and constant violation of human rights that have been the subject of numerous official reports by the United Nations and even the Organization of American States. The subjection of the people to the state has been accomplished by a variety of methods — physical, economic and ideological. Physical repression is practised only on people from the lower and middle classes who were connected with the Allende regime or have been involved in the human-rights campaign. Economic repression, as evidenced by increasing unemployment, lower real wages, and child-malnutrition, is being used to “re-educate” the workers in the school of “jungle capitalism”. And the third prong of the internal war, ideological repression, consists in banning political parties, purging the universities and censoring the media, the aim being not only to prevent the opposition from expressing itself but also to depoliticize the country. Finally, the permanent state of siege rules out any serious opposition to the regime and serves as a pseudo-legal justification for the various arbitrary measures accompanying the repression. The military is now the only social group capable of concerted action in Chile.

The repression of the country at all levels produces the docile manpower necessary for a widespread capitalistic accumulation of wealth providing the material

basis of national security. Reacting to the populist policies of state intervention, the military leaders have opted for financial orthodoxy in the public sector and liberal laissez-faire in the productive sectors, and have undertaken to dismantle all obstacles to the free play of forces in the market place. The deflationary financial policies, the withdrawal from the Andean Group, the dismantling of the public sector of the economy and the reduction in consumption have created an environment favourable to jungle capitalism and multinational corporations. The junta's economic advisers believe that the incestuous union of state nationalism and economic liberalism should transform Chile into a new South Korea.

Unfortunately, the perfect free market does not exist; economic agents are not all equal, and this inequality leads inevitably to imbalance and domination. By unrestrictedly opening the national market to private economic forces inside and outside the country, Chile has left itself little room to manoeuvre in the difficult confrontation taking place between national economies and transnational corporations.

Inequality leads to imbalance and domination

Junta isolation

The excesses of the internal war and the militarization of the state are steadily isolating the junta from the United States, the social sectors backing the rulers, and their own troops.

First there is geopolitical isolation. Although the junta claims to be a forward bastion in the anti-Soviet struggle, it has not managed to establish good relations with the Western world. Even its ally the United States has been abandoning it since the past Presidential election. In the style of John Kennedy, President Carter claims to favour “democratic” models of development in the Third World. Washington's hostility, however, will not go so

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far as to produce a repetition of the "destabilization" operation that hastened the fall of the Allende Government. The internal cohesiveness of the current Santiago regime rules out such an operation in the immediate future, not to mention the fact that the new American President does not seem to support that approach.

Second, there is social isolation. Whereas in 1973 the armed forces had been able to count on the support of the majority of the population, this majority has progressively become silent and apathetic. The wearing-away of the junta's popularity has resulted less from the excessive physical repression than from excessive deflationary policies and jungle capitalism, which have affected both the entire working class and the main section of the population supporting the junta, the middle class. Even the upper social strata, which have profited from the laissez-faire economic policies, are frustrated by their exclusion from political power. Though the military rulers have handed the key economic posts to civilians and have organized a corporatist dialogue with the public, they accept no organized political expression, even on the part of their civilian supporters.

Third, there is isolation within the army itself. Whereas the *coup d'état* affirmed the unity of action of the armed forces and the collegial nature of its decision-making, General Pinochet has since been becoming a *caudillo*, arrogating to himself most of the power at the expense of the other members of the junta. Also, the fact that the junta members have perpetuated their stay in power by their own decree has annoyed their peers and subordinates, whose advancement is being held back by the blocking of the top positions in the hierarchy. Finally, the exercise of power by the junta has opened up many sinecures for the military, but has brought them hardly any of the modern equipment that their Peruvian and Argentinian counterparts have obtained in large quantities.

Questioning

In view of this partial isolation of the junta, various non-Marxist groups and institutions have dared to start systematic questioning of the monopolizing of power by the military. For example, experts working for the Chilean episcopate have been stigmatizing a regime that runs counter to the republican, democratic and pluralistic traditions of the country. In the meantime, ex-President Frei, after being received at the White House, made a sharp, concise statement calling for the

return of a democratic regime "as the only possible solution". Even the mouthpiece of the institutional right, the newspaper *El Mercurio*, has called for the return of democracy, a democracy purified of its "demagogic and subversive elements", and has condemned the ultraconservatism of the junta. Finally, a member of the junta itself, the head of the navy, has criticized the incongruity of lumping together civilian and military responsibilities, indicating that power may soon be put back in civilian hands.

It is important, however, not to overestimate the significance of pronouncements that create exaggerated interest among a public deprived of political news for four years. Nevertheless, the rumblings within the country's non-military establishment clearly indicate the unrest of the civilian population in the face of Pinochet's desire to remain in power. With the same political skill that enabled him first to become army chief and then successor to Allende, General Pinochet has been counterattacking on all fronts since March 1977.

Political front

On the political front, the junta has extended its internal war against opposition from the centre and left by banning non-Marxist parties, which previously had simply been under suspension. Other measures have included further prolonging the state of siege and increasing censorship. Elections have been promised in ten years.

On the social front, the junta has let up a little on its orthodox approach to finance and even indulged in a new, slightly-populist wage policy benefiting technical, scientific and university management. The economic repression in general has been toned down.

On the military front, Pinochet has been making an intensive tour of the canteens to regain personal contact with his military bases. At the same time the junta has been increasing the number of general-officer positions in order to satisfy the impatient colonels. Geopolitically, in an effort to hold off Washington's human-rights offensive, the most glaring kinds of physical repression have apparently been shelved for the time being, while a number of political prisoners are being released often into exile.

The immediate future of Chile is reasonably clear. Taking advantage of the fragmented Chilean society they wrested from the Popular Unity, Pinochet and his partners have succeeded in cementing a state network relatively independent of

No organized
political
expression
accepted

the groups that supported the military takeover. Given the autonomy of the junta, it is to be expected that the regime will continue in a stable fashion over the coming years.

This continuity will stem from the following factors: First, the various contradictions that are little by little undermining the regime and accentuating the isolation of the junta are not yet sufficient to break the cohesiveness of the military. At the same time, no other group has the physical capacity to challenge successfully the armed forces' monopoly of power.

In the meantime, the junta will step up its ideological and organizational repression of the centre- and right-wing parties, which by supporting the army officers' initial war against the Chilean left helped set the stage for their own elimination. Fragments of these reactionary parties will be able to cling to life only with the complicity of certain sections of the army or through indirect protection by Washington. Some members of these élites (for example, Eduardo Frei) will continue their role of "voices in the night" until better days arrive.

Contrary to what many people outside Chile believe, the Church, which is the only national institution to have survived the coming of the military leviathan, is not now and never will be in the forefront of the struggle against the junta. As in the past, the Church hierarchy will continue to fight for human rights and, through its "national committee of solidarity", to oppose the most glaring kinds of physical and ideological repression. It will also continue to provide some protection and an ear for dissidents.

In spite of the economic repression, it is not inconceivable that the regime may find some new support among public service and university management and among certain sections of the sub-proletariat. After the real or imaginary convulsions that Chile lived through from 1970 to 1975, many social groups that dislike the junta's economic repression and monopoly of power are not ready to enter into a dangerous competition with the military in the next few years. Finally, the left is totally powerless within the country following the massive exile of its leadership and militant members, who have to be content with embarrassing the junta abroad, mobilizing opinion against its constant violation of human rights.

Any substantial change in the Chilean situation depends only indirectly on pressure from social groups inside the country or from the great powers. These internal

and external forces will have an effect on the junta's action, but not on its position as ruler of the state. Recognizing that only some deep fissure in the unity of the army would put the junta in real danger, and that such a break-up would have to have both internal and external causes, there are some hypothetical models for the future that may be applied to Chile. For example, the strongman tactics and style of General Pinochet could infect his peers or subordinates. Likewise, the staffs could oust their chiefs on the group that they are no longer following the general will of the army. In short, Pinochet could at any moment become the victim of a Viaux anti-Schneider move or a Pinochet anti-Prats move.

Models

Using the Argentinian military governments from 1970 to 1973 as a guide, we shall give the name "Livingstone-Lanusse scenario" to a succession model in which an army remains in power, but under unstable conditions, one faction displacing the other. In this model, the realization by the military that they are unable to solve the economic problems and are becoming increasingly unpopular sets the stage for a temporary return to civilian rule. In the case of Chile, there would have to be a steady deterioration of the economy and of relations with Washington in order for the Livingstone-Lanusse scenario to come about. Such a deterioration from within and without would encourage the "voices in the night" and provoke the open opposition of the professional associations, employer groups and trade unions. The final sequence in the scenario would see widespread squabbling among the officers, each taking the side of a bankrupt businessman, a ruined farmer, an insolvent shopkeeper, and executive reduced to proletarian status, or a stifled right-wing politician.

The return to civilian rule could follow the "Caramanlis scenario". Such a sequence of events guarantees, at one and the same time, democracy, institutional stability, the return of the military to their barracks and, above all, the exclusion from power of fascists, ultra-leftists and the Communist Party. This scenario is implicit in the present approach of the Chilean Democrat Party, which is now led by its right wing and hopes to return to power by promising a Chile without an Allende or a Pinochet. Frei Government No. . . . would bear little resemblance to Frei Government No. 1 with its "Revolution in Freedom". If we may be allowed to over-indulge in

historical analogies, the Chilean Christian Democrat Party has replaced its patron saint Jacques Maritain with Georges Bidault. A return to the Cold War, refusal of the historical compromise and submission to the institutional right — that would be the price to pay for a substantial attenuation of the internal war and would serve as the basis of a right-wing populist government. Such a scenario could receive passive support from part of the Popular Unity, whose sole objective right now is tactical — get the military back to their barracks.

The "Caramanlis scenario" would follow the "Livingstone scenario" if the latter were to unfold rapidly; the military right wing would hand over power to the civilian right wing. But if the Livingstone scenario became drawn out into a lengthy affair, a left-wing variant would then become possible. The army, too deeply divided, would offer the ever-more-demanding working classes a transition to a centre-left populist government. We shall use the name "Campora scenario" — after Argentina's 1973 President — for the complex interplay in which elderly statesmen, worn down under the harness of long-gone politics, try to manoeuvre between a di-

vided but still reactionary army and the increasingly radical masses. In this model, the coalition inevitably breaks up in the conflict between proponents of the established order and proponents of change.

The above scenarios are all possible but the simplest and likeliest one would see the immediate future prolonged indefinitely, Pinochet handing over power to Pinochet all the way to 1987. In such a scenario the army would maintain its cohesiveness and its confidence in Pinochet despite the economic crisis and the cooling of relations with Washington. Washington's opposition would be used to advantage by Pinochet in a nationalistic offensive and neutralized by support from the other military dictatorships on the continent. The economic crisis would lead to opposition from the various social and economic pressure groups, but it would be opposition of a scattered nature, with no political expression, and would ultimately be dissolved by the tactical skill of the junta. The Pinochet scenario has two variants: "Papadopoulos variant" offers ten additional years of repression, while the "Franco variant" offers 30 years of national reconstruction.

Rewriting the laws of war: the Geneva Protocols of 1977

By L. C. Green

The opinion seems to be a widely held that, since the adoption of the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928, particularly as interpreted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, war, or at least aggressive war, has been not merely illegal but criminal. This belief has been strengthened by a variety of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, culminating in the adoption by that body in December 1974 of the Definition of Aggression embodied in Resolution 3314 (XXIX). Moreover, many commentators have argued that Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations have rendered all forms of war illegal, with the exception of a resort to self-defence in response to an attack already launched — thus excluding any possibility of action by

way of preventive or anticipatory self-defence. In addition, a number of Third World and Eastern European countries have sought to contend that, despite Article 51 of the Charter, no action may properly be described as self-defence unless it is authorized by the Security Council, even though the effect of this interpretation is virtually to turn Article 51 upside down.

It is relatively simple to declare war illegal or criminal. Preventing states or groups — whether they are called national liberation movements or not — from resorting to force and launching armed conflict is another matter altogether. Since 1945, the world has experienced numerous conflicts of this kind — even though none of them have involved direct confrontation

between great powers. Such incidents have often taken the form of struggles for self-determination or have occurred between rival groups seeking governmental control while refusing to admit that they have been fighting a civil war. Because of this tendency to violence, which has existed from time immemorial, attempts have been made to lay down rules for the conduct of war, especially for the protection of those not directly involved, and also with the aim, so far as possible, of "humanizing" the actual conduct of warfare with a view to the exclusion of "unnecessary suffering". While it is somewhat contradictory to talk of rules for conducting an operation that is, in fact, illegal, it nevertheless remains true that international law contains a wealth of such rules to apply when armed conflict actually occurs.

For the most part, these rules are to be found in what are sometimes referred to as the Hague Law and the Geneva Law. The Hague Law comprises a series of conventions drawn up at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, notably Convention IV of 1907 relating to the conduct of warfare on land — all of which may be considered as the code of conduct regulating the actual waging of war. The Geneva Law, on the other hand, which has been prepared largely under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, is primarily concerned with the welfare of those who are not involved in the fighting, whether as non-combatants, prisoners of war, medical and religious officials, and the like. The most important series of conventions drawn up for this purpose were those of 1929 relating to the Red Cross itself and to prisoners of war and the wounded and shipwrecked, together with those of 1949 seeking to bring the 1929 code up to date in the light of what had occurred between 1929 and 1945, with the innovation of a special convention relating to civilians in occupied territory.

While it may be true that generals spend much of their time planning to fight the next war according to the strategy and tactics of the last one, it is the case with the law governing humanitarian war that the International Committee of the Red Cross seeks to amend it to apply in the next armed conflict in the light of the deficiencies that became clear in the one recently terminated. This was true of both 1929 and 1949, but such conflicts as those that occurred in Korea and Vietnam, with the introduction, for example, of the air-ambulance, showed that the law as established at Geneva was not adequate in modern conflicts. Moreover, both these

wars, together with the struggles taking place in connection with the winds of change in colonial territories, made it clear that the whole conspectus of the international law of war would have to change, for modern contestants were as often as not entities other than states and the conflicts in which they were engaged could hardly be described as international wars in the usual sense. In addition, it became clear that modern conflicts, being so highly ideological or political in character, were fought with a bitterness and barbarism that was rarely encountered in ordinary warfare. It was, therefore, realized that some effort would have to be made to introduce a system of law that might contribute to a reduction of the terror associated with such conflicts. With these ends in view, the International Committee of the Red Cross initiated, from 1971 on, a series of meetings of experts, and eventually produced draft documents for consideration at a diplomatic conference devoted to the development and codification of humanitarian law in armed conflict.

*Red Cross
initiated
meetings
of experts*

First session

The first session of this diplomatic conference met in 1974 and concluded its activities in June 1977. Two draft protocols intended to expand the 1949 law were presented, the first dealing with international conflicts and the second, in the promotion of which Canadian representatives played a major role, introducing a new law for non-international conflicts. The very fact that an international conference made up of state representatives was prepared to deal with the latter, traditionally a matter exclusively of internal domestic jurisdiction, was itself a major breakthrough. Perhaps the next most-significant fact was the decision at the first session of the conference to recognize certain struggles of self-determination as international conflicts and, concomitant with this, to allow the representatives of national liberation movements (the one that played a significant role was the Palestine Liberation Organization) to attend and participate as observers, with all the rights of full participants save that of

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the vote. This decision ultimately resulted in a move by the representatives of the Third World to enable these movements to sign the Final Act. Such a decision, albeit the final act of a conference has no legal significance other than to record what has actually happened, would have constituted an important precedent — for, regardless of any reservations to the contrary, once such an event occurs it does constitute a precedent — and could well have been used to support the view that the PLO, for example, now enjoyed full treaty capacity and an international status that had not, at that time, been conferred on it by any United Nations organ. Ultimately, a way out of the dilemma was found by agreeing to reproduce the exact terminology of the resolution granting observer status and arranging for national liberation movements to sign the Final Act on a page separate from that used by any state participating in the conference.

One of the major problems left unsolved by the conference and inherent in the decision to describe wars of national liberation as international armed conflicts, and subject, therefore, to the full range of the international law of war is that of definition. It is true that the United Nations has adopted a policy of recognizing as national liberation movements only such bodies as are accepted as such by the appropriate local regional organization (virtually restricting them, therefore, to the Arab world and Africa), but there is no reason why this practice should be followed elsewhere and no attempt was made at Geneva to set standards to enable a decision to be made. In practice, many of the Third World countries referred during debate to what they described as “true” national liberation movements, but even they went no further than reiterating UN attitudes. The situation was by no means clarified when a representative of the Irish Republican Army issued a statement to the media announcing that, since it was a national liberation movement, its members were fully entitled to prisoner-of-war status regardless of what the British or Irish Governments might say, especially as it was also agreed by the conference that such movements could make unilateral declarations of adherence. If such a declaration were made, it would appear that the Swiss Government, as depositary of the protocols, and the International Committee, as the intermediary through which much of the observance would be ensured, would be obliged to accept it. The former would have to inform all signatories to the protocol, which

would presumably decide, subjectively and individually, what attitude to adopt, while the latter might find itself obliged to fulfil all the duties envisaged for it in the document.

Definition

The problem of definition referred to above is by no means academic, but is of profound practical significance, as may be seen from the case of Angola, when various groups contended that they were each *the* national liberation movement entitled to recognition. Furthermore, if the conflict in question is not one between states or one involving a national liberation movement seeking self-determination, it is not an international conflict, but falls within the purview of Protocol II, concerning non-international conflicts. However, the definition issue is only complicated as a result of this. Protocol II applies to conflicts occurring on the territory of a party to the Protocol “between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory, as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol [but] not to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature”. This means, in effect, that Protocol II will only operate in what is, in fact, a civil war of the type that was fought in Spain, and the decision as to whether a Protocol II situation had arisen or not is likely to be made by the party in whose territory it occurs rather than on any objective basis. It is perhaps worth mentioning here that the Canadian delegation had hoped to reduce this threshold to ensure some international legal standard that would be applicable to non-international armed conflicts even though they had not reached this sophisticated organizational level.

Who is to decide that what starts with sporadic acts of violence, hardens into internal disturbances amounting to insurrection, becomes so aggravated that it amounts to civil war, with the partisans opposed to the government contending they are engaged in an anti-colonial manifestation, seeking their self-determination on the basis of national liberation and so entitled to be treated as an international conflict in the meaning of Protocol I is, in fact, a Protocol I situation? Formerly, it might have been argued that, if the contestants were wearing a recognizable uniform and comporting themselves as a

*Problem of
definition
unsolved*

properly-organized military force in accordance with the laws of war, then clearly the situation was covered by the laws of war, with both sides being entitled to prisoner-of-war status. But this is no longer the case. Protocol I has altered the conception of combatants and consequently of those entitled to prisoner-of-war status. In order to protect national liberation movements, it is no longer necessary that two parties to a conflict recognize each other, so long as the forces involved are subject to an internal disciplinary system that is able to enforce compliance with international law. International law in the past has required such forces to have a fixed distinctive sign, recognizable at a distance, and to carry their arms openly. This is no longer the case. Operations like that in Vietnam have shown that those likely to describe themselves as national liberationists are unlikely to be readily distinguishable from the civilian population and may even be dressed in identical fashion. In addition, the members of the IRA or of guerilla movements in Africa operating within the towns rarely carry their arms openly. Under the protocol, violation of the rules of international law does not deprive a combatant of his status as such, or of his right to be a prisoner of war. In addition, while combatants are required to "distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack . . . there are situations in armed conflict where, if, owing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall [nevertheless] retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement [— what if this is an ambush or an attack from the rear upon a sentry at a military installation?], and

(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate". (There were differences of opinion as to whether this meant "visible" to the naked eye or with the assistance of mechanical aids.)

Since the situation envisaged in this provision will not refer to the forces of an organized state or government, this means that the reciprocal basis of the law of war and of humanitarian law generally has been disrupted. Such forces will continue to be required to wear uniforms or other distinguishing emblems and carry their arms openly at all times, and failure to do

so will render them likely to lose their protected status. National liberation forces, on the other hand, remain protected and, even should they fail to fulfil the requirements just referred to, while they lose "the right to be a prisoner of war, [they] shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war" in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as any further protection afforded such prisoners by the protocol. They would, however, be liable to trial for war crimes.

Other matters, too, reflect "North-South" divergences and the pressures of the Third World majority. The Angolan armed conflict and the Luanda trial that followed it, together with criticism of European volunteers with the South African and Rhodesian forces, have focused attention on the employment of mercenaries. The general view seems to be that there is something dishonourable in the profession of arms if the professional serves for purely mercenary, or perhaps even ideological, reasons. After Luanda, it appeared as if condemnation would be reserved for those who sold their services to an authority opposed to a national liberation movement, while those who assisted such a movement for whatever cause were merely complying with the new morality as expressed in resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Protocol I acknowledges some of the obloquy heaped upon the mercenary in that it denies him status either as a combatant or a prisoner of war, but it does not say that mercenary service is in itself a crime. On the other hand, if it denies him protected status, it reduces him to the level of a non-combatant unlawfully taking up arms and, as such, liable to trial as a war criminal. It is possible to argue that he remains entitled to minimum humanitarian treatment and basic judicial guarantees.

Mercenaries

The reference to national liberation has also disappeared, and a mercenary is now described as any person who "(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict [— thus inhibiting the right of a belligerent defending itself against aggression from exercising its sovereignty within its territory by enlistment of visitors who may be willing to serve]; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities [— protecting, therefore, advisers or instructors sent by a sympathetic great power or its substitute]; (c) is

Angola focused attention on employment of mercenaries

motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party [— while this at first would suggest that developing countries or liberation movements paying little to their own forces are at a disadvantage, this is not, in fact, the case, since persons assisting such countries or movements are obviously motivated by other than mercenary considerations; this is yet a further example of discrimination in the application of the law, for the decision on status rests not on active participation in hostilities but on ascertainment of the motive of the individual or on the promises held out by the recruiting agency whether they are fulfilled or not]; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict [— this would damage the position of foreign volunteers serving as such if paid on a different scale]; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict [— this would protect, for example, such units as the Eagle Squadron serving with the Republic Force in the Second World War, or non-Israeli Jews or gentiles serving in any of the Middle Eastern wars and incorporated with the army of Israel, but, since no state recognizes Rhodesia or its nationality, does this mean that every member of the Rhodesian Army opposing the Zimbabwe forces is a mercenary and as such liable to trial as a war criminal?]; and [— clearly the provisions are cumulative, so that if any one is not satisfied the individual cannot be regarded as a mercenary]; (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces” [— the Cubans in Angola therefore cannot be regarded as mercenaries]. It has recently been announced that the Organization of African Unity has accepted this definition rather than that of Luanda. Perhaps the fact that the provisions are cumulative will provide the safeguard for those states that would otherwise find it difficult to ratify the protocol without reserving on this article.

The articles considered so far relate to the present political temper of international society, with its emphasis on decolonization and respect for self-determination. Closely related to such considerations is the condemnation of *apartheid*, which the United Nations has described as a crime against humanity. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that when the

conference came to review and extend the notion of grave breaches that would constitute a basis for universal criminal jurisdiction, it included among such breaches “practices of *apartheid* and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination”. Even though there was one delegate who considered that the separation of black prisoners of war from their white colleagues was more to be deplored than the murder of prisoners of war, one cannot but wonder how a legal authority would define any of the practices here condemned, or draft an indictment on the basis thereof.

Less objectionable is the provision condemning as a grave breach unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war and of civilians, a matter that was of deep concern at the termination of the Korean and Vietnamese hostilities. Equally, no objection can be taken to the condemnation of intentional attacks upon civilians or other non-combatants. One might even agree that it is, in fact, a grave breach to launch an attack against “works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects” although there are some who would argue that even this is permitted in the cause of self-defence. Again, one cannot disagree that it is a grave breach “perfidiously” to make use of the protected emblems of the Red Cross, Crescent or Lion and Sun. This protection does not extend to the Red Shield of David used by Israel, since this is not a recognized emblem. In 1976, a Canadian attempt to forbid the wrongful and abusive use of any unrecognized but habitually-employed sign, thus prohibiting Israel from using the Red Shield in a “perfidious” manner, was overwhelmingly defeated under Arab and Third World pressure.

Cultural heritage

A completely new development relates to the protection of objects forming part of “the spiritual or cultural heritage of peoples” — a somewhat vaguely defined conception. The leading role for such protection was taken by the Vatican, Austria, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Iran, and it is now a grave breach to make “clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship, which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples” the object of attack, when they are not located “in the immediate proximity of military objectives”, provided special pro-

ection has been given them by special arrangement, for there must be some means of identification.

In addition to these and similar provisions, Protocol I also contains detailed technical stipulations concerning the identification of medical units and their aircraft and transport vehicles. Likewise, more explicit requirements than hitherto are laid down relating to the conditions of internment of civilians and their rights and protection, particularly in order to ensure full respect for the rule of law and the application of proper judicial guarantees should trials prove necessary. At the same time, an attempt has been made to minimize the possibility of unwitting breaches of the law by military commanders. Too often in the past it has been possible for such an official to contend that he did not know what the law was or that it was doubtful. Now, however, parties to the protocol are required to appoint properly-qualified legal advisers whose task it will be to advise and warn the commanders to whom they are attached of the potential illegality of any proposed line of action. In addition, parties are made liable to disseminate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the protocol among both their armed forces and their civilian populations — the latter provision is modified to preserve the position of a federal state in which education may be the sole competence of a local government unit, an amendment that was adopted at the instance of Canada. Not only will the commander no longer be able to say he was unaware of the law but his liability for the acts of his subordinates has now been clearly embodied in an international instrument. On the other hand, largely as a result of Third World fears that such a provision was likely to militate against the preservation of military discipline and justify disobedience, a provision referring to superior orders and making it clear that only lawful orders were to be obeyed was omitted from the final text. This led Canada and others to state that such an omission in no way affected the customary law with regard to the non-availability of a defence of superior orders against a charge of violation of the laws of war.

Investigating violations

Canada was among those states that were in favour of a completely new departure in humanitarian war law. It had been proposed that there should be a permanent and compulsory inquiry mechanism to investigate allegations of serious violations

of the law, even though it was realized that any on-the-spot investigation would require the permission, if not the active co-operation, of the party accused of such breaches. This proposal encountered much opposition from the socialist states, as well as some of the developing countries, most of whose objections involved the contention that investigations of the kind proposed were invasions of sovereignty and were amenable to propagandist abuse. Ultimately, it was agreed that a body should be set up on a voluntary basis in the hope that some states at least would be prepared to recognize its authority as compulsory.

A further development, and one that again received Canadian support, concerned an extension of existing arrangements with regard to the appointment and acceptance of a protecting power. It has long been recognized that, when armed conflict breaks out and diplomatic relations between the parties are severed, some measure of normal intercourse and representation must continue. The method in the past has been for belligerents mutually to agree upon a neutral state to represent them *vis-à-vis* the “adverse party” — the currently-accepted term for enemy. Now an attempt has been made to ensure that such a protecting agency is available immediately from the outbreak of the conflict. If no power has been designated at the beginning of a conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or any other impartial humanitarian organization (it was, in fact, somewhat distressing to note the extent to which the International Committee was distrusted by or unpopular with a large number of states participating in the conference), is instructed to offer its good offices with a view to the designation of a protecting power, and it is now provided that, if, after a specified period, no agreement on such designation is possible, the International Committee or other organization concerned may act as a substitute, with all the rights and duties normally belonging to a protecting power.

So far as Protocol II is concerned, political doubts, fears and hesitations were probably even more apparent than was the case with Protocol I. Since this protocol deals with non-international conflicts, all the susceptibilities of sovereignty and the desire, particularly of the new states, to protect one's independence against outside interference are directly involved. Even though such outside interference is expressly forbidden, it is perhaps not surprising that many countries, especially those that might be regarded as most

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likely to find themselves involved in rebellion or a civil war, were very hesitant to agree to anything that placed the rebel side on equal terms with the established authority, or imposed an obligation to disseminate the contents of the protocol in a way that would appear to impose an obligation upon the government to inform its people of the rights they would have against that government, and restricting the government in its efforts to suppress any attempt at its overthrow. Since Protocol II was intended to operate in internal situations, when one of the parties was likely to rely upon the support of a civilian population untrained from the military point of view and not supplied with the technical and educational facilities of the government forces, it was contended, consistently by Canada, that the protocol should be kept as simple, non-technical and brief as possible, especially as many of the more refined elements of international conflicts would be absent, so that the intricacies and detail of Protocol I would be unnecessary. However, perhaps with a view to making its application less likely, there was a strong body of opinion at the conference that Protocol II should mirror Protocol I, even though at times this might mean introducing articles that were almost completely irrelevant in a non-international situation. However, in the last two or three weeks of the final session, when it appeared very likely that Protocol II would be completely lost, a major effort was made under the leadership of Mr. Justice Hussein of Pakistan, who cited the redrafted protocol Canada had prepared on an earlier occasion to explain the philosophy of a simplified Protocol II, to revive the notion of a simpler document, and this was finally adopted.

While one might regret the absence of this or that provision that has now been dropped, or that has not been carried over from the original Canadian proposal, it may well be possible that more states will accept Protocol II — states that are prone to civil war — than would otherwise have been the case. For the first time there exists an international instrument that seeks to postulate how a government and those opposed to it will conduct themselves in an armed conflict qualifying as a non-international conflict of the kind referred to above. The protocol is based on absolute non-discrimination and seeks in every way to preserve the rule of law on behalf of those who may be held in detention by either side during the conflict. The traditional recourse to cruel treatment,

such as torture, which seems to be inherent in any modern armed insurrection, is forbidden, while an attempt has been made to prevent one of the phenomena that became notorious in Vietnam and is being repeated in Africa — namely, the employment, by one side, of children. It is now forbidden to recruit any person under the age of 15 or to allow such a person to participate in conflict. On the other hand, no matter what offence such a wrongly recruited individual may commit, no death penalty may be pronounced if he is below 18. In this he is better off than a pregnant woman or the mother of a young child who is dependent upon her, for such a woman is liable to the death penalty, though it may not be carried out during pregnancy or while the child is dependent. A Canadian attempt to postpone all executions until after the end of hostilities, by which time antagonisms might have relaxed, was not adopted.

Parallels are to be found with Protocol I in the increased protection afforded to medical personnel and units, although the claim to preserve professional secrecy, which might well serve to protect an injured rebel, is made subject to national law. The improved provisions for the care of the wounded and internees, as well as religious personnel, are similar, though on a reduced scale, to those included in Protocol I. Since a government or rebel authority expecting defeat is inclined to resort to extreme measures, the protocol expressly forbids collective punishments, attacks upon civilians and any acts intended to spread terror among the civilian population. As with Protocol I, objects that are part of the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples are protected, thus ensuring, it is hoped, that neither side will destroy its own cultural and historical legacy. At the same time, in addition to forbidding starvation of the population, the protocol equally forbids either side to "attack, remove, destroy or render useless" objects like food or water installations indispensable to civilian survival. A further invasion of a government's right to preserve itself is to be found in the provision banning displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of those civilians is involved or such displacement is for "imperative military reasons" — as they will always be called. Reflecting the new concern with the environment, as well as the future of the country affected by the conflict is a provision, similar to one in Protocol I, to the effect that "works or installations containing dangerous forces

namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, *even where these objects are military objectives* [italics added], if such attack causes the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”.

Like all treaties, Protocols I and II demand good faith from their parties if their objectives are to be achieved. Subject to certain reservations, primarily relating to the political character of many of its provisions, it is probable that Protocol I will receive a reasonable number of signatures and ratifications, even though the military commands of the participating countries might not be over-enthusiastic. So far as Protocol II is concerned, it is likely that the developed countries that have reservations concerning Protocol I will find it relatively easy to accept this instrument. For the most part, however, they are not the countries for which it is intended. True, there is no guarantee that any country today is immune from civil war and other forms of non-international armed conflict. The provisions of Protocol II tend, however, to reflect the basic humanitarian ideas that are familiar to

those brought up in the Judaeo-Christian traditions of Western democracy and, even should a conflict ensue, the parties may be expected to respect the basic humanitarian imperatives embodied therein. But with some of the new states, and even some of those to which civil war has traditionally almost been endemic, it may well be that there will be considerable hesitancy about acceptance. It would be somewhat ironic if this protocol, which is really intended to introduce humanitarian principles into an area hitherto completely free from international regulation, is ratified only by those that accept its principles (even if they are not written down) or that are least likely to be called upon to put them into operation. On the other hand, it is quite possible that, if a country were to find itself involved in such a conflict, it might well consider it to its own advantage to accept the obligations of Protocol II, either in the hope that the rebels would do the same or because the rebels had made propaganda gains on the international stage by announcing their intention of observing and applying its principles.

Letter to the Editor

Sir,

F. S. Manor's article "By abandoning peacekeeping NATO could be reinforced" (*International Perspectives*, July/August 1977) calls for comment. Mr. Manor describes the ideal UN as one "that would be able to preserve law and order as a policeman on the beat ensures by his mere presence that order is kept and law obeyed". Policemen might be surprised to know they have this effect, but it is certainly true the UN rarely comes close to it. Even policemen would be unable to cope if criminals were to command the support of whole neighbourhoods. The point is that the control of law and order is vested in states, not in the UN. Nor was it meant to be otherwise. The veto was written into the Charter at the insistence of *all* the great powers. Throughout his article, Mr. Manor confuses two quite separate concepts: peacekeeping and enforcement. In doing so, he sets impossibly high standards for peacekeeping and concludes inevitably that it is futile.

Enforcement, or collective security, was envisaged in Articles 42-46 of the UN Charter and presupposed the deterrence or punishment of aggressors by the combined military might of the international community. Once the Cold War broke out, the needed unanimity of the great powers was broken and no enforcement action was possible (except for the Korean operation in 1950, when the U.S.S.R. was boycotting the Security Council). Peacekeeping, on the other hand, relies on the voluntary co-operation of opposing parties to maintain the peace. A peacekeeping mission is usually designed to discourage disputes from degenerating into armed conflicts, to verify that armistice lines are observed, or to supervise a process of disengagement. It assumes a degree of self-restraint by the parties involved and should ideally be linked with other *peacemaking* activities (e.g., negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, etc.). If and when circumstances change to the point where these conditions are no longer met, a peacekeeping mission will not be able to fulfil its mandate (as occurred in Egypt in 1967 and in Cyprus in 1974). One does not usually blame policemen for the existence of crime.

Mr. Manor also makes a number of questionable statements. He writes: "In June 1964, Canada was instrumental in calling an international conference to discuss the set-

ting-up of such a [permanent peacekeeping] force. In 1971, the conference was still hard at work." I can only presume that he is confusing the Ottawa Conference on Peacekeeping, held in November 1964, and the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which was set up in February 1965 and continues to meet. The first was a Canadian initiative and was a once-only meeting amongst actual or potential troop contributors to discuss informally questions of training, personnel and logistics. The UN Special Committee, on the other hand, has been meeting each year in an effort to develop agreed guidelines for future peacekeeping operations. Little progress has been made for the same reason that Article 43 of the Charter is inoperative. The great powers disagree about how to proceed.

Mr. Manor is also incorrect when he states that "in a crisis, each national contingent and considers that, for example, civil police forces might replace Canadian troops in Cyprus at less cost. However, the greater part of the "cost" of maintaining our troops in Cyprus which Mr. Manor cites consists of salaries which would have to be paid wherever the soldiers happen to be. In the 1976-77 fiscal year, for example, of the \$12,610,000 spent on the battalion in Cyprus, the extra cost to Canada of maintaining those troops in Cyprus was \$2,939,000. While this is not a negligible amount, it is not an outrageous sum to be paying to help maintain peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, one cannot substitute police for troops, the two functions being complementary, not interchangeable. Police forces are used when possible, but soldiers are needed to deal with what are essentially military situations. Mr. Manor asserts that their morale is poor. I can only say that reports I have heard do not confirm this.

Morale might be poor if, as Mr. Manor writes, "at the first sign of trouble, they are told to head for the nearest evacuation post". This is not so. UN forces are required to carry out the mandates they are given, including, in the case of UNEF II, resistance to attempts to prevent them from discharging their duties. It is true that in 1967 UNEF was compelled to evacuate the Sinai because the Egyptian Government withdrew its consent to its presence. This was Egypt's right. The point at issue was whether the matter should have been taken to the Security Council first.

Mr. Manor is also incorrect when he states that, "in a crisis, each national contingent of a UN force follows orders from its own government, rather than the UN" and that "in 1967 a number of the UN contingents returned home from the Sinai without awaiting the UN's decision about President Nasser's order evicting UN peacekeepers from Egyptian territory". This did not happen in the Sinai in 1967 or at any other time. On May 16, 1967, Egypt ordered the UNEF Commander, Lieutenant-General Inderjit Rikhye, to remove his troops. General Rikhye refused until he had instructions to that effect from the Secretary-General, which he received on May 18. Then, and only then, did the concentration and evacuation of troops begin.

It is easy to denigrate the UN's peacekeeping activities. It is more difficult to propose practical alternatives. Certainly there are problems, and Canada has been in the lead in calling for reform. But the need remains. We are seeing this again in relation to Rhodesia and Namibia.

G. A. H. Pearson
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 In *International Journal* 32:577-604 Summer 1977.

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 In *Canadian Public Administration* 20:342-369 Summer 1977.

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Below are lists of the most recent publications of the Departmental Press Office and the Information Services Division dealing with international affairs and Canadian foreign policy.

Press Releases, issued by the Departmental Press Office, Ottawa:

No. 59 (August 8, 1977) Resumption of normal operations by the Canadian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.

No. 60 (August 31, 1977) Canadian assistance to Portugal.

No. 61 (August 11, 1977) Diplomatic appointments.

No. 62 (August 25, 1977) Signature of interim Canada-Denmark marine-pollution contingency plan, 1977.

No. 63 (August 25, 1977) Statement by the Canadian delegate to the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, the Hon. Robert Stanbury, in Lagos, Nigeria, on August 24, 1977.

No. 64 (August 24, 1977) Canada-U.S. meeting on coal-fired generating plant, Atikokan, Ontario.

No. 65 (August 26, 1977) Thirty-sixth session of the International Conference on Education (UNESCO), Geneva, August 30 - September 8, 1977.

No. 66 (September 1, 1977) Visit of the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister for Production and Minister for Electric Power and Energy, September 5 to 10, 1977.

No. 67 (September 2, 1977) Appointments of Foreign Service Visitors.

No. 68 (September 8, 1977) Senior appointments at External Affairs headquarters.

No. 69 (September 8, 1977) Signature of Canada/United States marine-pollution contingency plan for the Beaufort Sea.

No. 70 (September 14, 1977) Canada/German Democratic Republic fisheries negotiations.

No. 71 (September 19, 1977) Garrison Diversion: final report of the International Joint Commission.

No. 72 (September 22, 1977) Participation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the thirty-second regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 73 (September 22, 1977) Official visit to Canada of the French Foreign Minister, October 5 and 6, 1977.

No. 74 (September 22, 1977) Meeting between Minister of Supply and Services Goyer and the Minister of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Central African Empire.

No. 75 (September 23, 1977) Participation of Minister of Communications Jeanne Sauv   in the first conference of ministers responsible for science policy of member countries of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation.

No. 76 (September 26, 1977) Official visit to Canada of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, October 4 to 6, 1977.

No. 77 (September 26, 1977) Canadian delegation to the eighth session of the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sport from French-speaking States, Lom  , September 26 to 30, 1977.

No. 78 (September 27, 1977) Canada-Bulgaria fisheries negotiations.

No. 79 (September 27, 1977) Signature of an agreement for nuclear co-operation between Canada and Sweden.

No. 80 (September 29, 1977) Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Belgrade follow-up meeting, October 4, 1977.

No. 81 (October 3, 1977) Signature of Canada-Bulgaria agreement on mutual fisheries relations.

No. 82 (October 4, 1977) Diplomatic conference on the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Ottawa, October 11 to 21, 1977.

No. 84 (October 7, 1977) Visit to Canada of the French Minister of Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts, Mr. Ren   Monory, October 22 to 26, 1977.

No. 85 (October 12, 1977) Visit of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Egypt, Israel and Spain, October 22 to November 1, 1977.

No. 86 (October 12, 1977) Visit to Canada of the State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Zaire, October 11 to 13, 1977.

No. 87 (October 13, 1977) Intergovernmental conference on environmental education. Tbilisi, U.S.S.R., October 14 to 26, 1977.

No. 88 (October 19, 1977) Third meeting of the Canada-Belgium Mixed Commission, Ottawa, October 17 to 21, 1977.

- No. 89 (October 20, 1977) New dates for Mr. Jamieson's trip to Israel, Spain and Egypt and announcement of his visit to Greece.
- No. 90 (October 24, 1977) Canada-Romania nuclear co-operation agreement.
- No. 91 (October 25, 1977) Developments in South Africa.
- No. 93 (October 28, 1977) Visit by Minister of Supply and Services Goyer to *franco-phone* Africa, November 6 to 15, 1977.
- No. 94 (October 27, 1977) Diplomatic appointments.
- No. 95 (October 28, 1977) Canada-ASEAN dialogue, second session.
- No. 96 (October 31, 1977) Renegotiation of North Pacific Fisheries Convention.
- No. 97 (November 1, 1977) Statement by Mr. William H. Barton, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, in New York on October 28, 1977, during the Security Council debate on South Africa.
- No. 98 (November 7, 1977) Canada-ASEAN dialogue, second session, October 31 to November 1, 1977 — joint communiqué.

Statements and Speeches, published by the Information Services Division, Ottawa:

- No. 77/8 Canada at the United Nations. An address by Mr. W. H. Barton, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, to the United Nations Association in Canada, Winnipeg, May 13, 1977.
- No. 77/9 Canada and Japan Progress towards Common Goals. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at a lunch given in honour of the Foreign Minister of Japan, His Excellency Ichiro Hatoyama, in Vancouver, on June 13, 1977.
- No. 77/10 A Challenge of Historic Proportions. The opening statement to the ministerial meeting of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, President of the Privy Council of Canada and Co-chairman of the Conference, Paris, May 30, 1977.
- No. 77/11 Milestones on the Road to a New Economic Order. A Canadian statement to the Conference on International Economic Co-operation by the Honourable Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Paris, May 30, 1977.
- No. 77/12 Canada and UN Resolutions concerning Israel and the Middle East. An address by Mr. Fernand Leblanc, Member of Parliament, to the eighth National Public Affairs Seminar of Hadassah-WIZO, Montreal, June 15, 1977.
- No. 77/13 Canada after One Hundred and Ten Years. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Canadian Club, London, England, June 30, 1977.

No. 77/14 The Commonwealth and World Security. A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Ottawa, September 20, 1977.

No. 77/15 Conference on International Economic Co-operation. An address by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, President of the Privy Council, to the resumed thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 13, 1977.

No. 77/16 NATO Ministerial Meeting. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, London, England, May 11, 1977.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Afghanistan

Development Assistance Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan

Kabul, July 5, 1977
In force July 5, 1977

Antigua

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Antigua constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian Investments in Antigua insured by the Government of Canada through its Agent, the Export Development Corporation

Bridgetown, Barbados, and
St. John's, Antigua, June 8, 1977
In force June 8, 1977

Bulgaria

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on Mutual Fisheries Relations

Signed at New York, September 27, 1977
In force September 27, 1977

Dominican Republic

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Dominican Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Ottawa, August 6, 1976
In force September 23, 1977

German Democratic Republic

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the German Democratic Republic on Mutual Fisheries Relations

Berlin, October 6, 1977
In force October 6, 1977

Germany, Federal Republic of

Treaty between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Extradition

Ottawa, July 11, 1977
Subject to ratification

Honduras

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Honduras

Tegucigalpa, March 31, 1977

In force March 31, 1977

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Honduras

Tegucigalpa, June 14, 1977

In force June 14, 1977

Portugal

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Portugal on their Mutual Fisheries Relations

Ottawa, July 29, 1976

In force July 18, 1977

Romania

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania for Co-operation in the Development and Application of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Ottawa, October 24, 1977

St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State of St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla relating to Canadian Investment in St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla insured by the Government of Canada through its Agent, the Export Development Corporation

Bridgetown, Barbados, and Basseterre, St.

Christopher, August 19 and 20, 1977

In force August 20, 1977

Singapore

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income

Singapore, March 6, 1976

In force September 23, 1977

Sweden

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Sweden concerning the Uses of Nuclear Material, Equipment, Facilities and Information transferred between Canada and Sweden

Signed at New York, September 27, 1977

Switzerland

Convention between Canada and Switzerland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital

Berne, August 20, 1976

In force August 19, 1977

United Nations

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the United Nations concerning the Headquarters and Operations of the United Nations Audio-Visual Information Centre on Human Settlements

New York, September 27, 1977

In force September 27, 1977

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to further extend the Agreement concerning Joint Participation in the Augmentor Wing Flight Test

Project of November 10, 1970

Ottawa, May 31 and July 18, 1977

In force July 18, 1977

Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America (This Agreement supersedes the Agreement of June 15, 1973, as extended.)

Washington, February 24, 1977

In force July 26, 1977

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the Establishment of a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan

Ottawa, July 28 and August 30, 1977

In force August 30, 1977

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning Transit Pipelines

Washington, January 28, 1977

In force October 1, 1977

Agreement between Canada and the United States of America on Principles Applicable to a Northern Gas Pipeline

Ottawa, September 20, 1977

In force September 20, 1977

Multilateral

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972

Done at London, October 20, 1972

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited March 7, 1975, accompanied by the following declaration:

- "1. The Government of Canada considers that the provisions of Rule 10, 'Traffic Separation Schemes', do not provide the compulsory use of the adopted schemes. The Government of Canada considers that the compulsory routing of ships is necessary to avoid collisions between ships and the resulting damage to the marine environment.
2. The Government of Canada notes that there are no exceptions to Rule 10(b), (c), and (h) for vessels engaged in fishing with nets, lines, trawls, trolling lines or other apparatus, or for vessels engaged in special operations such as survey, cable, buoy, pipeline or salvage operations, and that the exceptions in Rule 10(e) are not broad enough to adequately provide for vessels engaged in special operations. The Government of Canada considers that the practical application of Rule 10 would be complicated without realistic exceptions for fishing vessels and for vessels engaged in special operations.
3. The Government of Canada therefore does not consider that it is prohibited from providing for the compulsory use of traffic separation schemes or providing for such exceptions to Rule 10(b), (c), (e) and (h)."

Entered into force July 15, 1977

Entered into force for Canada July 15, 1977

Index 1977

Chile
Military regime, Zylberberg, Nov./Dec., p. 32

China
Hua Kuo-feng, Walker, Sept./Oct., p. 40
Sino-Canadian relations, Hervouet, Nov./Dec., p. 25

Conference on International Economic Co-operation *see* New International Economic Order

Culture
As diplomatic tool, Painchaud, May/June, p. 34
Exchange of letters, Graham, Jul./Aug., p. 46; Cowley, Jul./Aug., p. 47; Painchaud, Sept./Oct., p. 48

Defence (*see also* Peacekeeping)
Defence and foreign policies, MacLaren, Mar./Apr., p. 22

Dictatorships *see* External aid

Diefenbaker, John G.
Stursberg book on (*review*), Lever, Mar./Apr., p. 28

Disarmament
Parity, Jacobsen, Jan./Feb., p. 12
Planning, Land, Jan./Feb., p. 21
Progress, lack of, Jay, Jan./Feb., p. 10
Vladivostok Accord, Jensen, Jan./Feb., p. 17

Economic problems
Summit meeting, London, Inglis, Sept./Oct., p. 29
Youth unemployment, Land, Nov./Dec., p. 29

Environment *see* North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Europe (*see also* France and Spain)
Canada and, Donneur, Mar./Apr., p. 16; Mar./Apr., p. 20
European Economic Community, Windsor, Mar./Apr., p. 12

External Affairs (*see also* Defence, Provinces)
Consular services, Buick, Jul./Aug., p. 23
Morality and realism, Holmes, Sept./Oct., p. 20

External Aid (*see also* New International Economic Order)
Blueprint for aid to poorest nations, Reid, Sept./Oct., p. 3
Economic co-operation with dictators, Bernardin, Jan./Feb., p. 25
World Food Conference in retrospect, Weitz, Sept./Oct., p. 14

France
Fifth Republic, Baker, May/June, p. 19
Rise of Left, Domenach, Jul./Aug., p. 32

International law
Codification of, Wang and Stanford, May/June, p. 10
Rewriting the laws of war, Green, Nov./Dec., p. 36

ing, William Lyon Mackenzie
Neatby biography reviewed, Munro, Mar./Apr., p. 26

Latin America (*see also* Chile)
Canada and the hemisphere, Guy, Jul./Aug., p. 3

Middle East
Syrian objectives in Lebanon, Hayani, May/June, p. 39

Multinational corporations
Effects on Third World, Crener and Hénault, Jul./Aug., p. 18

Nationalism
Resurgence of, Craig, Jul./Aug., p. 37

New International Economic Order (*see also* Resources policy)
Global justice, Roche, Jul./Aug., p. 15
Lessons of Conference on International Economic Co-operation, Wright, Nov./Dec., p. 7
Need for realistic approach to new international order, Merle, Nov./Dec., p. 3
Not mainly economic, Arnopoulos, Sept./Oct., p. 8

Non-aligned nations
Chronology of, Jan./Feb., p. 6
Non-aligned movement, Svoboda, Jan./Feb., p. 3

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Kyba, Jul./Aug., p. 11

Peacekeeping
Case against, Manor, Jul./Aug., p. 28
Pearson reply (*letter*), Nov./Dec., p. 43

Provinces
International interests, Meekison, Mar./Apr., p. 8
Quebec in the world, Sabourin, Mar./Apr., p. 3

Reid, Escott
Memoirs (*review*), Eayrs, Sept./Oct., p. 44

Resources policy
International minerals policy, Dow, Nov./Dec., p. 19; Chambers and Reid, Nov./Dec., p. 13

Southeast Asia
Malaysia and Singapore, Van Praagh, Jul./Aug., p. 42

Spain
Democracy reborn, Thouez, Sept./Oct., p. 35

Transnational corporations *see* Multinational corporations

Unemployment *see* Economic problems

United Nations (*see also* International law, Peacekeeping)
Thirty-first UNGA session, Pearson, May/June, p. 3
UNESCO, progress of, LeBlanc, May/June, p. 13

United States
Carter foreign policy, Collins, May/June, p. 25; Sewell, May/June, p. 30; Goodsell, Jul./Aug., p. 7
Canada/United States relations, new atmosphere in, Balthazar, Sept./Oct., p. 25

World Food Conference *see* External aid

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
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